Comments by "" (@lyndoncmp5751) on "TIKhistory" channel.

  1.  @openeroftheway8596  Dont take my word for it. A German report shortly after the battle concluded that the biggest mistake made by the allies in Market Garden were dispersed drops and over a number of days. Those decisions rest squarely with Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst. You can read the report in full in Market Garden Then And Now Volume 2 by Margry. I'll repeat, British 1st Airborne FAILED to take the Arnhem bridge and FAILED to take much of Arnhem. The plan was to take not only the bridge but much of Arnhem as well, a circular line that went from outside Oosterbeek and then to just beyond Hoogkamp then Alteveer, Paasberg and Presikhaaf. This was needed in order for XXX Corps to cross over, fan out and consolidate a bridgehead. This was never even remotely achieved, and the Germans always controlled the bridge off ramp plus 99.9% of Arnhem. Even had the 82nd taken the Nijmegen bridge on the first day and XXX Corps crossed over on the 19th and reached the south end of the Arnhem bridge it wouldn't have mattered. The Germans were too strong in Arnhem and 1st Airborne didnt have the bridge captured anyway. The wreckage of Grabners force was also strewn across the bridge causing a road block. XXX Corps would have merely been a huge traffic jam and sitting ducks for German fire if they even attempted to get their tanks on the bridge. Nor could artillery support have helped for fear of friendly fire on Frosts men as well as destroying the very thing they wanted, the bridge and its off ramp. Despite bravery in holding a small portion of the bridge and some buildings at that end, British 1st Airborne simply didn't do enough. They failed as much at Arnhem as the 82nd did at Nijmegen..... and I'm British. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst screwed the operation. All the events that followed were due primarily to the decisions made by those three men.
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  2. Well all paratroop operations are risky. Its their very nature. They aren't guaranteed of success.
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  3. Flawed air planning was the reason. Well and the Germans.
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  4. Well that failed then because it was the Americans who were humiliated when Monty had to go to their rescue in the Bulge and save them hehe.
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  5.  @dickvansteijn4115  Sosabowski was an argumentative arrogant man who thought his brigade was more important and capable than it actually was. The Poles suffered lightly, less than 100 fatalities and weren't in the thick of the fighting. Every single one of his troops would have been lost had they dropped over Warsaw. His idea was a crazy one. They would have been blasted out of the sky before even reaching Warsaw. There would have been all those transport planes and gliders lost too.
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  6.  @thevillaaston7811  Sosabowski also refused Browning's offer to expand his brigade into a full division, supplemented with British troops to make up the numbers. He disgracefully didn't want any British troops in his unit. He was not a team player and cared only about the Polish cause not the Allied cause. He was right to be fired.
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  7. That was the air commanders fault.
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  8. Churchill was not prime minister in 1939.
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  9. Montgomery's axis of advance was more logical because the Ruhr was the German industrial heartland. Not much of note at Koblenz, Mannheim etc.
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  10. Eisenhower was responsible for the war dragging on. His broad front strategy was a disaster. He should have listened to Montgomerys concentrated northern thrust with 40 divisions in 4 armies (2 American, 1 British and 1 Canadian) into northern Germany, with the Ruhr the central focus. Instead Eisenhower allowed US 1st Army to mess around in the Hurtgen Forest and US 3rd Army to mess around in the Lorraine. Military strategy when an enemy is weak is to concentrate your forces and smash hard, not disperse your forces and blunt your power. Eisenhower was a great politician and man manager, but no battle commander. The Germans agreed with Montgomerys idea to concentrate on northern Germany and the Ruhr.
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  11.  @johnlucas8479  Montgomery contacted him on the 4th. His reply came in two parts on the 7th in a small dispatch then the rest on the 9th. That's 6 days in total. Market Garden was DECIDED on the 10th. Source, Michael Reynolds : Monty and Patton, Two Paths To Victory. Buckingham is simply wrong. Immediately after Monty received the 4th September SHAEF intel summary about the poor state of the German Army in front of him, Montgomery contacted Eisenhower that very same day but Eisenhower dragged his feet for nearly a week.
