Comments by "" (@lyndoncmp5751) on "TIKhistory" channel.

  1. Well it WAS Montgomery who won the North African campaign, yes.
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  2. C B, Well even Patton said that even on the second day of the German attack he told the commander of his XII Corps to get his 4th Armored Division engaged in the Lorraine in case it got moved north to the Ardennes by a higher authority admitting "how little I appreciated the seriousness of the (German) attack. From Patton, War as I Knew It page 180.
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  3. Montgomerys idea of a 40 division 4 army concentrated northern thrust began being proposed to Eisenhower in early August before Dragoon was really a factor and also before US Ninth Army had arrived to be included.
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  4. The Germans still lost nearly 100km of ground and major towns Eindhoven and Nijmegen.
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  5. @terpfen So why did Patton keep bashing his head against the Metz fortress for months?
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  6. Chris Brown, The Americans were their own worst enemies with their Hurtgen Forest, Metz and Ardennes debacles.
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  7. Yes the 11th Armored Division came under the command of Patton and his 3rd Army and Patton overly criticised the 11th Armored for being "very green and took unnecessary casualties to no effect". However, even Patton's biographer Carlo D'Este said Patton committed two green divisions (including 17th Airborne as well as 11th Armored) prematurely into battle at night without adequate reconnaissance and in poor weather for the sole purpose of his own ego, in trying to beat US 1st Army, under Montgomery, into Houffalize.
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  8. Where you from? The USSR had more prisoners marching off to camp than western Europe combined.
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  9.  @posham219  No problem. Cool 👍
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  10. Montgomery was a master of logistics and supply. He was more savvy than any other commander in that aspect of war. He was simply told by SHAEF intel at the end of the second week in September 1944 that the Germans in front of him were down on their knees. That's why he immediately decided on a quick advance.
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  11. And by the way, the top brass allowed even more stupid plans such as the Hurtgen Forest and the Lorraine to go ahead which were far worse disasters.
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  12. Yes, they reacted much stronger than anyone expected them to. Same in the Lorraine, Aachen, Hurtgen Forest etc. Market Garden wasn't unique in not achieving all its objectives. Operation Queen also failed, as well as the others I cited.
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  13. Actually Montgomery had an alternative plan for Market Garden, which was a paratroop drop at Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt, but General Brereton of First Allied Airborne Army flat out rejected it and chose Market Garden instead. Eisenhowers broad front strategy was a disaster. It prolonged the war by months and caused the failures in the Lorraine, Hurtgen Forest, Operation Queen and the retreat in the Ardennes.
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  14. Indeed. Due to the decisions made by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst British 1st Airborne failed to get to Arnhem in enough strength to make a difference there. XXX Corps couldn't even have crossed the bridge had they got there. The wreckage of Grabners SS column was strewn all over it, creating a road block. Also the Germans always controlled the long exit ramp off the bridge and had excellent fields of fire against anything on the bridge. The plan for Market Garden involved a major section of Arnhem to be captured right up to the northern suburbs, so XXX Corps could cross and fan out. That never happened. The bridge was never captured and only a few houses on the north side were. It was never enough, regardless if XXX Corps reached the bridge or not.
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  15. Shame the movie wasn't.
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  16. Bradley at the Bulge made his own mistake, and it was Monty who had to go down and sort out that American mess up for them.
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  17. The logistic situation was made worse by feeding armies further away from the supply points in areas of secondary importance. Should have been a concentrated northern thrust.
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  18. The Germans gave up attacking British defended lines long before this point as they always failed, instead preferred to attack American lines (Mortain, Ardennes, Alsace).
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  19. Can be Bailey bridged. Its not that wide.
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  20. @dulls8475 "" There is an argument about M Wittman only lasting a few months on the Normandy front because his training was not up to the more sophisticated allies opposite him as compared to the mass produced soviet Army that he had faced in the prior 3 years."" Who on earth argues that? It was Kurt Meyer who ordered the attack, a preemptive strike designed to catch the British/Canadians out and bide the Germans some time to withdraw towards Falaise. Wittmann knew it was a nigh on impossible ask and was apprehensive about it. He wasn't even supposed to go but he felt he was needed to lend some experience. He was concerned about the the flank in case it might conceal anti tank guns, which he hated because you couldn't see them. It had nothing to do with training, and Wittmann's combat experience was far greater than allies he faced. He simply had a supremely difficult task. Meyer asked too much. No allied tank commander in the same situation would have done any better. The next day of course, the remaining Tigers of his battalion annihilated the best part of the 44 Shermans that the Canadian 28th Armoured Regiment (Worthington Force) lost near Estrees la Campagne, for zero Tigers lost.
