Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "TIKhistory"
channel.
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
'Political calculations and pressure came into play as well. By late summer, 1944, Hitler's V-1 and V-2 rockets were raining down on targets in Europe and the U.K. There was intense political pressure from the British public upon PM Churchill to do something to end the missile attacks. Overrun the launching sites, for example, many of which were in Dutch territory along the North Sea and in the Ruhr industrial heartland. This pressure was probably also brought to bear upon Ike by President Roosevelt and his advisors as well, indirectly if not directly.'
V2s were a very real threat to British people.
'History has shown that trying to slog into Germany through the Scheldt Estuary was a costly blunder. General George Patton, had he been allocated the gasoline and supplies he had requested, which instead went to Monty's fatal gamble, 3rd Army could have punched across the Rhine months ahead of schedule and into heartland Germany.'
But no fuel or supplies were taken away from Patton for Market Garden.
'That's all speculation now, but it is hard to envision Patton doing as poorly as Monty or conceiving a plan so badly flawed as his.'
Who can say? Patton was never senior enough to be involved in such a decision.
'The British had many great and able senior officers, but Monty himself was vastly overrated.'
Montgomery perfomed with distiction as a single division commander in trying circumstances in France in 1940. As a single army commander, Montgomery won in North Africa and Sicily. As an army group commander, Montgomery won in Normandy, the Scheldt, the Northern half of the Bulge and the Rhine.
Unlike Eisenhower, Bradley and Devers, Montgomery had personal combat experience - in the First World war. He was wounded twice and was awarded the DSO.
2
-
@lufasumafalu5069
'and you are not there' Your words.
As you so rightly state, I am 'not there'.
'and never intetviewd vets from both sides.' Your words.
You are right there. I have spoken to two people who at Arnhem, both were of whom were British. Spoken to, not interviewed. I ain't met any Germans that were there.
You have intervied who, about this subject? As I thought, nobody.
Like me, you are reliant upon what other people have written about this subject.
Cornelius Ryan was in France at the time of MARKET GARDEN, but was not at Arnhem. Therefore, any opinions he expressed, if he did so, on the fighting at Arnhem are next to worthless. As far as passing judgement on fighting in Arnhem was concerned, you were either there, or or you were not.
Anyone can trot out the statistics, dates, contemporary documents etc. But all of that has long since been done.
'go home kid , try to read some history books instead of playing call of duty'
To be able to call me kid you would need to 70 years of age or older. Are you of that age?..
2
-
2
-
@davemac1197
This from Horrocks on whether clearing the Scheldt shold have taken place before MARKET GARDEN:
'Was Monty correct in, carrying out the Arnhem operation, which meant advancing sixty to seventy miles into Holland ? Would it not have been better if, after Brussels, 21st Army Group had turned north-west and cleared both sides of the Scheldt estuary to open the port of Antwerp which could then have been developed into a main base area, thus curing many administrative headaches.
I can only give you the opinion of a corps commander who was on the spot and has since made a study of the problem. Had he adopted this course, as many critics think he should have done, the port of Antwerp would certainly have been open to Allied shipping earlier than it was. But how much earlier it is not easy to say, because the campaign to clear the Scheldt estuary would certainly have been difficult.
The ground could be flooded at will by the Germans, while Walcheren could not be captured until it was flooded. Large German forces would have been cornered south of Breskens and could have put up a stubborn resistance in this difficult country where it was almost impossible to deploy large numbers of our troops. If we had devoted all our resources to clearing Antwerp in September it would have been impossible later on to carry out the swift advance up to the lower Rhine at Arnhem, because by then the German defences would have been given time to solidify. We were able to make this deep penetration only because General Student's Parachute Army was still moving down from Germany.
In my opinion Monty was right. We had advanced rapidly up the coastal plain while the Germans were still disorganised. His eyes were focused on the big prize to bounce a crossing over the Rhine and cut off the industrial heart of Germany, thus finishing the war in 1944. While there was still any chance of this succeeding he would have been wrong to deflect his resources to a subsidiary task.
The clearance of the Scheldt estuary would certainly have eased the administrative situation, but would it have shortened the war by even one day? On the information available, Arnhem was a justifiable gamble.'
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
Wall to rubbish.
The only political pressure on Eisenhower came from the US :
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P520
The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. Eisenhower's first reaction was that, even if it was militarily desirable (which he did not admit), it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war."
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN
2013.
