Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory"
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@mvies77
‘When you speak of a theatrical movie, it is well known virtually none, unless they are a documentary, and even then it is affected by bias, portray events accurately due to dramatic license, etc. So well made simply meant, quality actors, cinematography, etc. It was just an example of a part of the total mass of info on the subject.’
The film is chauvinistic US tripe, designed to belittle Britons. Americans love it and believe it to be true.
‘As far as your citing Eisenhower, etc. The quote I read and also saw as part of a documentary on Montgomery questioning the true purpose of the actions goal as to opening a supply route for the allies. The question concerned the opening of the routes location and where it truly lay. It quoted Eisenhower as livid at Montgomery, with his staff meeting with Montgomery's staff and finally walking out after accusing the British of betrayal.’
But where is there reliable evidence that Eisenhower was livid with Montgomery in 1944? There might be some. Eisenhower met with Montgomery at Conde-sur-Noireau on 23rd August, when Montgomery stated that there was not enough resources to maintain the allied advance across the whole front and that therefore a decision had to be made to prioritize one advance. Preferably that advance should be made in the North, by British 2nd Army and US 1st Army with Canadian 1st Army and US 3rd Army halted. Failing that, British 2nd Army and Canadian 1st Army should be stopped and the allied advance be concentrated in the South by US 1st and 3rd Armies. Eisenhower chose neither and the whole allied advance ground to a halt.
At the beginning of September, Eisenhower made the FAAA available for use by 21st Army Group – the only allied close enough to Britain to be able to make use of this force. At this time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces on the western front than Britain had in Britain after Dunkirk.
On September 10th, Eisenhower and Montgomery met in Brussels. Eisenhower again failed change his broad front strategy he did approve Market Garden, which would be carried out without denuding either of the US armies of their existing resources.
Where is the betrayal?
‘Morale? There were soldiers whom died and were captured and interred unnecessarily due to the intel that was ignored because Montgomery would not wait.’
But how does Arnhem differ from other allied failures in the Autumn of 1944? Or indeed any other situation where soldiers are captured? Where is there evidence that Montgomery acted with impatience?
‘The Polish General was charged with the failure of the action taking the blame, when according to the documentary it was Montgomery.’’
Sosabowski was not charged with any blame for Arnhem not being captured. He took criticism regarding his performance, but that is quite a different matter.
‘Everything I have seen and read states it was a faulty plan from the top and as usual the infantry, etc paid the price due the ego of Montgomery whom was a thorn in Eisenhower's side.’
What have you read? Where is it proved that any price was paid due to Montgomery’s ego? There were a number of good reasons why the operation was launched. The need to hinder V-2 launchings alone justified the undertaking. Martin Middlebrook, author of Arnhem 1944 The Airborne Battle stated:
‘Few would argue with the view that ‘Market Garden’ was a reasonable operation to mount in the circumstances of the time.’
If Montgomery was a thorn in Eisenhower’s side then so be it. Eisenhower did not have a day of personal combat experience and did not command above brigade level before September 1944. His was political appointment and he should never have been put in charge of the allied land campaign.
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Here is the General Marshall Speach as I found it. Which stats have I missed?
'I'm profoundly grateful and touched by the great distinction and honor and great compliment accorded me by the authorities of Harvard this morning. I'm overwhelmed, as a matter of fact, and I'm rather fearful of my inability to maintain such a high rating as you've been generous enough to accord to me. In these historic and lovely surroundings, this perfect day, and this very wonderful assembly, it is a tremendously impressive thing to an individual in my position. But to speak more seriously, I need not tell you, gentlemen, that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.
In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines and railroads was correctly estimated but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the past 10 years conditions have been highly abnormal. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared, through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen.
There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile people in the cities are short of food and fuel. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.
The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products - principally from America - are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.
The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies the continuing value of which is not open to question.
Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full co-operation I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.
It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.
An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.
I am sorry that on each occasion I have said something publicly in regard to our international situation, I've been forced by the necessities of the case to enter into rather technical discussions. But to my mind, it is of vast importance that our people reach some general understanding of what the complications really are, rather than react from a passion or a prejudice or an emotion of the moment. As I said more formally a moment ago, we are remote from the scene of these troubles. It is virtually impossible at this distance merely by reading, or listening, or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp at all the real significance of the situation. And yet the whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgment. It hangs, I think, to a large extent on the realization of the American people, of just what are the various dominant factors. What are the reactions of the people? What are the justifications of those reactions? What are the sufferings? What is needed? What can best be done? What must be done?
Thank you very much.
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@moonshinerman
Its still a definite no.
There is not a shred of evidence that Montgomery considered Patton to be a rival of him. Why would he? Patton was junior to Bradley, was in another army, and was at the other end of the Front. However, at one point, Montgomery asked Patton to be moved North, to command US forces next to his armies.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P 180
'Monty did not think highly of either Hodges or Simpson, the First and Ninth US Army Commanders. If only Bradley would transfer Patton to the Ardennes or preferably to Ninth US Army's sector, then Monty was sure all would be well—F.M. Montgomery entirely agreed with your point that it would be a great help to future operations if General Patton is transferred North of the ARDENNES,' Maj-General `Simbo' Simpson had reported to Brooke on 3 December. 'He [Monty] said that he always intended that General Patton should come North as part of General Bradley's command'
Hardly the act of someone who considered Patton to be a rival was it?..