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  21. Cock up within the US 82nd Airborne. The commanders didn't make their orders and tasks clear. Supposedly Gavin told Lindquist of the 508th PIR to move without delay on the bridge after dropping but Lindquist supposedly misheard and stayed where he was. By the time Gavin found out there was no move on the bridge and then reordered Lindquist to do so that evening it was too late and the Germans strengthened.
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  22.  mark bogacki  Browning had nothing to do with the cock up within the US 82nd Airborne command in not moving on the bridge after dropping. Browning wasnt even there yet. It was a US 82nd Airborne mess up.
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  23.  @pizzafrenzyman  Myth. Montys plan for a 40 division concentrated thrust across Northern Germany always including the US 1st and 3rd Armies. He even offered to serve UNDER Bradley if Eisenhower would only accept this plan. Sadly Eisenhower didn't and instead went with the disastrous broad front strategy, messing about in the Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace, Vosges etc which stalled the allied advance and prolonged the war by months.
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  24.  @pizzafrenzyman  The failure is on the airborne commanders who told Monty the idea would work and who then set about planning it. It wasnt Monty who decided the drop zones, the days on which they would be dropped, the follow up drops, the air support etc. Monty actually had precisely ZERO jurisdiction over any of the air forces (First Allied Airborne Army, USAAF and RAF).
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  25.  @pizzafrenzyman  It wasnt PLANNED by Montgomery. How many times do I have to explain this to people? And it did better than any of the American campaigns that same autumn. Nearly 100km in 3 days. The Americans didn't get much beyond Aachen all year, not to mention Patton going nowhere in the Lorraine.
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  26. The Scheldt would always have taken a long time to clear. Opening Antwerp was never a quick or easy fix. And Eisenhower kept squandering the supplies in pointless secondary campaigns that lead to no vital strategic advantages.
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  27. No it was to end the war.
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  28.  @johnburns4017  The RAF chose the drop zones and wouldn't be swayed otherwise.
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  29. Source: Hells Gate. The Battle of the Cherkassy-Korsun Pocket January to February 1944 by Douglas Nash.
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  30. If Germany won we would not be able to say what we like on You Tube.
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  31. Monty had zero antagonism towards Patton. Patton was not on his command level. Monty was an Army Group commander. His peer was Pattons boss, Bradley. Even so Montys preferred strategy was actually a strong concentrated 40 division 4 army thrust towards the Ruhr. This included Pattons 3rd Army but Eisenhower said no and instead went with the failed broad front strategy that got nowhere for seven months, messing about in the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine. Monty evdn told Eisenhower he would be prepared to serve under Bradley if this 40 division attack went ahead. Most claims about Montgomery are Hollywood myths. Monty never had any rivalry with Patton. It was the other way round.
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  32. Autumn 1944 was a shit show in general. Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine, Alsace, Operation Queen. All failures. Culminating in the Ardennes retreat. Eisenhowers broad front strategy was a fiasco.
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  33. The idea was to strike for the Ruhr quickly when the chance looked on, rather than stopping and taking a month to clear Antwerp.
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  34. The Villa Aston, Montgomerys Great Swan advance had just taken about 400 km in less than a week. That was faster than Patton. Then there was his advance after El Alamein. Over 1,000km in less than 3 weeks. Who moved faster in WW2? Of course, when faced with substantial and tough German opposition, which Montgomery usually faced, nobody is going to move anywhere fast. Cheers.
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  35.  @thevillaaston7811  Amazingly his post has 5 thumbs up. Clearly some people have watched Hollywood too much and not studied history. How fast did anyone else move when there were Germans in the way?
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  36.  @thevillaaston7811  As soon as anyone met tough German resistance they stopped, or were slowed majorly. That was WW2 in general. Too many people ignore a major reason for Market Garden not fully succeeding.....the Germans.
