Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory"
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@GiacomoLockhart
Err... no, Montgomery never acquired the the title of Supreme Commander. At all times Montgomery was accountable to Eisenhower. More so at the time of Market Garden than previously. Eisenhower was Supreme Commander throughout the campaign in Europe, and from 1st September 1944 had taken over from Montgomery as Allied Land Forces Commander. If the Max Hastings book does not mention that fact then you should ask that author for your money back.
Eisenhower's broad front strategy, enacted when he took over as Allied Land Forces Commander from 1st September 1944, took the allies nowhere in three months and cost 20,000 casualties at Aachen, 45,000 casulaties at Metz and 55,000 - and led to the Battle of the Bulge. Also during that period Market Garden cost 17,000 casualties and took the allies to the top end of he Siegfried Line.
Montgomery's tenure as Allied Land Forces Commander from D-Day (that was the 6th June 1944 btw) to 31st August 1944 and cleared the whole of France, and inflicted a bigger defeat on Germany than Stalingrad.
Perhaps I should start reading books about Market Garden, doubtless I have been sidetracked by the works of Alanbrooke, Churchill, DeGuingand, Eisenhower, John Frost, John Hackett, Leo Heaps, Lipmann Kessel, Martin Middlebrook, Cornelius Ryan, Graeme Warrack, Chester Wilmot and Roy Urquhart.
If you are lucky (or perhaps unlucky in your case) John Cornell will tell you about allies intelligence and those German troops at Arnhem.
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@GiacomoLockhart
Your wors in 'single quotes':
‘Montgomery was in charge of Op Market Garden. He was supreme commander - small "s" and "c". Fact.’
Anybody, but anybody, care to try to tell me where Montgomery was described as supreme commander or Supreme Commander in any situation in 1944-45?
‘Monty's failure meant that Ike's broad front strategy was then adopted’
Get real. Eisenhower’s broad front strategy was in place before Market Garden was even devised. One of Bradley’s subordinate commanders, Patton had already resumed his offensive towards the Saar and another of his subordinate commanders, Hodges was moving towards Aachen.
That was the point of Market Garden, It left he broad front strategy intact. The only new forces involved were airborne divisions from the First Allied Airborne Army. The only additional suppliers were 500 tons per day (enough for one division) for a limited period before the onset of Market Garden.
‘everyone (except Monty) knew that Market Garden had been a failure.’
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON
1947
P419
It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.
'Since Ike's strategy lasted until the end of the war - and not merely the 9 days that Market Garden did - there can be no comparison of casualty figures. You fatuously compare a few days with the remaining 9 months of war. That is just plain dumb.’
Get real, I have left out loads: the Bulge, Operation Queen and so on and so on.
‘The Battle of Aachen, which lasted 2 weeks and 9 days, resulted in 2,000 US dead and c.5,000 casualties, totalling 7,000, not 20,000, and, once again, was due to stiff German resistance, not Ike's broad front strategy.’
THE US OFFICIAL HISTORY
The Siegfried Line Campaign p. 185
Chapter 10. Aachen and the River Roer
P.224
‘The recent battering at Aachen had had occupied the first Army for a full month and cost 20,000 casualties and yet at no point had Hodges got more than twelve miles into Germany.’
N.B. Best you look further than Wikipedia next time.
‘that cannot be laid at the door of Ike's broad front strategy’
Get real.
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1959
CHAPTER 10. HITLER’S LAST THROW
P 340
November 28th. ‘Jumbo’ Wilson came to attend our C.O.S. meeting and gave us his views on future operations in Italy and across the Dalmatian coast. There are pretty well in accordance with the Directive we had prepared for him.
At 12.30 went to see the P.M., having asked for an interview with him. I told him I was very worried with the course operations were taking on the Western Front. I said that when we facts in the face this last offensive could only be classified as the first strategic reverse that we had suffered since landing in France. I said that in my mind two main factors were at fault, i.e.,
(a) American strategy;
(b) American organisation.
