Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory"
channel.
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
Land Forces 1939-45
Australia 751,729
Britain 3,510,309
B. Indian Ocean 6,500
Canada 730,625
Cyprus 30,000
East Africa 200,000
Fiji 3,050
British Guiana 42
Hong Kong 2,200
India 2,455,779
Kenya 98,240
Malaysia 1,500
Nepal 250,280
Newfoundland 4,005
New Zealand 128,905
Nigeria 121,652
Sudan 20,000
South Africa 334,000
Southern Africa 77,767
West Africa 200,000
West Indies 10,000
Any questions?
3
-
3
-
@randylucas2458
Ah so you have no evidence that 'Market Garden happened to shut Monty up because while Patton was shooting all over the place Monte was missing the limelight'
As for wastage of men, ammunition, fuel. Perhaps you should compare Market Garden (17,000 casualties) with allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties), and so on, and so on...
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@GregWampler-xm8hv
Its a definite no.
By the time of MARKET GARDEN, Eisenhower was both Supreme Commander, and Allied Land Forces Commander. Montgomery did not even have jurisdiction over the airborne divisions in that undertaking until they made contact with XXX Corps during the MARKET GARDEN operation.
The idea British are jealous of Americans is absurd.
Britain was the only one of the five major belligerents (Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan and Russia) that went to war on behalf of another country, all the others attacked other countries or were an attack. The USA is excluded from this group of nations as its homeland was never under threat and therefore it does not deserve to a place at this group.
Britain was the only major country to fight from the beginning to the end of the war. The only country to fight Germany and Italy on its own - for an entire year. The only country to fight in every part of the war: North West Europe, Italy, North Africa, Central Africa, the Balkans, Asia and the Pacific. On its own Britain out-produced Germany. All this from a country that is the size of the US State of Oregon and for four years was 20 miles from the enemy.
As far a who did what in the Second World War is concerned, WE RULE.
'the Americans at this stage provided the overwhelming majority of men and machines.'
The statistics at that time were...
British 21st Army Group:
Men 829,640. Vehicles 202,789.
US 12th Army Group:
Men1,222,659. Vehicles 235,682.
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
3
-
@johnlucas8479
That Brereton had the final say in airborne matters seems to have been accepted by a number of people:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P132
‘Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault. For their part, the troop carrier commanders dissented. Flying more than one mission per aircraft, they said, would afford insufficient time between missions for spot maintenance, repair of battle damage, and rest for the crews. High casualties among the airmen might be the result. If weather remained favorable, they pointed out, and if combat aircraft assumed some of the resupply missions, the troop carriers might fly but one mission daily and still transport three and a half divisions by D plus 2. Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day. Although subsequent planning indicated that it would in fact take four days to convey the divisions, General Brereton stuck by his decision.’
It beggars belief that given what happened with Walcheren, and that Eisenhower almost always sided with his fellow American commanders, particularly after 1st September, 1944, that Brereton could not stopped MARKET if he so chose.
Montgomery words only covered matters appertaining to the l Airborne Corps, which Montgomery had been given the use of prior to MARKET GARDEN. His words:
'I had been allotted the First Allied Airborne Corps and on the 3rd September, the day we liberated Brussels., I had asked its commander (General Browning) to come and see me, so that we might discuss the general axis of the thrust towards the Rhine and the best areas in which to drop the
airborne divisions.'
It seems that Montgomey had been obliged to seek the help of the XVIII Airborne Corps, as well as the USAAF and RAF transport units for MARKET GARDEN, when he met Eisenhower on the 10th September. Even within the operation itself, it seems that l Airborne Corps forces only came under the command of British Second Army when they linked up with XXX Corps.
No doubt davemac will know the precise details of these matters.
No one on YouTube knows what would have been outcome if Montgomery said yes, and Brereton said no. The available evidence that I have seen seems to show that Brereton's view would have prevailed every time.
Slightly off topic...
Montgomery's words in his memoirs regarding his mistakes with Arnhem, and the Scheldt should contrasted with the lack any admission of fault in the contents of the memoirs written by Bradley, and Eisenhower.
