Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory"
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@Clone Warrior
Where is it recorded that Montgomery wanted more aircraft for Market Garden?
Not in Normandy to the Baltic.
Where is it recorded that Montgomery wanted more ground forces for Market Garden?
Not in Normandy to the Baltic.
There is ample evidence that Montgomery had pointed out to Eisenhower in August 1944 that there were not enough supplies to maintain an advance by all allied forces. He stated this to Eisenhower on 23rd:
“Administratively, we haven't the resources to maintain both Army Groups at full pressure. The only policy is to halt the right and strike with the left, or halt the left and strike with the right. We must decide on one thrust and put all the maintenance to support that. If we split the maintenance and advance on a broad front, we shall be so weak everywhere that we will have no chance of success."
His words.
H was right, Eisenhower’s poor decision making gave the Germans victories at Aachen, Arnhem, Metz and the Hurtgen Forest, as well as giving the Germans the opportunity build up forces for the Ardennes.
As for who was where. As usual, Montgomery was up with his armies, Eisenhower was in Normandy, Brereton was in England. What evidence is there that Montgomery did not fully cooperate with First Allied Airborne Army? Montgomery proposed, and got approval for Market Garden on the 10th September, he Briefed Browning on the same day, Brereton convened a meeting (In England) on the same day. If the airborne army was not in a position to carry out Market then Brereton should have said stop. What was the airborne army there fo in late 1944 , if not to carry out major operations at short notice.?
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@warspite1807
'No, Student was not delivered plans for the entire operation.It was a one page SUMMARY for the 17th Airborne Corps if the memory serves me well, and delivered not on the first day, but the second. By that time all German forces were already tactically engaged or heading for objectives so this didn't make any difference.'
Your words.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
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@warspite1807
‘The plan was not to go to the coast...that was 'promoted' later by some people in British command, and it takes some thinking to realise why The bridges at Arnhem do cross the Rhine, but the roads north lead nowhere important from military strategy point of view The 52nd Lowland was supposed to be in the first day lift!’ Your words.
It’s a definite no.
Arnhem was confirmed as being in the MARKET GARDEN plan because of the urgent request from London for Montgomery’s forces to do something to stop V2 rocket attacks on London. Stiking out to the IJsselmeer would stop V2 rockets from reaching their lauchins areas in the Western provinces of the Netherlands.
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P543
‘On the morning of the September 10th Dempsey arrived at Montgomery’s Tactical H.Q. prepared to advocate this course [an advance towards the Rhine at Wessel]. Montgomery greeted him with the news that a signal had just come from the War Office, suggesting that the V.2s, which landed on London on the 8th were launched from bases in Western Holland near The Hague. The War Office enquired whether in the near future there was any chance of these bases being captured or at least cut off from their sources of supply in Germany. This settled the issue’
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Wil you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?” While General Dempsey and others favored a more easterly advance toward the Rhine at Wesel, this new German onslaught further persuaded Montgomery to drive deep into Holland. “It must be towards Arnhem.” He said.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P42
‘on 9 September for during the afternoon a 'Secret' cable arrived from the War Office, sent by the VCIGS, General Nye, in the absence of Field-Marshal Brooke:
Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.¹
By striking north-east from Eindhoven to Arnhem, 21st Army Group would be in a position to 'rope off' the whole of Holland, including the 150,000 fleeing German troops and the V2 bomb sites. To Nye Monty thus signalled back:
Your 75237 re V 2. As things stand at present it may take up to two weeks but very difficult to give accurate estimate. There are aspects of the present situation which cause me grave concern and these are first the present system of command of the land battle and secondly the admin situation. My letter being sent by DAWNAY will give you all the facts. These matters affect the time we will take to do what you want.
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@warspite1807
For MARKET GARDEN, XXX Corps comprised one armoured division, two infantry divisions, and one armoured brigade. The wooded highlands you refer to were of little consequence. The highest point is only a few hundred feet above sea level, and it is in an area used by the Dutch Army, and by the German Army in 1944 to rest armoured formations. It was of little consequence beyond the plan to capture Deelen airfield. From Arnhem, allied forces would have struck out North West to the Ijsselmeer, and, or East towards Germany.
Based on the available evidence, what you have claimed is a load of rubbish.
First Airborne’s build up plan was clear, Day 1, First Airlanding Brigade to secure the landing ground grounds, First Parachute Brigade to capture the Rhine Bridges. Day 2, Fourth Parachute Brigade to take the higher ground to the north of Arnhem . Day 3, The 1st Polish Independent Parachute Brigade to land to the South of the main Arnhem Bridge. Day 5, by which time, it was expected that 1st Airborne would have linked up with XXX Corps, the 52nd Lowland Division would be flown in, if Deelen Airfield was in allied hands.
There is no myth surrounding the 52nd Lowland Division. It was never formally part of the FAAA army, and it ended up performing a number of roles after MARKET GARDEN. My own father saw it in INFATUATE in late October of the same year. It was never going to be flown into Deelen Airfield until XXX Corps had linked up with 1st Airborne. Its intended role in MARKET GARDEN ended up being a footnote in that story.
