Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory"
channel.
-
2
-
@johnburns4017
From Para Dave:
'Asked the Dutch they always appreciated the Big boys who didn't get bounced into the channel.They didn't appreciate fighting the Gerries as Bernard and the Burns family scurried for the boats'
The Dutch folded in four days, (17th May 1940) having previously tried to take a neutral stance.
The Dutch Royal Family and others then found sanctuary in Britain, from where the Free Dutc h forces and the Dutch government in exile were organized in London. The Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg governments in exile signed the Benelux Customs Union agreement in London in 1944. What did they listen to?.. The BBC Dutch Service, and Radio Oranje - from the BBC, on which Queen Wilhelmina broadcast to the Dutch people on 34 occasions.
Young Para Dave should come with me to the Scheldt when he is old enough, its usually free drinks for the British, all night. He might even get a half of lager to himself.
If Para Dave wants, we can go through the what happened with Belgians, the Danes, the Norwegians, the French, and the rest...He has not got a fcuking clue...
2
-
@johnburns4017
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
‘Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery;based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’
This is no use whatsoever, there is no way of knowing what were the words in the War Cabinet memo, and what words were Martin Gilbert’s opinion.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING 1952.
Page 269
‘Former Naval Person to President 1 Oct 43
…‘2. Will you also consider my difficulties in the consequential appointments. For instance, I understood that Marshall would like Montgomery for Deputy, or, alternatively, to command under him the British expeditionary armies in “Overlord.”’
P374
It now fell to me, as British Minister of Defence responsible to the War Cabinet, to propose a British Supreme Commander for the Mediterranean. This post we confided to General Wilson, it being also settled that General Alexander should command the whole campaign in Italy, as he had done under General Eisenhower in Tunisia. It was also arranged that General Devers, of the United States
Army, should become General Wilson’s Deputy in the Mediterranean, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder General Eisenhower’s Deputy in “Overlord,” and that General Montgomery should actually command the whole cross-Channel invasion force
P376
‘Prime Minister to President Roosevelt 18 Dec 43
…9. Turning to the “Overlord” theatre, I propose to you that Tedder shall be Eisenhower’s Deputy Supreme Commander, on account of the great part the air will play in this operation, and this is most agreeable to Eisenhower.’ The War Cabinet desires that Montgomery should command the first expeditionary group of armies. I feel the Cabinet are right, as Montgomery is a public hero and will give confidence among our people, not unshared by yours.’
P393
‘I had asked Montgomery to visit me on his way home from Italy to take up his new command in “Overlord.” I had offered him this task so full of hazard. Of course, in the absence of special reasons a general should accept any duty to which he is called by national authority. At the same time nothing in the unwritten law obliges enthusiasm. In the Grenadier Guards, with whom I once had the honour to serve, all orders are received with the one word “Sir.” However, all kinds of inflections may be given to this monosyllable. I was gratified and also relieved to find that Montgomery was delighted and eager for what I had always regarded as a majestic, inevitable, but terrible task. When he arrived at Marrakesh, we had a two hours’ drive out to our picnic at the foot of the Atlas. I had given him early in the morning the plan prepared over so many months by General Morgan and the Anglo-American Joint Staffs in London. After he had read it in summary, he said at once, “This will not do. I must have more in the initial punch.” After considerable argument a whole set of arrangements was made in consequence of his opinion, and proved right. Evidently he was a firm believer in the operation, and I was very pleased at this.’
So there you have it, contemporary documents, and Churchill’s own words, not a hint that ‘based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for him was very weak’. Why would there be? Montgomery had excelled in difficult circumstances as a single division commander in France in 1940, he had won in as a single army commander in North Africa, he sorted out Patton’s nonsense plan for Sicily, he had warned about Eisenhower lunatic plan for Italy, and had ben proved right.
‘Fancy some more?’
From Para Dave, that is like being faced with person holding a gun that shoots out a flag with the word ‘bang’ on it, when he (or she) pulls the trigger.
2
-
@johnburns4017
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
‘Alan Brooke's own words and Monty admitting it from his memoirs.Rick Atkinson a Pullitzer Prize Winner even chimes in,where as we know you just pull it
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...."’