3
-
@johnlucas8479
Lets try again...
It would be good to see and read more about INFATUATE, and the rest of stuff about the Scheldt.
My Father was on INFATUATE, my Uncle also, if you count the naval bomardment. 97% of the YouTube stuff about the Netherlands in 1944 is about MARKET GARDEN.
But this not about INFATUATE itself, its about who had the final say on airborne operations at that time, with INFATUATE being good evidence as to who had that say.
This, from Brereton's 'wartime diary':
'ASCOT, 11 September 1944 (D-Pus-94). Everywhere the Germans are retreating. trying to reach the protection of the Siegfried Line and their prepared defenses. Our big problem Is supply. Our armies are consuming enormous quantities of ammunition. fuel, and food.
The First Army captured Liege three days ago and is at the Luxembourg-German border. The Third Army has reached the Moselle and made a junction with the Seventh Army coming up from the south. The British and Canadians in the north liberated Brussels and Antwerp a week ago and were close to the Dutch border. The stage is set to deal the enemy a knockout. Our airborne forces are available for a bold stroke in the enemy's rear. Ten operations are planned:
OPERATION COMET, desired by the Northern group of armies on the Rhine bridges from Arnhem to Wesel to facilitate an advance on the Ruhr from the north.
OPERATION INFATUATE, a landing on Walcheren Island to aid in opening the port of Antwerp by cutting off or harassing the German retreat across the Scheldt Estuary.
OPERATION NAPLES I, an operation behind the Siegfried 'Line to the east of Aachen.
Operation NAPLES II, a bridgehead over the Rhine in the vicinity of Cologne.
MILAN I, breaching the Siegfried Line at Trier.
MILAN ll, to assist in crossing the Rhine between Neuwied and Coblenz.
CHOKER I, to assist in breaching the Siegfried Line at Saarbrücken.
CHOKER II, to assist in crossing the Rhine between Maine and Mannheim.
Operation MARKET, to seize the vital bridges across the Maas, Waal, and Lower Rhine and establish a corridor through Holland and into Germany for the British Second Army.
OPERATION TALISMAN, in the event of German surrender to seize airfields in the Berlin area to facilitate the establish. spent of a SHAEF force there and the seizure of the German naval base at Kiel.
I refused Operation INFATUATE because of intense flak on Walcheren. difficult terrain which would prevent glider landings, excessive losses likely because of drowning, non-availability of U.S. troops, and the fact that the operation is an improper employment of airborne forces.'
His words.
3
-
3
-
@nickdanger3802
The Germans retrieved a copy of the complete MARKET GARDEN plan on a dead US soldier, in a crashed US glider, in an US landing zone, within two hours of the start of the operation.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 141
‘Someone in an American glider that was shot down near the First Parachute Army's command post was carrying a copy of the Allied operational order. Two hours after the first parachute had blossomed, this order was on General Student's desk.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P 561
‘Thus it was that by a double twist of fortune the two Germans primarily responsible for the defence of Holland found themselves so placed that they could act at once to counter the advantage the Allies had won by gaining surprise. Nor was this all. The German reserves were slender, but Model and Student soon knew exactly where to use them. Early that afternoon an American glider was shot down close to Vught, and, says Student, " a few hours later the orders for the complete airborne operation were on my desk."’
MAJOR-GENERAL R.E. URQUAHART CB DSO
WITH WILFRED GRETOREX
ARNHEM
CASSELL & COMPANY LTD 1958
P42
‘Two hours after the landings had begun, the complete orders for the entire Airborne Corps operation were on the desk of General Student in his cottage at Vught. They had been found on the body of an American soldier in a glider shot down close to the village.
Thus, the carelessness or wilful disobedience of one soldier gave the Germans an immediate compensation for the advantage we had of surprise.’
2
-
2
-
2
-
Not really…
Montgomery showed his appreciation of logistics at almost every stage of his time of army / army group command: in his build up for Alamein, the chase across North Africa after Alamein, in his skilful handling of allied armies in Normandy and planning his masterclass at the Rhine.
