Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory"
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@Keimzelle
ROTFL
'What exactly was the picture the German commanders had?'
Er... They had a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan with two hours of the onset of the operation, after they had found a copy of the plan on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, at a US landing zone.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
Antony Beever should have read a few books.
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@TimKitt
From the 1st September 1944 decisions about which targets to go for were made by Eisenhower.
What was the allied supply situation at that time?
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 591-592
‘At the start of September the Allied supply situation was certainly difficult, but it was not as serious as Eisenhower suggests, nor were the needs of his divisions as great as he asserts. Eisenhower says that " a reinforced division in active operation consumes 600 to 700 tons of supplies per day." ² This figure he quotes not from his own personal experience in command but from the U.S. War Department's Staff Officers' Field Manual, and it includes all manner of ordnance and engineer stores which are normally carried but need not be immediately replaced in a short, swift campaign. It includes also ammunition for heavy and medium artillery, most of which was grounded in September because it was not needed so long as the momentum was maintained. At this time Allied divisions, and their supporting troops, could be, and were, adequately maintained in action and advancing with a daily supply of 500 tons. (The fact that he was receiving only 3,500 tons a day did not prevent Patton attacking with eight divisions on the Moselle.) In a defensive role Allied divisions needed only half this amount.
When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels on September 10th, the Allied supply columns and transport aircraft could deliver from dumps in Normandy and bases in Britain to the front on the Moselle, the Meuse and the Dutch border some 10,000 tons a day for Patton, Hodges and Dempsey. The port of Dieppe was open and by the middle of the month had a daily intake of 3,000 tons, which was more than enough for First Canadian Army. In the last ten days of September with little help from air transport, the supply capacity was increased to 14,000 tons a day. Of this total 'lift,' 2,000 tons would have been ample to support Third Army if it had assumed the defensive. This would have left 12,000 tons a day to maintain the 20 British and American divisions with which Montgomery proposed to capture the Ruhr. Even on the basis of Eisenhower's inflated figure, this would have been sufficient, for in the wake of the advancing armies the supply facilities were being steadily improved. The petrol pipe-line from Cherbourg had reached Chartres by September 12th and was being laid at a rate of 25 miles a day. Rail communications were open from the Normandy bridgehead to Sommersous, 100 miles east of Paris, by September 7th, to Liege by the 18th, and to Eindhoven ten days later. At the end of September the port of Dieppe had a daily intake of 6,000 tons and by this time Ostend was also working.’
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@TimKitt
'They are going to need a port sooner rather then later'.
But how much sooner?
The German armies in the West were in disarray at the end of the Normandy campaign. When Montgomery met Eisenhower on the 23rd August, Montgomery said words to effect that that allied logistics only allowed for two of the four allied armies to advance against Germany and that the advance should be by British 2nd Army and the US 1st Army – towards the Ruhr. Failing that decision, Montgomery would agree to British 2nd Army and the Canadian 1st Army being halted, and the resources put to Bradley’s subordinates, Hodges (US 1st Army), and US 3rd Army (Patton), provided that a decision on a single thrust was taken to use the available resources to keep the allies advance on the advance.
The Germans were suffering a defeat as big as Stalingrad in France.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
'When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning [31.08.44] they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West.'
Post war research into the German situation at that time showed that at that time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces North of the Ardennes than were in Britain after Dunkirk.
Eisenhower accepted neither of Montgomery's proposals, all of the allied were thus under resourced, and the entitre allied advance groind to a halt, giving the Germans what they most needed: time and space to rebuild their forces.
The Germans seemed to agree with Montgomery's view of things:
Field Marshall Von Runstedt:
“the best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Strategically and politically, Berlin was the target. Germany’s strength is in the north. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open.There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in early September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Maas and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany.”
Hasso Von Mantueffel, commander of the 5th Panzer Army:
“I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower’s insistence on spreading the Allied force’s out for a broader advance was wrong.The acceptance of Montgomery’s plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives- on both sides- would have been saved.”
Gunther Blumentritt:
"Such a breakthrough ... would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."
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@johnlucas8479
‘Your state " The German armies in the West were in disarray at the end of the Normandy campaign.’