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  12.  @johnlucas8479  Page 209 Monty and Patton Two Paths To Victory by Michael Reynolds. "Monty did not receive a reply to his 4th September proposal until the 7th and even then it was incomplete, with the second part not arriving until the 9th" Sounds like nearly a week to get back to Montgomerys 4th September communication to me. 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th. 6 days. Monty contacted Eisenhower regarding a push towards the Ruhr on 4th September when the SHAEF intel told him the Germans facing his 2nd British Army were in a poor state, but Eisenhower took nearly a week just to get back to him. "Time is vital" and "the matter is such vital importance". Clearly Eisenhower didn't think so. He dragged his feet.
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  13. 1st Para had the intelligence report on 13th September that a battle scarred panzer division or two were refitting in the area. That's why they took along 6 and 17 pounder anti tank guns and PIATs.
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  14.  @GJVuyk  Of course Browning did. Even Captain Taylor Intelligence Officer of 1st Airborne had the intel about 10,000 German troops, probably from panzer divisions, were in the area. The intel report was dated 13th September and signed by Captain Taylor.
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  15.  @michaelthomas7178  Patton ground to a halt in late August. Market Garden was not even planned until over a week later and not even decided on until two weeks later. Patton received four fresh new divisions in late September 1944 but still couldn't take Metz until well into November. On 5th November 1944, Patton attacked toward the Saar with NINE divisions and had 250,000 men and over 600 tanks compared to the Germans 89,000 men and 69 tanks. Patton said to Bradley he'd be through the Siegfried Line and at the Saar by November 8th. Patton still hadn't done it by December 16th when the Germans pushed the Americans back into a retreat in the Ardennes and he was sent elsewhere.
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  16.  @michaelthomas7178  It was the American 1st Army attacks towards Aachen and into the Hurtgen Forest which got priority over Patton. Not that Patton could even achieve a minor objective of Metz.
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  17.  @imperialcommander639  There was no intelligence summary that found 1000 tanks, and by the end of day one when precisely ZERO German tanks had emerged from the Reichswald to engage the 82nd positions, well that should have bee then end of any such fantasy. What did they assume these phantom 1,000 tanks were doing all day, when they didn't even encounter one 😂.?
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  18. American air decisions had a major role in it not fully succeeding.
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  19. Montgomery wanted a massive concentrated thrust with 40 divisions, including two American armies, to head for the Ruhr, but Eisenhower went with the broad front strategy instead.
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  20. @sparkyfromel Actually Montgomery correctly predicting El Alamein to last around 2 weeks and Normandy to last around 3 months was genius. No other allied general could have correctly predicted that. I doubt Slim would have done better than Montgomery against the Germans in Africa and Europe. In all truthfulness, Slim didnt come up against the best of the Japanese. Montgomery in contrast defeated some of the premier German formations of the war.
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  21. Eisenhower was completely to blame for the failed broad front strategy all through autumn and winter 1944/45. This was nothing short of a disaster with hundreds of thousands of needless casualties for next to nothing gained. He was a great desk man, man manager and politician but a poor military grand strategist.
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  22. Brereton and Williams refused to fly double missions on day one. Even an emissary of Montgomery couldn't get them to change their minds.
