Comments by "" (@lyndoncmp5751) on "TIKhistory" channel.

  1.  @scottkrater2131  A great insightful post. Not.
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  2.  @scottkrater2131  Thank you.
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  3.  Marry Christmas  Except his own boss Bradley said Patton was a shallow commander with only one tactic... bulling ahead. When that wasn't possible he failed to get anywhere, as his Lorraine failure shows. Most of the time in WW2 you COULD NOT carry on with momentum and it took more complex strategy to overcome that problem, which Patton didn't have according to Bradley.
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  4. I don't think TIK is right to blame Gavin. I would put the blame mostly on Brereton.
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  5.  @rob5944  General Lewis H Brereton was the commander of the First Allied Airborne Army. It was he who had the say so whether his Airborne Army could be used so Brereton could have nipped the operation in the bud right away and Montgomery could have done nothing about it. It was Brereton, together with General Paul Williams of the USAAF who made the crucial decision for only single missions flown on day one and for the drops to be spread out over a number of days.
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  6.  @bigwoody4704  You are deluded. I have seen you in many posts now today just trolling and talking utter tripe. Seek help.
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  7.  @rob5944  Montgomery was in charge of British 21st Army Group, from whence the British ground forces for Market Garden came. He wasn't, however, in charge of First Allied Airborne Army, USAAF or RAF. He still took blame for Market Garden. This was, according to Carlo D'este (biographer of Patton and Eisenhower), the only time an allied general took responsibility for a failed operation in the 1944/45 period. Or something like that. And there were, of course, other failures that same period.
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  8. Swap Patton for Hodges US 1st Army and I agree with you. Patton was way too far to the south. Hodges US 1st Army, and later Simpson's US 9th Army, were in a better location for this pincer movement.
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  9. ​ @accomuk Well it's all about geography. Hodges and Simpson were simply better located than Patton. Eisenhower certainly trusted Hodges enough to give his army priority through autumn 1944. Hurtgen Forest, Aachen, Operation Queen. Montgomery got on ok with Hodges, and Simpson very much liked Montgomery. Simpson said he was "never better commanded" than when his 9th Army served under Montgomery.
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  10. ​ @Duke-i3u Brereton backed Williams of the USAAF Troop Carrier Command though and Brereton also rejected the RAF's proposal to carry out double glider tows and double missions around Arnhem.
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  11. It was PLANNED mostly by Americans Brereton, Williams, Gavin and Taylor. Monty only had the broad idea but he then had to defer to the air commanders to plan it and that's where it failed. Tell me how those all American Hurtgen Forest, Lorraine and Operation Queen fare? All failed and with circa 130,000 casualties.
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  12. When did that happen? 67 didn't disintegrate by themselves.
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  13. Eisenhower didn't allow Montgomery the full resources he required and requested and nor was the flawed air planning anything to do with Monty. Not his jurisdiction. That was down to the FAAA, USAAF and RAF. For example it was, Brereton and Williams who decided to drop in the day and to have multiple drops over a number of days and it was Hollinghurst of the RAF who made British 1st Airborne drop so far from Arnhem. Quit blaming Monty for the screw ups of others.
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  14.  @ALMdawgfan  Well Monty only came up with the broad outline. He then had to go to Brereton to see if the idea was feasible. Brereton liked the idea and told him that yes it was very feasible. Even Gavin liked the idea and thought it would end the war. Monty wasn't an airborne commander so he turned the detailed planning over to the air commanders as they knew more than he did and he didn't step on their toes. He had faith in their judgement. My opinion is that Monty was somewhat put out by the fact the US 1st Army wasnt allowed to carry out a tandem attack to Aachen.
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  15.  @johnlucas8479  There was no 'plan' presented to Brereton. Only a proposal. An idea. It was Brereton, Williams, Hollinghurst etc who then did the planning. Monty only proposed the outline, but no detailed planning. Brereton liked the proposal and then took over the planning, with the air force bigwigs. Browning couldn't overrule Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst from deciding what they did. He had no jurisdiction over the USAAF and RAF, while Brereton was his superior in the FAAA. Browning had to go along with what those three decided.
