Comments by "ODDBALL SOK" (@oddballsok) on "TIKhistory" channel.

  1. The question is how can hindsight foil you ? How is Gavin to KNOW that the german troops coming from the Reichswald (they were coming) were uncoordinated and poor quality ??? Can you answer this: why were the 82nd dropped on the EAST of Nijmegen ? Inbetween Nijmegen and germany's Fatherland Reichswald ? Ever though about that ? If the german soldiers in Holland were supposed to be old men and secondary sentry troops...why RISK your men and LZ in a much more dangerous position with threat coming from the east ?? It would be all the more easier landing in the west (southwest) ? There was even and old airstrip near Grave bridge ! Pretend you use your brains, you are paratrooper planner in the week ahead of MG and you choose EAST. WHY ??
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  2. Keent airfield...
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  3. I think it is because the 82nd should act as a shield against "anything" the germans could throw at the column from their nearest german access points; Kleve etc. The allied intelligence knew "sufficiently" what was in Holland (West) of the corridor, but was in the dark what cld be expected from the east. Hence Gavin had to expect the worst and prepare for the worst.
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  4. Or why not land 1st Airborne immediately at Deelen airfield ;). Somehow allied intelligence figured there would be sizeable german forces there... (I think they knew there were refitting SS troops there (hullo Enigma), but didnot want to scare the paras, scare the public that the policy makers should take responsibility, just play the fool). Since when was Enigma decoded ? 1941 ? If you know the SS is there (but unsure of their actual operational strength) then it figures to not drop ANY para closer to Arnhem bridge (on south side, or nearer to the railway bridge), but choose a "safe" distance near Renkum.
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  5. What is telling, or bothersome to me is that although Montgomery is all over responsible for the plan, and even though he is taking responsibility for the failure, excuse 90% success, I don't see or read that he is involved in the operation during the days that it took place. Where was he ? What was he doing between 17-22 sept ? HE could take drastic measures to fix things if there were cock ups (like pushing brereton for more flights even during darker hours, even during a slow dissipating fog in UK or in Holland...kick some ass). It seems because he anticipated the SS there , he'd pull away his involvement so that if a loss occurred he could blame his staff under him, but if it were a success, he would take all the credit and exploit the situation. ... If the MG project in potential creates a stunning strategic bridgehead for future operations in Germany, then at least you would see more attention from Monty in that crucial first week. But I read nothing of interest in his diary (published..so maybe pages are missing..)
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  6. Prague was a bit further away and thru mountains, than Berlin..when starting from Antwerp (port)...and Prague was taken by Patton s men.
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  7. reeeeaaallly ?you have a wild fantasy.... try a reference or quot e from REAL books ?
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  8. The case of the Gavin blunder is a mistake, but not one that made the market garden fail. His erratic decision simply doesn't matter: in fact Frost and the lack of support from the other british batallions prove that it isn't and wasn't a simple matter of "go to the bridge and hold it a couple of days. Around Arnhem there was enough german forces to kick the shit out of the british paras even if ALL the intended battalions had arrived in Arnhem center. So too were there enough german troops and called in reinforcements around Nijmegen center had Gavin sent all his (say half) first day troops into Nijmegen center. By the time XXX corps would have arrived as it did the germans STILL would have disrupted and harassed any combination of handful US paras with spearhead of XXX corps armour in the rubbled center of Nijmegen. The carnage that historically happened in Nijmegen WOULD JUST AS MUCH TAKE PLACE in Nijmegen had Gavin moved his paras immediately to the nijmegen center. And as XXX corps PROVED historically that it would NOT move armour and vehicles further over the bridge to reach Arnhem, so too would XXX corps not advance further if Nijmegen would not have been cleared for a radius of say 5 kms. You must realise that the use of paras to "take" a bridge is NOT to be able to "hold"the bridge against inf and tank attacks (they are incapable of), the ONLY tactical advantage of para s taking a bridge in surprise is to SAVE it from being BLOWN UP by enemy engineers. And in case of Nijmegen bridge luckily this happened, but not to the grace of the US rivercrossing feat, but through a heroic dutch resistance that cut the wires further inland away from the bridge. (Jan Jozef Lambert van Hoof)
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  9. well...then analyse the reality: You send 50 paras to the bridge..shoot some 20 germ guards away...you are left with 40 capable men. So, where on and around the Nijmegen bridge would you place them ? problem: 1) no near houses around the ramps (like in Arnhem). 2) If a german armoured column would move down from North over the bridge.(or east from Kleve or Emmerich).how would these 40 men stop them ? Do they carry a bazooka with 5 rounds each and every paratrooper ? Hmm ? Would the , say 4 paras with 4 bazookas not be noticed on the pavement around the ramps ?(and be bombarded with ample mortars and light artillery) In short: wouldn't the "defense" of the "entire" nijmegen bridge by a handfull of paras be "a joke" in military defense terms ? and cleared up in a matter of a few hours ? The key is which concentrated force of armoured vehicles arrives first :the germans or the XXX spearhead. The 82nd on the bridge on the days before is irrelevant. It is ONLY relevant to deny german engineers to place explosives. And yes, that is a risk Gavin and Browning seriously missed.
