Comments by "" (@lyndoncmp5751) on "TIKhistory" channel.

  1. ​ MC  ""Nor does this fix the really glaring deficiency concerning how to secure the flanks of the entire 30 Corp as it moved forward."" It is not very well known but there were actually two flanking corps moving up on either side of XXX Corps. These were XII Corps on the left and VIII Corps on the right. Both corps however suffered in lack of supplies and logistics , had even worse terrain to get across (although which terrain in WW2 WASN'T difficult to get across???) and didn't have the advantage of an airborne carpet laid in front of them. They did ultimately help in protecting the flanks. XXX Corps also had it's own rear elements that fanned out in flank protection. This is why Hell's Highway was only briefly cut by the Germans, despite it being deep inside their own territory. The Germans didn't manage to permanently cut the highway and were driven away from it.
    2
  2. ​ MC  Not sure why the need to "LOL". Nothing funny about my post. Aachen was a more viable option than the Hurtgen Forest in September and could have been gone for if Eisenhower was smarter. The Hurtgen Forest was a needless unnecessary campaign that took out far more men than Market Garden, and achieved very very little. US 1st Army attacks into the Hurtgen began just two days after Market Garden. On the 19th. ""all prioritized logistics were given to Market Garden" Marget Garden only had priority in extra supply transport laid on. It didn't take away any actual supplies from any US army. Nor did Market Garden stop all operations on the western front. Patton's 3rd Army was still trying to take Metz and, as I said, the US 1st Army began it's Hurtgen Forest campaign on the 19th. Just two weeks after Market Garden the US 1st Army had around over a dozen well supplied infantry divisions and 3 well supplied armoured divisions (circa 200,000 men) for their twin pronged attacks at Aachen and the Hurtgen. This was far more than Market Garden had to call on but it didn't do any better as you seem to have already acknowledged.
    2
  3.  @zen4men  👍
    2
  4.  @stevewiles7132  Hehe. No worries. You are dead right though. If the Germans were as bad off as the September 4th SHAEF intel summary told Monty they were, well then the operation would probably have succeeded
    2
  5. Montgomerys broad idea was liked by almost everyone. Others then took over the planning and he had no jurisdiction over the air forces.
    2
  6. I think a lot of it is overblown and exaggerated.
    2
  7. They did. Dutch resistance couldn't be 100% trusted though and besides, it was reinforcements that came from Germany that made the difference, and Dutch intelligence knew nothing about these reinforcements. All the tanks that caused problems were in Germany when the paras dropped. There was no Dutch intel about them.
    2
  8. The 9th SS established itself in the Veluwe region and the 10th SS in the Achterhoek. Both divisions were only a shadow of their former selves. The 9th SS could only muster some 3,000 fighting troops. It's panzer regiment had lost all it's tanks, the two panzergrenadier regiments all their heavy weapons, it's artillery regiment and anti-tank battalion all their guns. Only the recon battalion still had some 30 of it's half tracks and armoured scout cars and the flak battalion had saved four 2cm flak guns. The 10th SS was little better off. On September 10th, after the OKW decided that only one division should rehabilitate inside Germany, the 9th SS was ordered, firstly, to release one panzergrenadier and one artillery battalion to the 10th SS and, secondly, to hand over all its usable weapons and vehicles to the 10th SS before leaving for Germany. However, with the divisional commander's tactic agreement, the handover of equipment was purposely delayed, the Panzer-Aufkalrungs-Abteilung even going so far as to to make it's half tracks temporarily unserviceable by taking off the caterpillar tracks, so that it could hold onto them. There were no German tank attacks made on any airborne units in Market Garden until the arrival of Kompanie Mielke at Arnhem on the 18th. This was an army unit previously located deep inside Germany. Neither of the two SS divisions in the Netherlands had any tanks available on the 17th September so were unable to call upon tanks assault guns and tank destroyers. There was a tank destroyer unit Schwere Panzerjager Abteilung 559 in the Netherlands pre drop near to the Belgian border but it doesn't appear to have gone into action until some days into Market Garden when it tangled with the 44th Royal Tank Regiment and US 101st Airborne around Koevering. It managed to cut Hell's Highway for a while. Sources include Hohenstaufen: 9th SS Panzer Division by Charles Trange and Pierre Triquet, The 9th SS Panzer Division by Herbert Fürbinger, The 10th SS Panzer Division by Rolf Michaelis, Heavy Jagdpanzer: Development, Production, Operations Walter J Spielberger, Hilary L. Doyle & Thomas L. Jentz . The 3 airborne units and XXX Corps would have had more than enough to fight off the German forces in the Netherlands pre drop. However, the Germans reacted quicker than anyone anticipated by sending in considerable reinforcements in the following days, particular armour. 90% of the German armour deployed in Market Garden wasn't from either of the 2 Waffen SS Divisions although the SS did receive new tanks as the battle raged on. 8 new Panthers were received by 9th SS on the 20th, at Arnhem for example. Direct from the factory.