As regards the strategy, the American conception of always attacking all along the front, irrespective of strength available, was sheer madness. In the present offensive we have attacked on six Army fronts without any reserves anywhere.
“As regards organisation, I said that I did not consider that Eisenhower could command both as Supreme Commander and as Commander of the Land Forces at the same time. I said that I considered Bradley should be made the Commander of the Land Forces, and the front divided into two groups of armies instead of the three, with the Ardennes between them; Montgomery to command the Northern and Devers the Southern.
P 341
‘The offensive which Eisenhower had ordered in October, which Patton had anticipated by his attacks south of the Ardennes and which Bradley, after waiting a fortnight for the weather to clear, had launched on a far too wide front in mid-November was now petering out. Except for the capture of the Metz forts, it had achieved nothing; neither the drive on the Saar nor the drive on Cologne got the Americans anywhere or even engaged the German reserves.’….more to add
As Montgomery had warned Eisenhower when he refused to concentrate, the Western Allies were now in a “strategic straight-jacket”. They were bogged down and reduced to the trench warfare it had always been their objective to avoid.
‘For D-Day, Montgomery was made C-in-C 21st Army Group (that was the name of his command btw), not Supreme Commander. Eisenhower was Supreme Commander (capital "S" and "C") from December 1943.’
Thanks for letting me know about Montgomery’s title. My father mentioned it once when he told me about his army briefings before he set out for D-Day. But I thought na, that can’t be right. Thanks for putting me straight.
Btw. You failed to mention, or did not know that Montgomery was also allied land forces commander.
‘Finally, I note that you do not challenge the fact that Hastings was highly critical of Monty's plan. In fact, he said of it that it was a "rotten plan".’
Who cares? Hastings was nowhere near the events those events. He was not even born until after the war had ended. He was a journalist in Vietnam and later in the Falklands War. That was it.
It seems to get a bit better with this Robert Kershaw, he has at least had some military experience, but he is still far too young to have been in the war. As for Anthony Beevor, like the other two he is too young to have been involved in the war, he as in and out of the army in less than four years. He writes history to level of works seen in book racks in shops in airport departure lounges – American airport departure lounges. I have seen him spouting his nonsense in YouTube clips, its like dung dolloping out of a cow’s backside.
All three of them are being wise after the event.
Here is Martin Middlebrook, another post war historian, on Arnhem:
ARNHEM 1944 THE AIRBORNE BATTLE
MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK
VIKING
1994
CHAPTER 21
The Reckoning
P441
Few would argue with the view that ‘Market Garden’ was a reasonable operation to mount in the circumstances of the time.
Your contribution: 1/10 for effort.
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@GiacomoLockhart
'not Alanbrooke, Churchill, De Guingand, Eisenhower or Chester Wilmot'
Yea, right ho, or wrong in your case.
Alanbrooke offered no opinion on Market Garden itself merely confining himself to a diary entry after that operation, noting his opinion to the effect that Montgomery should prioritized the Scheldt over Market Garden.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this.
Winston Churchill's opinion on Market Garden was:
‘Heavy risks were taken in in the Battle of Arnhem, but they were justified by the great prize so nearly in our grasp. Had we been more fortunate in the weather, which turned against us at critical moments and restricted our mastery of the air, it is probable that we should have succeeded.'
His words.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this.
De Guingand's opinion on Market Garden was:
'It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland.'
His words.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this.
Eisenhower's opinion on Market Garden was:
'The attack began well and unquestionably would have been successful except for the intervention of bad weather. This prevented the adequate reinforcement of the northern spearhead and resulted in finally in the decimation of the British airborne division and only a partial success in the entire operation. We did not get our bridgehead but our lines had been carried well out to defend the Antwerp base.'
His words.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this.
Wilmot's opinion on Market Garden was:
'It was most unfortunate that the two major weaknesses of the Allied High Command—the British caution about casualties and the American reluctance to concentrate—should both have exerted their baneful influence on this operation'
His words.
As you have not read this author you cannot know this. And in this case of course, your father did not meet him.