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  37. There weren't any tanks near Arnhem. The two Waffen SS panzer divisions didn't have any tanks. Tanks didn't start arriving in Arnhem until the second and third days. These were German army units that were in Germany when the paras dropped. The recon photos only captured images of a handful of obsolete early war tanks of a training battalion. These were near Eindhoven on the day the paras dropped and they fled when fighter bombers attacked them and they played no important part in Market Garden.
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  38. Nearly 100km of German held ground was taken and the Germans retreated nearly 100km. How was it a defeat? Only Arnhem was a, defeat. The other 90% was successful.
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  39. John Lucas, I believe it was an operation worth trying. There almost certainly would have been more difficulties and more casualties had a British 2nd Army ground advance been carried out later in worse weather and with strengthened German defences. It failed because of the decisions made by the principle air commanders. Im not letting Hollinghurst off here. His decision to not fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne. The German conclusion was that dispersed drops and over a number of days was the biggest mistake made by the allies. Those decisions rested solely with Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst. Nobody else. Eisenhower can also be blamed for not shutting everything else down for just a week and not giving more resources to Market Garden, particularly more transport planes. Instead he allowed Patton to keep on bumbling in the Lorraine and he allowed Hodges to open up his failed attacks into the Hurtgen Forest. Market Garden did not fail because of any individual airborne commander (no, certainly not Gavin) and not because of XXX Corps.
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  40. The Villa Aston You can add in the casualties for the little known (or conveniently ignored) Operation Queen as well. Nearly 40,000 casualties, over twice those of Market Garden, and objective not reached, despite Antwerp being fully open and operational during most of it. If we want to know which generals deserved court martial then look no further than Hodges and Patton. Hodges for the twin failures in the Hurtgen Forest and Operation Queen, and Patton for the Lorraine. Bradley, of course, was 12th Army Group Commander who presided over ALL of these failures. Total casualties = 130,000. And that's BEFORE we even get to the Ardennes cock up.
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  41. John Lucas, The point about bringing in the casualties of other battles is a very valid one. We can argue that the casualties of Market Garden, the subsequent battles in southern Netherlands (Operation Aintree etc) and the clearing of the Scheldt COMBINED still came to far less than the Hurtgen Forest. When Hodges attacked into the Hurtgen Forest, it was not planned and not envisaged to drag on for 3 months. Likewise, when Patton attacked Metz, it was not envisaged to take 3 months. Its certainly not a badge of honour to state words to the effect of "but those battles dragged on for much longer that's why they had more casualties". Ultimately the casualties CAN be compared because none of these operations were meant to last months and none of them were anticipated to fail. They all had pretty straightforward objectives and they all failed to meet those objectives. Whether one dragged on for longer than the other is not a get out clause. The Hurtgen Forest was a bigger and more costly failure than Market Garden and that's all there is to it. I will add that the Hurtgen Forest failure directly lead to more casualties in the Ardennes.
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  42. John Lucas Let me ask this question. When Hodges ordered the first attacks into the Hurtgen Forest on 19th September 1944 (just two days after Mark Garden began) do you think he expected to still be fighting in the Hurtgen in December and with 40,000 US casualties behind him? The Germans, by the way, suffered considerably fewer casualties in the Hurtgen Forest campaign than the Americans did so there goes your argument. Nearly half of the casualties in Market Garden were in 1st British Airborne and mostly POWs, not killed or wounded. Arnhem was the place where by far the largest number of casualties took place, understandably because Arnhem was 100km behind enemy lines. Im not aware of any battles in the Lorraine or Operation Queen taking place 100km behind enemy lines. Are you?