    2
  9. 7th September was nearly 2 weeks before 17th September. They were whittled down to nothing, even abandoning armour due to lack of fuel in the meantime. By 17th September neither SS division had any tanks available left. This is why not a single SS tank attack opened up against any of the paratroop divisions on the 17th, or even the 18th. The first German tank attack against any of the paratroop divisions was that by Kompanie Mielke . Kompanie Mielke was in Bielefeld, Germany when the airborne troops dropped on the 17th. https://mikesresearch.com/2018/08/26/panzer-kompanie-mielke/ This was the FIRST German tank unit to engage any forces in Market Garden. The SS didn't have any tanks at the time.
    2
  10. Not a single German tank attacked any paratroop divisions on the 17th. Why, because they had none available on that day . Not a single German tank was sent south to death with the US 82nd Airborne at Nijmegen. Why, because they had none available on that day . Kompanie Mielke was the first German tank unit to go into action against any of the paratroop divisions. This was not until late on the 18th, after it had arrived from Germany. The link above is sourced from Retake Arnhem Bridge: An Illustrated History of Kampfgruppe Knaust September to October 1944 by Gerrtisen and Revell. It is a specialised German armour source. Best kind of source to go to when it comes to Germany amour, their deployments, inventories. Also 9th SS Panzer Division by Charles Trange and Pierre Triquet. The 9th SS Panzer Division by Herbert Fürbinger. The 10th SS Panzer Division by Rolf Michaelis.
    2
  11. Grabner's forcer with ACS, armoured cars and other half tracks was quite resoundingly dealth with by Frost's men at the bridge. Had Grabner actually had tanks then it might have been different but he had no tanks as none were available. Heinz Harmel down in the Nijmegen sector, even decades later after the war, didn't even know that there were German army units (not SS), with tanks and assault guns that had arrived in Arnhem on the 18th and 19th which were not under his jurisdiction and he had no idea of their dispositions. Harmel was in the Nijmegen area and did not know about these German army reinforcements that had just arrived. On the evening of the 20th after the bridge was crossed there were already German anti tank guns blocking the road at Ressen. The raised road beyond Ressen was terrible for tanks. Four Shermans trying to get to Arnhem when the Germans had a company of Tigers from Kompanie Hummel and Stug IIIs from Sturmgeschutz Brigade 280 already there? Tiger I at the Arnhem bridge. Date is 20th September: https://www.pinterest.com/pin/130745195415377492/ Schwere Kompanie Hummel: "19th September 1944......Detrainment in Bocholt and a 80 km road march towards Arnhem......attack with two Tigers(Let Knaack and Feldwebel Barnecki) on the same evening". Page 87 Tigers In Combat Volume II by Wolfgang Schneider. Also this , from 'Nijmegen US 82nd Airborne And Guards Armoured Division' by Tim Saunders From the 82nd's radio log, 20th September. 1730 hrs: ‘South east of Arnhem: three Tiger tanks, two companies of infantry and a heavy gun are on their way to Lent/Nijmegen.'