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  10. (1) such a 6 pdr gun is only as good as it gets the first shot(s) (with success) but after that is located and gets mortared...end of its use. (2) choosing between setting up the 6 pdr in ambush in wooded area against expected tanks around Groesbeek (landing zones), versus in a streetcorner in Nijmegen ...fully exposed when pulling it in the city by jeep..able to be sniped from all directions; the choice is obvious: leave it at Groesbeek and have only Piats or bazookas or mines in nijmegen.  
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  11. The panzerfausts find is luck. You (or Gavin) cannot plan on that. Btw having found a store full of panzerfausts is proof that it is reserved for ..? quite a substantial number of german garrison men. And where were these men ? Far far away, or rather (on patrol ? excercise?) nearby ? Nijmegen is a very important city in the eyes of the germans. It is unthinkable it would be void with troops (otherwise, the dutch resistance would have a ball there....).
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  12. Those are the facts..now use the brain to analyse: where would the 10th SS be on day 2 if some of Gavins men were scattered on,over, below , north and south of the bridge ? what would the 10th SS do ? And, If two Tiger tanks were ferried across on the island and given the situation :Handfull British paras contained on Arnhem bridge north ramp by ample german troops and stugs, and US paras untested on Nijmegen bridge and south ramp...a column of british tanks and vehicles moving closer to Nijmegen south.  Where would you (or german command) send the 2 tigers (and support) ? Again racing over Arnhem bridge, or rather down to squash resistance in Nijmegen ?
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  13. In logistics terms the paras have no effect or meaning for the end success of market Garden; what determines the new front/border/stalemate is where will the bulk of the military material and men of the XXXcorps meet the bulk of the military material and men of the Germans. Even IF  Gavin had the Nijmegen bridge on day 1, and even IF the XXXcorps would push on to Nijmegen on day 2 end, and even IF  XXXcrps would move vehicles OVER the Waal on day 3, by that time the germans had ENOUGH SS troops and material (tanks and artillery) in the area around Elst  and Arnhem to stop XXX crps in its tracks. Even IF XXXcrps would push on more and more material on the island and do successful manoeuvres (note: Oct-March the same british could NOT achieve easy breakthroughs in the swampy cold areas around the Waal and Rhine!) that would take AT LEAST 10 more days..then STILL no british tank would be able to cross the Arnhem bridge in September/October.. The frontline would have settled. Settled in practically the same frontline as it did historically. Period.
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  14. None other than MajGenJames M. Gavin, commanding the 82nd Airborne Division, during Operation Market-Garden, was extremely critical of Browning, writing in his diary on 6September 1944, (prior to the operation), that he "...unquestionably lacks the standing, influence and judgement that comes from a proper troop (readairborne combat) experience.... his staff was superficial...Why the British units fumble along... becomes more and more apparent. Their tops lack the know-how, never do they get down into the dirt and learn the hard way".