Far from marching to the sound of guns, Hackett was ordered, against his original orders, to detach part of his force to support the advance to the Arnhem Bridges by the acting divisional commander Hicks.
As far as MARKET GARDEN objectives were concerned, the evidence is clear, go give the allies a Bridgehead over the Rhine before the winter months set in.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.’
It was also, by including Arnhem in the MARKET GARDEN plan, Montgomery’s answer to the need to curtail German V2 rocket attacks on London by stemming the supply of those rockets from Germany to the western provinces of the Netherlands.
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He chose to dismiss Bletchley Park's warning of the German defenses available as informed by the Dutch.'
Nobody dismissed warnings of German defences. Eisenhower, Bradley and Montgomery all saw the same intelligence information, which was not a complete picture.The Dutch did not inform Bletchley Park. Bletchley Park was facility for breaking German codes, not evaluating information supplied by allied sources.
'Over the expressed misgivings of Bradley and Patton'
Patton was too junior to be consulted. Bradley stated that it should go ahead due to the potential gains that could be achieved.
'temporarily abandoning his strategy of advancing toward Germany on a broad front to totally destroy the German Army in the west which ultimately proved successful.'
The point is that Market Garden did change Eisenhower's stategy, if such a term can be used. The ground forces only involved XXX Corps, which could be sustained from 21st Army Group supplies and the First Allied Airborne Army which was sustained from Britain. The US 12th Army Group had supplies to sustain either its 1st Army or its 3rd Army. Bradley stupidly chose to sustain his 3rd Army instead of pushing his 1st Army through the Aachen gap to double the forces that the Germans in the North would be facing. Eisenhower's strategy cannot be considered successful. Montgomery took the allies from Normandy to the German border in three months. Eisenhower took seven months to advance across half of Germany. During that time the Germans were able to launch the Bulge offensive and were able to put most of their resources in he East - the Russian advance was by a distance the most important cause of he German collapse. That is what happens when you allow a bloke like Eisenhower, with almost no command experience and with zero personal combat experience in charge.
'The goal of ending the war in '44 actually, by Market Garden's failure, guaranteed that it would not.'
Esisenhower's dithering in August 1944 cost the allies the chance of ending the war in 1944 . Market Garden was too small an undertaking to change that.
'The commencement of the Ardennes Offensive, aka the Battle of the Bulge, three months later could have completely turned the tide of the war on the western front completely around. Had it not been for the German critical shortage of fuel and the heroic stand of Gen McAuliffe and his 101st Airborne at Bastogne, Operation Autumn Mist would have succeeded.'
There you have it. TheGermans had no fuel, even their own comanders gave it a 5% chance of success. Montgomery warned that a broad front strategy would leave the allies vulnerable to a counter attack. One of Bradley's subordinates, Patton warned about an attack in the Ardennes. How right they were.
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@danwelch8547
Normandy.
‘If Normandy had been left in Monty's culpable, errr capable hands, he still would have been mired near Caen when he died. He had an opportunity to break out of Normandy with Operation Perch but Monty gonna monty. No, Normandy was -- and the subsequent pursuit made possible -- by Bradley slogging through bocage and Patton brilliantly exploiting the breakthrough. Again, Monty could not finish the deal at Falaise when presented the opportunity.’ Your words.
Normandy as a whole:
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.
US GENERAL DWIGHT D EISENHOWER
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
US GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY
In his offensive of early July he had attacked along the entire front from St Lo to the sea and, since this dispersal of his strength was accentuated by the nature of the country, he had been unable to gain a clear success anywhere. For COBRA, however, he had accepted Montgomery’s suggestion that he should concentrate a powerful striking force on a 6,000 yard front, five miles west of St Lo.’
CHESTER WILLMOT
Normandy, Falaise in particular:
‘In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise’.
US GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY
‘to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
SIR BRIAN HORROCKS
‘The battle of the Falaise Gap resulted in a very great victory. It was the consummation of Montgomery’s original plan for using Caen as the hinge upon which the armies would swing.’
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND
‘When presented with the opportunity of using the Port of Antwerp, Monty montied.’
Your words.
Not really...
The port of Antwerp was captured 4th September, 1944. However, both banks the Scheldt Estuary as still in German hands and a campaign of at least three weeks plus time for mine clearance would be needed to clear the estuary. Meanwhile the opportunity to take the war into Germany slipped away, as evidenced by the German General Gunther Blumentritt:
‘”The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Strategically and politically. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open.""
His words.
And also Eisenhower:
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.
'
His words.
‘Exactly what battles did Monty actually win?’
Your words.
As an army commander: Alam el Halfa, the Second Battle of El Alamein, Medenine, Sicily. As an army group commander: Normandy, the Scheldt, the Rhine, and or course sorting out the northern half of the Bulge.
‘The folly that the most timid Allied general would lead a bold stroke through Holland was delusional.’
Your words.
