Comments by "" (@lyndoncmp5751) on "TIKhistory" channel.

  1.  @gawdsuniverse3282  Please provide counter evidence that Blumentritt is incorrect, self serving and not to be trusted. Just because you don't agree with the source doesn't mean its to be discredited.
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  2.  @gawdsuniverse3282  Thats not how debate works. I gave a relevant source with direct quote and gave that source's viewport. All you've done is say the source is wrong, the source cannot be trusted etc etc and you provide zero counter data. The broad front was a failure. It failed all through autumn 1944 to break though into Germany. I mean, even Operation Queen only had the limited goals of attaining the Roer. Even that failed to achieve its limited objectives. The broad front strategy directly lead to the retreat in the Ardennes and nearly 100,000 American casualties. Eisenhowers strategy was the wrong strategy and it failed. Instead of smashing down the door into Germany all it did was 'knock' all over it. The allied advance into Germany only got going in February 1945 because Eisenhower was lucky that the Germans did his job for him in throwing away all their reserves in the Ardennes. Had the Germans carried on defending then the allies wouldn't have reached the Rhine until summer 1945. Eisenhower was an excellent Supreme Commander because he was a great desk man politician and man manager but he was a mediocre battle strategist and C-in-C of ground forces. All through autumn 1944 he never even moved his HQ east of Paris. Montgomery should have remained in command of the ground forces or, as he told Eisenhower on 23rd August, if American public pressure demanded an American command all ground forces then he should let Bradley control the battle. Under Montgomery the allies moved 500km in 3 months June-September 1944. Under Eisenhower the allies barely moved 100km in 6 months September 1944 to February 1945..... with even a retreat thrown in.
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  3.  @gawdsuniverse3282  This sums it up nicely. Eisenhower and the Art of Warfare by DJ Haycock, page 182. "Despite objections raised to Montgomery's plan of an assault on a 40 division front, it was more sensible than Eisenhower's insistence on the entire front being in motion at all times, for no better reason than he could not abide the thought that the two American army groups would not participate as entities in the anticipated victory. Not only did Eisenhower fail to heed Montgomery's suggestions, but also he never seemed to understand the possible benefits. He was evidently unable to understand that to supply 40 divisions attacking on one front would have been an easier task than to supply first one army and then the other as each in turn went over to the offensive. It was this concentration of effort which Eisenhower failed to understand and implement "
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  4.  @gawdsuniverse3282  Basic rule of military reasoning when the enemy is down is to concentrate your forces and finish it off. Eisenhower dispersing his forces all along the front, never very strong in any one area, gave the Germans time to recover and regroup. That is the bottom line. There should have been a large concentrated northern battering ram. Instead we got a postman knocking all over.
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  5.  @gawdsuniverse3282  Um less than 50,000 German troops escaped Normandy to the east, and next to no armour. In contrast, Normandy cost the Germans 450,000 men and 2,400 tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers. 50,000 German troops escaping is nothing of significant when they just lost nearly ten times that number.
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  6. Montgomery was the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander in WW2. Nobody did more to help win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery. After Market Garden, the Americans had bigger failures in the Lorraine, Hurtgen Forest, Operation Queen and Ardennes. The irony is they had to turn to Montgomery to help them out of their self mad mess in the Ardennes. Eisenhowers broad front strategy was a complete failure.
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  7.  @johnpeate4544  In early November 1944 Patton had over 250,000 men and circa 800 tanks. The Germans had 90,000 men and less than 100 tanks. Patton still failed to achieve his objective.