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  43. John Lucas, The first big mistake the air commanders made was to STILL BE SITTING ON BASES IN ENGLAND. Plans and organisation should have already been underway to shift bases to the continent once the Falaise Gap was coming to a close in August. Montgomery's 2nd British Army was already in Belgium at the start of September. Quite obviously, Brereton and co preferred the cushy life in quiet rural England far away from the mayhem of the front lines. Had the FAAA already had bases on the continent closer to the Netherlands the operation may have gone smoother. The FAAA knew they were going to be used for a major drop soon. In fact the FAAA was desperate for it. The second mistake was not practicing double towed gliders. This was done for Operation Varsity but not for Market Garden. It has been stated that almost all of the American troops could have landed by D+1 by double towing Waco gliders. The time spent sitting idly in England in August/early September could have been spent practicing double towing. It was not. Exactly what WAS the First Allied Airborne Army doing in August/early September? You reject mistakes made in choosing the Arnhem drop and landing zones? I completely disagree. The lessons learned in Normandy was to NOT land too far from your objectives. Richard Gale of British 6th Airborne said Urquhart went along with the RAF decisions too meekly and Urquhart himself later stated this was an unnecessary and fatal error. The Poles were earmarked to land just south of the Arnhem bridge, so why not a section of 1st Airborne dropped there on drop day? Yes it was not perfect with some swampy ground (yet hardly a damn lake) but it was doable. Comet planned to drop just south of the bridge as well. There were other open areas closer north of the bridge. Not as large as those chosen further away but these smaller patches of open ground could have been utilised and used. Look at the smaller patches of areas landed on by glider in Normandy. In the dark!!! It was reluctance on the part of airmen in the RAF that dictated the drop/landing zones and not a question of "well that's all there was". This was an air mistake that doomed British 1st Airborne. Furthermore there were mistakes made within 1st Airborne. Urquhart was probably not the right man to command it while Lathbury made some poor choices. The decisions of airmen Gavin and Taylor at Nijmegen in not putting more effort on the Nijmegen road bridge on day one has already has already been talked about ad nauseam so no need to go there. The decision by Taylor of the 101st to refuse to have a drop on the other side of the Eindhoven waterway can also be considered a mistake. The Son bridge was not captured. Of course, Brereton could have nipped it in the bud and said no to the entire operation and there would have been nothing Montgomery could have done about it. He had no jurisdiction to order FAAA into an operation. Brereton had just rejected Montgomerys alternate proposal of a paratroop drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt, but he liked Market Garden and clearly assured Montgomery his FAAA had the means to go for it. Obviously FAAA did not. Big mistake in convincing Montgomery otherwise. It was mistakes made by the air commanders that killed the operation. The Germans agreed.
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  44. Can't edit for some reason. I meant the decisions by Gavin and BROWNING at Nijmegen, not Taylor. Market was all air planned and executed. It failed. Garden did not.
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  45. John Lucas, To reiterate, Market Garden failed because 'Market' failed, and Market failed because of the planning and decisions made primarily by three air commanders, Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst. The problems further escalated by decisions made within all three parachute divisions (not any one single commander in one division). That is the bottom line. End of story.
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  46. ​ @GOLDEN-sm3wr  But then despite having overwhelming numerical superiority for a while, and enough supplies, Rommel still failed to take Egypt.
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  47. Quite rightly too. His idea was sound. However, the actual planning of it and execution carried out by others was where it went wrong.
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  48. That wasn't Montgomery. Montgomery had no jurisdiction to command bombing operations. On fact beyond the initial idea for Market Garden, Montgomery didn't have much more input into the operation and he turned it over to the First Allied Airborne Army, the RAF the USAAF and the individual British 2nd Army commanders.
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  49.  @brucebartup6161  Well, everything you posted there was claimed after the war. A lot of claims, rewriting of history were done post war to make certain decisions look good or certain people look bad. Its called covering one's back. I actually gave you a verbatim communicated text from Eisenhower written to Montgomery on 7th SEPTEMBER 1944, not written or claimed years later. Here it is again, directly from Eisenhower to Montgomery on 7th September 1944 "My intention is to initially occupy the Saar and the Ruhr and by the time we have done this Le Havre and Antwerp should be available... I have always given priority to the Ruhr" Ouch!! Directly from the horses mouth in September 1944. Monty and Patton, Two Paths To Victory by Michael Reynolds page 209. 👍
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  50.  @scottkrater2131  Ive never said any such thing that Britain won the war without American aid. Just pointing out that most of what Britain used wasn't American, and that Britain produced a lot itself. Great Britain was one of the biggest industrial production centres in the world. Did you not know that? Or do you believe Hollywood nonsense. Of course America helped Britain. Just like Britain helped America. WW2 was a COMBINED Allied victory. Barely survived 1941? In 1941 the RAF dropped more bombs on Germany than Germany dropped on Britain in the Blitz. In 1941 the Bismarck lasted a week and the Tirpitz went into hiding. Britain prevented the Axis controlling the Atlantic and Mediterranean in 1941 and stopped the Axis from taking North Africa. Britain was stopping the Axis a thousand km away from Britain. Britain was in zero danger of being defeated in 1941. Nazi Germany never had a significant major victory over Britain after France in May 1940.
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