Comments by "ODDBALL SOK" (@oddballsok) on "TIKhistory"
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0:48...it is not "just" bending a corner and go after the Ruhr..it is find your allied Armies (those under Montgomery and not Bradley to be more exact!) in a lucrative unobstructed position to fan out in all directions into nazi germany; the manufacturing heart the Ruhr, but also straight towards the east to Berlin, and straight towards the North Hamburg/Denmark...ALL of it would be open for...Monty !
Locking up german (secondary) troops in Holland is only a small advantage. There never was serious thought of allied armoured fights/progress into Holland (too many obstructing waterways, too many civilians, no strategic bonus).
But by going towards the Zuiderzee alone, there won't be any improvement in clearing Walcheren and the Schelde for Antwerp or getting Rotterdam harbour.
Germans were still there, demolitions were still there, bunkers and guns were still there.
There is or was no need for further "support" from germany. (But it could have lead to a psychological effect that german troops other than the absolute necessary (demolition engineers) would have pulled away over the Afsluitdyk...but that takes some time, and would not be noticed in Walcheren until months later)
The only important "support" that would be cut off is that of NEW V2 rockets that were sent to The Hague area and fired on London. But later it showed that the Germans fired V2 from Friesland (near Leeuwarden) in the North of Netherlands.
Still, RAF bombardments of V2 sites were effective enough, so there was no imperative need to adjust a landbased thrust towards potential V2 launching sites. Besides V2s could still be moved over Friesland over the Afsluitdyke past Amsterdam to Den Haag still with a closed Zuiderzee end at Arnhem..
No, if the allied wanted a big sea port asap, then Market Garden was a waste of time, effort, materials and casualties. Matter of fact was that clearing Schelde project was not planned, and developed until AFTER market garden failure.
Then it "suddenly" dawned upon them that for any further push (over a broad front) they'll need a big port closer by.
And Antwerp was thought to be liberated and functional, but its approach proved to be dangerous.
Market Garden and the north salliant thrust was simply a too good to let go opportunity for Monty personally based on the reports of German panic in the west. Any negative comment or resistance report or recon photo was dismissed because the benefits of a success were too great.
I don't blame Monty and the other planners for looking away from a single recon photo of "a" tank, of "a" report of SS in the area (that were hammered and on the run before and thus needed refitting and rest), on splitting the drops over three days; speed in starting the project was of the essence, the para brigades were sitting idle in UK ; it was a luxury for Monty and he knew it.
To NOT use all that reserve and missing out on a great opportunity would be wrong.
It was a gamble, the allies (Ike included) lost, and the HQ carried on with the normal war progress.
But this time Bradley and Patton claimed most of all further resources.
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check this critique on Poulussen book:
http://www.go2war2.nl/artikel/2411/Lost-at-Nijmegen.htm
quote translated:
With "Lost at Nijmegen" author R.G. Poulussen especially revived the discussion about the developments in Nijmegen and he closely monitors the first 24 hours of the fighting in and around Nijmegen. The conclusions go far for the sources and the burden of proof. With the same simplicity, a completely different conclusion can be drawn from the text of the booklet. The 508th PIR had all the freedom and possibility to undertake an attack on the Waal Bridge. This also happened in the first 24 hours and twice. Both attacks were rejected by the Germans. Could they have done more? Possibly, but the source information in the book is not convincing enough. That the late taking of the Waal Bridge had an effect on the development of Market Garden is actually an open door. But that precisely this delay was crucial for Market Garden is also not convincingly demonstrated in the book. With equal ease, other delays in *Market Garden can be identified as just as crucial*.
(!!!!!!!)
It is praising the author that he is trying to revive the debate around Market Garden 'new' life with this work. His work can contribute to the overall picture of Market Garden. His conclusions go too far, however, to be able to determine on the basis of the contents of the book. The
book lacks a good source account for this (an indication of the source
is not given, it is only from the notes that some sources have been
used) and it is mainly limited in its sources. By quoting other primary sources, a *completely different picture can be outlined*. It is precisely these other sources that have not or hardly been used. This involves sources of non-American origin that can explain the German and British positions in their entirety. The book does not reveal the positions and numbers of British troops that entered Nijmegen. Nor is it supported with sources which German troops were present in
the Betuwe, in Nijmegen and the Reichswald or could be transported there
quickly.
This
does not mean that the author would be wrong in his conclusions, but
that the book gives me insufficient sources, say proof, to support the
conclusions.
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*****
aha..and there you make an assumption you can't make.
The success of shooting up Graebner men on the Arnhem north ramp in my opinion can't be copied over the south ramp of Nijmegen.
1) Arnhem had houses nearby and a bridge sentry house ..nijmegen didn't; a lot more difficult to defend in concealment.
2) Graebner was a fool..oh no, that is depicted in the movie..experienced Graebner REALISing the danger of concealed enemy infantry positions in the houses knew you can't STOP in front of them, and could not do harm with MGfire from further on the bridge (and being exposed to possible 6 pdr guns elsewhere along the Arnhem north banks or allied airplanes) decided to RACE past them and end deeper in arnhem to join up with the other SS troops.... unfortunately the halftrack drivers had no clear view on the bridge road, had difficulty avoiding mines, looking out for them means EXPOSING your body up from the halftracks, smoke, etc..and when one stopped , the rest got stuck as well, with clear view from the brit paras ON TOP of them, then it was prize shooting.