P 261
‘Under relentless pressure on Eisenhower from George Marshall and others in Washington to get those airborne divisions into the fight, the plan had been slapped together in less than a week. The First Allied Airborne Army, also created at War Department insistence, and the corps headquarters that preceded it had drafted and discarded eighteen operational plans in the past forty days.’
Montgomery wanted to keep the war moving , preferably in the North, where the Ruhr is. Failing that, Montgomery offered to halt 21st Army Group and allow Bradley to advance further south provided that a decision to move forward somewhere was made. Hardly and act of self interest, was it?
Your comparison with Galipoli is absurd.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
'The drops began landing at ~12:30 that day.
It was not until ~15:30 nearly three hours later that Major Gough's men formed up and departed for Arnhem. Unfortunately, by this time, the Germans had established defensive positions that allowed them to repulse the Jeep mounted forces. The consequence being, nobody was getting to Arnhem, except on foot. This was a CRITICAL failure!'
But according this bloke Middlebrook, glider landings (LZ-S, and LZ-Z) took place between 13.00 and 13.40, and parachute landings (DZ-X) took place between 13.50 and 14.08.
That could truncate the time to unload Jeeps, for troops to muster and for the force to set off for Arnhem down to 52 minutes. If Middlebrook is correct, to layman such as me, it does not seem to be that unreasonable. But of course, I have not taken part in an airborne landing at brigade scale in wartime. Doubtless, Antony Beevor has such experience...
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@ToolTimeTabor
If Gough's squadron was to avoid the German Battalion Krafft, it seems it would have to have left the landing grounds at about 1.30pm. But the parachute troops (Among them, Gough's men?), did not start to land until 1.50pm.
As to why Gough's troops landed by parachute... Perhaps it was as Antony bloody Beevor's dubious claim that those troops landed by parachute as a matter of pride. Matin Middlebrook merely notes that those troops had undergone parachute training after they had been left behind in the airborne landings in Sicily.
Beevor did not put his claim into print until 2018.
Middlebrook's work was described by the Arnhem Fellowship as (And I quote):
'Probably the best general history ever of the battle. Written for the 50th anniversary and the author was able to speak with around 500 veterans.'
I know who’s version I would trust out of Beevor and Middlebrook. What say you?
Gough’s men were 35 minutes behind schedule for their departure to Arnhem Bridge. Before attempting to pass judgement on this delay, it would be good to see if information could be found regarding how the gliders carrying the jeeps landed. Based on eye witness testimony, there were problems with some of 1st Airborne glider landings. Colonel Graeme Warrack witnessed one such incident, albeit involving Hamilcar, rather than a Horsa. Middlebrook notes that two of Gough's gliders crash landed. Was time spent helping with these crashes, to free people in the gliders, and the glider cargoes? Perhaps a slightly heavy landing rather than a crash for a glider led to more time being needed to unload the glider. Who knows I don’t.
Was 50 minutes for mustering Gough’s too short a time frame? I have not been in such an undertaking, so I could not possibly know. Perhaps other people on here do know.
2
-
@blastulae
‘I say that because none of Monty’s subordinate generals were any better than, except in personality.’
Your words.
But on what evidence do you base that opinion? On the assumption that you are comparing those American counterparts…
Montgomery had served with distinction in the First World War, being wounded twice and being awarded the DSO. In trying circumstances, in France in 1940, in command of a single division Montgomery had performed with distinction as he trained his division to the highest pitch of efficiency. His work proved its worth as he led his troops on the famous night march to close the gap on the allied left after the Belgian capitulation. When so ordered, he brought his division back to Britain almost intact. As a single army commander, in his first major command, he reorganized 8th Army, won against Rommel with inferior numbers at Alam el Halfa, and then went on to end the war in North Africa as a contest at Alamein. For HUSKY, Montgomery tore up Patton’s lunatic plan to land all around the island to shreds and concentrated allied forces in one place, the campaign was over in six weeks. Montgomery finished OVERLORD ahead of schedule (D+78, instead of D+90), with 22% fewer than expected casualties, and gave the Germans a defeat as big as Stalingrad. Montgomery sorted out the Northern half of the Bulge, carried out the crossing of the Rhine with six divisions suffering just 1,200 casualties, and saved Denmark from Soviet occupation.