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  16.  @johnlucas8479  I didnt claim either of the first two points of yours so? As to point three, Brereton already blocked Montys alternative plan for a drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt. Brereton said no, as the area was unsuitable for paratroop drops and the Flak too intense. Monty was only commander of British 21st Army Group. He had no jurisdiction to order air forces around. Detailed source for all this including Williams choices can be found in Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Margry. This is the only source that reproduces all the serials. It is the most detailed and comprehensive source on Market Garden, in two volumes. Very expensive though but well worth it and far superior to any paperback.
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  17.  @ALMdawgfan  Ike was the guy who liked and agreed to Market Garden. He was the supreme commander and all offensives had to be cleared with him first. Ike also agreed to the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine debacles too, don't forget. Sadly Eisenhower took a week just to get back to Monty on it and didnt allow Monty all the ground forces he requested. Instead of the US 1st Army making a strong tandem attack towards Aachen to supliment Market Garden Eisenhower instead agreed to the US 1st Army making pointless piecemeal probes into the Hurtgen Forest, which got underway two days into Market Garden. Yes the commanders and troopers in the newly formed First Allied Airborne Army were desperate to do a drop and get back into action before the war ended. They had been sitting around doing nothing for months and Monty was the only one interested in using them. Bradley had no interest in using paras for behind the lines drops. Bradley still wasn't interested in 1945 either. It was Monty who used them again, for the Rhine crossings. Paras are elite troops. They want to do the job they trained hard for and only Montgomery offered them that after Normandy.
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  18.  @ALMdawgfan  As I already wrote, Monty had an alternative idea along with Market Garden in case it wasn't green lit. This was to drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt but Brereton rejected this proposal on the 9th September and much preferred Market Garden. None of the allied leaders in early to mid September favoured concentrating on Antwerp over everything else. The idea was to keep moving closer to Germany while they looked on their knees. Nobody wanted to stop and give the Germans breathing space. Eisenhower himself, also on 9th September wrote to Monty and told him: "My initial intention is to occupy the Saar and the Ruhr, and by the time we have done this Le Havre and Antwerp should be available" Source, Monty and Patton, Two Paths To Victory by Michael Reynolds page 209. Eisenhower clearly thought the Ruhr could be attempted while Antwerp was being cleared and made no effort to prioritise Antwerp in early to mid September whatsoever. Antwerp not open is one of the big Red Herrings of WW2. It didnt prevent Market Garden, Aachen, Lorraine, Operation Queen from going ahead. Indeed, in early November, despite Antwerp not being open, Patton was still supplied with 9 full divisions, including 3 armoured (he had 8 times as many tanks as the Germans did), for his failed attempt to bash through the Siegfried Line in the Saar, and then three weeks after Antwerp was opened the Americans fell back into a retreat in the Ardennes. Antwerp not cleared didn't really prevent any allied attacks from happening autumn 1944 and didn't alter much after it was cleared. When all is said and done, Market Garden was worth attempting. Eisenhower even after the war said "it would have been criminal not to try it" and German general Gunther Blumentritt said Montys idea to get to the Ruhr quickly in September 1944 was the correct strategy. Market Garden was nowhere near the biggest Allied 'failure' of 1944. The other Allied offensives fared worse. Pattons Lorraine campaign that dragged on forever and suffered nearly 100,000 casualties, including sick, was more or less a complete waste of time and men for nothing important attained. Again, Blumentritt correctly argued that Metz should have been left alone and instead of trying to get to the Saar in the east, Patton should have ignored the Lorraine and turned north through Luxembourg and headed for Bitburg.
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  19.  @johnlucas8479  Pages 23 to 49 of Margry's Market Garden Then and Now has extensive detailed descriptions of how it was planned including maps, orders of battle. I would highly recommend this two volume tome for anybody truly interested in the minute details of Market Garden. It is the best source there is and certainly vastly superior to Beevor, Kershaw, Ryan etc. All serious students of Market Garden need to own it and put away Beevor.
