Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory" channel.

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  8.  @johnlucas8479  ‘Bayeux to Rouen on the Seine River is 156 klms. Bayeux to Antwerp is 533 Klms. For each 100 trucks need to supply a division from Bayeux to Rouen would require 328 trucks to supply the same division from Bayeux to Antwerp.’ How so? Would that pre-suppose that transport resources for the advance from Bayeux to were being used to full capacity? Would that also pre-suppose that the same size of force advanced from Rouen to Antwerp was the same size of force that had advanced from Bayeux to Rouen? ‘Question were would Montgomery get the extra trucks?’ Who can say?.. British Second Army transport companies in France increased from six to 49 by the 26th September, with another seven to follow. That meant an increase from 360 Lorries to 3,000 Lorries, with another 420 to follow. N.B. Most of those transport companies used the British Army spec 4x4 3-ton lorries: the AEC Matador, the Austin K5, the Bedford QL, and the Crossley Q-Type, as well as Canadian Military Pattern vehicles. Further, two of those transport companies, that were using 6x6, 10-ton lorries (Leyland Hippo) at that time were issued with 5-ton trailers to be towed by those lorries. The Canadians were running another 10 transport companies. ‘If he uses aircraft from the USAAF and RAF Transport Commands to make up the difference that FAAA would not have the planes available to launch any Airborne Operations. Each proposed Airborne Operation would stop the air resupply missions.’ Perhaps you are right. But with an advance by British Second Army, and US First Army, put in hand after Eisenhower and Montgomery had met on the 23rd of August, what role would there have been for airborne drops? ‘For 2nd Army to maintain the same level of supplies at Essen compared to Rouen. Each 100 Truck at Rouen the 2nd Army would need 446 trucks at Essen. I just looking at the numbers. Either Montgomery thrust would stop at line Antwerp to Aachen until additional ports are operational which will not occur until October, or the number of Divisions would need to be reduced to maintain the pushes in the case of 2nd Army of the initial 9 Divisions at Rouen less than 3 could be supported on a drive from Antwerp to Essen. The US 1st Army 9 Division at Seine less than 6 at Aachen would be in a position to push onto Essen.’ In my opinion, you are reaching conclusions without knowing the full story. Besides that, I think that you would do well to consider what you think what conclusion would have justified a narrow-thrust attack, and what conclusion would have rendered a narrow-thrust attack a failure. There can never be a definite conclusion to this matter. I stand by my opinion: that based on what is known of the situation facing the allies at that time, as they understood it, a decision to adopt Montgomery’s proposal regarding the advance towards Germany in the late Summer and Autumn of 1944 would have been the correct decision.
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  30.  @USAACbrat  No. The evidence is clear in regard to the Montgomery's auhority ot undertake Market Garden: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. ' US General Dwight D Eisenhower. His words. As far as Market Garden was concerned, Berlin was not the target, as one of Montgomery's harshest critics confirmed: MONTY The Field-Marshal 1944-1976 NIGEL HAMILTON HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1986 P 49 In fact by 10September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot: I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic. Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue: Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine. In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue. Eisenhower's broad front policy gave the Germans what they most wanted, time and space to reoganize and rebuild their forces. As the Germans themselves confirmed: 'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved" German General Kurt von Manteuffel. "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open." German General Günther Blumentritt. 'Monty's need for glory'? He had already offered to stop 21st Army Group and leave all of the available resources to put into a US drive in the South, providing Eisenhower made a decision regarding a single thrust strategy instead of his broad front lunacy. A proposal that hardly displayed a 'need for glory'.
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  33.  @BaronsHistoryTimes  -Montgomery was at Eindhoven as soon as it was in allied hands, Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was in England. Model was Oosterbeek when the landings started, but soon fucked off, as anyone else would have. Only an imbecile would try to claim that Student was an 'Air Born General' in September 1944. -The V2 rocket campaign was hindered by Market Garden. -Eisenhower had agreed to defer the opening of Antwerp so that Market Garden could be launched. -The 17,000 lossses at Market Garden should be compared to Eisenhower's losses in his defeats at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000). -The number of Dutch civilian deaths in the winter 1944/45 are dwarfed by the number of people that were liberated by Market Garden. Further, there is no evidence the Netherlands would have been liberated before the end of the war if Market Garden had not taken place, or that that the Germans would have behaved any differently towards the Dutch at that time if Market Garden had not taken place. -The deporting of Dutch people to work in Germany statred long before Market took place. -Montgomery did not boast about anything in regard to Market Garden. -The timetable for crossing the Rhine was down to Eisenhower's lunatic broad front strategy. Montgomery had been obliged to postpone his drive to the Rhine at the beginning of 1945 in order that he could sort out Bradley's mess in the Ardennes. Bradley had enough trouble in trying to manage two armies, let alone three. Given ther importance that Germans placed on the Ruhr, giving US 9th army to Montgomery use was an obvious decision, even for Eisenhower. -The SS officer Prince Bernhard, was shown the door by both British and US intelligence services. Only his Royal connections kept him out of prison in the 1970s. Nobody is interested in his vile comments.