Not a mention of Montgomery's ego hear, or of him being supreme commander hear. Its a pity we cannot here what you have to say, we could do with a laugh. Doubtless your family have to here your drivel.
You are a cretin, James Bogle. Whether you were in the British or not is of no consequence as you nothing about the events in question here. However, if you were in the army, that fact would only lend credence to American criticism's of the army in YouTube comments.
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@GreatPolishWingedHussars
'Churchill could use this accusations to put more pressure on Polish Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk to cooperate with Stalin, because it could be argued that one of his most valuable assets, Sosabowski's elite brigade, was no longer useful to the Allied war effort.' Your words
Do you actually think that there was ever any realistic chance that the the Polish Airborne
Brigade was was going any sort asset in dealing with Stalin? That the Brittish, and the Americans - who would have to provide transport, could have conveyed a brigade of troops across German held territory to Warsaw is absurd.
'But that wasn't the only lousy behavior from our unfaithful "allies". When you have allies like that, you really don't need enemies! Churchill was just as dishonest and mendacious as Montgomery and the traitor Chamberlain who betrayed Poland in 1939. Polish soldiers should never have fought alongside this treacherous army!'
Yea, so unfaithful that they went to war on behalf of Poland in 1939, they housed, fed, clothed many thousands of Poles to the tune of about £200 million in 1940s money, and then those Poles were allowed to settle in Britain under the terms of the The Polish Resettlement Act 1947.
If Britain is so obnoxious to Poles, then perhaps the million Poles that migrated to Britain in the 2000s should fcuk off home, so thatwe can all can understand what care workers say, and people can queue at bus stops again.
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@dmbeaster
'Your version is typical British obfuscation. Unfortunately, Montgomery's memoir preserves the evidence that his number one reason for proposing Market Garden was a path to Berlin. It was Eisenhower who dismissed that notion, but approved Market Garden based on much more limited objectives, as he makes clear in his memoir.'
Se below.
Eisenhower also never passed the buck on the failure of Market Garden to Montgomery - he accepted joint responsibility for the mistake, which had the consequence of badly delaying the entire war effort.
'Accepting responsibility went with the job, along with the cars, the champagne, the big chateau, the big parade in Paris, and first crack at the female drivers.' On what basis do you claim that MARKET GARDEN 'had the consequence of badly delaying the entire war effort'?..
'It is a certainty that Montgomery never gave up on his dream for Berlin based on something Eisenhower said and thought - he said nothing to that effect at the time. In the time frame, Montgomery never retracted his expectation to drive to Berlin.'
And why not?.. Montgomery was proved to be right. It as only cock-sure American politicians like Eisenhower, and Roosevelt who, in 1944 thought that Berlin did not matter.
'In a typically dishonest fashion, he subsequently pretends that Eisenhower's more limited objectives was allegedly his own idea.'
Not really...
Montgomery spoke with Chester Wilmot about Market Garden's objectives in 1946. I have quoted this already. Montgomery work 'Normandy to the Baltic' appeared in 1947, with no mention of Berlin in relation to Market Garden...Eisenhower's memoirs did not appear until 1948.
'But Montgomery's "path to Berlin" rationale was preserved in his own letters to Eisenhower proposing Market Garden.'
Which letters?.. The first time that MARKET GARDEN was proposed was when Montgomery and Eisenhower met at Brussels on the 10th September 1944.
'There is no honest way to spin it any differently.'
Any spin has come from chauvinistic Hollywood films, US TV proframmes, and a bevy of US authors who have re-written history.
Harsh but fair.
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@johnlucas8479
‘The point I was making is the important of having Antwerp operational ASAP for the future war effort.’
But Antwerp was not vital for a twenty division thrust into Northern Germany to cut off he Ruhr from the Rest of Germany. This could have been accomplished with existing supply quantities. Quantities that were soon to be added to by the availability of Dieppe and Le Havre.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 601
‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.
Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944." ‘
‘With the benefit of hindsight clearly the opening up of Antwerp should have been Monty priority. But at the time Monty though he could do both.’