Bradley, Eisenhower and Devers did not have a single day of personal combat experience between them. Eisenhower had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. Bradley made a mess of his part on D-Day, and fell to pieces in the Ardennes, and then made a meal of encircling the Ruhr. Eisenhower made a mess in North Africa, having to go to Alexander for help. His planning for AVALANCHE and BAYTOWN nearly ended in disaster. When appointed himself as allied land forces commander in September 1944, his schoolboy broad front strategy gave the Germans just what they needed, time and space to reorganise. Devers did little of note with his DRAGOON sideshow and in the remainder of his time in Europe. By the time that any of them got into the fighting, the Germans were totally committed in Russia, and across all fronts the Germans were short of men, equipment and supplies.
Below that: Crerar and Dempsey both fought in the First World War and performed competently as single army commanders. Hodges, Patton and Simpson did have personal combat experience, Gerow and Patch did not. Hodges went to ground at the start of the Ardennes, Patton got passed over for army group command, it seems due to his personal behaviour, and regularly put his personal agenda ahead of the common good.
‘British 11th Armoured Division captured Antwerp on September 4, with its port 90% intact, thanks to the Belgian resistance. Its CO didn’t proceed to clear the estuary, nor did his corps CO order it, nor his army CO nor did Monty. So all were equally inept.’ Your words.
The Scheldt estuary banks were 100 miles long, the Germans were in forces at the Breskens Pocket, and many of the forces that would be needed for an attack on the estuary were not in place, due to the pace the British 2nd Army advance across Belgium and France.
‘Ike had no choice but to put US troops north of the Bulge under Monty’s command, as they were cut off from the other US armies. But the fool attacked from the tip of the Bulge, rather than cutting it off at the base, as Patton urged Bradley to do.’ Your words.
As for who did what in Bulge…
Here is a German view:
Hasso von Manteuffel, commander of the 5th Panzer Army:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to
engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’ His words.
And an American view:
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander, 7th Armoured Division. “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
And a modern US take on Montgomery in the Bulge:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zd6LrT7Zrjo&ab_channel=USArmyWarCollege
(1hr, 6 minutes, 32 seconds).
‘Everything else you posted supports my point that Gavin was just following Boy’s orders. So again I ask, how is it Jumpin’ Jim’s fault? With his reduced forces, he couldn’t secure the heights, the bridge south of town and seize those across the Waal. Nor did Browning order him to try. Au contraríe, he ordered him to hold the heights first.’ Your words.
Again:
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P 157
‘Take only the bridges and you probably could not hold them without the high ground. Take only the high ground, the Waal bridge at Nijmegen, and the Maas-Waal Canal bridges, and the ground column could not get across the Maas either to use the other bridges or to relieve the airborne troops. With only so many troops at hand, General Gavin saw no solution at first other than to take first the high ground and the Maas and Maas-Waal-Canal bridges-thereby ensuring juncture with the ground column-then Nijmegen.’
There it is, from the US Army history of the war, Gavin thought that the Groesbeek Heights should be taken before Nijmegen Bridge.
2
-
2
-
'monty after demanding market garden failed to show up and direct - getting his picture painted' Big Woody (aka Para Dave)
'By a curious coincidence, both Montgomery and Bradley, the two Allied army group commanders of the Normandy campaign, happened to be sitting that day [01.09.1944] for portraits at their respective headquarters. Bradley near Chartres was being painted by Cathleen Mann, who was married to the Marquess of Queensberry. Meanwhile Montgomery, wearing his trademark outfit of grey polo neck sweater, corduroy trousers and black, double-badged beret, was sitting for the Scottish portraitist James Gunn. His tactical headquarters and caravan were in the park of the Château de Dangu, halfway between Rouen and Paris.'
Source: Antony Beevor.
'and before you pop off i'll pst the link' Para Dave
Any idea what link that would be?... The American schoolboy's book of history? How the USA won the war, the Hollywood way?
'Monty even admitted it was a mistake - after the war of course' Para Dave
THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY
1958
Published by The World Publishing Company
2231 West 110th Street, Cleveland 2, Ohio
P 267
'I remain MARKET GARDEN S unrepentant advocate.'
Para Dave is from Cleveland, Ohio, USA. Perhaps he should nip down there and get himself a copy - if they have not sold out.