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  15. did so. But in terms of losing momentum by losing bridges immediately; you have bridge at Son, railway bridges at Arnhem and >Nijmegen..all blown up by detonation or 88guns. The son bridge actually stalled the XXX progress. THAT was vital. Was it the 101st to blame ? Horocks ? Or rather the naive optimistic planners ? Same goes for Nijmegen. There is enough (i add page numbers later) to show that north of Nijmegen was soon filling with sufficient german reinforcements that would nullify any 82nd battalion or platoon attempt on taking the bridge. Any clearing of these SS would HAVE to be done by XXXcrps. Either INSIDE nijmegen (as per history) or over the bridge in Lent, Elst, whole of Betuwe Island. The 82nd would be incapable of going out IN the island area. History has shown that XXXcrps  FAILED to do this job in full force "hell bound", and VITAL hours slipped away in which a more aggressive spearhead /commander would have sent his good troops forward PAST the SS that were shooting out of windows (what else can they do in Nijmegen??? the Nijmegen ramp is CLEAR for 100 mtrs) and go the SAME route as the 6 to 4 shermans that went before them. Follow up on them and go via side roads (not via Elst)  to Driel to Arnhem and fire some rounds into Arnhem (and that's it...). I never found arguments or reasons why the XXXcrps as a WHOLE halted in Nijmegen and wasted time in clearing up Nijmegen center for 18 hours ? I suspect it is simply a matter of wrong or incomplete orders and procedure: "do not advance until cleared". And while 1000 guards at the spearhead do the clearing, the rest BEHIND them...do ..NOTHING. And THAT was the last blow to the hope of Arnhem.
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  16. By luck I have the right Kershaw book; 1)page 100 1st patrol in nijmegen 18.30 17 sept. Frundsberg brigade afternoon 17th in nijmegen incl Reinhold, Euling..euling turned via Pannerden..graebner 19.00 Elst on to Nijmegen (20.00?) Henkewas there ALREADY. 2) Graebner turned BACK after reports of frost fights at arnhem (note had 508th attacked EARLY then they wld face graebner troops TOO..by arriving LATER they encountered LESS troops: only Henke ;) STILL 508th could NOT overcome garrison and Henke…stalemate until more elements of 10th SS arrived over the night: page 101. 3) HENCE 508th would only be perhaps capable of pushing bridge flaks away, but not be fit to hold against Henke (when did he arrive by the way ??) nor the later 10th SS coming in at night. 4) Note that the “very easy”bridges Grave and Heumen were secured in what ?30 minutes ?? No!! 3 hours and six hours (page 119) . And you think “a” huge bridge like nijmegen would be secured in 30 minutes?…muhahaha. 5) Page 119 Occupation of the 300 m hill SE of nijmegen . this “took precedence even over the capture of the main bridge over Nijmegen”. If you have been there you can confirm this to be true. 6) Page 123 The lost LZ had to be retaken (on 18th) planes had taken off at 10.00 and were expected to arrive at 13.00 hrs. Compn were extracted from reserves and further US soldiers detached FROM NIJMEGEN to overcome this CRISIS. orders were given to CLEAR the northern and southern LZs! Only the paradrop of 18th sept tipped the balance. also of note page 194 Zonnenstahl, on your website http://www.defendingarnhem.com/Sonnenstuhl.htm sonnenstuhl; Forward artill observ brought down fire to within 100 mtrs of our own positions (Nijmegen, Elst).Therby overcoming CRITICAL moments...this id MUCH to sustain confidence and morale.It may well have been a factor slowing the rate of allied advance towards Arnhem... (I remember there was sentence where it showed that when shermans started to move out for an attack (ELst or LEnt ?) the german arti barrage made them stop immediately...so effective was the sperrbarrage.).
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  17. on the british capabilities vs Tigers and in rubbled cities like Caen. Yes, but that took a LOOOONG time. And if so superiour; what took XXXcrps so long in Nijmegen then ? And what took XXXcrps so long in negotiating Elst ? And why cldnt XXXcrps go assault the Arnhem bridge AFTER frost had surrendered ? No, really.the germans , even weak , even untrained, even unorganised were no walkover. That is nothing to be ashamed about, it simply takes time to overcome enemy resistance...strong or weak. short or long time. It costs time, material, men....logistics.
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  18. hear hear akgeronimo
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  19. ha..I thought I was the only one dealing with TIK and some snob John Burns about this misplaced accusation of Gavin and the nijmegen bridge "failure". Turns out 4 mnths before a proper (modern) para was fighting the same battle..
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  20. By the way on 51:20 day three morning you SHOW that the germans move up TIGERS from the SOUTH side of the arnhem bridge. They were FERRIED over the pannerden river near Het Looveer. This means and PROVES that even if Gavin had his airborne troops at the Nijmegen bridge at day one, the german SS would still have control over AT LEAST the north ramp of the Nijmegen bridge. Say the SS inf troops were not capable of pushing the 82nd away from the south side of the Nijmegen ramp on day 2, then for sure the arrival of the XXX spearhead would NOT be able to cross the Nijmegen bridge ! Tigers and 88guns would blast all allied vehicles off the bridge and could do so from relatively far away hidden and protected (against jaBo attacks) positions along the river bank. The allied push would just as much be stalled on Nijmegen and further polish para drops on the island would not have mattered other than as it already did. For all the allied air superiority it is amazing they did not know (dutch resistance would be able to tell) and did not see, and did not REACT on the ferrying of heavy german reinforcements over there. PLug the holes of the enemy push, and put pressure on your own push...that is all there is to warfare logistics. So the failing of feeding your own push (the airlift; Brereton is to blame) and the too slow pushing up the XXX corps is the obvious scape goats. Its all logistics people...
