Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory"
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@johnlucas8479
‘Bayeux to Rouen on the Seine River is 156 klms. Bayeux to Antwerp is 533 Klms. For each 100 trucks need to supply a division from Bayeux to Rouen would require 328 trucks to supply the same division from Bayeux to Antwerp.’
How so? Would that pre-suppose that transport resources for the advance from Bayeux to were being used to full capacity? Would that also pre-suppose that the same size of force advanced from Rouen to Antwerp was the same size of force that had advanced from Bayeux to Rouen?
‘Question were would Montgomery get the extra trucks?’
Who can say?..
British Second Army transport companies in France increased from six to 49 by the 26th September, with another seven to follow.
That meant an increase from 360 Lorries to 3,000 Lorries, with another 420 to follow.
N.B. Most of those transport companies used the British Army spec 4x4 3-ton lorries: the AEC Matador, the Austin K5, the Bedford QL, and the Crossley Q-Type, as well as Canadian Military Pattern vehicles.
Further, two of those transport companies, that were using 6x6, 10-ton lorries (Leyland Hippo) at that time were issued with 5-ton trailers to be towed by those lorries.
The Canadians were running another 10 transport companies.
‘If he uses aircraft from the USAAF and RAF Transport Commands to make up the difference that FAAA would not have the planes available to launch any Airborne Operations. Each proposed Airborne Operation would stop the air resupply missions.’
Perhaps you are right. But with an advance by British Second Army, and US First Army, put in hand after Eisenhower and Montgomery had met on the 23rd of August, what role would there have been for airborne drops?
‘For 2nd Army to maintain the same level of supplies at Essen compared to Rouen. Each 100 Truck at Rouen the 2nd Army would need 446 trucks at Essen.
I just looking at the numbers.
Either Montgomery thrust would stop at line Antwerp to Aachen until additional ports are operational which will not occur until October, or the number of Divisions would need to be reduced to maintain the pushes in the case of 2nd Army of the initial 9 Divisions at Rouen less than 3 could be supported on a drive from Antwerp to Essen. The US 1st Army 9 Division at Seine less than 6 at Aachen would be in a position to push onto Essen.’
In my opinion, you are reaching conclusions without knowing the full story. Besides that, I think that you would do well to consider what you think what conclusion would have justified a narrow-thrust attack, and what conclusion would have rendered a narrow-thrust attack a failure.
There can never be a definite conclusion to this matter.
I stand by my opinion: that based on what is known of the situation facing the allies at that time, as they understood it, a decision to adopt Montgomery’s proposal regarding the advance towards Germany in the late Summer and Autumn of 1944 would have been the correct decision.
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@USAACbrat
No.
The evidence is clear in regard to the Montgomery's auhority ot undertake Market Garden:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. '
US General Dwight D Eisenhower. His words.
As far as Market Garden was concerned, Berlin was not the target, as one of Montgomery's harshest critics confirmed:
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P 49
In fact by 10September Monty had discarded any notion of getting to Berlin in the immediate future. As he said after the war to Chester Wilmot:
I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.
Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.
Eisenhower's broad front policy gave the Germans what they most wanted, time and space to reoganize and rebuild their forces. As the Germans themselves confirmed:
'I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower's insistence on spreading the Allied forces out for a broader advance was wrong. The acceptance of Montgomery's plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives—on both sides—would have been saved"
German General Kurt von Manteuffel.
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really
strong striking force with which to break through to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open."
German General Günther Blumentritt.
'Monty's need for glory'? He had already offered to stop 21st Army Group and leave all of the available resources to put into a US drive in the South, providing Eisenhower made a decision regarding a single thrust strategy instead of his broad front lunacy. A proposal that hardly displayed a 'need for glory'.
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@BaronsHistoryTimes
-Montgomery was at Eindhoven as soon as it was in allied hands, Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was in England. Model was Oosterbeek when the landings started, but soon fucked off, as anyone else would have. Only an imbecile would try to claim that Student was an 'Air Born General' in September 1944.