The intro to A Bridge Too Far is nonsense. It also claims that Hitlers was still winning the war in 1944.
As for Messina...
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact, he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
Your best bet is to stop relying on chauvinistic Hollywood films for your history.
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seth1422
‘doesn't he still do the bulk of his sales in the UK?’
I have no idea what his sales are in Britain or the USA either in total or in relative terms. Nor would I know where to check.
‘the unhealthy assumption that the world is conspiring against the UK due to base vanity and greed,’
Not my assumption. My belief is that the USA is chauvinistic in the extreme in these matters (modern history) and that the US media and American authors (and Beevor) do not care who they trample on to make money out of this mood.
Here is one example of many:
"I did not feel good" about suggesting Americans captured the Enigma code rather than the British. It was a distortion... a mercenary decision to create this parallel history in order to drive the movie for an American audience,"
- David Ayer, Screenwriter U571.
At least this this bloke had the decency to own up - albeit some years later. As far as this matter is concerned, for me I would not now trust anything that comes out of Hollywood any more than I would trust something that came from Stalin’s Russia.
The idea that proximity fuses and so on took the edge off of any desire from people in Britain, and in Belgium to see action against v weapons is absurd. But Americans with their homeland 2,500 miles from danger probably could not care less. Market Garden served to keep the war moving forward and would have cut the Germans off from many launch sites in The Netherlands. If Montgomery had said to Eisenhower – were going into the Netherlands instead of towards Germany one can easily imagine the response of Bradley and Devers, and their subordinates such as Patton. Muddled thinking started with Eisenhower and his aversion to concentrate forces.
‘Admiral Cunningham never stopped being furious with him over the Scheldt. Dempsey didn't trust his judgement. Harris couldn't forgive him for his dissembling over Goodwood. Churchill was uneasy with him and thought he was a "cad". And even Alanbrooke, his most important defender, constantly lived in fear of what he would screw up next.’
If Cunningham was furious with Montgomery then he should not have been. The decision to attempt the Scheldt or Arnhem had to be Eisenhower’s. The buck stops there. Harris furious with Montgomery? Where is that recorded? Churchill called Montgomery a Cad? Where is that recorded? Not in Churchill’s history of the war. I know, I have been all over it. All the mentions of Montgomery were positive.
Example:
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME IV THE HINGE OF FATE
BOOK II Africa Redeemed
Chapter XXIX: Return to Cairo
P464
‘I saw a great many soldiers that day, who greeted me with grins and cheers. I inspected my own regiment, the 4th Hussars, or as many of them as they dared to bring together – perhaps fifty or sixty – near the field cemetery, in which a number of their comrades had been buried. All this was moving, but with it all there grew a sense of the reviving ardour of the Army. Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
As for Alanbrooke, what screw-ups?
As an aside, I recommend you look up the bibliographies of the key authors TIK uses in his analysis. Middlebrook, Poulussen and Neillands in particular.’
From memory Martin Middlebrook concluded that Market Garden was a reasonable undertaking given the circumstances prevailing at that time and that the main reason why Arnhem was not reached was that US 82nd Airborne Division failed to take Nijmegen Bridge when it should have done. The whole subject has been done to death – like the rest of the Second World War. All of the key people involved are dead. The books they wrote are all available – and along with contemporary documents must form they must form major part of the story of these events. The documentaries that spoke with the key people were all made by the BBC and ITV in the 1960s and 70s. In modern times the only new information that has come out is the release by the government of codebreaking secrets in 1976.
The likes of Beevor and so on go over old ground and bring almost nothing new to the subject apart from splitting hairs, and splitting the split hairs, passing off opinion as fact based wholly on hindsight.
‘Oh, and I should point out that Beevor does discuss the delay of Warren's battalion of the 508th departing for the bridge on the first day…’He was nothing if not energetic and aggressive in his command style throughout his career, sometimes to a fault.’
I could not care less as all that matters is that Gavin failed at Nijmegen. Most historians and people like Beevor seem to take this view. I have an opinion that Gavin probably could not believe his luck when he got the chance to re-write history when he was asked to work on the film ‘A Bridge TooFar’.
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seth1422
'British military researchers Sir Samuel Curran and W. A. S. Butement invented a proximity fuze in the early stages of World War II under the name VT, an acronym of "Variable Time fuze".'
Brennan, James W. (September 1968), The Proximity Fuze Whose Brainchild?, 94 (9), United States Naval Institute Proceedings, pp. 72–78.
As for the rest of it. Montgomery could not get on with Tedder, Harris could not get with Leigh Mallory, Patton did not rate Bradley, and so on - who could care less. Its been raked over so many times. All Beevor and his like are doing is going over old ground with only hindsight to bring into play as they pass judgement without any proper context.