Notice that this diary entry is from after the conclusion of Market Garden, and thus this opinion is hindsight. The whole period of MARKET GARDEN is covered by Alanbrooke in his work, ‘Triumph in the West’, chapter 8, ‘Lost Opportunity’. Notice the chapter title. Alanbrooke was in the Americas from the time before MARKET GARDEN was agreed, to a couple of days before it ended. Notice the words ‘for once is at fault’. What else could anyone infer from that other than Alanbrooke considered that Montgomery’s judgement had been fault free up to that time. After five years of war (two and two thirds years for the USA), and with Montgomery having been an army / army group commander since the middle of 1942. That will do nicely…
'Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it'
‘The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"’
Wrong… Montgomery’s words "a bad mistake on my part" was about his belief at the time that the Canadian Army could clear the Scheldt on its own. Unlike US commanders, Montgomery was prepared to own up to his mistakes. Montgomery did not state that an attempt on the Rhine before the Scheldt had been cleared was a mistake. Perhaps Rick Atkinson should have stopped polishing his Pullitzer Prize and checked back instead.
'From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
No how does this Neil Barr add to the subject?, Alanbrooke’s words have been available to read since the late 1950s. No one disputes that Alanbrooke stated what he stated. By including his extract, Para Dave is merely duplicating the quote. Why would anyone think that this Dr Niall Barr (who was born decades after the war), and his PHD, would bring anything new to the subject?
2
-
@johnburns4017
From Para Dave (aka Big Woody):
‘How about Air Marshall Tedder
With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal’
Tedder should have checked back when wrote this stuff. ‘With Prejudice’ was published in 1966. All he had to do was to look at Eisenhower’s memoirs, which were published in 1958, which included this statement: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
‘How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him’
Why go to Max Hastings, when you can get it straight from de Guingand:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’
'How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
The old div, Max Hastings, the Golf club bar bore, reported on the from the Falklands war, and then appointed himself an expert all things Second World War. He should have checked first.
1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1. 13.09.44:
‘the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered, in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
The ‘Recon Battalions intact’ was actually identified as a single battalion, the training and reconnaissance of the Hermann Goering division.
Bedell-Smith did not advise that MARKET GARDEN should be cancelled, he advised that one of the US Divisions should be moved up to Arnhem. That change hardly seems likely to have been acted on by the US General Brereton, who was the head of the FAAA.
'How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp.He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
How many more times?..
Eisenhower did attempt to contact until 5th September, and due to him being located Ranville, 400 miles behind the frontline, his message to Montgomery did not finish arriving until 9th. Meanwhile, Montgomery received an urgent message from London, asking what could be done about V2 attacks on London from the Western part of the Netherlands.from Montgomery immediately asked for a meeting with Eisenhower, which took place on the 10th, at Brussels Airport. As a result of that meeting, Montgomery was given the go ahead to plan MARKET GARDEN, as Eisenhower later testified: ‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’ His words.
2
-
2
-
Bullet-Tooth Tony
Who mentioned Norway, Netherlands, Belgium and France, Dunkirk, Greece, Crete,Hong Kong, Libya, Tobruk, Dieppe, Singapore?..
Not me, not you. Why would we, in a comments section about Market Garden?
Why would any sane person?
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
'Montgomery’s failure at Arnhem was his second time. The first time was at Caen during the Normandy campaign, the place where was supposed to be taken over on D+1, but actually happened on D+31. This is why after Operation Market Garden, we did not hear much from Montgomery any more, who basically retired, or was forced to retire ever since.' Your words.
The only undertaking that Montgomery gave about Normandy was to be at the Seine by D+90, he got there by D+78. After Market Garden, Montgomery cleared the Scheldt (The only allied victory in the Autumn of 1944, sorted out the Northern half of the Bulge, carried out the crossing of the Rhine, and then saved Denmark from being occupied by the Russians.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
‘Monty’s forces captured Antwerp Sept 4 1944. Supplies for the European theater didn’t start flowing through the port until late November. Why? It took 3 months for the Canadians to clear German forces through the Scheldt River 20:41 estuary’ Your words.
Not really…
Due to the pace of the allied advance from Normandy, many of the assets needed for the clearance of the Scheldt were still West of the River Seine. The banks of the Scheldt are over 100 miles long, and the entire lot needed to be in allied hands before ships could discharge their cargos at Antwerp. The fortifications at the mouth of the estuary were some of the most formidable in Europe. The Germans were still on the South side of the estuary, at the Breskens pocket. Further, the period of time you noted included a three-week minesweeper campaign to clear the estuary of mines. This would have applied whenever the land battle had been completed.
‘Because Monty didn’t pay any attention to this huge problem and gave the Canadians scant resources to complete the job. He was too busy with his genius Market Garden operation which was partially successful. Monty was not the man who should receive the mass of supplies since his ego was incredibly inflated compared to his abilities.’ Your words.