-The V2 rocket campaign was hindered by Market Garden.
-Eisenhower had agreed to defer the opening of Antwerp so that Market Garden could be launched.
-The 17,000 lossses at Market Garden should be compared to Eisenhower's losses in his defeats at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000).
-The number of Dutch civilian deaths in the winter 1944/45 are dwarfed by the number of people that were liberated by Market Garden. Further, there is no evidence the Netherlands would have been liberated before the end of the war if Market Garden had not taken place, or that that the Germans would have behaved any differently towards the Dutch at that time if Market Garden had not taken place.
-The deporting of Dutch people to work in Germany statred long before Market took place.
-Montgomery did not boast about anything in regard to Market Garden.
-The timetable for crossing the Rhine was down to Eisenhower's lunatic broad front strategy. Montgomery had been obliged to postpone his drive to the Rhine at the beginning of 1945 in order that he could sort out Bradley's mess in the Ardennes. Bradley had enough trouble in trying to manage two armies, let alone three. Given ther importance that Germans placed on the Ruhr, giving US 9th army to Montgomery use was an obvious decision, even for Eisenhower.
-The SS officer Prince Bernhard, was shown the door by both British and US intelligence services. Only his Royal connections kept him out of prison in the 1970s. Nobody is interested in his vile comments.
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@ToolTimeTabor
‘Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. TIK ignores the reality of the situation as he is a Monty fanboy The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool.’- Para Dave / Big Woody.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
N.B. This is SHAEF information, not 21st Army Group information.
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@manosdelfuego1
Not really…
‘One battalion took the brunt of the casualties instead of multiple units within the division.’
Your words.
But the figurers do not really seem to bear this claim out:
1st Airborne fatalities were: First Parachute Brigade: 209, Fourth Parachute Brigade: 294, 1st Airlanding Brigade: 325, Divisional and attached units: 346.
‘The 1st Airborne pretty much ceased operations as a full unit after Arnhem while the 82nd was able to hold its ground until well into November.’ Your words.
They do not compare.
1st Airborne was at the wrong end of Brereton’s air plan, and was attacked in far greater numbers by SS Panzer forces than either of the US airborne divisions. US 82nd was relieved by XXX Corps, starting the 3rd day of the operation, XXX Corps never reached 1st Airborne. Further, British forces filled out the Nijmegen bridgehead and began transferring forces there, after the completion of the Scheldt campaign for the push into Germany to the Rhine.
Even 76 later, it seems to be hard for a layman (me) to make a case for any delay in an attempt to take Nijmegen Bridge. There was a delay, and look what happened. Here is one view, from a professional soldier:
A DROP TOO MANY
MAJOR GENERAL JOHN FROST CB, DSO, MC
PEN & SWORD BOOKS 1994.
Page 242
‘Nijmegen Bridge was there for a walk-over on D-Day. The Groesbeek Heights, so called, are several miles from Nijmegen. They do not constitute a noticeable tactical feature and their occupation or otherwise has little or no bearing on what happens in Nijmegen and Nijmegen Bridge. The Guards expected to be able to motor on and over, but when they arrived, late as it was, the bridge was still firmly in German hands. Now the 82nd, trained at vast trouble and expense to drop by parachute over obstacles, had to cross the river in the teeth of intense opposition in flimsy canvas folding boats that they had never seen before. When so bravely done, it was too late.’
‘The overreach was on Monty, it was his plan and Browning, he failed to appreciate the situation tactically.’ Your words.
The head of the First Allied Airborne Army, US General Lewis Brereton had the final say in all airborne operations at that time. Just prior to Market Garden he had vetoed a plan to drop airborne forces on Walcheren Island in the Scheldt. Further, as far as Brereton having the final on Market planning is concerned, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
‘The plan would have been more sound and effective had the objective been Nijmegan. Once Nijmegan was secured it could've been used as a lynch pin to secure Arnhem and turn into the Ruhr.’
Your words.
So, what should Eisenhower and Montgomery have done to try to stem the V2 rocket attacks on Britain:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th. were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
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