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  21. I believe there was a 17 pdr antitank gun landed at Oosterbeek (by a Hamilcar)..but no such heavy AT at Groesbeek. The 6 pdr does nothing against a Tiger (or even a Stug) front. Only hope is perhaps a hidden ambush and aiming at the rear.
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  22. That is a nice website link. Thanks. Anyways, how I come to look upon this MG project in terms of achievable success is like you consider the bulk of the german army as a container of ketchup up in the woods NE of Arnhem and the bulk of the allied army (XXXcorps) as a container of mayonaise starting south of Valkenswaard. The roads going over the various bridges as conduits and the areas around towns as other containers, and towns as more difficult to fill containers. The bridges are chokepoints and one way valves controlled by this or that paratroop or garrison fraction. Those one way valves can get displaced or removed if enough fluid pressure acts on it , over "some" time. If a bridge is blown then the valve is broken. A ferry or moving by boats across is a trickling valve. At 17 september you start building the pressure of the two containers. In this view the mere fact that there was enough and more than enough german heavy and battle hardened troops at Arnhem and having access to the "island" south of Arnhem is clear evidence the MG project had to fail in Arnhem. The bridge was simply a bridge too far. Only if thru some miracle if Frost (+ backup) could hold on the original perimeter (of some 1 km across) north of Arnhem ramp and the XXXcrps would make it on time (4 days?) and deploy its tanks onto that bridgehead of 1 km (and support of artillery on the south end of the arnhem bridge) it would be viable. But any wargame with realistic troops depictions would tell that with the given battalion of Frost and the given SS troops in the area (and having access to the "island") etc.. it wouldn't work.
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  23. I haven't got the exact hours , but I find thison Frundsberg alone. : 18 September, 1944: Kampfgruppe "Frundsberg" is blocked from crossing the Arnhem Bridge and begins to ferry personnel and equipment across the Pannerdern Canal (fyi Pannerden is CLOSER to Nijmegen Waal river than Arnhem Rhine river!!). Components of Kampfrguppe "Frundsberg" include 4 Panzer Mk Ivs, Kampfrgruppe "Reinhold", Kampfgruppe "Euling", and Kampfgruppe "Henke". 19 September, 1944: British XXX Corps reaches Nijmegen. 20 September, 1944: Division defending positions along the Waal River, Nijmegen; Kampfrguppe "Hanke" captures Fort Hof Van Holland. At 1500, 2nd battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (US 82nd Airborne Division) begins amphibious assault crossing of the Waal River, and their attack on Hunner Park is repulsed by Kampfgruppe "Euling". British Grenadier Guards clear Fort Valkhof of elements of Kampfgruppe "Euling" and cross the Waal River between 1800 and 1900 as elements of Kampfgruppe "Frundsberg" withdraw from Nijmegen and ready for the defense of Arnhem. As the nijmegen bridge was not assaulted or taken historically on 18 sept , there obviously was no need or order for any german (ragtag) reinforcement to be directed to Nijmegen. HAD the 82nd taken positions on the Nijmegen bridge on 17th then OBVIOUSLY the germans somewhere somehow would have sped things up in the direction of Nijmegen. Reserves from where I hear you ask?: well from the ferried over elements ON THE 18Th september. Or do you REALLY think those guys and 4 tanks (and later the 2 Tigers) just HANG around in Pannerden and wait 48 HOURS until ALL the men and ALL 4 tanks are ferried over IF THE SITUATION would be dire at Nijmegen bridge ? You guys make the mistake(that allied commanders did all the time) that once a situation is cast in stone and you change one vital element you expect the germans/oponents to NOT react or NOT change their decisions and orders ?