    2
  12. British 1st Airbornes intelligence officer Capt Taylor received the information that there were around 10,000 German troops in the area that might consist of a panzer division or two refitting. This report was signed September 13th. What British 1st Airborne then did with that info was up to them. They did, however, bring along a number of anti tank guns to try and deal with that threat. Browning certainly didn't hide anything from 1st Airborne, as 1st Airborne clearly received that intel.
    2
  13. Monty didnt plan it. He had zero jurisdiction over any air units. It was planned by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst with Gavin and Taylor having big input too. Poor Urquhart in Arnhem had no real role. The RAF told him what to do. Monty couldn't even get Brereton and Williams to fly double missions on day one.
    2
  14. Nyet Zdyec Ironically German general Herman Balck, who was Patton's adversary in the Lorraine, said the Third Army there was "timid" and "cautious" and that it often failed to follow up on any successes it had. Patton's Lorraine campaign was a far bigger failures Market Garden. It was actually the biggest allied failure of autumn 1944. 55,000 battle casualties and objective still not achieved (get through the Siegfried Line). In the Lorraine, Patton's forces barely moved 100km in 4 months. In Market Garden Montgomerys forces moved 100km in 3 days. Montys combined casualties for Market Garden, subsequent operations in the Netherlands such as Operation Aintree and the Scheldt clearing campaign only came to 30,000 which is about half that of Patton's in the Lorraine, and the Scheldt clearing was the only allied campaign of autumn 1944 to achieve its objectives.
    2
  15.  @GiacomoLockhart Well I read what you wrote. You clearly wrongly stated "the supreme commander of Op Market Garden was Monty". He wasn't. Eisenhower was. It was Eisenhower who decided on the resources allocated. Nor did Montgomery have any jurisdiction over the air forces. It was the air forces, the FAAA, the USAAF and the RAF which dictated the air component of Market Garden, ie the 'Market' part. Beevor, by the way, is so clueless that he claimed British 1st Airborne was and I quote "lightly armed". This is incorrect. They had 6 and 17 pounder anti tank guns and PIATs and were able to take out Panzer IIIs, Panzer IVs, Stug IIIs and even a King Tiger. In fact after the King Tiger loss at Oosterbeek, Abteilung 506 never again sent any more of their King Tigers into those narrow streets. I will abuse Beevor as much as I like when he abuses Montgomery and other great British commanders. Cheers.
    2
  16. Jeffrey Beigie, This is a myth. On August 23rd Montgomery met Eisenhower at his Tactical HQ in Normandy and told Eisenhower that if American public pressure demanded an American command all ground forces then he would gladly serve UNDER Bradley if it meant the concentrated northern front go ahead. Eisenhowers ego didn't listen. Instead Eisenhower insisted on taking over ground strategy above actual experienced battlefield generals.
    2
  17. On September 8th/9th Montgomery was considering an alternative to Market Garden. Montgomery proposed a paratroop drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt. However, General Brereton, commander of First Allied Airborne Army flat out rejected this idea and chose Market Garden instead. Montgomery deferred to Brereton.
    2
  18. Dave M A C I still believe that Market Garden was scuppered primarily by Brereton and Williams with their insistence on dispersed drops over a number of days, no double missions on day one, Hollinghurst for refusing to fly closer to Arnhem and some mistakes made by individual airborne divisions. British 1st Airborne had already failed in Arnhem regardless of Gavin. The Germans still held 99% of Arnhem plus the bridge off ramp. 1st Airborne only held a small section of the bridge and some houses. Not enough to facilitate XXX Corps crossing the bridge, getting past the Grabner wreckage, getting off the bridge and fanning out through Arnhem. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst fudged it for them, as did Urquhart and Lathbury to a lesser extent.