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  8. Eisenhower was out of touch of the situation when he took over from Montgomery as ground forces commander on 1st September 1944. Eisenhower's HQ remained at Granville on the west coast of the Cherbourg peninsula, nearly 600 km away from where the front now was. As Montgomery put it, Eisenhower was in "a useless place for a land force commander who had to keep his finger on the pulse of his armies and give quick decisions in rapidly changing situations. There were no telephone lines, not even radio telephone between his HQ and Bradley and myself. In the early days of September he was in fact completely out of touch with the land battle". From Montgomery, Memoirs page 271
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  9.  @johnathanh2660  There is not a jot of evidence that either Churchill or Roosevelt had a role in Eisenhower's decision to take over ground strategy or insist on a broad front. Montgomery promised Paris in 3 months. He did better. He was in Brussels, Belgium in 3 months. It amuses me when Caen is brought up. Did Bradley's US 1st Army take St Lo any quicker? No. Montgomerys overall timeline for Normandy was 3 months. He achieved that, with time to spare. Under Montgomery in charge of allied ground forces the allies moved 500km in 3 months June to September 1944 and never suffered a retreat. Under Eisenhower in charge of allied ground forces the allies barely moved 100km in 6 months and suffered a retreat. Eisenhower didn't trust Bradley and Hodges in the Ardennes, so he turned to Montgomery to take over US 1st and 9th Armies. Montgomerys press conference was cherry picked by US generals. Montgomery only held that press conference in the first place to defend Eisenhower. Eisenhower was getting lambasted in the British press for his failed broad front and the retreat in the Ardennes. In the press conference Montgomery actually said teams win battles and the team leader was Eisenhower. Montgomery also highly praised the American soldiers. In fact the New York Times said there was no finer tribute to the American fighting man than the one Montgomery gave them. However in the following days, Bradley in particular started kicking up a fuss. Very quickly all the nice things Montgomery said about the American soldiers and Eisenhower were ignored and instead Bradley and his cohorts started complaining that Montgomery didn't mention them and wrongly accused him of claiming he won the battle single handedly. That was not the case. Montgomery purposely did not mention Bradley or Patton because in every single comment to the press prior to this neither Bradley or Patton made any mention of or gave any acknowledgement to the fact that Montgomery was commanding the northern battle in the Ardennes. This got so bad that Beddell Smith had to issue a SHAEF press release on January 5th 1945 stating that Montgomery was commanding the US 1st and 9th Armies and had been ever since December 20th. Soooo Montgomery goes down to the Ardennes sector, helps them out tremendously, saves many American lives, praises the American soldiers and Eisenhower..... and gets nothing but bitching for the next 80 years just because he supposedly hurt poor Bradley's feelings. Talk about a thin skin.
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  10. Didn't Montgomery promise El Alamein would last around a dozen days and succeed? Did he deliver on that, yes or no? Didn't Montgomery promise Normandy would last 3 months and succeed? Did he deliver on that, yes or no? Didn't Montgomery promise that the broad front was a mistake and wouldn't succeed? Was he right about that yes or no?
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  11. Why would Patton and Bradley not trust Montgomery to carry out the plan? Every previous campaign of Montgomerys was a success. And Patton and Bradley would have been part of the plan for a 40 division 4 army concentrated northern thrust. Montgomery even told Eisenhower he'd serve UNDER Bradley if his proposal was accepted and if American public pressure demanded an American command all ground forces.
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  12. Absolutely, Montgomery was the most successful, most experienced and most savvy Western Allied ground commander of WW2.
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  13. Antwerp is a red herring. Antwerp was only crucial for the advance across Germany, once Germany was broken into. That never happened until February 1945. Antwerp was not crucial for the westwall battles getting INTO Germany. These campaigns were well supplied without Antwerp. Eisenhower just squandered the supplies in the Hurtgen, Lorraine, Alsace. Antwerp was fully open by late November. Operation Queen and the Lorraine continued to fail and then the Americans were pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes nearly a month after Antwerp was open. Antwerp open changed absolutely nothing for the westwall battles.
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  14. Jeffrey Beigie How did the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 not deliver what he promised? Didn't he correct predict El Alamein to last around a dozen days and didn't it end any hope of Axis victory in North Africa? Didn't Montgomery promise that the Normandy campaign would last three months and the allies would be in Paris by then, yet instead he did better and was actually in Brussels, Belgium by then. Etc etc.