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  24. additionally : waffen-ss.no/SS-Panzer-Division-Frundsberg.htm The armoured reconnaissance battalion SS-Panzer Aufklarungs Abteilung 9, under SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Grabner, had already crossed the Arnhem Bridge southwards when news of the Allied attacks arrived, and raced to secure the road through Nijmegen. On finding the defense of the Nijmegen Bridge well organized, it had returned to Arnhem, (that was the 18th) (I cant vouch on the truth of all of it, but neither can you on your sources..) Note: WELL ORGANISED. I suppose a SS officer would know how to assess a bridge garisson of non SSunits against the risk of uncoming american paratroopers...
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  25. additionally: Frundsberg units then moved to their allotted task of supporting the German defenses at Nijmegen, and later slowing the advance of the British XXX Corps armor after it cross the Waal. Considerable casualties were inflicted on the British during the stubborn German defensive fighting. Frundsberg’s Kampfgruppe Knaust and SS-Pz AA 10 stubbornly defended the town of Elst, the capture of this town would be the only hope for the British of rescuing the beleaguered 1st Airborne Division. So all these SSmen were already in the "island"area on 18th and 19th. And they proved they CAN harass the XXX crps in /around Elst.
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  26. check also this on http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/CGSC/CARL/nafziger/944GIAD.pdf page 2 "Nijmegen defense force 17-20 sept" and add up the "already present" and "reinforcements of 10th SSand what day they were "there". Also further on page 4 "Build upof Kampfgruppe 10thSS 18-21 sept..crossed EARLY on 18 sept am in pannerden. I don'tknow how you understand this, but to me it shows that ALL the SS (and pioneer) troops that gave the allies a hard time in Nijmegen center would already be in place and prepared for any move OVER the Nijmegen bridge of XXXcrps at midday 19th if the 82nd paras would not already have been pushed away by Grabner on the 18th (when he "checked" nijmegen bridge..). And it is likely the 82nd could not make a carnage on the nijmegen ramp like Frost men did on the Arnhem ramp because there weren t enough housings nearby....
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  27. remember your own suggested (and not finished ) website ? http://www.defendingarnhem.com/Sonnenstuhl.htm Look at the above page (with all kinds of maps and info from KERSHAWs book) and see the Map of the Artillery Blocking Line created by Sonnestuhl in Sept. 1944. Readthe superlatives of his commanding officer: To achieve this, Sonnenstuhl created a Sperrfeurlinie (Artillery Blocking Line) which can be seen on the map below. It meant the forward observers only needed to provide a number and the whole Artillery Regiment would decend into that area in a short period. This of course halted any attack by the Allies and boosted the confidence of the defending Germans. Even the commander of Artillery OB West was impressed by this solution that he visited Sonnenstuhl's command post to see it in action for himself so he could pass this method onto other units. And all the artillery pieces were IN PLACE by 19th sept ... No 6 pdr crew would survive a well placed concentrated barrage....and Sonnenstul only has to go from one AT gun to another to wipe them all of. I am not boasting about german or british capabilities and who is better..the conclusion you DO can take is that for either side it was NOT going to be a walkover in the island region on 19th sept IF the Nijmegen bridge had been kept in hands of the 82nd. and the bloody HISTORY of Elst as is proves it
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  28. akgeronimo501 hastings who ? This hastings ? http://russia-insider.com/en/weasel-history-secret-intelligencce-wartime/ri12534
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  29. More than 2/3 ds of the britsih 1st para did NOT do their job: Reach arnhem bridge...neither of them captured the arnhem RAILWAY bridge: 100% failure. 101st airborne did not get Son bridge; and they held up XXXcrps 24 hrs..... Talking about failures. The Son canal is a mere 30 meters ...you can piss over it..yet engineers took 24 hrs..why ? Because british Horrocks did not have them AT THE FRONT of the column. That too is a GRAVE mistake that hurted the timetable. In my opinion more idiots and naive narcissistic optimists were involved in the planning and execution of this project Market Garden on the british side (Hullo Browning!) than on the American side (Hullo Brereton!).
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  30. ***** Nay, of course the trucks are not next to the fighting spearhead ...but as a leader of the XXXcrps column you MUST anticipate the likely possibility that a bridge would be blown and the paras were not successfull. What is your priority then ? HAve the bloody bailey or pontoonbridges near and ready! ...It strikes me as naive to have those engineers coming over from the rear of the column all te way from Belgium. 24 hrs - 12 hrs..yes, I did not have the exact hours at hand. But still...TWELVE HOURS ??! TWELVE HOURS ??? have you witnessed engineers builidng a small! bailey bridge (30 mtrs!)..in an environment where thy were not shot at (Son was cleared)...less than 2 hrs you have that bloody bridge... WHere were the other 10 hrs wasted on ? Indeed; getting the stuff from the rear. THAT is poor planning. British on Arnhem: British did not "have" Arnhem bridge. Tanks could run past it (Tigers on Arnhem, Shermans on Nijmegen) whilst para infantry covered "a" ramp. You "have" a bridge when you control the ramps on both(!) ends and have a secure cordon screen around it.
