Comments by "AFGuidesHD" (@AFGuidesHD) on "TIKhistory"
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How can it be argued that British intentions were wholesome and pure when Chamberlain said to his cabinet on 20th March "we should attack Germany" and on the 30th March "he was somewhat uneasy at the fact that our Ambassador in Warsaw could obtain no information as to the progress of the negotiations between Germany and Poland. One possible, but very distasteful, explanation of this was that Polish negotiators were, in fact, giving way to Germany" if more evidence is needed for such a British conspiracy for war, Joseph Kennedy reported to Washington after his conversation with the foreign minister; "England is advising France that they should both go to war regardless of Poland." on 22nd March and; "Halifax felt that the inevitability of war sooner or later should be met right now" on 24th March.
If their intentions were so wholesome to merely defend Poland from big bad Germany that clearly was planning to invade them, why did Georges Bonnet feel the need to say "We should go to the utmost limit including the use of threats to bring in Poland" ?
After actually looking at all the evidence from the British side, Simon Newman concluded:
What finally convinced the British Government that this policy had to be adopted was the fear that Poland might give in to pressure from Germany to remain neutral in return for some acceptable solution of the Danzig problem. The British had to prevent this eventuality because they considered that it would be detrimental to their interests; so detrimental, in fact, that they were prepared to risk a war to prevent it. Such an agreement, coming in the wake of a long string of German successes culminating in the occupation of Prague, the annexation of Memel, and treaties with Slovakia and Romania, would represent a further blow to Britain's prestige and influence and seriously undermine her power to organize resistance against Germany in the future. Furthermore, it would mean the loss of the eastern front which strategically was essential in a war with Germany. These were the options which the Foreign Office had all along been trying to keep open. Rather than accept their foreclosure, the British preferred to go to war.
Robert Vansittart was somewhat more open and honest about the outbreak of war, rather than any "n-nooo Germany started it" mythology nonsense. He was indeed honest and said "yes we started it to prevent Germany from becoming a hegemon" that means, even if they were to become a hegemon peacefully through treaties with Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, Italy, Finland, Poland and so on.
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