2
-
2
-
2
-
@johnlucas8479
Yep, Para Dave uses the name Big Woody as well. Whichever name he uses, its the same stuff: Everything that goes wrong is Montgomery's fault', Carrington (who Para Dave calls Scarrington), was a coward, XXX Corps were cowards, my uncle was a coward, and so on and so on. He gives utter credence to post war writers like Antony Beevor, Max Hastings, some bloke called William Weidner, a Dr Barr, and so on, and so on, rolling out their academic credentials, as if they give some these people some sort of insight into the thoughts of Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley, and so on. According to Para Dave, this William Weidner has stated that Carentan was a British objective in the Normandy campaign. That is a new one on me.
What do these writers bring to bring to the subject?..Every time they quote decision makers, thy are referring those people's own works, or to interviews with Chester Wilmot, Liddell Hart, etc. Nearly all of the useful statistics they trot out have long since been in the public domain, usually since about five years after the war ended. Even the Ultra Secret has ben in the public domain for not far short of 50 years.
There is another guy, one Rick Atkinson. I have exchanged emails with him, he seems to be a nice person. But what is new in his works?...The number of paper clips used by SHAEF in 1944? The VD rates for troops in liberated Luxembourg?
Evey time a book about MARKET GARDEN is published by these people, its always the definitive account, the final word, or whatever.
I have the Antony Beevor definitive account of MARKET GARDEN, or whatever it is supposed to be, here. What is its big claim? That people in the occupied part of the Netherlands endured privations in the Winter of 1944-45 and through to VE-Day. Yep, a big secret - that only came out as recently as 1945. What a waste, of his time writing this, what a waste of my time to read it, what a waste of the trees used for the paper to print it on. Still, its not all bad...it makes a good door stop.
Lyndon CMP states a lot of things that I agree with. You now state things that I agree with.
2
-
@johnlucas8479
‘I have read all the source you quote from. here an other quote for your records
"The plan agreed between Dempsey and Browning for MARKET was for the American 101st Airborne Division to be dropped to secure the bridges north of Eindhoven;"
Rostron, Peter. The Military Life & Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey GBE KCB DSO MC: Monty's Army Commander (p. 190).’ Your words.
So what does this add to the understanding of decisions regarding airborne landing at Zon Bridge?
Also, is there a contemporary source to support what the author stated here? Further what are the credentials of Peter Rostron? I would doubt that he would have been there at that time. From his photograph, he looks to be a lot younger than me. Who can say?
‘As to your comment relating to Brereton and the 2 lifts, you know my position and the sources I used to support my position, especially the reference to the weather. Both the source you mention in your comments makes no reference to the weather conditions on the day or the fact that Williams was responsible for both Operation Dragoon and Operation Market Garden as well as D-Day and Operation Husky. He was the most experience airman with regards to airborne operation. Ask you self this question: "If Williams plan for 2 lifts on D-Day for Operation Dragoon, why did he only plan for a single lift for Market Garden? Clearly, he had a very good reasons behind his decision. One factor was the weather, morning fog as reported by 21st Army Group.’ Your words.
Not really… What I consider to be reliable sources, have stated the opinion that the lack of two air-lifts on the first day of MARKET GARDEN was a contributory factor in the Arnhem not being taken, and that Brereton was ultimately responsible the lack of two lifts on that first day. For me, it is a reasonable assumption, that any such opinion would not have been stated if two lifts were not doable.
‘You blame the American for running down the British War effort, yet you are quick happy to rundown the US effort at every chance possible. Are you any different?’ Your words.
I note what I consider to be pertinent facts and reliable testimony. If people consider that as running down the US war effort, so be it. Whatever, there are so few of us trying to fight back against a tsunami of American chauvinistic books, films, TV programmes, press articles, lectures, social media items, and so on, and so on, and so on, and so on. It all seems to have he same message - We are America, we are better than you.
‘You known my position regarding Market Garden, which is "The Operation was high risk, but the potential benefit if successful was worth the risk of Failure." In hindsight should the operation have been cancelled due to the issues with the air plan, you can argue both ways.’ Your words.
I have previously agreed with the opinion that in the circumstances at the time, MARKET GARDEN was a worthwhile undertaking.
‘You quote Brereton refusal to permit an airborne drop on Walcheren Island. If you thing about it, It a relative small island and heavy fortified, we don't know what support was to be provided to the air drop. Would it be another Arnhem with the airborne force effectively destroyed before relief arrived. Who knows. All you need to read the accounts covering the attack on Walcheren Island to realise dropping Airborne troops on the island was not a good idea.’ Your words.
Opinions after the event are two a penny. What accounts from people that were there apart from Brereton, make clear that ‘dropping Airborne troops on the island was not a good idea?’