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  20.  @ALMdawgfan  Monty actually initially proposed things that were overruled and overturned by those in the Airborne and he went along with the new decisions. For example he initially wanted US 101st Airborne strung out 30 miles like a kite string, extending to within artillery range of British 2nd Army. General Taylor, commander of the 101st was against this extended dispersal of his 101st and so Monty did not press the matter but instead backed down when Brereton took it up with him and he let the issue be settled between Taylor and Dempsey, commander of British 2nd Army. Taylor and Dempsey met at Montys HQ on 12th September and came to a mutual agreement between them and Monty did not interfere. Taylor decided on a smaller area to drop over, nearer to Eindhoven, and Dempsey said he'd be able to reach it. Source. Page 24 of Market Garden Then and Now by Margry. As I said, most of the actual planning of Market Garden, as opposed to the initial idea and early proposals, was actually not done by Monty but by the FAAA, USAAF and RAF.
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  21.  @ALMdawgfan  Its all documented fact and sourced. I even gave you the page numbers with citation. Dont shoot the messenger. I gave you a bona fide proven example of an airborne commander (in that case Taylor) getting Montys initial suggestion overturned and settled between himself and Dempsey, with Monty staying out of it and letting the two of them get on with and sorted out between them. Monty did NOT order the troopers dropped in the day (Brereton did), Monty did NOT order the drops to be carried out over multiple days (Williams did), Monty did NOT order 1st Airborne to be dropped so far away from the Arnhem bridge (Hollinghurst did). I cant even come up with even one major aspect of the planning for 'Market' that Monty actually decided and ordered. Not one. Hell it wasn't even Monty who decided which division would be allocated which location in the operation. This was decided within the First Allied Airborne Army at Breretons HQ in Sunninghill Park in a meeting at 1800, hours on September 10th after Brereton had flown back to England. Monty wasn't even there. These choices were decided upon within the FAAA at Sunninghill Park because: a) The 82nd should be the division to cover the largest section with the most bridges to take, the Nijmegen area. b) The least seasoned division, the 101st, should cover the Eindhoven area, closest to the British 2nd Army and the first to be reached by XXX Corps. c) Leaving the British and Poles to go for Arnhem. At this 1800 meeting on the 10th at Sunninghill Park were Brereton, Browning, Williams, Gavin, Taylor, Urquhart, Sosabowski and their staffs. Source. "Page 24 Market Garden Then and Now by Margry" So Monty did indeed turn over the detailed planning of Market to the air commanders. He wasn't even present when the air commanders planned it. I never said he was a total bystander. He came up with the broad idea and kept a close eye on it but he didnt execute the detailed planning and he did not ignore it when a particular disagreement went against his initial proposal. He obviously recognised the expertise of the air commanders in planning an air operation. The air commanders decided the guts of the operation, not him.
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  22.  @ALMdawgfan  Page 22 Market Garden Then and Now, paragraph 7: "Between September 8th and 10th Montgomery also considered an airborne operation against Walcheren Island to open the Scheldt River but Brereton rejected this, asserting that the terrain was very unsuitable and the Flak sure to be intense" As I said if you are truly interested in the Market Garden operation then Market Garden Then and Now is the essential work to read. Its not a paperback. Its a specialist two volume near 800 page tome and as such very expensive for casual observers to own.
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  23.  @ALMdawgfan  Monty WAS relevant. He was by some way the most successful and accomplished western allied ground general of WW2. Let's not ignore that after Hodges fled his command HQ in panic when he heard the Germans had broken through the American lines in the Bulge heading his way and Bradley dithered that it was Monty who Eisenhower turned to and got him to come down and sort that mess out. The irony.
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  24.  @ALMdawgfan  TIk is gold? When he blames the failure largely on Gavin and the 82nd? I don't even agree with that. It never came down to one factor. And British 1st Airborne would have still failed to capture the Arnhem bridge, with or without Gavin doing things differently in Nijmegen.