The same thing would be more difficult to achieve for 82nd on Nijmegen (and that would have to be EARLIER on the day than Frost did his trick on Arnhem..).
Earlier means less prepared, less troops in position, less material brought in , less mines...even Frost let the 1st Graebner recon group pass by without firing shots....obviously!
There is a difference between ARRIVING at a position and having CLEARED or PREPARED or SECURED a position
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The 508th was not able to overcome the garrison and flak teams on the bridge, AND move over many (??) 6pdrs in Lent, dig trenches and make a sound "cordon" , meanwhile fending off SS infantry and halftracks..in the space of couple of hours on the 17th sept.
Let alone stave off the further reinforcements on the 18th.
You MIGHT want to fantasise over what if ALL the 82nd troops that were at Groesbeek heights had moved to >Nijmegen and ABANDONED the LZs for the drops of 18th (moved to 19th) september:
Well, maybe yes, gavin would have the Nijmegen bridge....for ONE day.
The ragtag piecemeal troops form the reichswald WOULD have overrun the LZ , hence the next drops would be shot at /obliterated, totally LOST.
But Gavin would be holding the Nijmegen center and south ramp.
Fine. The XXXcrps arrives neatly from the SW.
The NORTH ramp however he would NOT be able to hold, or control.
Too much SS poured in Elst and maybe as close as Lent from the Pannerden ferry (Just a ridiculous 7 km = 5 mile distance!! straight EAST) with armoured cars, stugs, 88s and finally Tigers.
Any concentration of Sherman tanks over the bridge would be knocked out (from distance 88s , 75 At, Artillery barrages, Panzerfausten in Lent, and finally a tiger tank) when sighted.
Sighted on the bridge, sighted going out of Lent on the dykes...all-the-time.
XXX would or could clear out Lent, Elst, the island and Driel, but that would take MANY DAYS.
And even so, a couple of Shermans arriving at the south ramp of Arnhem ramp would NOT be able to support Frosts men. And frosts men would not be able to support the shermans if trying to run OVER the Arnhem bridge (already full with rubble).
The perimeter around the Arnhem north ramp was already so small, it had no effective meaning for the original plan. The Arnhem center was full of SS, tanks, heavy tanks, artillery screen, Tigers; there is NO way that XXXcrps could DO anything.
In fact, if the XXXcrps were so supernatural, they would have done so on the 21st, 22nd or 23d..after all, XXXcrps is brimming with tanks, and what did the germans have in Arnhem to stop them ??
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John, it is actually YOU who put all assumptive blame on Gavin without having prove and morever without DELVING into arguments to support or disprove yourself.
I started out in thinking, that it can't be so simple as you brits (TK included) portray it.
A gut feeling (and I am dutch, no particular yankee lover, nor brits affectionado..I'd like to squash BS arguments).
And lo and behold, gradually I read more (Try It never snows in september of Kershaw..OH ? YOU CLAIM YOU HAVE READ IT ?) on books and websites, find out about EXACT times per day that this or that report or action or sighting took place. And based on that information anyone sane must come to a different conclusion than you guys do.
A group of 508th of 82nd DID attempt in 17th evening to take the bridge . Yes much later than 15.00 hrs when they landed and started taking their first objectives (prepare roadblocks)..but Gavin must have reminded them or Lindquist in a epiphany suddenly remembered ?.
But the german garrison at the bridge would have been SUFFICIENT to defend against a mere 50 men of 508th that could be spared at the 17th eve or afternoon.(There were A LOT of tasks to be acquired by the 82nd !!!).
EVEN IF the 50 bold men had displaced the garrison (say loss of 10 men ?), then they would be NO MATCH for the reinforcements that came from north later the afternoon 17th.
Prove "at 20.30 hrs the 508 tried to attack Nijmegen but were REPULSED).
MORE and MORE germans and SS poured in and that WHOLE Kampfgruppe managed to do an attack FROM Nijmegen to the LZS of 508th and PUSHED that sector AWAY.
So if ZE germans are CAPABLE of doing THAT on the 18th morning, how would the 508th with 40 men be able to keep them from retaking the nijmegen bridge IF they had installed themselves on the bridge (in houses? in ruins ?NO , there is NOTHING to gain cover in a 150 m radius around the ramps!!!)
Instead of frolicking over Gavin you should ask yourself WHY isn't there a paradrop or glider drop planned on the Betuwe Island in the first place ??
Any landed troop there has the advantage to help take the bridge ramps of BOTH Arnhem and NIjmegen.
Reserves could be sent NORTh AND SOUTH depending on the battle situations. (and added bonus : stop german reinforcements coming from the pannerden ferry..perhaps)
It is INCREDIBLE that that did not take place.
That location was the key for success,
The brits gliders (jeeps, carriers, AT) should have landed near Elst and a few coup d etat parachuted paras could have landed in the Arnhem park at the north ramp and Nijmegen hunnerpark ..et voila..the few 20 mm flak guns would perhaps hit a couple of dakotas but place a good concentrated number on that and the job would have had a better probability of succes.
AndWHO were the ones that denied the planes to get too close to the bridges ??
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