    2
  19. John Burns. From Monty The Field Marshall 1944-1945: "Eisenhowers headquarters had ruled out Montys appeal for an airborne assault at Walcheren (to clear the Scheldt), early in September, repeated on 10th September". Brereton too flat out rejected this. Eisenhower put zero priority into opening Antwerp at the time.
    2
  20. The tanks came in from Germany in the days that followed. They were not there before the paras dropped. It wasn't ego either. Monty genuinely felt, rightly, that a northern thrust was more logical than messing about in the south.
    2
  21. Good post, apart from the Sosabowski part. He was never blamed by anyone as the reason it didn't succeed. Not even by Montgomery or Browning, and Browning was out of the paras and shunted out to Burma as an admin way before Sosabowski was got rid of. The intel was not ignored either. 1st Airborne actually received the intel that "a battle scarred panzer division or two" may be refitting in the area. That's why they brought along 6 and 17 pounder anti tank guns and PIATs. The fact is, both SS panzer divisions had been decimated in Normandy and were completely without any tanks and only had around 3,000 fighting men each. The tanks actually came in from Germany in the following days, in German army, not SS, units that were nowhere near the Netherlands when the paras were dropped. These units were unknown by any intel. Kompanie Mielke, Kompanie Hummel, Stug Brigade 280, Panzer Brigade 107, Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 etc.
    2
  22. What do you mean for the British? It was a world conflict and many countries were under brutal Axis oppression.
    2
  23. Chris Excellent post. Very well put. 👍
    2
  24. Dispersed drops over a number of days and the long distance drop zone choices were the fatal flaws of Arnhem. Everything else is secondary. There would have been enough paratroops to achieve their objectives at Arnhem, regardless of German dispositions, if the drops weren't so dispersed and so distant.
    2
  25. TheVillaAston Yes it was Brereton, Williams, Hollinghurst etc who dictated the air decisions of Market Garden. Dispersed drops over days was the main reason it failed, along with German powers of recovery.
    2
  26.  @randylucas2458  ""Patton's run to Berlin did not have much in the way of tactics or strategic planning he literally charged his way to Berlin as fast as he could get gas" Patton didn't get anywhere near to Berlin. His 3rd Army went to Bavaria in southern Germany and then Czechoslovakia. It was Hodges US 1st Army that headed for Berlin and met the Red Army at Torgau.
    2
  27.  @アイギス-e4s  I can turn it around the other way. Without the British Commonwealth, the European Axis would have controlled all of Europe, the Eastern Atlantic, all of the Mediterranean, the Middle East and much of Africa..... and America would have been unable to do anything about it on it's own. And the above is something hardly anyone recognises today, what with Hollywood's etc influence.
    2
  28. R PM Tigers In Combat Volume 2 by Wolfgang Schneider, Tiger I in the West by Jean Restayn, Market Garden Then And Now by Karel Margry.
    2
  29. Vioarr, Kompanie Hummel lost a total of 5 of its 14 Tiger Is during the fighting in the Netherlands. It had 9 Tigers left when it became temporarily attached to Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 as its 4th company for the Aachen fighting in November.
    2
  30.  @Swift-mr5zi  You can read Eisenhower's or Montgomery's books or more specifically Mark Zuelhlke's Terrible Victory: First Canadian Army and the Scheldt Estuary Campaign, September 13 – November 6, 1944 and Robin Neiland's The Battle for the Rhine 1944 : Arnhem and the Ardennes : The Campaign in Europe.