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  31. what is "Nijmegen: U. S. 82nd Airborne Division - 1944" other than a statement we already know ? A book ? a DVD documentary ? a board game ?
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  32. A very worthwhile website that discusses ALL Market Garden books from all perspectives, and mentions ALL their mistakes: http://www.kritischhistoricus.nl/414964211 You have to google translate it. And yes, even kershaw and Ryan books are having some serious mistakes...
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  33. what about the one(s) from Brian Urquhart ?
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  34. ***** What is the point ? Let's assume the photo of Brian (and listed in Bridge Too Far book (print of 1980ies) was a fake. 1) if coming "from Germany" is the statement, it is unimportant; German border is only few miles away...so near enough. 2) you claim liberally there is no proof, but you also present no proof of WHERE they were EXACTLY . 3) You canNOT disprove the obvious conclusion or assumption (if you like) that the SS troops more , or less ? had troops placed  and refitted in , near Deelen airfield. Now Deelen was seen as pretty important. By the german HQ, by the allies as well. The most logical location for at least quite a substantial concentration of troops would be Deelen. That is pretty immediate near Arnhem. As for the other assumption you make; brits paras did not meet tanks on day 1"therefore" there were no tanks in Arnhem..consider this: Day 1 was only half a day. The first info germans COULD have there were paras IN ARNHEM was....? after about 18:00 hrs. Dusktime. Up and until then it is thought that ordinary infantry is capable of pushing para infantry out of houses. Sending in "a tank" in streets, between houses, to clear infantry, at night time...is NOT a sound order. So OBVIOUSLY even if tanks/stugs were at the edge of Arnhem, they would not get the order to ENTER and approach the bridge ramp. The germans TOO had a code of "honour" not to destroy (occupied, "befriended") civilian property if it was NOT necessary! So you may state correct facts, but you make incorrect conclusions.
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  35. Just fantasising here, as you may do too; Enigma was broken in ..1941, 1942. So in all likelihood it MUST have been KNOWN to MI6 that "some" SS troops with cannibalized armour  are stationed in or near Arnhem. Now, imagine, you are MI6. You canNOT give clues to the Germans that you cracked enigma...but you kinda wanna warn Monty that there is a potential threat up there at Arnhem...what do you do ? 1) continue the drop..but put yourself as major commander in the background 2) supply yr british landing party with some more AT capability (17 pdrs in stead of 6 pdrs) and many Piats. 3) drop them at a far more safer distance; say 15 miles to the east away from the SS ? 4) destroy ANY reference to possible incriminations that you as commander may have known about the SS there. You DESTROY air recon photos that show tanks or even vehicles. You send Brian U. on sick leave, and you state then and after you "were absolutely surprised the germans were refitting there, we had absolutely no knowledge of them...and  'of course' the dutch resistance couldnt be trusted"..hear, hear. That may be a more reasonable explanation on the things at hand than yours. Enigma cracking... that is the key.
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  36. just spinning here; maybe, just maybe Carrington HAD to stop continuing with his few tanks at NIjmegen because HE was  instructed not to progress further otherwise the German may have guessed that Enigma was cracked.....Bilderberg conference and such....Prince Bernhard...Carrington invited...oompa loompa..
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  37. 12:33 because there were no reserves ready to make the whole deployment into the Ruhr. After a successful bridgehead between Arnhem and Zuiderzee, the British allies army had to be refitted, rearranged..there were anyway logistical problems with supplies from Cherbourg, more american allies in France needed also huge supplies...obviously you need the time to clear Antwerp approaches. If you reverse the order ; FIRST the Canadians would be attacking Walcheren, clearing the area (september ; better weather instead of the storms of Oktober)..then for the germans it is obvious where to solidify defenses against any future british thrusts into Germany... More certainly any and all the bridges over Rhine and Waal would be ready for detonation. Any attack in east direction after Walcheren in horrendous october and november autumn weather would seriously hamper Monty's progress...and he CERTAINLY would not get the benefit over Bradley and Patton in the fight for resources. Even when Antwerp is closer to his zone. Using paras behind enemy lines is a tactical surprise (instead of advancing on the frontline as such)...likewise the para project market garden was a strategic surprise: it was stepping over a logical step and catching the germans off guard.