Even at the time of Market Garden, his view of how war should be fought was clear. With both army groups getting 7,000 of supplies each per day, there was enough to continue the advance of 20 divisions. When Eisenhower and Montgomery met in late August, Montgomery stated that the thrust in the north, envisaged before D-Day, would leave the allies able to surround the Ruhr and stop German war production. To do this meant stopping 1st Canadian Army and the 3rd US Army to let British 2nd Army and the 3rd US Army advance together. Montgomery went on to state that if Eisenhower was not prepared to do this, then Montgomery would offer to stop Canadian 1st Army and British 2nd Army so that US 1st Army and US 3rd Army could advance into Germany in the less important southern route, provided a decision was taken to properly use the available resources.
Eisenhower did neither, and the entire allied advance ground to a halt. All this after Montgomery had inflicted a defeat on the Germans in Normandy as big a Stalingrad and with the Germans having fewer tanks and artillery pieces on the Western Front than had been in Britain after Dunkirk. Eisenhower gave the Germans what they most wanted, time and space.
Stopping the whole of 21st Army Group to clear the Scheldt would have changed nothing. There was still 100 miles of estuary banks to clear, the Germans were still in strength in the Breskens Pocket and the heavy fortifications at the mouth of the Scheldt were still intact. Further, the mine clearance in November took three weeks, and it would also have taken three weeks in September.
Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan and cleared France in less than 90 days. Eisenhower took over as land forces commander with no plan and went nowhere in the following 90 days.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@seth1422
1) Don’t give us that crap. I have been to the highest point in the Netherlands. It is at Vaals in Limburg – ‘Drielandenpunt’ – where the borders of the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium meet. Even that is only a thousand feet.
The Groesbeek heights are about a third of the height of ‘Drielandenpunt’ and are six miles from the Nijmegen Bridge I have also been in at the Groesbeek heights, as was my farther, in his case in the Winter of 1944-45. Many years later we discussed the point about Groesbeek and its proximity (or lack of) to Nijmegen. The high ground north of Arnhem is as high as Groesbeek and is nearer to Arnhem Bridge. Yet 1st Airborne sent troops to Arnhem Bridge on the first day. Gavin did not do likewise in regard to Nijmegen.
2) Changes nothing. Gavin failed to act against Nijmegen Bridge on the first day.
3) The evidence shows that, as anyone would expect, senior officers met, but the last word on airborne matters was down the airborne commanders.
4) Nope. He wanted agreement. The last word was his – as can be judged by what actually happened, in drop zones and in the number of lifts on the first day.
5) But battle by battle Montgomery showed his way was superior.
‘Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
‘Montgomery was not my immediate Commander, but he always kept in such close touch with the battle that he knew when and where ‘the shoe pinched’. He then went down to see the Commander on the spot – in this case, me – and listened to what he had to say. He then made up his mind immediately. As he drove away I knew that he had probably already forgotten about Bremen and would already be considering the next problem.
That was what made him such a superb battle commander.’
Sir Brian Horrocks.
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled. He well understood the personal equation of the British soldier, and the morale of his remained high, in spite of frustrations and losses that could easily have shaken troops under a commander in whom they did not place their implicit trust.’
Dwight D Eisenhower.
Notice how I quote people who were actually there. Unlike the prick Big Woody who quotes just about anyone who writes sonething likes and that he can find on Wikipedia.
2
-
2
-
2
-
John Cornell
'Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him ' Fondly quoted by Big Woody.
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON
1947
P416
‘I had unfortunately been away sick in England during most of the period of preparation, and only arrived back on the 17th. So I was not in close touch with the existing situation. It was undoubtedly a gamble, but there was a very good dividend to be reaped if it came off. Horrocks was the ideal commander for the task, and morale of the troops was high.’
His words.
Oh, and while I am about it, from the same source:
P419
'It is interesting to consider how far we failed in this operation. It should be remembered that the Arnhem bridgehead was only a part of the whole. We had gained a great deal in spite of this local set-back. The Nijmegen bridge was ours, and it proved of immense value later on. And the brilliant advance by 30th Corps led the way to the liberation of a large part of Holland, not to speak of providing a stepping stone to the successful battles of the Rhineland. '
His words.
2
-
2