    2
  31. @FromPovertyToProgress What you have misconstrued is that at the end of December Antwerp had to cease unloading operations for a while because there was a backlog of supplies building up. This was completely because of the German Ardennes offensive and the calamity involving the US forces there, which was a disaster. Practically everything had to be put on hold to assist the Americans in the Ardennes. This meant transport that would have been used to disperse the supplies from Antwerp were being used elsewhere and diverted to rush troops and supplies from other places to the Ardennes. In essence, there was a lack of transport to move supplies from Antwerp for a while because of the German attack in the Ardennes and the priority given to stopping this. It had nothing to do with Antwerp itself or any lack of infrastructure forethought. Once the Ardennes was sorted out, Antwerp was back to its December 1944 level. All through December 1944 and from November 29th massive levels of supplies came pouring in from Antwerp. Only the Ardennes calamity interrupted this. So blame the Americans for falling asleep and allowing the Germans to push them back into a retreat forcing everything else to be dropped in order to help them out.
    2
  32.  @FromPovertyToProgress  You literally wrote : "Yes, the port of Antwerp was open in late November, but it took a few months to get the supplies transshipped out of the port and into well-organized supply depots." That is not so. Supplies poured put of Antwerp immediately after it was opened and the first convoys unloaded on November 29th. It did not take months for those supplies to reach the front line forces. 11th Armoured Division, for example, already received its new Comet tanks from Antwerp in December.
    2
  33.  @nickdanger3802  Patton couldn't take Metz for months. Monty took Caen while facing the densest concentration of German armour ever deployed in WW2. The Americans took St Lo no quicker than Monty took Caen. In fact, had the Americans not given up on St Lo in June then the Germans would have had to divert some of the panzer divisions defending Caen over to the St Lo sector. However, seeing as the Americans applied no serious pressure on St Lo in June, even though it was a June 15th objective, not one of the seven panzer divisions around Caen were deployed to St Lo. Nor were any Tigers either. Montys command of the allied ground forces in Normandy not only teached their objective of Paris ahead of schedule and with fewer allied and greater German casualties than expected but Monty was out of France and in Brussels Begium within 3 months of D-Day. Only Paris was supposed to have been reached by then. Amazing going under Montys leadership. Truly better than expected. Sadly it then all ground to a halt and went nowhere under Eisenhowers command for the next seven months, with the Americans even pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes.
    2
  34.  @gawdsuniverse3282  Seriously? Now why do you think the Germans HAD to retreat from Normandy? Because under Montgomerys command their forces there were smashed/written off... including the densest concentration of German armour ever deployed in WW2. Ten panzer divisions lost in Normandy. Around 2,500 tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers. Compared to the German forces engaged in Normandy in summer 1944, what the Germans had on the front line in September and October was minimal. They even had to resort to throwing green, badly trained panzer 'brigades' into the fray, because the panzer 'divisions' had to be rebuilt after Montgomery totalled them in Normandy. So the Germans were in a comparatively sorry state in the period after Normandy and yet Eisenhower, now C-in-C of ground forces never capitalised on this situation as he could have done because instead of smashing the front door down he preferred to knock all over it. Eisenhower and his broad front was an utter failure. It got next to nowhere, suffered totally unnecessary casualty rates and ended up being pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes. Montgomery warned Eisenhower in November about the thinned down Ardennes front but did Eisenhower listen? Even when the Germans attacked on 16th December Eisenhower and Bradley continued to crack open a bottle of champagne in Versailles celebrating another star added to his rank.
    2
  35.  @gawdsuniverse3282  And next you'll be trying to argue that Eisenhowers broad front failure WASN'T the reason the Germans were able to attack in the Ardennes, forcing the Americans into a retreat and having to expend nearly 100,000 casualties...... just to get back to the start lines they were already at six weeks before. Great going!!