With the benefit of hindsight, the allies should have had a workable to attack Germany as soon as it was clear that the battle of France was coming to an end. That would have entailed Eisenhower getting out of the way of the work of professional soldiers and thus allowing clear headed thinking to prevail over US self-interest.
‘Image the problems the Germans would have faced with Antwerp Operation by end of Sept, Monty Launching Operation Market Garden with the 1st Canadian Army supporting 2nd Army. 1st US Army attack to Hurtgen Forrest and Aachen as well as 3rd US Army attacking Lorraine simultaneous and all well resourced.’
But how was the Scheldt to be cleared by the end September? The amphibious forces were not in place for an attack on Walcheren, the Germans would still have mined the estuary – which would still have taken three weeks to clear.
The idea that the Scheldt could have been taken in a week is absurd.
‘Maybe if these operation Germans may not have been able to mass the Troops and tanks used in the Ardennes offensive.’
The way to stop the Germans from massing troops and tanks used in the Ardennes offensive would have been to do what the Germans last wanted us to do – as noted above.
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@johnlucas8479
Not really...
The Ruhr was there was there for the taking when the battle of France ended, as the Germans well knew:
"The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. The attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine"'
German general Gunther Blumentritt
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 601
‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.
Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."’
The time to act was at the beginning of September, based on decision that should have been made before then. At that Model had only 239 tanks and assault guns and 821 artillery pieces less armour and artillery than had been available in Britain after Dunkirk. Model had barely sufficient tanks to refit one armoured division.
Even if an attempt to clear the Scheldt had been made at this time, many of the assets needed for an assault were some way from being ready to deploy there, the Germans still held the Breskens Pocket, which would have precluded the use of the estuary. Further, the clearance of mines would still have taken three weeks. The moment to would have gone, the Germans would still have gained the time they wanted to re-equip their forces.
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@johnlucas8479
What did the allies know?
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P509
‘On the day after the fall of Paris, the SHAEF Intelligence Summary, reviewing the situation in the West, declared: " Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich.”’
What did Montgomery propose?
When Montgomery met with Eisenhower on the 23rd August (1944), he stated:
“Administratively, we haven't the resources to maintain both Army Groups at full pressure. The only policy is to halt the right and strike with the left, or halt the left and strike with the right. We must decide on one thrust and put all the maintenance to support that. If we split the maintenance and advance on a broad front, we shall be so weak everywhere that we will have no chance of success."
What did Eisenhower decide to do?
He rejected Montgomery’ advice and proposal to concentrate resources, as had worked well in North Africa and Normandy. At that meeting on the 23rd August, Eisenhower rejected the sensible course of action, to concentrate resources in the North of allied front, and the option to put all allied forces there under the command of 21st Army Group on political grounds, stating to Montgomery that "The American public, would never stand for it”.
What happened?
When Eisenhower took over as allied land forces commander (01.09.44), the allied advance ground to halt, with each army taking on under-resourced undertakings, all of which failed (apart from the attack on the Scheldt). All of this gave the Germans time and space to stabilize their western front, stabilize their eastern front and to re-build forces, many of which were later used in their counter attack in the Ardennes in December 1944.
Again, Chester Wilmot provides the important information:
‘German records reveal that, of the divisions which took part in the Ardennes counter-offensive in December, very few were in existence as fighting formations during September. The training of the new Volksgrenadier divisions had only just begun, for the bulk of the troops who were drafted to them and to the depleted infantry units in the West during the autumn had been called up only in the last week of August. The spearhead of the Ardennes attack, Sixth SS Panzer Army, was not
formed until September and its divisions were not fit for battle until November.’
Eisenhower’s failure to create a plan suited carrying the war forward by capturing the Ruhr, an area that was producing 51.7 per cent of Germany’s hard coal and 50.4 per cent of Germany’s crude steel? Across the Germany economy the period September, October, November saw the Germans produce 1,764 tanks. Assault gun production rose from 766 in August to 1,199 in November. Rifles, machine guns, mortars artillery, ammunition etc continuing to be produced in substantial numbers.