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  23. To reiterate, not a single German tank or assault gun was in the Arnhem area when the paras dropped and thus not a single German tank or assault gun was able to move out and threaten British 1st Airborne until late on day 2. These were tanks from Kompanie Mielke, which had just arrived from travelling 200 km from Bielefeld, Germany from late on the first day. Similarly, the other German armour which fought around Arnhem (the Stug III assault guns of Brigade 280 and the Tiger 1s of Kompanie Hummel) were also in Germany on the 17th and did not arrive in the Arnhem area until the 19th. The two Waffen SS panzer divisions didn't have a single tank between them and the 8 brand new Pathers that 9th SS had on paper in its inventory had not yet arrived from the factory. They didn't get to Arnhem until the 20th, too late to participate in the fighting for Arnhem against Frost's men. The only tanks available in the entire Market Garden area of operations on the 17th were some obsolete early war tanks of a training battalion and these were in the American drop zone. They fled when they came under attack by US planes and played no further role in the battle. None of the German units with armour that made a difference in Market Garden werw in the Arnhem area when the paras dropped on the 17th. The routes to every single bridge objective were totally devoid of any defending German armour.
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  24. Eisenhower instead allowed US 1st Army to mess around in the Hurtgen Forest going nowhere.
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  25. @magnetarattractionsno9643 When did any army under Montgomery ever run away? You're thinking of the Americans in the Ardennes.
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  26. "... Bastogne and he thought no other general would have done what Patton did there." All Patton faced in front of Bastogne were four mediocre infantry divisions of Branderbergers Seventh Army. No SS panzer divisions, no Tiger battalions....and even then he struggled for 5 days to advance less than 20 km including 3 days just to get through the village of Chaumont. The US 1st Army, under Montgomery, meanwhile, were by then fighting off 1st SS, 2nd SS, 9th SS, 10th SS, 12th SS, Panzer Lehr, 2nd Panzer, 9th Panzer, 116th Panzer, the Tigers of SS 501 etc.
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  27. It was Brereton who came up with the multiple day drops plan.
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  28. Gavin DID order a move on the bridge though. Both pre drop and then again at 6.00 pm on day one.
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  29.  @od1452  I know. Just pointing out that Browning never told Gavin to ignore the bridge and that Gavin actually did order an attack on the bridge on the 17th. Regarding the tanks, there was no intelligence report of 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald. Im of the opinion it was later made up to excuse why the bridge wasn't taken. Even if it was true that they really thought there were large numbers of tanks in the Reichswald, when none showed up to threaten them on the 17th and 18th that should have put paid to that idea, right?
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  30.  @od1452  By the way, the German forces to the north were not disbelieved. British 1st Airborne had the intel that a grouping of 10,000 troops "may represent a battle scarred panzer division or two reforming". That is why they took 6 and 17 pounder anti tank guns and PIATs along with them. Recon pics only showed a handful of obsolete early war tanks of a training battalion and that unit played no real role Market Garden. The two SS panzer divisions actually had zero tanks between them. The tanks later came in from Germany in the days that followed. German army units. Kompanie Mielke, Schwere Panzer Kompanie Hummel, Sturmgeschutz Brigade 280 and Panzer Brigade 107. None of these units were even in the Netherlands when the paras dropped. They arrived on the 18th and 19th.
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  31.  @nickdanger3802  The recon photos captured a handful of early war obsolete tanks of a training unit. https://www.raf.mod.uk/what-we-do/centre-for-air-and-space-power-studies/documents1/ahb-narrative-arnhem-the-air-reconnaissance-story-second-edition-march-2019/ These played no role of significance in Market Garden and in fact were around the 101st sector on the 17th and fled when attacked by fighter bombers. They played no other role in Market Garden. All the German tanks around Arnhem werein Germany on the 17th and didn't arrive in the Netherlands until the 18th. None were identified by any intelligence pre drops.