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  15. Brian Bartup, Montgomery was no longer C-in-C of ground forces. After September 1st he had to clear anything of major significance with Eisenhower, as Eisenhower was now the C-in-C of all ground forces. And Eisenhower was well behind the front lines. First near Cherbourg then the other side of Paris at Versailles. Terrible locations for the commander of all ground forces who had to oversee the battlefront with hands on decisions to be made. Due to Eisenhower remaining in Cherbourg and not moving up to the front near Montgomery and Bradley, it took Eisenhower nearly a week just to get back to Montgomery on the strike for the Rhine proposal. A precious week that was lost. Eisenhower assumed command of the battle.....then removed himself from the battle.
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  16. Everything should have closed down for just one week to support Market Garden. Instead Patton was allowed to continue in the Lorraine and the Hurtgen Forest attack got underway just 2 days after Market Garden began. Full priority should have been given to Market Garden. A diversionary US attack towards Aachen would have drawn away German reinforcements that were sent in from Germany. For example Stutmgeschutz Brigade 280 was actually heading for Aachen on trains but was rushed to Arnhem when the paratroopers started dropping.
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  17.  @user-tb9nr5id5y  The broad front most definitely prolonged the war. It wasted vast amounts of men and resources in pointless secondary campaigns of little strategic benefit and completely slowed and stalled the advance into Germany.
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  18. Both Gavin and Ridgway really liked Montgomery though and spoke highly of him.
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  19. "The failure to liberate the channel ports and the Scheldt estuary was all Monty's, and who could have possibly seen the Ardennes offensive coming?" The Scheldt wasn't a failure. It suceeded quicker than the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine campaigns did, and with far fewer casualties. Eisenhower was both Supreme Commander AND the C-in-C of all allied ground forces from September 1st, so not prioritising clearing the Scheldt was on Eisenhower. He was the boss and the man in control of strategy. As for the Ardennes, on November 28th Montgomery warned Eisenhower that the American line in front of the Ardennes was too weak and thinly held and should be strengthed. Eisenhower didn't.
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  20. @Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Well, ALL the units north of the German 'bulge' were under Montgomery's command from December 20th 1944.Not only British XXX Corps but the US 1st Army (and US 9th Army). In fact, Montgomery was in command of more forces in the Battle of the Bulge than Bradley was. Forces under Montgomery's command did the majority of the fighting....against the majority of the German forces. But you already know this 😉.
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  21. As already mentioned by John Peate, Market Garden wasn't Montgomerys northern thrust. Market Garden was merely a limited operation. Montgomery's actual concentrated northern thrust was for 40 divisions in 4 armies (north to south Canadian 1st, British 2nd, US 1st and US 3rd) to all stick together as one powerful force that need fear no enemy. They would advance into northern Germany together, with the central point being Aachen and the Ruhr. They would then consolidate build up supplies then advance together across northern Germany to Berlin via Kassel, Hanover, Magdeburg etc. It wouldn't have been narrow as such. Still a couple hundred kilometres wide. This was a very sound and logical strategic proposal by Montgomery. He just didn't want resources wasted in the Lorraine, Hurtgen Forest, Alsace and southern Germany, because southern Germany was irrelevant to winning the war.
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  22. John Peate Yes, Montgomery considered an alternative to Market Garden and as you say this was for a drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt. Brereton rejected it out of hand and decided on Market Garden.
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  23. Imagine trying to get across the southern Netherlands later on in worse weather and with tougher German defences. Market Garden got to Nijmegen (where the British and Canadian advance into Germany in 1945 kicked off from) in less than 3 days. I suspect it would have taken far longer and with considerable killed and wounded in, say, November.
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  24. So what did this book say about Patton in the Lorraine, the biggest allied failure of autumn 1944? 55,000 casualties and objective not achieved?