    2
  36.  @gawdsuniverse3282  " the campaign in North Africa was close to the sea," Um there were no viable ports between Alexandria and Benghazi. That's over a thousand km, along just one main road. When Montgomerys 8th Army reached El Agheila in late November 1942 they were 1,300 km from the supply line port of Alexandria. On the Eastern Front it took a train load of tanks roughly two weeks to get from Germany to the front in 1941-1944. No units in North West Europe took two weeks to get from the Channel ports to the front 😂. The American armies were well supplied for their broad front failures. Hurtgen Forest, Aachen, Lorraine, Operation Queen, Alsace were all well supplied. Patton had nine fully equipped and supplied divisions, three of them armoured, for his early November attempt to break through the Siegfried Line. He outnumbered the Germans 3:1 in men and 8:1 in tanks, plus overwhelming air and artillery support. He even had brand new M36 Jackson tank destroyers newly arrived from the ports. He still failed in his objectives. Eisenhowers broad front was at utter disaster. It failed completely all through autumn 1944. It would have been easier to logistically supply a concentrated northern thrust closer to the channel ports than supplying secondary campaigns down in the Lorraine and Alsace. That's just basic geography.
    2
  37. @johnhehir508, Indeed. Eisenhowers broad front wasted so many men and material in pointless irrelevant campaigns from the Hurtgen Forest, to Metz, to the Vosges. These debilitated allied ability to smash into Germany proper.
    2
  38. Patton wasn't the most feared general and the Germans didn't even know who was commanding the ghost army for ages.
    2
  39.  @jbjones1957  British 21st Army Group was concentrating on the Scheldt and opening Antwerp in October/November. This was actually the only allied campaign of autumn 1944 to achieve its objectives. It was an extremely tricky operation but one that completely suceeded. British troops were involved in it but obviously 2nd British Army could not take proper part because the zone of British 2nd Army was a considerable way from the Scheldt, much further to the east near the German border. Armies stick to their boundaries otherwise itd be a mess. After Antwerp was about to be opened the US First Army was again given priority with Operation Queen. As I said then everything shut down mid December to February to aid the American problems in the Ardennes. US forces were given priority October 1944 to February 1945.
    2
  40.  @jbjones1957  2nd British Army was NOT 'idle'. In November it was having its own limited localised offensive after the Operation Aintree in Netherlands battles in October around Overloon. This was Operation Clipper, which preceeded Operation Queen. This was in the Geilenkirchen sector. It was a success, as was Operation Aintree. So again, not 'idle'. The Americans were simply given priority of attack by Eisenhower. Their sector was to be the focus of attack in the northern sector of the allied front line. British 2nd Army was relegated to a limited and supporting role during this period and priority within 21st Army Group was to clear the Scheldt, which British units were also involved in. The Alsace campaign was not a success in autumn 1944. It failed to achieve all its objectives and the Colmar pocket was still there into 1945 without being reduced. Strasbourg wasn't the limit of the Alsace objectives. You are ignoring that the Americans dictated ground strategy after 1st September 1944 when Eisenhower became direct C-in-C of all ground forces. Montgomery had no say in ordering his own offensives. He even had to get Eisenhower to agree just to Market Garden. As to "willingness to fight" the British had been fighting against the Germans since 1940 on the ground. The Americans not until almost 1943 so I question your disrespectful aspersions there. Not cool.
    2
  41. Yes it doesn't seem as though Eisenhower, the commander of all ground troops, actually commanded anywhere in a practical location to the front where his armies actually were.
    2
  42.  @davemac1197  Then we can move in and stop them. Woof Woof!!! ☺
    2
  43.  @davemac1197  I absolutely love Kelly's Heroes. It has a far greater repeat/rewatchability factor than more "realistic" and supposedly superior war productions like Saving Private Ryan and the Band of Brothers mini series. Neither of which have great characters and dialogues. Zulu is the same. Great characters and script. Woof Woof!! That's my other dog imitation. 😁
    2
  44. Dave M A C, I posted a long reply to you here yesterday, but I see today that it's gone. I have no idea what happened. This has happened a few times on this channel. Weird.
    2
  45. Dave Cheers for the advice there. Seriously there was nothing of any derogatory note in my reply that disappeared. It actually did post initially because I read it twice to check any typos. It was only about the armour. Nothing more. If I get time I may rewrite it again. Cheers!!
