Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory"
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John Voltaire
'Monty is that he is a coward for dodging responsibility for the train wreck that was Market Garden,'
Where is there evidence that Montgomery dodged responsibilty for Market Garden?
If market Garden was a train wreck, what are the Siege of Metz and the Battle of Hurtgen Forest to be described as?
'dropping the entire thing on Gen. Sosabowski, the one person who pushed back realizing that this will lead to senseless deaths.'
Where is there evidence of this?
Montgomery criticized Sosabowski's work at Arnhem. That is quite different from blaming Sosabowski for the entire operation. In any case, why would he? Market Garden was largely successful.
'Additionally, Eike was going to fire him because Monty would not do anything unless it was pretty much a guaranteed win.'
First, Ike (Eike) could not fire Montgomery. Montgomery was in a different army and was accountable to the CIGS. Eisenhower could only request that he be replaced.
Second. Montgomery was thorough. A thoroughness saved many allied lives. Unlike Eisenhower and most US commanders, Montgomery had personal combat experiece - in the First World War and this experiece undoubtly influenced in approach to war.
'It's same as a boxer choosing his own opponents'
Why is it? Montgomery was appointed to command 8th Army in Africa, Sicily and Italy and his battle plans all met with agreement by other allied commanders. For D-Day, the landing location was chosen and Germans the put nearly all of their forces in front of he British 2nd Army. In the Bulge, Eisenhower asked Montgomery to take command of the northern armies.
'His victory in Africa was due more to lack of resources and stretched supply lines of Germans than efforts by the Brits.
If 'lack of resources' means that Montgomery's victory was devalued then that also applies to every single US victory in Europe during the war. They only ever fought German forces that had a 'lack of resources'.
Which one do you want?
'Hitler never really cared for Africa especially after Barbarossa started.'
That is nothing to do with Montgomery.
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'Monty was a nasty piece of work--obsessed with his own image, much like MacArthur, but without MacArthur's talent (and Mac was no Patton or Slim or O'Connor). He was embarrassed because he had focused on taking Antwerp while ignoring the undefended Scheldt estuary until it was too late and the Germans occupied it in force--as Antwerp fell.’
Deferring an attack on the Scheldt was agreed by Eisenhower, who by September 1944, as well as being Supreme Commander, had taken over from Montgomery as allied land forces commander.
Eisenhower later acknowledged that he had agreed to Market Garden ahead of the Scheldt:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
His words.
Further, the need to degrade the German V-Weapon attacks on Britain and Belgium from the western part of the Netherlands was a major driving force behind the launching of Market Garden. Obviously no American can relate to this.
‘Taking the Ruhr, let alone Berlin, was utterly impossible without Antwerp as a functioning port--so Monty's later story made no logistical sense, whereas Ike's story was quite sensible and consistent with every other strategic decision he made throughout the war. Ike was always very attentive to his logistics.’
In September 1944 21st Army Group and 12th Army Group were each receiving 7,500 tons of supplies per day. Enough to sustain 20 divisions for a combined thrust against the Ruhr by the British 2nd Army and the US First Army. Opposing those 20 divisions, along entire Western Front the Germans could muster fewer tanks and artillery pieces that Britain had in Britain after Dunkirk.
‘Churchill and Britain needed a hero in late 1942 and after sacking Auchinleck and then winning at El Alamein, Churchill and Brooke (always Monty's sponsor) built Monty up far beyond his real talents, and then everybody was stuck with the great "hero" and his great ego: a decent general for 1918 set-piece battles but not for highly mobile combined arms offensives in 1943-44.’
Churchill and Britain needed victories in late 1942. There was no desire to see heroes in Britain during the war from the upper echelons in all parts of public life. The whole thrust of ‘propaganda’ or government messages based on MPs own anecdotes from their contact with the public, and evidence acquired from ‘mass observation’ was to emphasize the collective effort, particularly the men and women in street. Posters were all about ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘together’. The films people watched: ‘Millions like Us’, ‘The Way Ahead’, ‘Went the Day Well’, The Foreman Went to France’. Montgomery became well known through he enthused his troops and by winning battles.
‘It was no fluke when Patton beat him to Messina in Sicily, or when Rommel was able to salvage what was left of his forces after Alamein and reconstitute his army in Tunisia, when a vigorous pursuit (think, Patton or Guderian) would have left him without a functioning force.’
Correct. It was no fluke:
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
'Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
If there was any chance Market-Garden could have worked, it would have been with the two Army Groups reversed, with either Patton or Hodges (not that Hodges was so great by late 1944, but think Collins' corps and Ridgway's airborne troops) with the pedal to the metal. Monty, Dempsey, and Horrocks were NOT the people to lead such a bold, combined arms, "time is of the essence" operation deep into enemy territory on a single axis. But Monty in the North and Bradley to his South was forced by logistical necessities recognized back in 1943, and they were what they were.
But all of the major set backs happened to the Airborne forces which were under the command of the US General Brereton and over which 21st Army Group had no direct jurisdiction: The choice of landing zones and the decision to delay an attempt to capture Nijmegen Bridge. XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen on the third day, in time to reach the troops at Arnhem Bridge, only to find that Nijmegen was still in German hands.
