Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory" channel.

  1. 1
  2. 1
  3. 1
  4. 1
  5. 1
  6. 1
  7. 1
  8. 1
  9. 1
  10. 1
  11. 1
  12. 1
  13. 1
  14. 1
  15. 1
  16. 1
  17. ​ @billybuzzard4843  A reasonable question. This might be an answer... SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44: ‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’ SHAEF Intelligence Summaries were seen by Senior allied commanders, including Bradley, Brereton, Devers, and Montgomery. SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44: [the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’ Montgomery then devised operation COMET to take bridges at various bridges in a line up to, and including Arnhem, with British 1st Airborne, and the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade. In the face of reports of stiffening German resistance, and in answer to an urgent war office request to know what could be done to stem V2 rocket attacks on London, Montgomery cancelled COMET, and on the 10th September got Eisenhower's approval to MARKET GARDEN, which added two more airborne divisions to the same plan as COMET. D-Day for MARKET GARDEN was set for the 17th September. SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44: ‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’ The aerial recce photos for MARKET GARDEN can be seen on line an comprise a series of high level, overhead aerial shots.
    1
  18. 1
  19. 1
  20.  @OneHitWonder383  UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The European Theater of Operations THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN By Charles B. MacDonald CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993 P 141 ‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’ CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954 P 561 ‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’ MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO WITH WILFRED GRETOREX ARNHEM CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958 P42 ‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village. Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
    1
  21. 1
  22. 1
  23. 1
  24. 1
  25. 1
  26. 1
  27. 1
  28. 1
  29. 1
  30. 1
  31. 1
  32. 1
  33. 1
  34. 1
  35. 1
  36. 1
  37. 1
  38. 1
  39. 1
  40. 1
  41. 1
  42. 1
  43.  @nickdanger3802  SIR BRIAN HORROCKS CORPS COMMANDER Sidgwick & Jackson LONDON 1977 Chapter 5 The Advance to Brussels and Antwerp Page 80 ‘Although the order for us to halt came from my immediate boss, General Dempsey Commander of the Second Army, I am certain that it did not have the blessing of Field-Marshall Montgomery. I think it was a direct result of the Broad Front policy insisted on by Eisenhower, mainly for political reasons. Montgomery had stressed to me over and over again, ‘Never let up the pressure Jorrocks, or the Germans will recover. They are very good soldiers. Keep at them day and night!’. For the second mistake I must at least take part of the blame. When the 11th Armoured Division had been ordered to capture Antwerp, ‘Pip’ Roberts had asked me for a definite objective; an armoured division was not the ideal formation with which to capture a large town – even with he help of the Belgian resistance. I replied, ‘Go straight for the docks and prevent the Germans destroying the port installations.’ My reason for this was that I still retained painful memories of the delays imposed on the Eighth Army during their advance along the North African coast; the Germans always destroyed the port facilities and thus slowed down the unloading of our supplies. Marvellous to relate, Roberts captured the docks in full working order, including those on the north bank of the Scheldt. This was an almost unbelievable stroke of luck, for the sluice gates and the dockside equipment, all electrically operated, could easily have been put out of action. Here the Belgian ‘Armée Blanche’ appeared in force. With their assistance, the 159th Infantry Brigade assaulted the many concrete emplacements surrounding the German H.Q. in the park.' His words.
    1
  44. 1
  45. 1
  46. 1
  47. 1
  48. 1
  49. 1
  50. 1