    2
  46. Dave M A C, Trying again. Basically I was wondering what on earth the 16 Panzer IVs of 10th SS at Vorden were doing on the 17th, and subsequent days? The Panzer IIIs and IVs of Kompanie Mielke and the Tigers of Kompanie Hummel both came from 200 km away in Bielefeld, Germany to engage Frosts men at the Arnhem bridge. Mielke arriving on the 18th, and Hummel on the 19th. Where were the Panzer IVs of 10th SS? They must have been non operational? They weren't engaging Frost on those days. I didn't know that 10th SS was initially raised as a panzergrenadier division and the why they had Stugs. I thought it was just a shortfall in tanks. In Normandy, 9th SS had a full 1st battalion of Panthers but its 2nd battalion was a roughly 50/50 mixture of Panzer IVs and Stugs. 10th SS in Normandy only had one battalion there, again roughly a 50/50 mix of Panzer IVs and Stugs. I just assumed it was because of a lack of tanks and not that the Stugs were already allocated when it was going to be just a panzergrenadier division, like 17th SS? I don't have that book you mentioned. Is it worth getting? The Tigers of Schwere Panzerkompanie Hummel were assigned to 10th SS and I believe they lost 5 of their 14 Tiger Is in the Market Garden engagements. They were then sent to the Aachen sector, becoming the 4th company of Schwere Panzer Abteilung 506 from November to February 1945. Then they fell back to the Rhine then the Ruhr pocket, last engagements being around Altena in April 1945. Interestingly, it was the Tiger Is of Hummel that were involved with the skirmishes against Pershings in late February around Elsdorf. The only Tiger I v Pershing actions in WW2. Its interesting you mentioned the pictures of the brand new Panthers being only in dark yellow. Are the pictures you've seen very clear? Is there lighting variation? I only ask because in Market Garden Then And Now by Karel Margy on page 598 there is a picture of a knocked out brand new Panther which had the end of its gun barrel shot off by the 1st Worcestershires near Elst. I can make out a camouflage pattern applied. Its very clear on the gun mantlet and turret side. At some point in September around the time zimmerit was discontinued the factories started applying camouflage paint before they sent them out to the units and also introduced the so called ambush or light and shade scheme which was little dots or disc shapes over the paintwork to resemble sunlight patterns. This was also applied at the factories. Different factories had different patterns. I can see tiny disc shapes on the mantlet of the Panther on page 598 but it doesn't have zimmerit. Perhaps the Panthers you've seen predated this one? Do they have zimmerit? I didn't know SS-Flak-Abteilung 10 was the unit at Ede so thanks a lot for that information mate. Most appreciated.
