Comments by "Nick Danger" (@nickdanger3802) on "TIKhistory"
channel.
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"At the request of the British War Cabinet, on April 19, 1944,[22] General Eisenhower directed Crossbow attacks to have absolute priority over all other air operations, including "wearing down German industry" and civilian morale[23] "for the time being", which he confirmed after the V-1 assault began on the night of June 12/13, 1944 saying to Arthur Tedder "with respect to Crossbow targets, these targets are to take first priority over everything except the urgent requirements of the Overlord [invasion of Normandy] battle; this priority to obtain until we can be certain that we have definitely gotten the upper hand of this particular business".[24] The launches surprised the Allies, who had believed that the earlier attacks on the sites had eliminated the danger. The British, who had not expected German bombing of Britain to resume so late in the war, were especially upset. Some suggested using gas on the launch sites, or even executing German civilians as punishment.[13]
Carl Spaatz, commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USTTAF), responded on June 28[25] to "complain that Crossbow was a 'diversion' from the main task of wearing down the Luftwaffe and bombing German industry" for the Combined Bomber Offensive, and to recommend instead that Crossbow be a secondary priority since "days of bad weather over Germany's industrial targets would still allow enough weight of attack for the rocket sites and the lesser tactical crises."[26]:349 By July 10, Tedder had published a list of Crossbow targets which assigned 30 to RAF Bomber Command, six to the tactical Allied Expeditionary Air Force, and 68 to Spaatz' USSTAF; after which Spaatz again complained,[27]:239 so Eisenhower allowed "spare" bombing of non-Crossbow targets: "Instructions for continuing to make Crossbow targets our first priority must stand, but ... when ... the entire strategic forces cannot be used against Crossbow, we should attack—(a) Aircraft industry, (b) Oil, (c) ball bearing (German): Kugellagerwerke, (d) Vehicular production" (Eisenhower, July 18)."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Crossbow#Bombing_priority
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Before the first V2 hit Britain. USAAF bombing of Peenemunde: 19 July 1944 Three B-17s were lost and 64 were damaged, three P-51s were lost.
4 August 1944 Three B-17s were lost, one was damaged beyond repair and 94 damaged; 2 airmen were KIA, 2 WIA and 40 MIA, 9 P-51s were lost and 1 was damaged beyond repair; 1 pilot was KIA. 25 August 1944 5 B-17s were lost and 75 damaged; 1 airman was KIA, 9 WIA and 45 MIA, 2 P-51s were lost. link below, again
This was semi interesting, again, now it's just tedious, again.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Peenemünde_in_World_War_II
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IWM Tactics and the Cost of Victory in Normandy
"By 1944 Britain was running out of soldiers. The campaigns in the Mediterranean and Far East, the war at sea and the bomber offensive had all drained her manpower reserves. The army that was sent to Normandy lacked for nothing except adequate reserves of fighting troops. Though well supplied with weapons, vehicles and equipment, Second Army could not afford huge losses, militarily or indeed politically. With vast reserves of US manpower now coming on stream, it was vital for Britain's interests and national standing that her field army was strong enough both to engage and defeat the Germans, and then also provide a sustainable army of occupation. Everything had to be done to minimize casualties and preserve the army's fighting strength.
One who understood this only too well was the land forces commander, General Sir Bernard Montgomery. 'Monty' was a controversial leader, criticised by many, as much for his personality as for his handling of the campaign. But his operational methods reflected an acute awareness of the size and limitations of the army under his command. Much of it was untested in action, having spent long years training in the UK. Even his veterans lacked the sort of intense combat experience gained by many German soldiers on the Russian Front. Nor were his men imbued with the political and ideological fanaticism that characterised some German units, particularly Waffen-SS formations."
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An twerp, Ultra and Market Garden "This ferrying activity continued throughout September, and Ultra provided continuous coverage of the German activities while the British failed to seal off their escape route. On 6 September an Ultra message stated that a GAF division and other
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miscellaneous units had already been ferried across and that they were preparing to
increase their activities. An intercept on 8 September “estimated that so far 25,000 men, 350 vehicles and 50 tons of equipment had been ferried across.”44 Ultra continued to
provide almost daily situation reports that detailed the evacuation of the Fifteenth Army.
On the day that Market-Garden commenced, it was estimated that 70,000 men had been
ferried across the Scheldt Estuary and escaped into Holland.45 By the end of the
evacuation on 23 September, a summary stated that 82,000 men, 530 guns, 46,000
vehicles, and 4,000 horses were ferried out of the pocket.46 These numbers are low
compared to those provided by the 21st Army Group G2 Brigadier Bill Williams. In his
intelligence summary on 18 September, he stated that, “probably over 100,000 men had crossed into the Scheldt Peninsula since Antwerp was captured.”47
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a406861.pdf
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