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  25. @rufusmcgee4383 That was in September. In October Patton was well supplied and by the time of his early November attempt to get to the Saar and through the Siegfried Line he enjoyed a 3:1 superiority in men and 8:1 in tanks. He had 9 well equipped and well supplied divisions. 3 were armoured divisions. As von Mellenthin wrote in Panzer Battles, page 317: "" On 2 November Third Army was authorized to attack to the Saar as soon as the weather cleared. Patton now assured Bradley that he could get to the Saar in three days and easily breach the West Wall with six infantry and three armoured divisions, plus two groups, i.e. brigades, of mechanized cavalry. Third Army numbered approximately a quarter of a million officers and men. Its opponents, the First German Army, had a total strength of only 86,000. Seven of the eight enemy divisions were strung out on a front of 75 miles and the only reserve was the 11th Panzer Division with 69 tanks. While the German formations were necessarily dispersed defensively, Patton, with command of the air and ample mobility on the ground, had the capacity to concentrate overwhelming force at any point he chose. Even on a basis of direct comparison he had an advantage of three to one in men, eight to one in tanks and a tremendous superiority in the artillery arm" Patton was still failing to achieve his objective SIX WEEKS later when he was pulled out of the Lorraine.
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  26.  MC  With respect I didn't miss your point. You said Browning was in charge of the paratroop army. That is the point I was addressing. Bowning was not. General Lewis H Brereton was commanding general of First Allied Airborne Army and it was Brereton (together with General Paul Williams of the USAAF, and Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst of the RAF) who presided over the really important decisions for Market Garden pre drop and these are what ultimately killed the operation. Browning was largely irrelevant. He didn't make any of the big overall First Allied Airborne Army decisions and nor did he make any of the divisional decisions. In truth he might as well not even been there. He was an irrelevant no man's land man in the middle. Neither at the very top nor a divisional commander. Gavin made his own decisions around Nijmegen. It was miscommunication between Gavin and the 508th PIR that failed to move on the bridge on day one in a timely manner. Nothing to do with Browning. Nor was it Browning who made the decision to pull out of Nijmegen on the 18th. That was also by Gavin. Though Browning, and Gavin, both prioritised the Groesbeek Heights, Browning never ordered Gavin to abandon any attempt on the bridge. In fact Browning told Gavin late on the 18th that the bridge must be taken the next day or at the very latest by the morning of the 20th. "" It is fine to blame the 82nd commander for not taking the bridge but the overall commander gets a pass? BS. "" The overall commander was Brereton. These decisions were all made pre drop to prioritise the Groesbeek Heights. I haven't blamed Gavin at all. Gavin TWICE ordered Lindquist of the 508th PIR to move on the bridge. Allegedly, Gavin was mad as hell when he learned at 6.00 p.m that the 508th still hadn't moved on the bridge, even though they were ready and assembled at 3.00 p.m. Other decisions were made because the Germans reacted well and follow on reinforcement drops were canceled due to the weather. I put the blame mostly on Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst. They scuppered the plan before it even took off with their single missions on day one insistence (which even Montgomery could not persuade them to alter) and drops over a number of days. The Germans concluded this was the biggest mistake made by the allies in Market Garden. Browning himself specifically said the most crucial problem at Nijmegen was the non arrival of the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment on the 19th. Browning said had this occurred then the bridge may have been taken on the 19th. We wil never know if that was true or not. ""It was a stupid plan"" Then Brereton should have said so and should have told Monty the operation was stupid, couldn't be done and that FAAA wasn't capable enough, just as he told Monty his Scheldt paratroop alternative wasn't viable. General Gavin thought Market Garden was a good plan and that it would end the war quicker. ""done for political and personal glory more than military brilliance or necessity."" It was done to try and end the war at a time the Germans looked down and out. Personal glory? But Montgomery also argued for the US 1st Army to advance on his southern flank to Aachen and beyond. The objective of Market Garden was to ONLY get a bridgehead across the Rhine, and also to cut off the Netherlands. The next phase would have been for the Americans to quickly advance to get into a position for both British 2nd Army and US 1st Army to then quickly take the industrial core of the Ruhr, which was expected to shorten he war. If you argue that Market Garden was a stupid plan/idea then I'd love to know your thoughts about the Hurtgen Forest, which was a far bigger failure and suffered nearly 3 times as many casualties for nothing of note gained and then allowed the Ardennes to occur.