‘The only real question is whether Ike recognized the futility of all this and acquiesced in Churchill's and Montgomery's pressure for the sake of Allied unity, knowing that with Monty-Dempsey-Horrocks in charge its chances were slim to none, but at least the casualties would be British and the responsibility of the Brits who were forcing it on him--or did he talk himself into thinking against all reason and his usual cautious nature, that it might work?’
What futility? Eisenhower had this to state about Market Garden:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
His words.
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Michael McCotter
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
It seems that according to one William F Buckingham, quoted by some people in YouTube comments, Montgomery did not see the MARKET plan until the 15th September.
The 21st Army Group report on Market Garden noted:
'D -1 16 Sep 1630 hrs. Lt-Gen BRERETON decided to proceed with op MARKET'
On what basis should MARKET GAEDEN have been cancelled?..
It seems that neither Dempsey or Brereton said no can do. The weather forecast was good, the intelligence picture was probably of concern, but it was far from conclusive. The urgent request from London for action against V2 rocket launches from the Netherlands had to be attended to.
Montgomery later stated that he should have insisted on certain changes to the MARKET plan, a very noble thing to do, given the overwhelming evidence that he did not have the power to insist on those changes.
P.S. There is another TIK follower from Alaska...
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Michael McCotter
Oh well…
At this point we seem to have a reached a consensus, due to the lack of any evidence posted so far that refutes what I have quoted, that Montgomery had no final say of the MARKET airborne plan.
As to what date Montgomery saw the MARKET plan, in my previous comment I noted what other people had stated in YouTube comments about that date. Let us recap on what I stated:
‘It seems that according to one William F Buckingham, quoted by some people in YouTube comments, Montgomery did not see the MARKET plan until the 15th September.’ My words.
Young Big Woody(aka Para Dave on YouTube comments) has taken it upon himself to get up-tight about this, as if I had as if I claimed that this is an irrefutable fact. How would I know, I have not read the book. ROTFL.
Para Dave goes to paste substantial (by YouTube standards), amounts of quotes which all of which may or may not be quotes from this august work by Buckingham. Its not that clear.
Here is one that Para Dave notes a page for, like the rest, It is nothing to do with who had he final say on the MARKET airborne plan, or what date Montgomery saw that plan.
‘ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,43-44 the Fact that both US Airborne formations were misused as conventional infantry under British command for a cosiderable amount period after the Failure of MARKET suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations’
How is this Buckingham supposed to know?.. I doubt that he can cite actual experience of those events, according to what I can find on-line, he is a tutor at the University of Glasgow. I doubt if that University employs tutors who are in their nineties. There could be any number of reasons why ‘both US Airborne formations’ were in the front line for as long as they were…lack of allied troop numbers?, they were considered to be effective units?, and so on. British 6th Airborne was retained in the front line for a longer period after D-Day that the US Airborne divisions were after MARKET GARDEN. Why don’t people check these things?..
Notice that young Buckingham states ‘the Failure of MARKET’ rather than the failure of MARKET GARDEN.
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So its still the case that we have not seen any evidence in these comments that refutes what I have quoted, that Montgomery had no final say of the MARKET airborne plan. Or as to when Montgomery saw the MARKET plan, if it was not on the 15th September.
Chester Wilmot, who, unlike Ambrose, Atkinson, Barr, Beevor, Buckingham, Hamilton, Hastings, Weidner, and so on, was actually there went on to state this view in regard to MARKET GARDEN:
‘It was most unfortunate that the two major weaknesses of the Allied High Command—the British caution about casualties and the American reluctance to concentrate—should both have exerted their baneful influence on this operation’.
Sitting here, 78 years later, it would seem that British caution about casualties was understandable, given Britain’s manpower situation after five years of war. The American reluctance to concentrate resources is hard to account for, given the success of a such a policy when it was put into effect by the Germans in 1940, by Montgomery in North Africa and Normandy, and by the Russians in 1944. By the time that Eisenhower made the mistake of appointing himself as allied land forces commander, in September 1944, dispersal of resources had failed when Eisenhower and Alexander allowed Patton to abscond from the battlefield in Sicily and Eisenhower had spread out the allied forces in invasion of Italy.
As far as what Bradley’s subordinate commander, Patton should have been told to do is concerned…it was really an American matter as who should command American forces. One of the opinions posted here by Para Dave would seem to indicate an opinion that there was something wrong with the performance of the US 12th Army Group. Seemingly, Montgomery was of the opinion at the beginning of December that Patton would have been a better choice to lead US forces in the North, rather than Bradley’s other subordinate commanders, Hodges and Simpson.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P 180
‘F.M. Montgomery entirely agreed with your point that it would be a great help to future operations if General Patton is transferred North of the ARDENNES,' Maj-General `Simbo' Simpson had reported to Brooke on 3 December.’
Notice that I have quoted what was stated at that time, not Nigel Hamilton’s opinion.
Reinforce in the North, reinforce in the South? Montgomery said then that Eisenhower should do one or the other. He did neither.
This what others, who were there had to say:
'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved'
Hasso von Manteuffel.
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin.
Gunther Blumentritt
And also, it seems, one American:
'if Eisenhower had not been so "wishy washy" and had backed either Montgomery or Bradley in the fall of 1944, the war would have been over by Christmas.'
Ralph Ingersoll.
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