Comments by "ODDBALL SOK" (@oddballsok) on "TIKhistory" channel.

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  5. well..that is too simple stated. In fact Frost and the lack of support from the other british batallions prove that it isn't and wasn't a simple matter of "go to the bridge and hold it a couple of days. Around Arnhem there was enough german forces to kick the shit out of the british paras even if ALL the intended battalions had arrived in Arnhem center. So too were there enough german troops and called in reinforcements around Nijmegen center had Gavin sent all his (say half) first day troops into Nijmegen center. By the time XXX corps would have arrived as it did the germans STILL would have disrupted and harassed any combination of handful US paras with spearhead of XXX corps armour in the rubbled center of Nijmegen. The carnage that historically happened in Nijmegen WOULD JUST AS MUCH TAKE PLACE in Nijmegen had Gavin moved his paras immediately to the nijmegen center. And as XXX corps PROVED historically that it would NOT move armour and vehicles further over the bridge to reach Arnhem, so too would XXX corps not advance further if Nijmegen would not have been cleared for a radius of say 5 kms. You must realise that the use of paras to "take" a bridge is NOT to be able to "hold"the bridge against inf and tank attacks (they are incapable of), the ONLY tactical advantage of para s taking a bridge in surprise is to SAVE it from being BLOWN UP by enemy engineers. And in case of Nijmegen bridge luckily this happened, but not to the grace of the US rivercrossing feat, but through a heroic dutch resistance that cut the wires further inland away from the bridge.
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  37. In addition to the shortsighted hindsighting blame on Gavin, 82nd, 508th; Getting the Nijmegen main bridge LAST makes sense if you consider this; The planners expected NO germans at the betuwe Island. The planners DID learn that SS corps was at Arnhem before the 17th but EXPECTED the SS to be HELD up IN Arnhem (by the 3 british columns arriving at the north ramp and thus TIGHTLY secure the ramp so that not even a tank or halftrack (as they would!) could pass). At Nijmegen, there was LITTLE defense expected, but the planners DID expect german reinforcements coming straight from GERMANY; Kleve..thus THROUGH the Reichswald, and THUS through Groesbeek. Thus Gavin HAD TO MAKE SECURE his LZ and defenses against strong enemy troops coming from THE EAST. All the bridges on his west could be taken AT ANY STAGE as long as there weren't SS troops getting FROM Arnhem to Nijmegen (and even so they were supposed to be battle fatigued..). As the smaller bridges at Grave and Mook could be EASILY blown up (and were already prepared..this info must be known by dutch resistance and thus allied intelligence), it was MORE IMPORTANT to get those IMMEDIATELY and the Nijmegen bridge last (Nijmegen bridge was NOT prepared for explosives, especially when Model would not have it!). Decisions to assembly, organise and march to hither or tither are done BEFORE the jump. So naturally the movements of the 508th are explained with the above assessment in mind. Unfortunately, it TURNS OUT (and that information only slowly filters through the ranks) , that the SS WERE able to move a stream of armoured vehicles PAST FROST to NIjmegen, and more importantly, more SS troops were able to get FERRIED over in a CONSTANT STREAM via the pannerden ferry. And THAT was the killer in the MarketGarden project; the planners simply did not think of possibilities for the germans to insert troops inbetween Arnhem and Nijmegen. Had the planners dropped paratroops on the island (near Elst) on 17th sept than THAT would have been the key of success; the whole "island" would be (more or less) a secure supply LZ for the british and the 82nd if need be. And any attempt to ferry over german troops along the pannerdencanal would be sighted, harrassed and finally stopped by troops and called in airsupport (if radios would work)). If one is a simpleton (John Burns), you may even blame FROST for letting Graebner (and kampfgruppe Henk!) PASS by his defense positions at the Arnhem north ramp to get to Nijmegen which eventually would prove to be too strong for the first men of 508th arriving at the Nijmegen ramp. But in reality it is the planners to blame...
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  38. ***** in fairness, we are talking about few hours of "delay" (in yr view) or rather wait for sequential preconceived orders. What are a few hours ? Seriously,ask yourself: WHat difference would a few hours make in terms of getting your men in force (columns) to a battle location, and equal what does a few hours mean to the enemy to get his troops lined up in their positions ? It's not as if you have 2000 men marching and 5 seconds before 18.00 hrs there is none, and 5 seconds after 18.00 hrs you have the whole 2000 in position... On each and every second you can compare number of men versus the other and be able to tell: americans arrive earlier yes they have more than germans: 200 yanks overcome 40 flak germans;yanks win. Or the reverse: Kmfgr Henk arrives in part 300 germans, versus 50 yanks; Germans win. But in BOTH occasions  you MUST continue counting until your maximum number of men have arrived and see the balance shifted; But hey sorry; German SS drip in , later by more massive numbers: 2000 men...and the 508th and perhaps other reserves ? Not more than 400: Result is THE SAME: Germany wins. Your fantasy is to have moved ALL OF 82nd and the HQ of Browning with guns in their hands to the goddamn bridge; how much ? 4000 ? Then all the germans may be stuck in Lent...but next day the germans come out ofthe woods; Reichswald,Groesbeek,the second drop gets shot from the skies and on the fields...result 82nd surrounded in Nijmegen. Day laterXXXcrps arrives somewhere at Grave bridge which has been abandoned for Nijmegen, and gets blown up: End of Market garden. Monty's fallus ends at Grave instead of Driel.
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  44. jesusss you uploaded this nonsense again ? Failures: planners (under Monty and Browning who took 10 essential planes on the first day with nonessential staff that cld hve been filled with US 82nd troops that COULD have taken and HELD the Nijmegen bridge); they FAILED to understand that the germans had a HUGE insertion point via Pannerden (and Looveer) ferry to put SS troops AND ATguns AND tanks to the "island" and up the Arnhem bridge and DOWN the Nijmegen bridge and south ramp. No 82nd rifle group could EVER hope to stop the steadily growing influx of german troops there and then on sunday and following monday. The majority of 1st Airborne SHOULD HAVE LANDED on the Island from day one. At least the para dropped infantry.... the poles managed 4 days later... And lest not forget Brereton who DENIED the troopers more than 100 more transport planes that CERTAINLY wld have made the difference, even WITH the extra SS troops and tanks at hand. If the building sucks at the foundation (Browning, Brereton) then any construction fails.. ...and of course 30th crps was BLOODY SLOW !! "no sense of urgency"....it is proven by the fact that the few tanks that went across the nijmegen bridge did NOTHIng afterwards...because INFANTRY were still busy fighting at the "west" side of the south ramp, and HUNDREDS of shermans were lying IDLE miles SOUTH of Nijmegen doing FUCK ALL!! Nobody ever wondered how 5 shermans could get across the bridge (east side of south ramp) , then BLOODY SEND MORE OF THE SAME after them ?????
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