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  25.  @thevillaaston7811  Haha Bog Woofter caught out lying. Totally busted. Cheers for that. Lovely.
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  26.  @thevillaaston7811  Haha rimshot. Bog Woofter is simply a bullshitter and a liar. I no longer even have to read his posts to know that. He has a demented hate on for Montgomery. Very odd seeing as Monty was the most important and most crucial western allied ground general of WW2, going to the rescue of the Americans not once but twice. Eisenhower relied on Monty again and again. Bog Woofter should be bloody grateful. I dont recall Monty saying he hoped the Americans would be get pummelled by the Germans, as Patton hoped the British would after the American embarrassment at Kasserine. Unfortunately for Patton, Monty defeated Rommel once again.
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  27.  @thevillaaston7811  I even come across people who try and deny that Market Garden could not have gone ahead without the agreement and sayso of Brereton and his First Allied Airborne Army. They just wont accept it. They believe Monty had jurisdiction over the FAAA, the USAAF and the RAF and they refuse to accept facts that Monty only came up with the broad outline of the operation and actually turned the planning and execution of it over to other commanders. As I wrote elsewhere, Monty even backed down when Taylor protested and he let the issue be settled between Taylor and Dempsey. Some people have a bizarre need to have to believe Monty planned and decided everything and that his ego wouldn't allow for anything else. This is of course nonsense. But try telling these people that. You even have nitwits like Bog Woofter ignoring the Germans own orders or battle which show none of the armour that made a difference in Market Garden was even in the Netherlands on the 17th. We know exactly when these units arrived via their own unit records and combat diaries. Its beyong question yet they would rather quote hacks like Beevor and Hastings, both of which have been shown to be poor researchers, just like Ambrose before them. So bloody frustrating.
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  28. Poor flying weather supposedly.
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  29. ​ @thevillaaston7811  Monty, The Field Marshal 1944-1974 by Nigel Hamilton: "Eisenhower's headquarters had ruled out Monty's appeal for an airborne assault on Walcheren (to clear the Scheldt) early in September, repeated on 10th September". Montgomery's alternate scenario of drop around Walcheren was also rejected by Brereton at this time (9th/10th September). Brereton chose Market Garden instead. Brereton was enamoured with the idea of Market Garden and he quickly set about planning it. Chief among this planning was the fatal flaw to disperse the drops over 3 days. The Germans concluded that was the biggest mistake the allies made during the entire operation. Montgomery's idea.  Brereton, Williams, Hollinghust. Gavin, Taylor, Urquarts etc actual planning. The idea was sound. The planning was fatally flawed. Perhaps the First Allied Airborne Army wasn't capable enough at the time. A point Brereton should have stressed. However he did not and instead he assured Montgomery his Airborne Army could perform the mission.
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  30. Yes the First Allied Airborne Army was desperate to get into action and Monty was the only one who wanted to use them for what they were trained for, ie parachute drops behind enemy lines. Bradley had no interest in using them. The planning was done by the paratroop generals and the air forces.
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  31. The idea was sound and well liked. The actual planning of it, by the air commanders, was flawed.
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  32. ​ @andym9571 Nothing to do with Montgomery. Montgomery had zero jurisdiction over the Airborne or Air forces. They were under SHAEF command, headed by Eisenhower.
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  33. Vandeluer contacted the RAF for air support on the second day to get rid of the anti tank guns near Eindhoven and was told none was available.
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  34.  @nickdanger3802  Brereton chose wrongly. That's where it all went pear shaped. Even his air commanders and an emissary from Monty failed to get Brereton to fly double missions on day one.
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  35. Huh? Britain stood up to Hitler in September 1939 and declared war on Nazi Germany. What did the USA do? Britain then took the lead in the west for the next years so that by the time the USA finally appeared a lot of the hard work was already done.
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  36.  @TheGixernutter  The Soviets took Poland, not the west. The Poles should be thankful Britain went to war for them in 1939, otherwise the Third Reich would still be there to this day.