What was timid about Montgomery? Certainly not in the aftermath of El Alamein, or the Normandy breakout. His task of handling the 3rd British Division in the trying circumstances of France in 1940 would never have been given to ‘timid’ commander. Montgomery was thoroughly professional soldier whose approach to war was influenced by his experiences in the First World War (Unlike Bradley and Eisenhower, he had personal combat experience) and British manpower constraints. Thorough prepartion of forces, careful planning and battle management wins almost every time. As Montgomery's record proved.
Any questions?
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@danwelch8547
‘1. Alam Halfa -- The defensive plan he won by executing Dorman-Smith's plan? Or the non-existent counterattack whereby he completely failed to annihilate a worn down enemy with no fuel?’
Err…neither.
The ‘defensive plan’:
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ALEXANDER OF TUNIS
CASSELL, LONDON 1962
CHAPTER lll TWO BATTLES
ROMMEL AT ALAM HALFA P22
‘Recently there has been discussion whether or not General Montgomery ‘adopted’ as his own the plan evolved by his predecessor for the action that was shortly to be fought – actually within a little more than a fortnight of his taking over command – in defence of the Alamein position.
I cannot conceive that General Montgomery is likely to have been interested in other people’s ideas on how to run the desert war; and in my own conversation with General Auchinleck, before taking over command, there was certainly no hint of a defensive plan that at all resembled the pattern of the battle of Alam Halfa as it was actually fought.
…as I have already indicated, the actual pattern of the battle was exclusively Montgomery’s.’
‘The ‘non-existent counterattack’’:
Which quite rightly did not take place, as it was exactly what Rommel wanted Montgomery to do.
Rommel complained to Kesselring, "The swine isn't attacking!"
THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-45.
CHAPTER 11.
‘2. Alamein -- the battle he could not lose because Torch was going to force Rommel to retreat anyway? And yet Monty nearly lost anyway?’
No, Rommel had no brief to retreat, as no German general had. The forces that opposed Torch were Vichy French. Alamein was goin to be won by 2nd November, the Anglo/America Torch landings began on the 8th November.
‘3. Medenine -- Really? The battle he fought after he allowed Rommel to retreat, unmolested and uncontested, for 1,500 miles? A battle not needed if he had destroyed PanzerAmee Afrika?’
No, not really. 1,500 miles left plenty of opportunity for the Axis to regroup, surprise Eighth Army and turn the tables – the allies had been twice up and twice back already. Montgomery did not allow this to happen a third time and was then able to easily defeat the, by then, reinforced Axis forces at Medenine.
‘3. Normandy -- The original plan was to break out in the east before the Germans could reinforce. Monty won the battle of the buildup at every step but could not break through. He had an open German flank during Perch and one understrength panzer company routed his forces. The western breakthrough was attempted only after the eastern breakthrough failed. And failed. And failed. Claims that the western breakthrough was the original plan are revisionist history.’
Is this 3 or say 3A? If it is revisionist history, it started on the 15th May 1944 at St Paul’s School when Montgomery briefed Allied commanders on Overlord. There he clearly stated that the main effort in the opening phase would be west - to capture Cherbourg. That is what happened. Shall we go through those quotes again?
‘4. The Scheldte should have been cleared immediately upon the seizure of the port of Antwerp. Every available resource should have been dedicated to that end. Instead of throwing 1st Para Army at a target defended by remnants of two panzer divisions, 1st Para should have been thrown at the Scheldte as both infantry and paras. The Germans should not have been given a moment to recover.’
If so, then Eisenhower is the cause of that. By the 4th September 1944 Eisenhower had appointed himself as allied land forces commander in place of Montgomery. What a mistake that was. Be that as it may, such a decision had to be his. In his directive of the 4th September he targeted the Rhine, the Ruhr and Antwerp.
Not just Antwerp.
‘It's amazing how your litany of successes conveniently overlooks the big failures. Or the credit due others (Dorman-Smith, Bradley, etc).’
What failures? What credit goes to the later IRA helper Dorman-Smith / O'Gowan?
What credit goes to Bradley?
All clear now?..
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@tomsexton3625
'YOUR DESCRIPTION SLAPPED TOGETHER IN ABOUT A WEEK CERTAINLY DESCRIBES THE PLANNING'
Its the description by one Rick Atkinson, not me.
But surely the idea was to try to get Germany defeated asap in order to keep the Russians as far east as possible. To that end, Market Garden was a modest undertaking, a sixty mile dash with one armoured corps and three airborne divisions. Even the inclusion of Arnhem in Market Garden was only down to the need to try to curb V2 attacks on London.
As for Patton. He as not senior enough to be part of the big decisions, those decisons were down to Bradley, Devers, Eisenhower and Montgomery. When Patton stopped at the end of August 1944, he was a hundred miles from the Rhine, let alone Berlin.
Eisenhower's broad front policy set the stage for the Bulge, Montgomery warned him about giving the Germans time and space, and the vulnerabilty of Eisenhower's spread of forces to a German counter attack. One of Bradley's subordinate commanders, Patton later warned about the danger of a German attack in the Ardennes.
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