My father took part in the assault on Walcheren, an event he considered to be more scary than his landing on D-Day. We never discussed this particular point, but I can only think that he would have considered the help to the amphibious landings from an airborne landing could have been very helpful.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@johnlucas8479
'Your statement "The Germans agreed that the allies should have advanced in the North." when did they say they agreed?'
No, I typed typed that the Germans agreed that the allies should have advanced in the North. My words, my opinion, based on this:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 601
‘Since the war von Rundstedt and other German generals who can speak with authority (Student, Westphal, Blumentritt, Speidel and others) have all declared that a concentrated thrust from Belgium in September must have succeeded. These generals are agreed that if even fifteen divisions had driven on after the capture of Brussels and Liege, as Montgomery proposed, the Wehrmacht would have been powerless to stop them overrunning the Lower Rhineland and seizing the Ruhr.
Indeed Blumentritt says: " Such a break-through en masse, coupled with air domination, would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."’
This is in full, what Blumentritt said after the war to Liddell Hart: "The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. The attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine""
Surely you do not think that I meant every single German, do you?..
There might be Germans who took a different view.
If so, it would be good to see those views.
As for General Carver... I would be interested to know if his words were words were written at the time, or were they words based on hindsight?
2
-
@johnlucas8479
More than the stuff about who did what at Nijmegen, Browning, Brereton, and so on, there can never be conclusive proof about what should have been done after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy
As previously noted, the German opinion that I have seen, is that the allies should have concentrated resources on a single thrust towards Germany at that time, in the North. Given what the allies knew about the state of enemy, its forces in the West, and the German crisis on the Eastern Front, the reluctance of Eisenhower to concentrate the available allied resources is hard to account for.
The state of allied logistics at that time, with the allied forces getting 14,000 tons of supplies per day, would have allowed 20 allied divisions, each with up to 500 tons of supplies per day to continue the allied advance with the remaining forces held back from such an advance until such time as material circumstances changed.
Events in the latter part of 1944 seem to have happened broadly as Montgomery and Alanbrooke had warned about, with the allies not being strong enough anywhere to force a breakthrough into Germany. The upshot being that the Germans were given what they most needed: time and space to rebuild, and re-equip existing forces, and to create new forces in order counter attack in the West. Perhaps there was a direct line from the US casualties in the Bulge to Eisenhower’s decision making in the previous Summer, who can say?
Politics and the War in France in 1944.
As far as I can see, Eisenhower should have been planning for the post Normandy campaign by having a clear view on where the allies should advance and by making decisions to keep the Germans off balance, as (as Montgomery had in Normandy), and being able to direct allied resources to where they were most needed.
Eisenhower seems to have put non-military factors ahead of military considerations far too often, particularly after he decided to take over as allied land forces commander from the 1st September 1944. Perhaps, by that time, as the US was increasing established on the continent, they were done with the allied alliance?
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
Pages 262-263
‘Brooke’s diary for Monday, August 28th, reflects this difference in strategic view and the problems raised by Eisenhower’s decision.’
‘ “Difficult C.O.S. meeting where we considered Eisenhower’s new plan to take command himself in Northern France on Sept.1st. This plan is likely to add another three to six months onto the war. He straightaway wants to split his force, sending an American contingent towards Nancy whilst the British Army Group moves along the coast. If the Germans are not as beat as they are this would be a fatal move; as it is, it may not do too much harm. In any case I am off to France to-morrow to see Monty and to discuss the situation with him” ’
…
‘”Arrived Monty’s H.Q. by 2 p.m. [29th August] Had a long talk with him about recent crisis with Eisenhower. Apparently he has succeeded in arriving at a suitable compromise by which First U.S. Army is to move on the right of 21 Army Group and head for area Charleroi, Namur, Liége, just North of the Ardennes. Only unsatisfactory part is that this army is not under Monty’s orders and he can only co-ordinate its actions in relation to 21 Army Group. This may work; it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
P520
The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. Eisenhower's first reaction was that, even if it was militarily desirable (which he did not admit), it was politically impossible to stop Patton in full cry. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war." To which Montgomery replied, " Victories win wars. Give people victory and they won't care who won it."
Arnhem.
Arnhem seems to be almost a red herring in regard to the matter of the broad front versus a narrow(er) front. MARKET GARDEN was a limited undertaking by comparison to Montgomery’s proposals as to how the war should be carried forward, and was undertaken after Eisenhower had spurned the chance to opt for a thrust into Germany when the German forces were at their lowest ebb. The evidence that I have seen is clear in regard to the intended scope of MARKET GARDEN:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
His words.