Other poor American thinking in 1944 was the decision to withdraw US troops from Italy for Dragoon, which had little effect on the war in France but signalled to Germany a slackening off of US interest in Italy – leading Germany to withdrawing troops from that front and doubtless allowing the Germans to further prioritize North West Europe and the east over Italy.
Alanbrooke noted in Triumph in the West:
‘The situation awaiting the C.I.G.S. in Italy was dominated by three factors. The first was the withdrawal from General Alexander’s command, at the instance of the American Chiefs of Staff, of seven American and French divisions at the very moment when victory seemed within his grasp and their descent, on August 15th, on the South of France, where during the next few critical and decisive weeks they could play little or no part in either the Italian or the Overlord campaign. The immediate effect of their appearance on the Riviera had been, as Brooke had foreseen, the despatch by Hitler—sure now that no further landing on either the Italian or Dalmatian coast was to be feared—of three crack divisions from Italy to Northern France.’
Beyond that, there was publicity surrounding the Morgenthau Plan served stiffen the resolve of the Germans – moving the Nazis, the armed forces and the population as a whole closer together.
Any questions?
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@johnlucas8479
‘So was you are saying Monty know on 23rd of August that there was a supply shortage and he start the push for a single northern thrust.’
Your words.
Of course. Any real soldier could have seen that the supply situation and the need to exploit the defeat of the German army in France dictated a concentration of resources. Of course, Eisenhower failed to see that.
‘Then once Antwerp was capture intact, clearly getting Antwerp operational ASAP the supply problem would be resolved. So why did Monty Directive M525 dated 14th Sept place the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary after the capture of Boulogne and Calais. Your words.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
His words.
‘Clearly Montgomery made a poor decision about Antwerp, as he wasted resources, men and time when he should have focusing the 1st Canadian Army on clearly out Antwerp at the same time as he focus on Market Garden.’ Your words.
I cannot see what point you are trying to make here.
‘As you claim Monty had little involvement with Market Garden and he was focus Not on opening Antwerp, so were was Monty focusing on.’ Your words.’
Where have I claimed that ‘Monty had little involvement with Market Garden’? I have posted evidence that Montgomery had no final say on the Airborne part of the operation. But that is quite different to having ‘little involvement’ in the operation.
‘By the 9th of September the German forces in front facing 2nd British Army was already being re-built so that operation Comet was cancelled.’ Your words.
But Comet involved only 1st Airborne and the Polish Brigade. That should not lead to a conclusion that Market Garden should not have gone ahead, based on what the allies knew of German strength.
‘If the Ruhr was so important the direct approach would have been Wesel / Aachen direction, so why did Monty directed 2nd Army North towards Arnhem?’ Your words.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
‘While Italy and Dalmatian were important from a British point of view, clearly was you are claim the quickest way to defeat Germany was the capture of the Ruhr. The Italian Campaign was not going lead to the capture of Ruhr. So why should USA continue to support a secondary theatre that would not lead to a quick ending of the War in Europe.’ Your words.
As I have shown, the lack of USA interest in the Italian campaign had no consequential benefit the fight in North West Europe. The campaign in Italy tied down 50 German divisions in Italy and the Balkans, and maintaining troop levels there could have aided the collapse of Germany and could have aided the western allies in the post-war world.
This is what US General Mark Clark stated on the matter in June 1944:
“The Boche is defeated, disorganised and demoralized. Now is the time to exploit our success. Yet, in the middle of this success, I lose two corps headquarters and seven divisions. It just doesn’t make sense.”