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  38. in addition to the shortsighted hindsighting blame on Gavin, 82nd, 508th; Getting the Nijmegen main bridge LAST makes sense if you consider this; The planners expected NO germans at the betuwe Island. The planners DID learn that SS corps was at Arnhem but EXPECTED the SS to be HELD up IN Arnhem (by the 3 british columns arriving at the north ramp and thus TIGHTLY secure the ramp so that not even a tank or halftrack (as they would!) could pass). At Nijmegen, there was LITTLE defense expected, but the planners DID expect german reinforcements coming straight from GERMANY; Kleve..thus THROUGH the Reichswald, and THUS through Groesbeek. Thus Gavin HAD TO MAKE SECURE his LZ and defenses against strong enemy troops coming from the east. All the bridges on his west could be taken AT ANY STAGE as long as there weren't SS troops getting FROM Arnhem to Nijmegen. As the smaller bridges at Grave and Mook could be EASILY blown up, it was MORE IMPORTANT to get those IMMEDIATELY and the Nijmegen bridge last. Decisions to assembly, organise and march to hither or tither are done BEFORE the jump. So naturally the movements of the 508th are explained with the above assessment in mind. Unfortunately, it TURNS OUT, that the SS WERE able to move a stream of armoured vehicles PAST FROST to NIjmegen, and more importantly, more SS troops were able to get FERRIED over in a CONSTANT STREAM via the pannerden ferry. And THAT was the killer in the MarketGarden project; the planners simply did not think of possibilities for the germans to insert troops inbetween Arnhem and Nijmegen. HAd the planners dropped troops on the island (near Elst) on 17th sept than THAT would have been the key of success; the whole "island" would be a secure LZ fro the british and the 82nd if need be. If one is a simpleton (John Burns), you may even blame FROST for letting Graebner (and kampfgruppe Henk!) PASS his defense positions at the Arnhem north ramp to get to Nijmegen which eventually would prove to be too strong for the first men of 508th arriving at the Nijmegen ramp. But in reality it is the planners to blame...
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  39. Like I said; it was Frost who let Graebner including Henk pass by Arnhem north ramp to the south without a shot fired . Good riddance for Frost personally, but it meant extra SS forces on Nijmegen bridge before the 508th got there. I haven't found an exact time when Henk Kamfpruppe was there but in tracking the timing and movement of Graebner it must have been well before 18.00 hrs. The 508th battalion (400 men max in total ..but sent off party at best 100 men) could not do the task of setting blockades at Beek and reach Nijmegen before 18.00 hrs. Even if splitup, sending off 100 men straight to Nijmegen they MIGHT arrive earlier than Henke, but would not be able to set up solid defense positions against the arrival of Henke AND Graebner. Digging trenches for men and a possible 6pdr AT gun and filling up the sandbags TAKES TIME. Hence the signal "position secured" is HOURS away from "position arrived". In fact as frost let the SS pass under his noses, you might as well blame Frost for the failure. Instead what to think of the SIXTY (yes 60) sherman tanks that were in and around Nijmegen  as per Battle order on 19th and 20 th sept and DID NOT PUSH THROUGH over the Nijmegen bridge ?!? For 18 hours! If 6 tanks can make it over the Nijmegen bridge against the background of shooting SS and Guards infantry..then why not 16 ?? or 36 ?? or indeed 60 ?? YOu say they were held up in fights "all over the Groesbeek heights" fighting what ? Old men and children ? SO why were they WASTED there ? Never asked yourself this ? Where were the 54 shermans of Horrocks ?
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  40. drinking...TEA ?!?!
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  41. Maybe his cellphone didn't work ? Or the doves to deliver messages weren't dropped ? Or the chain on his bicycle was off, and he didn't feel like walking up and down 2x 15 miles ? maybe he was fully occupied with many other tasks and attention points ? hmm. you know, being a general and so on... (sarcasm)
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  42. John Cornell "why didnt gavin check.." Because it was 1944..decades before cellphones and internet. Telephones didnt work (cut lines) so they either had to be installed (ropes and ropes of lines) or the walkietalkies didnt work or its signals were obstructed (germans were no idiots in that field). And once you GIVE an order , you EXPECt it to be done. And given it to be hostile territory, you don't get alarmed if there  aint a messenger or wardove or indian smoke message coming from the extreme ends of your troops to say what has or hasn't been achieved...in the VERY FIRST hours of the day. cock-up ; yes..extraordinary cock ups ? No. That is warfare , and many more units involved in the MG project made them... Question is was it crucial to the entire success?; answer no. It didnot matter GIVEN all the surge of SS material and troops passing by Frosts battalion, and ultimately Pannerden canal (which is a low running stream !?..and the brits could NOT USE THE SAME CROSSING POINT towards germany a week later ?!??!).
