Comments by "" (@lyndoncmp5751) on "TIKhistory" channel.

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  20.  @ThumperE23  Absolutely untrue and just two days after Market Garden began, the Americans started attacking into the Hurtgen Forest and priority of supply and major attacks remained with the US armies all through October, November and December. Then everything had to be shut down until February 1945 when the Americans were in retreat in the Ardennes. The American armies had priority for five straight months, and did very little with it. Did you know the twin pronged US 1st Army attack in the Hurtgen Forest and Aachen in October 1944 used FOUR TIMES as many men and supplies as the ground element of Market Garden, which wasn't even a full 2nd British Army attack? You probably did not. Montgomery DID clear the Scheldt and open Antwerp. As a matter of fact this was the only allied campaign of autumn 1944 to succeed in its objectives. All the others failed. Regardless, Antwerp being open changed nothing for the west wall battles. Operation Queen still failed and the Americans still got pushed back into that retreat in the Ardennes. You cannot blame either on Antwerp. The Hurtgen Forest was not an unmitigated disaster due to no Antwerp. It was well supplied. It was an unmitigated disaster because of poor strategy and tactics. It was the most ill conceived idea of the entire 1944/45 period, it achieved nothing, cost unnecessary high casualties and then directly lead to even more unnecessary high casualties in the Ardennes. Eisenhowers broad front strategy was a complete failure.
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  37.  @gawdsuniverse3282  Oh for goodness sake. The Ardennes was mid December. Montgomery's concentrated northern thrust would have been September/October, right after Normandy. Three months before the Ardennes. The Germans were on the run in August and by September they didn't have any new panzer divisions to throw into the front lines. They just lost TEN panzer divisions the month before in August. This is why in September they could only throw in green and badly trained panzer brigades, and these got mauled very quickly. It took Germany MONTHS to build up their panzer divisions to use in the Ardennes. By December they had built them up, although still only at half strength in tanks compared to Normandy. We are talking about a concentrated battering ram into Germany in September/October. Not December. The reason WHY Germany was able to rebuild for the Ardennes was because Eisenhowers broad front strategy was a failure and it didn't break through into Germany as promised. It got nowhere and Germany was able to keep on producing. Had Montgomerys concentrated northern thrust been agreed to by Eisenhower, the industrial heartland of the Ruhr would have been reached much sooner and this would have been detrimental to Germanys ability to reproduce much of their armaments. Their steel production for tanks was largely in the Ruhr. Everyone knew if you take the Ruhr you are going to be stabbing into the heart of Germany. But no, Eisenhower allowed resources to be thrown away in the Lorraine, Hurtgen Forest, Alsace etc.
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  49.  @FromPovertyToProgress  You are incorrect. The Hurtgen Forest, Aachen attacks, Lorraine, Alsace, Operation Queen etc were EXTREMELY WELL SUPPLIED. They didnt fail due to lack of supplies. Masses and masses of supplies came in via the Red Ball Express, then the opening of the railways and Le Havre. People don't realise just how much the rebuilt railway network contributed to bringing supplies up. The westwall battles were very well supplied otherwise none of those massive campaigns could have occurred. Look how quickly the US was able to respond to the German Ardennes attack with massive redeployment, resources and supplies. This was late December. Its completely untrue to claim massive levels of supplies couldn't get to the front until February 1945. Massive levels of supplies got to the front all through October, November, December and January. Antwerp is a complete red herring. Antwerp was not crucial for the westwall battles. Antwerp was only crucial for the advance across Germany, once Germany was broken into. The Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace, Operation Queen etc did NOT fail due to Antwerp not being taken. They failed because of poor strategy and stubborn German resistance. It was Eisenhowers broad front strategy that caused the stall. Eisenhower dispersed the supplies all along a 500km front and squandered them in pointless and unnecessary secondary campaigns, from the Hurtgen down to the Vosges. It was the SQUANDERING of the supplies, not LACK of supplies. Eisenhower should have listened to Montgomery and concentrated the effort only in the north.
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  50.  @gawdsuniverse3282  The available German forces in September/October 1944 would have been powerless to oppose a concentrated 4 army 40 division immovable allied force. Listen to Gunther Blumentritt: ""The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine. "" Gunther Blumentritt in, The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart.
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