Comments by "Nick Danger" (@nickdanger3802) on "TIKhistory" channel.

  1. 2
  2. 2
  3. 2
  4. 2
  5. 2
  6. 2
  7. 2
  8. 2
  9. 2
  10. 2
  11. 2
  12. 2
  13. 2
  14. 2
  15. 2
  16. 2
  17. RAF on Market "Postponements for one reason or another were frequent and all this time the aircraft and crews were inevitably kept idle, to the openly expressed dismay of those who urged the alternative. In their view the right course was to use all available transport aircraft to maintain supplies to Patton's army, which was the furthest forward, so that he could continue his offensive. It was impossible to do both once the Supreme Commander ruled in favour --192-- of airborne operations. Montgomery had decided on a bold stroke. He would outflank the defences of the 'SIEGFRIED Line' and, leaping over the three natural water barriers, the Maas at Grave, the Waal at Nijmegen and the Neder Rijn at Arnhem, secure positions from which to make a major advance eastwards.' The essential feature of the plan', he notes 'was the laying of a carpet of airborne troops across these waterways. . . . The airborne carpet and the bridgehead force were to be provided by the Allied Airborne Corps consisting of two American and one British Airborne Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade'.1 The crossings of the Maas and the Waal were to be secured by two American parachute divisions, the 101st and the 82nd, that at Arnhem by the British 1st Airborne Division. The operation, known as 'MARKET', was complicated by the fact that Transport Command could not take the whole division to its destination in one lift, and it was unable to do so for the simple but compelling reason that it did not have enough aircraft. Whether or not there were sufficient transport aircraft, of which the bulk were manufactured in the United States of America, to meet the needs of air transport all over the world is a question which cannot be answered here. All that can be said is that their allocation was made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff whose duty it was to survey the war in every theatre, and who did not place at Leigh-Mallory's disposal enough squadrons to take all three airborne divisions to their objectives in one lift. Those who had furthest to go, the British 1st Airborne, and who were to drop on the third defensive river line were allocated fewer than were given to the other two divisions. This was unavoidable in the circumstances, for the bridges at Grave and Nijmegen had to be first captured if that at Arnhem was to be of value to the prospective invaders of Germany." pages 192-193 PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RAF-III/UK-RAF-III-9.html
    2
  18. 2
  19. 2
  20. 2
  21. 2
  22. 2
  23. 2
  24. 2
  25. 2
  26. 2
  27. 2
  28. 2
  29. 2
  30. 2
  31. 2
  32. 2
  33. 2
  34. 2
  35. 2
  36. 2
  37. 2
  38. 2
  39. 2
  40. 2
  41. 2
  42. 2
  43. 2
  44. 2
  45. 2
  46. 2
  47. 2
  48. 2
  49. 2
  50. 2