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  43. John Cornell So the XXXcrps tanks split up all over the place (I guess attacking german TANKS??!??) is the fault of Gavin ? (twat)
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  44. John Cornell Compare the experiences the same paratroopers had on Dday: contact with units were lost; assumed DEAD or surrendered. What do you do as commander ?? If you have tons of men to spare; send other groups. If you DONt  (and something and you yourself tells us there wasn't enough men to do all the first moment chores) it depends on the time, priorities, spare men that report to be idle, etc. There is chaos . ALWAYS. Maybe less then the shit in normandy.. but make no mistake; the landing zones on DDAy were yes in the dark, but were in the hinterland where normally NO GERMAN soldiers were stationed..they TOO marched in to seek the paratroopers. In Groesbeek too, the germans were THINLY dispersed...BUT the daylight made IMMEDIATELY clear the US landed there and so german reinforcements are QUICKER to go in the right direction. At least gavin had to be prepared for that.And that TAKES TIME and ATTENTION. Compare it to the british airborne at Oosterbeek; only ONE battalion was lucky to reach the bridge ramp (and NOT CONTROL IT)..ALL the others FAILED. And also Frost could NOT GET IN TOUCH  with Hartenstein HQ. (Only a relay to the next closest team that evening, but when those were killed/routed..the next days communication was lost).
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  45. ***** 101st: lost Son bridge...101st did not repair the bridge.They can't.  result: FAIL. Only because there were some engineers in BELGIUM that had bailey (or pontoon) bridges  the XXX cld advance TWELVE HOURS ?!?! later. (12 hrs is very very very very looooooong time to build a stupid 30 mtrs bailey bridge...there you see a logistical fail of Horrocks..who was still in Belgium at that time ..). Had Nijmegen bridge been situated next to Eindhoven, then XXXcprs wld also take the bridge if 82nd had not yet taken it.. (WHY ? because the damn bridge is then CLOSER to XXXcrps starting point...simple logistics). Nimegen bridge blown up ?No, to the credit of 82nd 8and dutch resistance). Nijmegen rail bridge? Blown. Arnhem rail bridge ? BLOWN UP. Arnhem bridge blown up ? Not yet.  but blocked by wreckage. Ultimately BLOWN UP by british !
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  46. German fallschirmjäger success at Belgian fort(complex) Eben Emael...but Kurt Student's Fallschirmjägers LOST it at the operations around The Hague at three small airfields Ypenburg, Ockenburg and Valkenburg. All lost against growing resistance of dutch infantry, inexperienced and with obsolete rifles..yet they won. Because of TIME and because of ARTILLERY. That is the lesson Student learned (and at Crete again) Once the paras are localised and STATIC , then more and more numbers of even the poorest quality infantry will overrun your paras. The absolute killer is the artillery and mortars. (At Crete the brits didnot have the influx of more reserves and their artillery was detected by the Stukas (good coordination/communication paras and luftwaffe)..).
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  47. 5:39 escaton? where did I hear that before ? ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dkn6rGh2S9s
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  48. THREE HOURS !!!
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  49.  @TheImperatorKnight  The battle was lost at the Looveer and Pannerden ferry points... :D (or rather..the battle was anyhow lost during planning and Brereton strangled it, but a surprising fetching against all odds victory from the claws of inevitability was strangled by ignoring the Looveer and Pannerden ferry points..). Gavin could not perform logistical miracles... (or..how to expect a bridge (and banks) control by the first wave of paratrooper men in hours and deal with a steady flow of germans, when the whole XXXcrps couldnt deal with the same steady flow of germans inside Nijmegen,on the bridge and after the bridge in 2 days..) It is plain and simple.
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  50. the list of sources...ufff.. but hey " Mosley, O. "Fascism: 100 Questions Asked and Answered." Black House Publishing, Kindle 2019." O. Mosley ? in 2019 ? not 1938 ?
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