Him and the rest and the US media should shut the fuck up and do something constructive.
Even my father has lost interest and he went right through 1939-45, D-Day to Luneberg Heath. I'll wager that there is a good many of that generation who feel the same.
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@georgesenda1952
When Eisenhower eventually ventured out to meet Montgomery, he went to the meeting by armoured train.
As relatd by General Simpson:
'Monty commented that he himself felt rather naked just arriving with an armoured car behind him, and he felt much safer with this enormous American guard before he met Ike.'³ Eisenhower was, however, embarrassed and ashamed, instituting an official investigation after the battle to determine whether there had in fact been due cause for such exaggerated security measures. '
The author Nigel Hamilton stated of Montgomery:
'Monty's own fearlessness was legendary. Standing on the beaches of Dunkirk he had berated his ADC for not wearing a helmet after a shell had landed almost beside them. 'But sir, nor are you,' the helpless young officer had complained.⁴ Landing in Sicily, Monty had toured the bridge-head in a DUKW with Lord Louis Mountbatten, C-in-C Combined Operations. When a German aircraft screamed very low over their heads Mountbatten had wisely thrown himself to the floor of the vehicle. 'Get up, get up,' Monty had chided him impatiently.⁵ Though he was conscious and careful of his health, with a near-fetish for pullovers worn one on top of the other, he seemed to feel no fear of enemy sniper, artillery or aircraft fire. Indeed so oblivious did he seem to the danger of snipers in Normandy that the War Office had sent a special cable pleading with him to wear less conspicuous 'uniform', lest like Nelson he fall needless victim to an enemy sharp-shooter—a cable that amused Monty since it so patently ignored the dictates of great leadership in battle, that a commander must be seen by his men and recognized. Bradley's and Eisenhower's caution in view of the rumour of enemy assassination teams struck Monty as excessive'
³ General Sir Frank Simpson, Wason interview, loc. cit.
⁴ Lt-Colonel 'Kit' Dawnay, interview of 24.8.78.
⁵ Lt-Colonel Trumbull Warren, interview of 9.11.81.
Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience.
Montgomery had fought in the frontline during the First World War, being wounded twice,and being awarded the DSO.
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@georgesenda1952
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, 7th Armoured Division.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zd6LrT7Zrjo&ab_channel=USArmyWarCollege
1hr, 4 minutes, 30 seconds onwards.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army.
‘There was no doubt that the Americans have had a severe shock. Their commanders had chosen to ignore the two most elementary rules of war – concentration and the possession of a reserve to counter the enemy’s moves and keep the initiative.’
Field Marshall Alanbrooke.
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
'GIs actually contained Bernard in a barn when he had his driver try to run a road block in the Ardennes'
Para Dave (aka bigwoody)
The story about Montgomery being detained by US soldiers is utter rubbish. No credible histories of the Battle of the Bulge include this story. Only a gullible idiot would believe that story.
Montgomery's activities in his visit to the First Army HQ are well known.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN
2013.
P 448
‘At 12.52 p.m., a SCHAEF log entry confirmed that “Field Marshall Montgomery has been placed in charge of the northern flank.” He would command the U.S. First and Ninth Armies, as well as his own army group; Twelfth Army Group was left with only Patton’s Third Army.
P449
‘Having been alerted to the impending command change at 2:30 Wednesday morning, he dispatched a major to Chaudfontaine for a “bedside conference” with Hodges who was roused from his sleep to learn that four British divisions were moving towards the Meuse to secure he riverbanks and bridges. Roadblocks also had been built on the Brussels highway with vehicles and carts.
‘The field marshal himself arrived at Chaudfontaine at 1:30 p.m. on Wednesday in a green Rolls-Royce flying a Union Jack and five-star pennant from the front fenders, accompanied by outrider jeeps with red-capped MPS. As usual he was dressed without orthodoxy in fur-lined boots, baggy corduroy trousers and as many as eight pullovers. “Unwrapping the bearskin in which he was enveloped,” Iris Carpenter reported, “he picked up his box of Sandwiches, his thermos jug of tea and his situation map chalked over with his grease pencil, and marched inside.’
‘Politely declining Hodges’s offer of lunch—“Oh, no, I’ve got my own” — he propped his map on a chair and said calmly “ Now let’s review this situation…The first thing we must do is to tidy up the battlefield.”’
‘Three hours later they had both a plan and an understanding. Hodges and his staff appeared tired and dispirited, British officers later reported, but determined to hold fast.’
The only source for the false story that Montgomery was detained by US troops is 'Killing Patton' by some hack authors called Bill O'Reilly and Martin Dugard.
Montgomery's only visit to the Bulge battle area is well documented . He travelled from his headquarters in Zonhoven in Belgium to Hodges's headquarters at Chaudfontaine in Belgium on the 20th December 1944. A distance of approximately 45 miles. He arrived at Hodges's headquarters at 1pm, stayed for three hours and then returned to Zonhoven and there exchanged cable messages with Eisenhower.
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