Not really…
It was Eisenhower that gave the go-ahead for MARKET GARDEN to take place before the opening of the Scheldt, as he later admitted:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
‘Maybe if Eisenhower had given the fuel and supplies to Third Army they could have achieved something quickly. But that would mean stopping four other armies and giving most everything to one army.’ Your words.
Not really…
At the time of MARKET GARDEN, US Third Army was 100 miles from Rhine. Any attack on the US Third Army front would not have taken allied forces into any vital part of the German homeland, unlike in the North, where an advance into Germany would taken the allies to the Ruhr.
‘How quickly did Monty pursue Rommel?’ Your words.
In North Africa, Montgomery pursued Rommel’s forces 1,350 miles to Tripoli between 03.11.42 and 23.01.43. A pursuit that took place along a single main road, in some of most extreme conditions in the world, with hundreds of miles between re-supply points. Alamein to Tobruk is 375 miles, Tobruk to Benghazi is 310 miles, Benghazi to Tripoli is 600 miles. Between supply points there was virtually no means of living of the land.
‘How quickly did Monty take his army from Sicily through the Italian boot to the allied bridgehead barely hanging on outside Naples?’ Your words.
If the allied bridgehead outside of Naples was ‘barely hanging on’, then that was down to Eisenhower, and his planning, as, not for the first or last time, he split allied resources, as he sought to bolster the prestige of the US army by sending Montgomery to the pointless diversion of operation BAYTOWN, and the even more pointless diversion that was operation SLAPSTICK, in which the 1st Airborne Division was transported to Taranto on the decks of four Royal Navy cruisers, one Royal Navy minelayer, and one USN cruiser. This left scant allied forces spread out over hundreds of miles, and Eighth army needing to cross any number of rivers to bridge and cross as the Germans escape northward, thanks to Eisenhower taking charge of the campaign.
‘No one trusted Monty to move his army quickly and achieve all he promised. He had let his allies and compatriots down too many times.’ Your words.
Montgomery delivered complete victory in North Africa, and in Normandy. If anybody let allies down it was Patton, when he deserted the battlefield in Sicily to gain personal glory at Palermo, and again when he headed towards Paris instead of enveloping German forces in Normandy. Or how about Mark Clark leaving British and US forces in the lurch as sought personal glory in Rome?
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@nickdanger3802
Its a definate no.
whilst Britain was buying large amounts of 100 octane from the US, that wasn't the only source of supply. They were also importing it from Abadan in Iran, Trinidad, Curacao and Aruba in the Caribbean and producing it in 2 British refineries, Billingham and Stanlow.
Government records show that in August 1940, planned and actual imports between May 1940 and April 1941 would amount to 27.8 million tons of oil, of which 6.3 million tons would come from the US.
1,324,000 tons of this would be aviation fuel, of which 205,900 tons, 16% of the total, would come from the US.
Britain later cut back on imports from the Middle East in favour of increased imports from the US, because the sea route was shorter, but the RAF was not dependent on US fuel for the BoB.
The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain in the English Historical Review.
The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain -- Bailey CXXIII (501): 394 -- The English Historical Review.
Abstract
Aviation historians have advanced the supply of 100-octane aviation fuel as a critical and recognisably American contribution to the Battle of Britain during the critical events of 1940. A study of the contemporary Air Ministry records in the Public Record Office indicates that this assertion can be challenged. This challenge can be made both on the grounds of the aircraft performance benefit involved, as indicated by contemporary RAF testing, and on the national origin attributed to 100-octane fuel supplies. These records demonstrate that, contrary to the assertions of aviation history, the supply of 100-octane fuel to the RAF in time for use in the Battle of Britain must be attributed to pre-war British planning and investment during the rearmament period of the late nineteen- thirties.
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
Overture: 1932-40
P13
‘There were some instances where one could sense a firm’s long-term selfish interest at work, and on the other hand there were some remarkable examples of unselfish collaboration between rivals. I think, perhaps, that the most remarkable of these was the collaboration between I.C.I. and Shell and Trinidad oil companies in designing and setting up a 100-octane petrol plant in Heysham.’
100 octane fuel only increased performance below about 15,000 ft, and most of the fighting was at that level or above. By far the bigger improvement was the switch to constant speed propellers for Fighter Command aircraft, that began to happen in July 1940.
100 Octane fuel had actually been developed by the French before the war and Britain had used it in Schneider Trophy competitions before the war.
N.B. Never, ever, ever let me see you trying to invent a US angle on the Battle of Britain again. 2,936 Fighter Command pilots took part in the battle, eleven (yes, that's 11) were American. Happy to acknowledge those eleven, one of whom was killed, none of whom had a confirmed 'kill', none of whom were Ben Affleck..But that's it.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2