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  27. ​ MC  Well as a matter of fact Aachen and the Hurtgen are considered two separate battles, although within the dictate of a single US Army. The battle of Aachen October 2nd to 21st October and the battle for the Hurtgen Forest 19th September to 16th December (when the German Ardennes offensive superseded operations there). They aren't generally considered one and the same. Your first paragraph actually makes Montgomery's argument for a concentrated thrust in the north with 4 armies a sound proposal. Montgomery argued against wasting resources and logistics in the south (Lorraine, Alsace, Vosges etc). Instead he argued for a 4 army thrust in the north, centred on Aachen and then the Ruhr. Eisenhower disagreed and instead choose to disperse his effort over the entire front, hundreds of miles. It is much easier to supply 4 armies on one front than to supply more armies on a much wider front all at the same time. As to your second paragraph, it was the September 4th SHAEF intel summary which convinced Monty that the Germans in front of British 2nd Army were in a very poor state. Montgomery did not come up with this out of thin air. SHAEF intel told him that was the case. Eisenhower then took nearly a week just to get back to him and it was another week before the operation went ahead. The Germans had strengthened somewhat in those two weeks but it was too late to stop the operation. The First Allied Airborne Army was itching to get into combat and Brereton was enamored with the idea. Even Gavin was. Remember only the idea was Montgomery's. The planning,for Market at least, was worked out by the air commanders and Montgomery had to take a back seat, not having any jurisdiction over the FAAA, RAF and USAAF. The Germans concluded that the biggest mistake made by the allies was dispersed drops over a number of days and that decisions rests with Brereton and Williams. Montgomery, and others including the individual divisions commanders and I believe Browning, argued for double mission flown on day one but Brereton and Williams refused. The RAF's decision to not fly closer to Arnhem was also a major reason. Garden actually did quite well. Grave, where the 82nd were was reached by XXX Corps in 42 hours. That was 80% of the way.
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  28.  @madmonkeys88  And even at the time, others argued against the Broad Front. That wasn't 20/20 hindsight. That was perception at the time. Eisenhower was just stubborn and had to have all American armies involved. This wasted resources.
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  29.  @madmonkeys88  But smashing the door down with a concentrated blow is better than merely knocking all over it. That what the broad front did. Knocked everywhere and kicked nowhere. The Germans in 1940 concentrated their forces against France in a northern effort. The western allies should have done the same against Germany in autumn 1944. This would have been easier to supply and support as well. It was simply more manageable. Added to that, the main strategic objectives like the Ruhr and Berlin are on northern Germany. The Broad Front was a mistake, as I see it. It was obvious at the time because it was getting nowhere for months, at unnecessary cost. For political reasons, however, Eisenhower had to have every American army heavily involved, whether their sector was secondary and irrelevant or not.
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  30.  @anthonyeaton5153  There was never planned to be any spearhead to Berlin. Montgomery's concentrated northern thrust involved 40 divisions in 4 armies and would still have been a couple of hundred km in width.
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  31.  @dashcroft1892  The Poles and Canadians were far too slow and failed to close the Falaise Gap. Operation Totalize was a disaster.
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  32.  @ungrimironfist5740  Far more Brits died on the western front that Poles you ignoramus. Even in Market Garden, less than 100 Poles died compared to ten times that number of Brits (nearly 1,500).