That seems to have been the case… but I might not be right. Given the evidence of the information available to allied leaders at that time that I have seen, that would seem to be a reasonable view.
‘It's all well and good to looking at post war research to make claims’
But in my case, I cited information available to allied leaders at that time that I have seen.
‘How far do you think the 2nd British and 1st US Army can go with supply lines stretching back to Cherbourg and Normandy beaches.’
Who can say? Not Me.
What is known, is that with a lot less resources, a month after Montgomery and Eisenhower met on the 23rd August, British forces got to a mile from Rhine at Arnhem in the MARKET GARDEN undertaking,. Albeit, with Dieppe operational by 5th September to provide resources for the First Canadian Army. Ostend was captured on the 9th, Le Havre on the 12th, Boulogne on the 22nd, and Calais on the 30th.
23rd August – 5th September…
I have not seen any estimate how long it would have taken to make any changes to allied military affairs needed to enable two of the four allied armies together as per Montgomery’s proposals on the 23rd August, have you? If Eisenhower had agreed to Montgomery’s proposals, and preparations for such an advance had taken until 5th September, there would have the certainty that Dieppe would be available to supply the First Canadian Army as it continued with the liberation of Channel and North Sea Ports.
What is known, is that Eisenhower turned down Montgomery’s offer to stop the British and Canadian forces in order that US forces could advance, provided that a decision was made about a way forward that was based on making the best use of allied resources at that time. Also, that Eisenhower cited political reasons for not agreeing to any of Montgomery’s proposals regarding the way forward.
I have not been any military organization, much less planned, or taken part in any war. But it seems to me that Montgomery knew a lot more about war than Eisenhower did, particularly about what happens when armies suffer huge defeats.
Montgomery had been a front-line soldier in the First World War, and had seen the defeat of the German army in 1918. He had been on the wrong end of the allied defeat in France in 1940, and he had led the pursuit of Axis forces in 1942 and 1943.
Eisenhower did not have single day of personal combat experience to his name, he had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. He seems to have had no reference point from personal experience to judge his decision making against.
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@johnlucas8479
'Not everyone agrees with your assessment of Eisenhower ability. This from amen that know Eisenhower during the war'
But what assessment have I made?
I stated this:
'Eisenhower got a very important decision wrong because he put US considerations ahead military considerations.
I might not be be right.'
My words, now read this:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P520
The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. Eisenhower's first reaction was that, even if it was militarily desirable (which he did not admit), it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war." To which Montgomery replied, " Victories win wars. Give people victory and they won't care who won it."
I also stated this:
'Anyone with even the smallest amount of combat experience would have more of that experience than Eisenhower. My mother had probably seen more of the enemy than Eisenhower at that time. But, all other factors being equal, then who would be the better choice for making military decisions?..' My words. My question was about Eisenhower and Montgomery, not Eisenhower and my mother.
Eisenhower may, or may not have beeen an able military commander. How should I know?
All that I have stated is what seems to have been Eisenhower's motive for turning down Montgomey's proposal for the advance to Germany, and put to you a question about the relevence of personal combat experience in assessing a military leader.
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@johnlucas8479
'Also, how many of the 49 transport companies were available between the 23rd August to 4th September when they were needed to support the rapid advance from the Seine to Antwerp?'
I don't know. I can go back to the relevent volume in the HMSO history of the war, but from memory, I dont think it contains precise dates in regards to the availability each transport company at that time. Beyond that, for more detailed information it might be a question of going to the MOD library, or something like that.
All that I did was answer you question: ‘were would Montgomery get the extra trucks?’, with the information that I have, that by the 26th September, 21st Army Group was operating with 59 transport companies.
Perhaps 43 of those transport companies arrived on the 25th September... Its not very likely, but I do not know the details.
But I stand by the opinion that I have aleady stated, that given what I know of the situation that faced the allies on the 23rd August, for me, Montgomery's proposal would have been the correct way forward. But that is an opinion based on incomplete information, and it is the opinion of someone with no military experience. Someone may yet produce evidence that would cause me to change my opinion.
All that I would add, is that given what seems to be Montgomery's track record on logistics, it does not seem very likely to me that Montgomery would made such a proposal, even in broad terms, with out having some idea as to how the logistics might work.