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  37.  @stephenskidmore5283  Well said, and all the failed main American campaigns that same autumn suffered far bigger losses. Lorraine, Hurtgen Forest, Operation Queen. Then the Ardennes.
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  38. Why do you say that? They were no better than the airborne divisions.
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  39.  @johnlucas8479  Antwerp is a red herring. The US 1st Army was very well resourced for its Aachen and Hurtgen campaign, as was Patton from October onwards. By November Patton outnumbered the Germans 3 to 1 in men and 8 to 1 in tanks and told Bradley he'd be at the Saar in 3 days. He was still failing 6 weeks later. The allied failures of autumn 1944 were not because Antwerp was not open. They failed due to the wrong military tactics and decisions.
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  40.  @johnlucas8479  Completely incorrect. Patton was tasked with Metz on September 5th 1944. He was not dormant. He simply failed to concentrate his forces. Pattons 3rd Army actually received FOUR fresh new divisions in September. Bradley said there was "parity of supplies across armies" from mid September. Patton was only devoid of certain resources end of August/beginning of September. Not after that, and the gas crisis was over by 10th September. All the above facts are sourced from Monty and Patton: Two Paths to Victory by Michael Reynolds. Further, Montgomery was only given priority mid to late September. After this, US 1st Army was given priority for its Aachen and Hurtgen Forest attacks. This US 1st Army campaign used far more men, tanks, trucks, ammo, fuel etc. Just look at the numbers involved. The entire US 1st Army took part. US 1st Army even received the new M36 Jackson tank destroyers in this campaign. Antwerp not open did NOT prevent the US 1st Army from being well supplied for the October-November Aachen and Hurtgen Forest campaign, nor the following Operation Queen, which also failed. These all failed due to strategy and tactics, plus tenacious German defending, not Antwerp not being opened. Ironically, Antwerp was fully open end of November and yet what happened? Three weeks later the US Army was in retreat in the Ardennes. Antwerp changed little to nothing and in truth to the Lorraine Antwerp was just 1/3 shorter distance than Le Havre. Big deal. Too much is made of Antwerp, largely by Americans who have to have SOME reason for their failures. Hey why not blame Monty yet again.
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  41.  @johnlucas8479  The US 1st Armys advance towards Aachen alone involved 100,000 troops including two full armoured divisions and four full infantry divisions. At the same time the attacks into the Hurtgen Forest were also going ahead, with another circa 100,000 men. That is way more men and material than Market Garden.
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  42. Gavin ordered a move on the bridge both pre drop and again at 6.00 pm on drop day. This didn't get going until two hours later and even then one of the companies got lost.
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  43. Market Garden went ahead because of the 4th September SHAEF intelligence summary which assured him the Germans facing his 2nd British Army were and I quote "no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battle groups, disorganised even demoralised, short of equipment and arms". The operation was already planned and in the process of going ahead when other reports started showing otherwise and wasn't about to be cancelled due to a couple of less than half strength poorly equipped divisions refitting in the area.
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  44.  @thevillaaston7811  Its amazing they are all out the woodwork now at the same time isn't it?
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  45. 9th and 10th but both were less than half strenght and neither had any tanks.
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  46. There were no real German flank attacks to speak of by the time XXX Corps linked up with the 82nd on the 19th.
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  47. Browning didn't have a lot to do with it. Other generals above and below him (Brereton, Williams, Hollinghurst, Gavin, Taylor, Urquhart) made nearly all the decisions not Browning.
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  48. Hells Gate by Douglas Nash is the premier work on this battle.
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  49. Browning did insist. He told him late on the 18th thst the bridge MUST be taken the next day, the 19th. Unfortunately the non arrival of the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment on that day scuppered it. Gavin then had to use the Guards Armoured Division to fight through the streets of Nijmegen, which was never their task initially. Very difficult for tanks to have to fight in a built up urban area. They are sitting ducks and of course a number were lost to the German anti tank guns by the bridge.
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  50. @openeroftheway8596 1st British Airborne also failed at Arnhem. Never took the bridge there or enough of Arnhem. The failure lies at the feet of Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst.
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