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  32.  @johnlucas8479  I repeat, Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst made the wrong decisions. Decisions that other commanders involved, and even Montgomery, tried to change, without success. These decisions cost the operation fatally. Urquhart went too meekly along with the RAF choices. His colleague, Richard Gale of British 6th Airborne said Urquhart should have protested "to the point of resignation". There was ground suitable for paratroop drops, although not gliders, closer to the bridge to the south of the river. A coup de main there would have secured the Arnhem bridge. More men dropped on day one would have changed the operation. Double missions were doable as shown by the protestations against single missions by many of those involved. 7 hours needed from first light to attack Flak batteries until the first drops after 1.00 pm? There is the first calamitous flaw. Its light at 6.00 am in England in mid September. Brereton, together with Williams and Hollinghurst, made fatal wrong decisions. There is no doubt about that. And let us not ignore the fact that it was Brereton who told Monty that yes the operation was feasible with a good chance of success. Brereton could have said no at the beginning and that would have been that. Brereton had already rejected Montys alternate idea of a drop around Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt. Brereton had the say so jurisdiction for the usage of his First Allied Airborne Army. It was down to him. Browning was a, small fish and of little practical relevance in comparison to Brereton and Gavin on either side of him. The film A Bridge Too Far gives Browning more importance and relevance than the reality.
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  33.  @thevillaaston7811  Has Big Woody called the Grenadier Guards "cowards" and Carrington "Scarrington" this week? Clone Warrior is definitely either Big Woody, or somebody else we know from these boards with another new accout that was registered right after you caught him lying. Just ignore the twat.
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  34.  @johnlucas8479  Browning need not have been there at Nijmegen. He offered little, either pro or con, to the events around Nijmegen. He was got rid of before Sosabowski was. Already Browning was shunted out of the airborne in November 1944 and was in Burma as an administrator to Mountbatten by December.
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  35.  @johnlucas8479  You post about Urquhart proves my point Urquhart wanted more planes and more men dropped as well as men dropped across the river. Browning was the middle man who had to go Brereton. Browning wasn't the decision maker. Brereton said no to double missions. It was Brereton who already made the decision for daylight drops by the way. There was ground suitable for drops south of the river closer to the bridge, though not for gliders. It's feasible a chute drop in limited numbers could have been done there but the RAF would have none of it, and Urquhart didn't argue much. As I said, Richard Gale, the more experienced commander of 6th Airborne, felt Urquhart went along with the RAFs more distant choices all too easily and should have argued against them more severely, to the point of resignation. Urquhart was an inexperienced airborne commander and was way too easily lead by the RAF decisions. I do not absolve him of blame either. The wrong man to command 1st Airborne in my view, and the view of others much closer to the issue. This cost the operation greatly, as we know. And I may add that wasn't the only time the RAF messed up. On the 18th when Joe Vandeluer of the Guards Armoured Division requested RAF fighter bomber support to deal the German 88mm gun road block at Aalst, south of Eindhoven, he was told "sorry, none available". None available, for such an important operation? Unbelievable. It took seven hours to get past that 88mm road block.
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  36.  @johnlucas8479  The bombing missions were so late because the troops were not going to be dropped until the afternoon. Had there been double drops the bombings could have been scheduled earlier. Its light at 5.30 to 6.00 am in England in mid September and not dark in the Netherlands until nearly 7.00 pm. More than enough time for bombing AND double drops. If we pull everything forward by 3 hours then the troops could have been scheduled to drop at 10.30 to 11.00 a.m then that is MORE than enough time for a second drop in the 7 or so hours of daylight left. They only have to drop when its still light, not complete all their missions when its light. A second drop as late as 5.30 pm could have been doable. Transport planes can fly back at night. They did it on D-Day. No big deal.
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  37.  @johnlucas8479  Anyway, what is your gist? That Browning WAS to blame, as the opening poster says? Despite Browning not being the bigwig that made the crucial planning decisions and despite Browning not really making the big tactical decisions in the actual battle itself?
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  38.  @johnlucas8479  It did prove my point. Urquhart asked for more planes because the single mission had already been established and wouldn't be changed. Urquhart knew there wasn't going to be enough men dropped on day one. I already said Williams, as troop carrier commander, was also to blame. But Brereton was the commander of First Allied Airborne Army and agreed with Williams. Brereton himself rejected all pleas by the airborne commanders and Monty for double missions. For Dragoon, the preliminary bombing raids began hitting their targets before 6.00 am. Same could have been done for Market Garden and thus a 7.00 to 7.30 am first drop was doable. Enough time for double missions for Market Garden. This is why double missions were argued for by airborne commanders and an emissary from Montgomery.