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  33. Indeed. It is EASILY the best work on this battle.
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  34.  @gawdsuniverse3282  "One, single thrust by an allied army would have meant that the bulk of available german forces would have opposed it." Please list this available German force by division, armour strength etc.
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  35.  @gawdsuniverse3282  The Scheldt was cleared, Antwerp was open and supplies were pouring in by the end of November. Yet what happened? Two weeks later the Americans were in retreat in the Ardennes, expending nearly 100,000 men just to get back to the start lines they were ALREADY AT six weeks before. Good thing Montgomery went down there to stop it getting a lot worse for them.
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  36.  @gawdsuniverse3282  "" a single narrow front attack led by Montgomery would have failed " Who said it would have been narrow and lead by Montgomery? Montgomery proposed a 40 division 4 army concentrated northern thrust. 1 British, 1 Canadian and 2 American armies. This would have been at least a couple of hundred km wide. Montgomery offered to Eisenhower on August 23rd he'd serve UNDER Bradley if American public pressure demanded an American command it. Montgomery never demanded he lead it. As long as his proposal was accepted he said Bradley could command it.
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  37.  @jbjones1957  Because the Americans had priority of attack and supply after September with the Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace, Vosges, Operation Queen etc. The British 2nd Army was only given limited options and resources, but still suceeded in Operation Aintree etc. The Scheldt was the focus of the northern sector in October/November. Then everything had to be shut down in late December and January due to the Americans failing back in the Ardennes. All priority was focused on that.
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  38.  @jbjones1957  2nd British Army wasn't GIVEN any option to mount a major attack east. The Americans were given the resources and priorities in October, November and December. 2nd British Army wasn't.
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  39.  @johnathanh2660  Yes Eisenhower had enough on his plate, so therefore should never have taken on the job of C-in-C of all ground forces as well as Supreme Commander. That's TWO separate jobs. Montgomery was doing a good job of it already, from the Normandy beaches to being out of France and in Belgium in under 3 months. Excellent going, far exceeding all expectations. Eisenhower himself said much. However, he never once said Churchill or Roosevelt pressured him into taking over ground strategy or the broad front so we can categorical reject that theory out of hand. It's a non starter. You said Montgomery failed to deliver at Caen. That's why I brought up Bradley and St Lo. St Lo was also taken over a month behind schedule. Objective was D plus 9. Why did you criticise Montgomery for taking Caen when he said, but excused Bradley for not taking St Lo when he said? Bradley was facing very little in front of St Lo. Conversely, Montgomerys British and Canadian forces in front of Caen faced the densest concentration of German armour ever deployed in WW2. By the end of June there were 7 panzer divisions and a number of independent panzer battalions (Tigers, Jagdpanzers etc) defending Caen. Conversely, the Americans faced precisely ZERO panzer divisions before July. Bradley's lack of drive against St Lo in June was PRECISELY the reason why the Germans sent every single panzer division to the Caen frontage. Eisenhower most certainly did NOT trust Bradley to be able to handle the Ardennes situation. Eisenhower had no confidence whatsoever in Bradley's ability to sort the whole disaster out. Bradley insisted he could. Eisenhower totally disagreed and already on just the 4th day of the battle had lost faith in Bradley and instead sent for Montgomery to come down and take over Bradley's US 1st and 9th Armies and to command everything north of the German salient. This is not opinion, this is fact. Bradley even telephoned Eisenhower after the decision to turn to Montgomery was made and Bradley protested. Eisenhower had to cut the conversation short with a "Well Brad, those are my orders" finality. What do you mean what is my point about Paris/Brussels? You accused Montgomery of failing in his promises. When I factually point out that Montgomery actually EXCEEDED his promise and was in Brussels So it was the weather which caused Eisenhowers broad front to fail, according to your revisionism? Except the weather was actual not that bad September to mid November 1944, and certainly wasn't the reason the advance stalled. Strange then that the weather didn't prevent Montgomerys Scheldt clearing operation from succeeding in October/November.... the only allied campaign in NW Europe to achieve its goals in autumn 1944. Very strange. Tedder. Ah yes one of a number of senior British militarily commanders who were insanely jealous and frustrated at the fame and attention Montgomery had at home, while the general public at large had no idea who they were. Montgomery was the poster boy of the British fight against Nazi Germany ever since El Alamein. Conversely hardly anyone could pick Tedder out of a lineup if their lives depended on it. Of course they wished for Montgomery to disappear, despite the fact that he'd done more to help win the war in the west than any of them?