    2
  47. Dave M A C Brilliant posts there. The Flak element of 10th SS is not something I have delved into in any great detail so this is all an excellent wealth of information. I will copy all that for my own references so thanks a lot. What I can't understand is why those Panzer IVs around Vorden headed off in the direction of Nijmegen? Arnhem was closer so why weren't they deployed there on the 17th? And also when they failed to get across on the ferry then what? Why didn't they head to Arnhem instead? Why just be held back instead of getting into action at a time the situation seemed very critical? Kompanie Mielke and Kompanie Hummel arrived via Bocholt I believe to Arnhem pretty quickly and that's a longer distance so it's odd why after failing to get ferried across the Pennerden canal they couldn't just get to Arnhem before Mielke and Hummel arrived. Yes I know there was a certain amount of tomfoolery in pretending vehicles were non operational and out of action so they didn't have to give them up, such as taking off the tracks so they could hold onto them hehe. As Captain Mainwaring would say "that's a shabby Nazi trick. You see the sort of people we are up against Wilson?" 😂
    2
  48.  @davemac1197  Yeah it's very odd. That's what I mean. If they didn't want to use the Panzer IVs of 10th SS against British 1st Airborne then how come they used the Panzer IVs and IIIs of Mielke and the Tigers of Hummel against them instead? Obviously I get your point that initially it was felt they were needed down towards Nijmegen to counter advancing British armour (which wasn't even at Eindhoven on the 17th) but when they were blocked at the canal and couldn't get across (still on the 17th? ), I can't understand why they were not THEN thrown into Arnhem because Mielke and Hummel were still deep inside Germany then. Very strange. Like you, say the internal decisions are very interesting. How about situational awareness? How aware was 10th SS that Mielke and Hummel were on the way as reinforcements? Plus Sturmgeschutz Brigade 280? Heinz Harmel down near Nijmegen doesnt seem all that clued up even years later about the Heer units that were thrown in. Similarly how much was known to 10th SS that Panzer Brigade 107 was heading towards the Eindhoven area. This was a bigger force than the 16 Panzer IVs they had. Also Schwere Panzerjager Abteilung 559, with Jagdpanthers and some Stugs. This unit is somewhat mysterious as despite being aready in the Belgian/Netherlands border area and I believe skirmishing on the 17th, it doesn't appear to have made any significant engagements until around the 23rd/24th in the Veghel/Koevering area against 44th Royal Tank Regiment. What was it doing the preceding week? The Market Garden Then And Now book has some excellent pictures of two different Panzer IVs of Mielke that were knocked out near the bridge by 6 pounders and PIATs of Frost's men. Its given as late on the 18th they were knocked out, although I don't know when the pictures were actually taken. I believe the Tigers of Hummel went into action at around 8.00 pm on the 19th so it was probably dark or getting dark then? Great discussion Dave. Cheers.. On, no comment on the Challengers to Ukraine 😂.
    2
  49. Excellent stuff Dave, as always. A wealth of info there on Schwere Panzerjager Abteilung 559 so thank you very much. I can't remember where I read it now but I was certain that a Stug from 559 was lost on the 17th against the XXX Corps break out but perhaps not then. I must be misremembering. I want that book Autumn Gale as it looks great, but not at the prices it's going for. That's even too much for a birthday present. I haven't spent silly money on books for a long time. I used to but I've stopped that now. I think the last expensive book I bought was From Normandy to the Ruhr With the 116th Panzer Division by Heinz Gunther Guderian. Paid over fifty quid for that. Glad you mentioned the later involvement of the 116th PD in Market Garden. The jacket says only one unit on either side fought in Normandy, Market Garden, Aachen, Hurtgen Forest, Ardennes, Reichswald and Ruhr Pocket (basically, all the major battles of 1944/45)...the 116th Panzer Division. I think that's correct? Definitely right about the new panzer brigades. They were rushed to the front without adequate training and had no organic reconnaissance or even maintenance sections. Yes, Panzer Brigades 111 and 113 were in the Lorraine engaging Patton. One of them only received its Panthers to train on just over a week before going into action. Crazy. Yes that makes sense for the Waal at Nijmegen being the crucial sector before Arnhem and the reason why 10th SS armour was immediately sent in that direction. Makes total sense now that I reconsider it. Keep the enemy away from the 'island' ASAP. As you say, the Wilhelmina canal at Son could be, and was, easily bridged. Stopping the thrust from getting over the Nijmegen road bridge was another matter. Quite so. Id like to post more but don't have the time today so I'll just have to make do with this for now. Cheers Dave 👍
    2
  50. John Scurr Correct. It was Brereton and Williams who dictated the air plan. It was Brereton, and Williams who refused to fly double missions on day one. It was Brereton who grounded fighter bomber support and it was Brereton who later passed the buck onto XXX Corps and 1st Airborne, despite Williams refusing the RAFs request for double missions. Brereton accepted zero responsibility. Montgomery, on the other hand, was gracious to not point fingers at any service branch and instead blamed himself.
    2