The chase after Alamein, where Montgomery made sure that the logistics properly assessed for the 1400 mile advance across North Africa, rather than some risky gung ho chase for glory, the day after battle ended. His detailed plan for OVERLORD, with allied build up being at the centre of his planning, his advice to Eisenhower on the 11th September, 1944, that MARKET GARDEN would have to be cancelled due to logistic matters, the massive preparations for PLUNDER in March 1945, and so on...
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Hardly...
Montgomery ripped to bits the the lunatic plan to land all around Sicily and instead, concentrated resources to land all the forces together, in one place. The outcome was a an allied success, despite Patton deserting the battlefield o seek personal glory in Palermo.
Caen had little bearing on the outcome of Overlord, which saw Montgomery beat the scheduled completion date of D+90 by 12 days, and with 22% fewr han expectd casualties.
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the years ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
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Tim 0neill
During 4th September, 1944, from his headquarters in Granville, Normandy, issues a directive to Montgomery (at Saulty. Hauts-de-France) and Bradley (Château-Thierry Hauts-de-France), ordering the forces north-west of the Ardennes (21st Army Group and two corps of First U.S. Army) “to secure Antwerp, reach the sector of the Rhine covering the Ruhr and then seize the Ruhr.”
On the evening of 4th September, as soon as he learned of the capture of Antwerp, Montgomery sent a signal to Eisenhower suggesting that the time had come to make “one-powerful and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin”
‘The state of Eisenhower's communications was such that his 'Most Immediate' signal, sent from Granville on the evening of September 5th in reply to Montgomery's proposal about Berlin, did not reach the Field-Marshal's H.Q,. near Brussels until after breakfast on the 7th. Even then the signal was not complete and the missing paragraphs did not arrive for another two days!
The final part of Eisenhower’s 'Most Immediate' did arrived at Montgomery’s headquarters until 9.15am on the 9th September and read:
The bulk of the German Army that was in the west has now been destroyed. Must immediately exploit our success by promptly breaching the SIEGFRIED LINES crossing the RHINE on a wide front and seizing the SAAR and the RUHR. This will give us a stranglehold on two of Germany's main industrial areas and largely destroy her capacity to wage war whatever course events may take.
On the same day (9th), Montgomery received a 'Secret' cable from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMS-TERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have disappeared.
Montgomery and Eisenhower met at Brussels Airport on the 10th, their first meeting since Eisenhower had taken over command of the allied land campaign, 10 days earlier. Eisenhower noted the outcome of that meeting:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. To assist Montgomery I allocated to him the 1st Allied Airborne Army, which had been recently formed under Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton of the United States Air Forces. The target date for the attack was tentatively set for September 17, and I promised to do my upmost to for him in supply until that operation was completed. After the completion of the bridge-head operation he was to turn instantly and with his whole force to the capture of Walcheren Island and the other areas from which the Germans were defending the approaches to Antwerp. Montgomery set about the task energetically.’ His words.
Sources: Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe. Nigel Hamilton, Monty The Field Marshall 1944-76. Dwight D Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe.
Where is there evidence of Montgomery disobeying orders?
Why can't people like this Edward Chandler check thing out before coming up with half-baked attempts at history?
Why do gullible idiots like Para Dave buy into this Edward Chandler nonsense?
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@larryvanmillion
'the u.s blunted the northern thrust by the time monty was tasked to clean up the lines.'
Not according these people:
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, 7th Armoured Division. “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zd6LrT7Zrjo&ab_channel=USArmyWarCollege
1hr, 4 minutes, 30 seconds onwards.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army.
'what major battle did the brits have in the north bulge ?'
So what is this about? Montgomery? Or Britain?
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The allied forces at all three areas of operations were under pressure after the Germans retrieved a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan from a dead US soldier, in a US glider, in a US drop zone. There were far more German troops in the vicinity of Arnhem, than in Nijmegen, and therefore, the 1st Airborne drop zones were bound to come under more pressure than those of the US airborne forces.