Later (in 1951) Clark reflected:
‘A campaign that might have changed the whole history of relations between the Western world and the Soviet Union was permitted to fade away, not into nothing, but into much less than it could have been. …not alone in my opinion, but in the opinion of a number of experts who were close to the problem, the weakening of the campaign in Italy in order to invade Southern France, instead of pushing on into the Balkans, was one of the outstanding political mistakes of the war. …
Stalin knew what he wanted in a political as well as a military way; and the thing he most wanted was to keep us out of the Balkans. … It is easy to see therefore, why Stalin favoured ANVIL at Teheran…but I could never see why as conditions changed, the United States and Britain failed to sit down and take at the overall picture. …There was no question that the Balkans were strongly in the British minds, but…the American top level planners were not interested. …I later came to understand, in Austria, the tremendous advantages that we had lost by our failure to press on into the Balkans. …Had we been there before the Red Army, not only would the collapse of Germany have come sooner, but the influence of Soviet Russia would have been drastically reduced.’
‘Morgenthau Plan was agreed by USA, UK and USSR, so that no repeat of what happen at the end of WWI would occur.’ Your words.
Churchill was pressurized by Roosevelt into agreeing the Morgenthau Plan, but this plan was rejected by the government and it was put aside by Truman. But by then, the damage was done. Whether the USSR as in agreement was of little consequence, Germans were already fearing what the Russians would do as they overran German territory.
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John Cornell
From the Liar...
'Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy. Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a road sign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometres to Caen'
There is no sense in that. Minsk to Caen has Berlin roughly in the middle - between the two. This could easily be construed as a comment that Germany's day were numbered, they were facing enemies on two fronts, and so on and so on. Further, Caen was the most important and best known town in the allied bridgehead, that it was in the British sector would have been of little importance to people 1,400 miles away. Further, surely it would have been Eisenhower’s name that those Russians would have known rather that Montgomery. After all, US propaganda had spread the word far and wide that Eisenhower was the supreme commander of the expedition. The fact that he did next to nothing towards Overlord's success would not have been known to those Russians.
If this Gelb oppo can produce evidence that the road sign was aimed at Montgomery then so be it. Until then, Gelb's interpretation can only be described as dubious. Notice how the Liar accepts Gelb's interpretation hook, line and sinker.
If, in the unlikely event that evidence shows that this sign was aimed Montgomery, then the Russians can fuck off. Britain was fighting Germany on its own while the USSR was allied to Germany.
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@John Burns
Big Woody is a liar, and this is why:
Big Woody’s forgery can be seen here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2obwt4n1G0&lc=UgyXsiASB8pi_JS_WfV4AaABAg.9Afuv3FHaYc9BMmj0JXY2u&feature=emcomments
Lead comment:
John Cornell
3 weeks ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Patton should have kept his mouth shut and concentrated on achieving his task of taking Metz, which had been his objective two weeks before Market Garden and yet still hadn't done it 8 weeks after Market Garden.
The 25th reply is the lie:
Big Woody
1 week ago (as of 31 07 2020)
Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, page 188 Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image. At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!
This is were Big Woody unwisely took it from:
http://ww2f.com/threads/what-went-wrong-with-operation-market-garden.28468/page-5#post-389603
What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?
Discussion in 'Western Europe 1943 - 1945' started by tovarisch, Feb 2, 2010.
Page 5 of 14 < Prev1←34567→14Next >
RAM
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...
'Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!' ...
RAM, July 28 2010
...From another opnion in a hack forum, not from 'Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage. By Hanns-Gert von Esebeck' as Big Woody claimed.
From now on I refer to Big Woody as The Liar.
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@johnburns4017
This from Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
Part One
‘Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 454 By April 1945 the 61 American divisions formed the bulk of the Allied Armies,supported by 13 British,11 French,5 Canadian and one Polish.While Britain was now a significant ally amongst many,the United States emergence as a superpower was now all but complete’ His words.
By April 1945, the war was long since over as any sort of contest. In any case, the situation was absolutely nothing to crow about, The USA is, and was, huge compared to Britain in land area, population, ego, and bad taste. Untouched by war before and after its its brief period in the fighting,
and having bled Britain and France white, its teenage citizens now have got the bare faced cheek to try to tell others about the war. There was no Battle of Britain, or Battle of Moscow for the USA. American war stories are boring, their supposed efforts and privations on their home front pale by comparison with the home fronts in Britain, and Russia. No wonder their film makers steal other countries history, and their writers are constantly trying to do other countries down.