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  40.  @johnathanh2660  I think your entire point of view seems to be to point out when Montgomery didn't achieve an objective as quickly as he said he would but when achieved an objective actually quicker than he said he would you shrug with a "so what big deal" retort. Conversely when other commanders failed to achieve their objectives as quickly as they said they would you excuse them and give them a free pass. Itd be interesting to hear your excuse for Patton on November 3rd 1944 when he told Bradley he'd be through the Siegfried Line and across the Saar in 3 days.....and was still failing 6 weeks later. 😉.
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  41. Montgomery had the plans. He laid them out. Unfortunately Eisenhower took over as C-in-C of all ground forces on September 1st and had different plans. The wrong ones.
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  42. It comes from Hollywood. Even his supposedly difficult personality is exaggerated. The fact is he even got on fairly well with MOST American commanders he served with. A very small number bitched about him post war and unfortunately this gave the false impression it was the norm.
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  43. Yes only a bridgehead across the Rhine was the goal (as far as a Ruhr manoeuvre is concerned). After moving north to cut off the Netherlands and open Antwerp, no move on the Ruhr could have occurred without the US 1st Army to the south moved eastwards in tandem. They needed to get beyond Aachen first, and they had a tough time with that.
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  44.  @johnpeate4544  Absolutely. Montgomery was the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. Hard to catch up to and capture Rommels hastily retreating force after El Alamein when it had a head start, was smaller and lighter and when the Eigth Army still had to get through hundred of thousands of mines. The Soviets failed to capture German forces even when they had them more or less encircled (Cherkassy-Korsun, Kamenets-Podolsk).
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  45.  @johnpeate4544  I honestly cannot understand the desperate criticism of Montgomery in North Africa. Its literal desperate straw clutching. Before Montgomery it was two years of see saw back and forth with zero decisive battles. More or less as soon as Montgomery came in and took over, it only went one way for the Axis. Job done.
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  46.  @johnpeate4544  If Montys Eigth Army wasn't threatening Rommels rear in Tunisia after Kasserine , the US forces there could have been in real trouble.
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  47. 1. Why would Patton be in charge? Patton wasn't even in charge of the US forces. Bradley was commander of US 12th Army Group. Patton was never higher than a single army commander. 2. Montgomery moved quicker than anyone else in the allied armies ever did. 1,300km in just 20 days from El Alamein to El Agheila November 4th to 23rd 1942, and as has already been mentioned The Great Swan, from the River Seine to Brussels advanced 400km in less than a week. How fast did Patton move when the enemy was in front of him? He barely moved 100km in 4 months in the Lorraine. How about Hodges in the Hurtgen Forest?
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  48.  @sean640307  Yes at Metz particularly it was about 10km in 3 months. And Montgomery gets pilloried for Caen?
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  49.  @sean640307  Quite right. Patton moved fast when there was nothing in his way but Montgomery moved even faster when there was nothing in his way. Montgomery also moved faster than Patton when there was an enemy in his way too. Even Market Garden was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. 100 km advanced in 3 days. Apart from a short period in September 1944, Patton was never in the middle of the thickest fighting on the Western Front in WW2.
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  50. Patton was in charge of the Lorraine campaign. His 3rd Army suffered 55,000 casualties and still didn't get out of it in 4 months of trying.
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