The evidence is clear, planning for and ultimate responsibility for the MARKET plan rested with the head of the First Allied Airborne Army, US General Lewis Brereton. 1st Airborne had been in action in Sicily and Italy before MARKET GARDEN, putting the division on a par with the US 101st Airborne division in terms of combat experience.
General Urquhart saw action in Sicily and Italy before MARKET GARDEN, of his time in Arnhem, Brigadier, later General Hackett stated: ‘There could have been no one in the 1st Airborne Division without the highest regard for Roy Urquhart, both as an officer and as a man. I have never seen anyone show up better in a battle.’
General Browning saw action in both World Wars and was and in 1941 was appointed as the first General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the newly created 1st Airborne Division. And yet, for political reasons, Browning was passed over for command of First Allied Airborne Army, as the appointment was given to US General Lewis Brereton, who had zero airborne warfare experience.
(What's your source that there was a 1000 German tanks in the Reichswald?
Don’t know who’s source TIK was.
Was it the same guy who said Monty would take Caen on D-Day? Just asking.)
Which guy said Monty would take Caen on D-Day?
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@dongilleo9743
‘It seems like one major criticism of the broad front strategy was that it spread Allies forces out too thinly from the English Channel to Switzerland. If you are concentrating Monty's narrow front 40 divisions in the north, wouldn't that by necessity require the rest of the front to be thinly held, like the Ardennes were prior to the Bulge? If the rest of the front is static and thinly held, with no threat of an attack, wouldn't Germany be able to concentrate all of it's best forces and reinforcements to oppose the narrow front? By August, Germany was scrapping together men to man the Siegfried Line, and building Volksgrenadier divisions. In September the Germans were able to scrape together enough men and material to stop Market-Garden.’
But the material point is that when Montgomery proposed the narrow front strategy in August 1944, the German Army had suffered a defeat in Normandy that was as big as Stalingrad. When British forces entered Amiens at the end of August, they captured German documents showed the state of German forces in the West. This information was later proven to be accurate as it is known that at that time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces north of the Ardennes than were in Britain after Dunkirk. The German forces that attacked in the Ardennes in December of 1944 were created and equipped in the period when the allied advance had ground to a halt.
It was one thing for German forces to overcome (just) a limited undertaking like MARKET GARDEN, quite another to have been able to resist a concentrated thrust of allied divisions to the Ruhr. Here are some views on the matter.
'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved'
German General Hasso von Manteuffel.
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin.
German General Gunther Blumentritt
'if Eisenhower had not been so "wishy washy" and had backed either Montgomery or Bradley in the fall of 1944, the war would have been over by Christmas. Instead he [Eisenhower] hesitated, then backed Montgomery when it was too late'
Ralph Ingersoll.
79 years later, no one knows for certain if a concentration of allied forces in a thrust into Northern Germany in September 1944 would have shortened the war. However, it seems to be clear that given the situation that the allied leaders faced at that time, the thrust into Northern Germany would have been the correct decision.
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@ErikExeu
'The whole idea was extremely stupid. The British should have focused on to clear up the access to Antwerpen and to trap von Zangens army. But these were too small things for Montgomery. His only objective was to take resources from the Americans. Well, then we can perhaps agree MG was 90% succesful.'
Not really...
MARKET GARDEN presented an opportunity to get the allies a Bridgehead over the Rhine, while they believed that the Germans in disarray after Normandy, and to stop the flow of German resources into the western part of the Netherlands for V2 rocket attacks on Britain, and before the Germans could recover from their deat in Normandy.
There is opinion that to 'clear up the access to Antwerpen' (The Scheldt), would have been a very difficult task and it could taken up to a month.
Meanwhile, any chance of getting across the Rhine at that time would have gone, and the V2 rockets would have continued to fall on Britain.
Montgomery had given Eisenhower the opportunity to take resources from the 2st Army Group and give them to the 12th Army Group, when they mt on the 23rd August 1944.
A note of caution:
Anyone can form a opinion, attribute blame, responsibility or whatever on the decision making of Eisenhower, Montgomery, Browning, Gavin, and so on, based on what is now known about the outcome of those decisions. Far, far harder, is to form a opinion, attribute blame, responsibility or whatever, based on what we know of the circumstances that those people faced at that time.
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