‘From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 116 Britain's war effort even after just one year of conflict - had placed an intolerable burden upon her finances and her future was now in the hands of The United States of America.Without American aid and assistance above and beyond the commercial basis of "cash and carry",Britain would not be able to continue the War.’ His words
Total Rubbish:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P492
‘The countries of the sterling area were with us: they adopted the same kind of exchange control policy as we did and were willing takers and holders of Sterling. With others we made special arrangements by which we paid them in sterling, which could be used anywhere in the sterling area, and they undertook to hold any sterling for which they had no immediate use and to keep dealings at the official rate of exchange. Such arrangements were originally made with the Argentine and Sweden, but were extended to a number of other countries on the Continent and in South America. These arrangements were completed after the spring of 1940, and it was a matter of satisfaction – and a tribute to sterling – that we were able to achieve and maintain them in circumstances of such difficulty. In this way we were able to go on dealing with most parts of the world in sterling, and to conserve most of our precious gold and dollars for our vital purchases in the United States.’
And of course, the USA did not take advantage of the situation, perish the thought…
P506
‘The President sent a warship to Capetown to carry away all the gold we had gathered there. The great British business of Courtaulds in America was sold by us at the request of the United States Government at a figure much below its instrinic worth.’
‘*Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts’ His words.
The last time I saw Andrew Roberts on TV, he was getting taken apart by a couple of Indian historians, who demolished his lunatic views on the state of India at the time of independence.
‘p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse’ His words.
This clown Roberts must be out of his mind. The is no record of any desperation on the part of Britain to seek involvement from US forces. A German invasion in 1940 was almost certain to fail. A German invasion in 1941, 1942 and so on…bring it on.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME II THEIR FINEST HOUR
REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
P278
‘We have seen how our many anxieties and self-questionings led to a steady increase in the confidence with which from the beginning we had viewed the invasion project. On the other hand, the
more the German High Command and the Fuehrer looked at the venture, the less they liked it. We
could not, of course, know each other’s moods and valuations; but with every week from the middle of July to the middle of September, the unknown identity of views upon the problem between the German and British Admiralties, between the German Supreme Command and the British Chiefs of Staff, and also between the Fuehrer and the author of this book, became more definitely pronounced. If we could have agreed equally well about other matters, there need have been no war. It was, of course, common ground between us that all depended upon the battle in the air. The question was how this would end between the combatants; and in addition the Germans wondered whether the British people would stand up to the air bombardment, the effect of which in these days was greatly exaggerated, or whether they would crumple and force His Majesty’s Government to capitulate. About this Reichsmarshal Goering had high hopes, and we had no fears.’
Likewise, a sudden Russian collapse…Churchill did not think so, and he called the shots.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME III THE GRAND ALLIANCE. 1950.
P352
‘Without in the slightest degree challenging the conclusion which history will affirm that the Russian resistance broke the power of the German armies and inflicted mortal injury upon the life-energies of the German nation, it is right to make it clear that for more than a year after Russia was involved in the war she presented herself to our minds as a burden and not as a help. None the less we rejoiced to have this mighty ally in the battle with us, and we all felt that even if the Soviet armies were driven back to the Ural Mountains Russia would still exert an immense, and if she persevered in the war, an ultimately decisive force.’
It took four years for Britain and the late USA, easily the two biggest shipbuilding countries in the world to build up invasion force, supported by the world’s two largest navies, massive air forces, round the clock bombing, Britain reading German codes, the populations of the occupied on the allies side. Even in the very, very, unlikely event that Germany got the best of Russia,, how long would they have needed an invasion force to compare with Overlord? Hitler would have dead long before any such to pass. In which case, the Germans would have made peace, which was exactly what they did in 1945.
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@johnburns4017
Part Two...
‘p.149 Air Chief Marshall Portal reminisced to Chester Wilmot "the Americans had tremendous confidence in their own troops and by and large the confidence was justified for they did lean very quickly once they got into action-far more quickly than our lads did and once they got experience fought extremely well’
Really?..