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  39.  @thevillaaston7811  All bark and no bite. Toothless little doggie.
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  40.  @thevillaaston7811  The fact that he didn't respond with "huh, what are you talking about, Im not him" is a telling giveaway. Not even any denial. 😂
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  41.  @stevewiles7132  Yes, that's a given. All accepted by consensus. But we are concerned about the allied mistakes in this thread, no? Cheers.
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  42.  @johnlucas8479  Well the actual quote I have in front of me from page 255 of Market Garden Then And Now is "no Typhoons available yet today". Nothing about poor flying conditions. In fact the weather was not too bad in the afternoon when the 88mm guns were holding Vandeluer at bay near Aalst. Certainly not impossible flying conditions. The morning was worse but the afternoon improved. Still, no Typhoons had arrived to help before Vandeluer got past the 88mm guns at around 5.00 p.m after a near 7 hour delay. Lacked clarity? There was a grouping of German 88mm guns on the side of the road in clear view. They weren't even hidden in a forest. There is a picture of one of these guns on page 260. It's out in the open by a roadside pole and away from the woods. It was clarified enough. Simply yet another air failing, to add to a long list of others.
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  43.  @johnlucas8479  Many sources have stated the weather improved after the morning of the 18th. The GERMANS were even flying aircraft on the afternoon of the 18th. The 21st Army Group report you cited even states that. How come the weather was ok for the GERMANS to fly around in but yet no Typhoons were sent to assist Vandeluer to get past the 88mm anti tank gun road block near Aalst? The Typhoons didn't have to fly from England 😂. As I said, it was just another in a long list of screw ups from the air commanders. The USAAF and the RAF hampered the operation right from the beginning.
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  44. @Answer Questions Just to clarify, XXX Corps didn't wait for air support. They were told early on that no Typhoons were available, so they sent elements to the right and to the left of the main highway, on long convoluted detours. The left hand element actually managed to link up with the 101st Airborne but the right hand element ran into a collapsed bridge, German paras and SS troopers and were halted. The main column still had to get past the 88mm anti tank gun road block on the main highway, which they couldn't do. The guns were in an excellent position.
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  45. @Answer Questions Yep. I have big problems seeing responses andI often dont get notifications. You Tube is getting worse.
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  46. Brereton made the big decisions, not Browning. He was Browning's boss and the commanding general of First Allied Airborne Army, not Browning. Browning was largely irrelevant and had no real major roll in the operation. Browning did not even have the jurisdiction to overrule the RAF drop zone choices around Arnhem even though he didn't agree with them. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst were mostly to blame. Browning was a bit player to be honest. Nor did Browning tell Gavin to ignore the Nijmegen bridge at any point and in fact Gavin ordered the 508th PIR to go for on day one twice. Pre drop and again around 6.00 pm. Clearly Browning had no input in the communication mix up between Gavin and Lindquist there.
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  47. Furthermore, when 9th SS sent a force from Arnhem across the bridge and down towards Nijmegen on the afternoon of the 17th to counter the threat posed by the 82nd Airborne in that sector there was not a single tank among this force. Why? Because they didn't have any. They only had half tracks etc. No tanks, no assault guns.
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  48. Montgomery was only interested in the war ending. Montgomery even told Eisenhower he would serve under Bradley if it meant a concentrated northern thrust. Unfortunately Eisenhower took his job and insisted on the broad front strategy which kept failing for six months and dragged the war on.
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  49. Patton. Patton couldn't even take Metz for months. He failed to concentrate his forces. Never even managed to get out of the Lorraine and suffered 55,000 needless casualties as a result.
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  50.  @dragosstanciu9866  Yep. Fight one bad guy at a time. The British knew that Hitler wanted to attack Russia at some point, as well. Clever, those British.
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