Comments by "HaJo Os." (@hajoos.8360) on "Drachinifel" channel.

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  44. Again a lot of work, Drach made, to present us the well documented sea-history, exspecially Nelson, of this age more lively. 3 decisive points in this fine documentation are false, from my point of view. 1. Nelson was not that genius, he was a propaganda figure. Of course, he was a good officer, a fine seaman, but no gentleman (easy to realise, how he handled the fate of Admiral Carraciolo). He won only against the amateurs & idiots, he failed against the professionals, for example at Tenerife. Sidney Smith & Thomas Cochrane were much more talented than Nelson & Nelson knew it, followed them with his jealousy. In my personal view both guys were the best sea-officers of all time. 2. Nelson did not invented the frontal attack against the enemy-line with 2 columns. Another more genius scotsman did it before. Admiral Duncan, a very smart giant, able to do the job of every able seaman, invented it 8 years before Trafalgar at the Battle of Camperdown against the Dutch. Unfortunately for the Brits, Duncan died already in 1804. He obviously would have avoided all those wrong decisions made by Nelson following the idiot Villeneuve. 3. Villeneuve was brave. Of course not, he was a coward & never fit for command. It was Boney's failure not to know his admirals by character. At the Nile the Frogs had only amateurs in command. Brueys sent the half of his crews to land for fetching water, instead to demand soldiers from Alexandria for the job. He knew that Nelson was after him, so the Frogs fought only with a half crew. Brueys anchored only by bow anchors, too frenchie lazy to bring out a spring on stern anchors. During the battle Villeneuve, commanding the rear, had enough time to establsih a spring for 2 ships of the line, to hammer the british bows of their leading vessels, let's say Bellerophon and Orion. And of course Boney had a better admiral relegated as a governor in the Carribean, Villaret-Joyeuse. Villaret-Joyeuse was educated by the best French admiral ever, Suffren (more british than the Brits, always demanded close action on pistol range). Villaret-Joyeuse (before the war a post-captain) fought without educated crews (with merchant sailing-masters on board) against Howe at the Glorious First of June. He was defeated tactically and won strategically. With his miserable crews this was an outstanding performance. Villaret-Joyeuse would have sailed into the channel and you, guys, would have to listen now a Froggish docu.
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  50.  @TheNecromancer6666  this counts only for the crews and engineers. The social differences and behaviour between officers and crews were not helpful and the circumstances of comeradeship on board were better in WWII. The Germans were enforced to use their experiences, for example 2 aft turrets of Seydlitz out of action at the battle of the Doggerbank, because they were inferior. Admiral Beatty was too arrogant to use conclusions and consequences, because he commanded superiour forces. I do not share Drach's opinion about the biggest calibre is the best. The Germans had in WWI and II more rounds ammunition on board, because their shells were smaller. About speed you are right in the German planning. But in reality German battlecruisers were one or two knots faster than their british opponents. At the Doggerbank Blücher slowed the Germans down. Without Blücher we would not have seen the battle. It is a major mistake to put slow ships into the line of battle, as we have already seen in the battle of Tsushima, but the Germans repeated the mistake at the Doggerbank and Jutland. With a smaller and faster high seas fleet at Jutland Jellicoe would not have been able to cross the German T. The opposite is the case, it is probable that Scheer would have crossed the British T, before the Homefleet would have formed the line of battle. The would have meant a decisive victory for the Germans. At the battle of the Falklands Admiral Spee failed totally, Lütjens failed always, Kummetz failed at the Oslo Fjord, and Captain Langsdorff failed at the battle of River Plate. The Germans admiralty was miserable in tactics and strategics, and they promoted the wrong men. They decided politically, always a mistake. The German admiralty was not even able to calculate the correct fuel demand for their operations, unbelievable.
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