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  49.  @manosdelfuego1  ‘It was Monty's plan originally as it was supposed to be an entirely British ground operation but as no spare troops were available the Airborne was suggested which changed the plan. As Monty had no experience planning airborne operations and Brereton was consulted.’ Your words. Get real. It was only ever a plan that involved airborne troops – so that a ground advance could get into Germany around the top of the Siegfried Line. Montgomery had experience with working with airborne forces in Sicily and in Normandy. By the time of Market Garden, Airborne operations were under the control of the First Allied Airborne Army (FAAA), led by the US General, Lewis Brereton. ‘As for intelligence the only ones who seemed to accept it hook line and sinker were the British. This is evidenced by the selection of their drop zones and landing zones as well as their total lack of consolidation of forces after the drop. This proved fatal to the 1st Airborne. Now I will grant you that the 1st was in no way responsible for the drop zone selections. However, their lack of consolidation and moving on the bridge as a division proved to be their downfall.’ Your words. Get real. The drop zones and landing were decided by FAAA, which saw the same intelligence as everyone else. What prove fatal was FAAA’s choice of drop and landing zone locations and FAAA’s decision to spread the landings over several days, which compelled 1st Airborne to leave substantial forces to guard those drop and landing zone locations. ‘When the 82nd took Nijmegan bridge it took them about an hour with minimal losses as opposed to holding the bridge for a day or two and suffering even more losses. They took the bridge at the correct time when they could exploit the success.’ Your words. Get real. When XXX Corps reached Nijmegen, the City and the Bridge were still in German hands. XXX Corps had to fight its way through the City. It then took the Bridge while US 82nd crossed the river in boats incurring heavy casualties. Casualties they need not have incurred. If US 82nd had taken the Bridge when they should have, XXX Corps could have spedon to relive 1st Airborne at Arnhem Bridge.
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  50.  @manosdelfuego1  Not really… ‘One battalion took the brunt of the casualties instead of multiple units within the division.’ Your words. But the figurers do not really seem to bear this claim out: 1st Airborne fatalities were: First Parachute Brigade: 209, Fourth Parachute Brigade: 294, 1st Airlanding Brigade: 325, Divisional and attached units: 346. ‘The 1st Airborne pretty much ceased operations as a full unit after Arnhem while the 82nd was able to hold its ground until well into November.’ Your words. They do not compare. 1st Airborne was at the wrong end of Brereton’s air plan, and was attacked in far greater numbers by SS Panzer forces than either of the US airborne divisions. US 82nd was relieved by XXX Corps, starting the 3rd day of the operation, XXX Corps never reached 1st Airborne. Further, British forces filled out the Nijmegen bridgehead and began transferring forces there, after the completion of the Scheldt campaign for the push into Germany to the Rhine. Even 76 later, it seems to be hard for a layman (me) to make a case for any delay in an attempt to take Nijmegen Bridge. There was a delay, and look what happened. Here is one view, from a professional soldier: A DROP TOO MANY MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC PEN & SWORD BOOKS 1994. Page 242 ‘Nijmegen Bridge was there for a walk-over on D-Day. The Groesbeek Heights, so called, are several miles from Nijmegen. They do not constitute a noticeable tactical feature and their occupation or otherwise has little or no bearing on what happens in Nijmegen and Nijmegen Bridge. The Guards expected to be able to motor on and over, but when they arrived, late as it was, the bridge was still firmly in German hands. Now the 82nd, trained at vast trouble and expense to drop by parachute over obstacles, had to cross the river in the teeth of intense opposition in flimsy canvas folding boats that they had never seen before. When so bravely done, it was too late.’ ‘The overreach was on Monty, it was his plan and Browning, he failed to appreciate the situation tactically.’ Your words. The head of the First Allied Airborne Army, US General Lewis Brereton had the final say in all airborne operations at that time. Just prior to Market Garden he had vetoed a plan to drop airborne forces on Walcheren Island in the Scheldt. Further, as far as Brereton having the final on Market planning is concerned, the evidence is clear: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY P 588 The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave. THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945 Rick Atkinson LITTLE BROWN 2013. P 265 ‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’ UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P132 ‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’ ‘The plan would have been more sound and effective had the objective been Nijmegan. Once Nijmegan was secured it could've been used as a lynch pin to secure Arnhem and turn into the Ruhr.’ Your words. So, what should Eisenhower and Montgomery have done to try to stem the V2 rocket attacks on Britain: CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P543 ‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
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