Further, on the 9th September 1944, Montgomery received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye:
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM. Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP—UTRECHT—ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P49
[Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that
‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’
Montgomery sought personal glory?
There seems to be little evidence to support the (mainly American) view that Montgomery proposed a consolidation of allied resources into a narrower thrust towards Germany in the Summer of 1944, in order to gain personal glory. On the contrary, when Montgomery and Eisenhower met on the 23rd August, Montgomery stated (these not his exact words), that the allies should advance in the North because that was where the most vital parts of German industry were located. He also stated that he would agree to stop 21st Army Group to allow 12th Army Group to advance in the South, provided that a decision was made to narrow the allied advance to a realistic size. Further, after this time, Montgomery continued to advocate the appointment of a separate land forces commander after Eisenhower had taken that role for himself, to the point that he would accept Bradley being appointed land forces commander, provided that such decision was made.
In conclusion, if conclusions can be reached.
From the point that Eisenhower took over as allied land forces commander, the war in North West Europe, with his ‘broad front’ strategy the war continued for another eight months. What the (Western) allied casualties were in that period, I do not know. Whether a narrower thrust advance into Germany would have ended the war sooner, cannot proved. However, based on the evidence that I have seen regarding the situation that faced the allies after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy, in my opinion, a narrower thrust advance into Germany would have been the best strategy for the allies to adopt at that point.
Footnote.
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
Pages 436-437
On page 372 of Eisenhower's " Crusade in Europe " he refers to a conversation which took place between us on the day this diary-entry was written. I feel certain that he did not write down at once the statement which he attributes to me, and I can only assume that, when he came to write it, he did not remember clearly what I had said. According to him, when we stood together on the bank of the Rhine on March 25th, I said to him :—" Thank God, Ike, you stuck by your plan. You were completely right, and I am sorry if my fear of dispersed effort added to your burdens. The German is now licked. It is merely a question of when he chooses to quit.
Thank God, you stuck by your guns." When this statement is considered in connection with what I wrote in my diary that evening, it will be clear that I was misquoted. To the best of my memory I congratulated him heartily on his success and said that, as matters had turned out, his policy was now the correct one; that, with the German in his defeated condition, no dangers now existed in a dispersal of effort. I am quite certain that I never said to him, " You were completely right," as I am still convinced that he was " completely wrong."
I am convinced that Alanbrooke was correct in his memory, regarding this matter.
2
-
@johnlucas8479
The matter of Berlin was noted by me only in regard to the goals for MARKET GARDEN. Montgomery, Eisenhower, and Tedder noted that MARKET GARDEN was only intended to get the allies across the Rhine. You pointed out the the 21st Army Group report on MARKET GARDEN noted that the ultimate goal of that undertaking was the Ijsselmeer (incorrectly noted as the Zuider Zee in that report)
That Montgomery was looking for the Western allies to eventually get to Berlin before, during, and after MARKET GARDEN is not in dispute. My guess is that on the 18th September, Montgomey belived that MARKET GARDEN would succeed - giving the allies a bridgehead across the Rhine, and sealing off the Western part of the Netherlands. Thereafter, a new plan would take advantange of the gains made by MARKET GARDEN and look to take the allies to the Ruhr, and beyond - to Berlin. Depending on the situation that presented itself at the end of MARKET GARDEN, Montgomery would have proposed that the allies push on into Germany, or possibly pause, while the Scheldt was cleared. Or possibly both. A wholly successful MARKET GARDEN might have given that degree of choice. Who can say?
2
-
@johnlucas8479
That Berlin was in Montgomery's thinking before, during, and after MARKET GARDEN, and later in the war is not in dispute.
I merely pointed out that it was not a stated goal for MARKET GARDEN. The goals for which seemed to be get the allies across the Rhine, as stated by Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Tedder. Also, according the 21st Army Group MARKET GARDEN report, the untimate goal was the Ijsselmeer (noted as the Zuider Zee in that report) - as previously pointed to me by you. Hence, my opinion that MARKET GARDEN has not much to do with the main Broad Front v Narrower Front stuff.
My opinion is that with MARKET GARDEN reaching the Ijsselmeer, and the Rhine, there would have been further discussion, based on the situation after MARKET GARDEN regarding the position of allied forces, and the evolving supply situation. Who can say?
2