In his great work ‘THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE’, Chester Wilmot makes no mention Portal in the narrative, nor does he mention him as a source:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
APPENDIX A
A NOTE ON SOURCES
‘I am under a great obligation to those who have helped me and particularly to: Air Chief Marshall Lord Dowding; Marshal of the R.A.F. Lord Tedder; General W. Bedell Smith, Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb, General Sir Frederick Morgan, Major-General K. W. D. Strong and Brigadier E. J. Foord (all of SHAEF) ; Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand, Major-General Sir Miles Graham, Brigadier
R. F. K. Belchem, Brigadier E. T. Williams, and the late Col. J. O. Ewart (of 21st Army Group) ; Air Marshal Sir Philip Wigglesworth, who was Chief of Staff to the late Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, and Admiral Sir George Creasy, who was Chief of Staff to the late Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay; General Sir Miles Dempsey and Col. L. M. Murphy (of Second British Army); the late Lieut.-General George S. Patton, Lieut.-General W. H. Simpson, Major-General Clift Andrus, Major-General H. W. Blakeley, Major-General James M. Gavin, Major-General C. H. Gerhardt, Major-General R. W. Grow, Brigadier-General E. L. Sibert, and Col. B. A. Dickson (of the U.S. Army); General Sir Evelyn Barker, Lieut.-General G. C. Bucknall, General Sir John Crocker, Lieut.-General Sir Brian Horrocks, General Sir Richard O'Connor (all of whom commanded corps in Second Army) ; Major-General C. M. Barber, Lieut.-General Sir George Erskine, Lieut.-General Sir Richard Gale, Major- General Sir Percy Hobart, Major-General G. P. B. Roberts, Major-General D. C. Spry, General Sir Ivor Thomas (all of whom commanded divisions in Second Army) ; Major-General G. W. Lathbury, Major-General J. H. N. Poett, Brigadier K. G. Blackader, Brigadier B. A. Coad, Brigadier J. W. Hackett, Brigadier C. B. C. Harvey, Brigadier S. J. L. Hill, Brigadier W. R. N. Hinde, Col. A. Jolly, Lt.-Col. R. M. P. Garver, Major A. D. Parsons, and Dr. J. M. Stagg. Finally, I must express my gratitude to the many anonymous staff officers—British, Canadian and American—who prepared the operational studies, historical narratives, and After-Action Reports upon which I have drawn extensively in the preparation of this book.’
And this is just from the allied side. Now compare this with the sources cited by clowns like Beevor, Roberts, Weidner, and so on…
‘p.156 American assistance was thus vital to prevent Japan taking control of the Western Indian Ocean. Churchill agreed acknowledging that Britain "was unable to cope unaided" with the Japanese threat there’
Not really…
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE 1951.
P162
‘Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt 15 Apr 42
I must revert to the grave situation in the Indian Ocean arising from the fact that the Japanese have felt able to detach nearly a third of their battle fleet and half their carriers, which force we are unable to match for several months. The consequences of this may easily be:
(a) The loss of Ceylon.
(b) Invasion of Eastern India, with incalculable internal consequences
to our whole war plan, including, the loss of Calcutta and of all contact with the Chinese through Burma.
2. We had hoped that by the end of April the American Pacific Fleet would be strong enough to reoccupy Pearl Harbour and offer some menace to the Japanese which they would have to consider seriously.’
From the minutes of a meeting of the Defence Committee and American representatives General Marshall, and Mr Hopkins:
P285
‘At the moment we had no sure knowledge of the United States’ naval intentions and movements in the Pacific. The first essential in that area was to get superiority over the Japanese in seaborne aircraft. We ourselves would very shortly have three aircraft-carriers in the Indian Ocean, and these might be joined in due course by the Furious.’
‘He’ [Mr.Hopkins] ‘had sensed public opinion both in America and in the United Kingdom, and had found it disturbed as to what the United States Navy was doing.’
ROTFL. As you can see, Britain was bloody terrified about coping in the Indian Ocean on their own.
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