Comments by "Nick Danger" (@nickdanger3802) on "TIKhistory"
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@davemac1197 "Browning and Brigadier-General Gavin, the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, were in agreement that the priorities around Nijmegen were first the vast area of high ground known as the Groesbeek Heights, followed by the bridge at Grave, the three smaller bridges over the Maas-Waal Canal, and finally the very large bridge at Nijmegen. Browning also told Gavin that he was not to make any attempt to move towards Nijmegen until the Heights had been secured; Gavin agreed though he later felt confident enough in his plan to allow one battalion to head for the bridge immediately after landing. The Groesbeek Heights were certainly important as they served as the Division's main drop zone and dominated the entire area, and so there is no question that the position of the 82nd Airborne Division, not to mention the right flank of the 2nd British Army when they arrived, would have been placed under considerable pressure if the area were to remain in enemy hands. Even so, the priorities of any airborne formation has to be the capture of its ultimate objectives, i.e. the bridges, and all other concerns are entirely secondary. Browning defended his decision long after the War, but it was a great mistake not to attach a higher priority to Nijmegen Bridge as, without it, the 1st Airborne Division would be cut-off behind two large rivers and 13 miles of hostile territory."
Pegasus Archive Browning
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"The location of these zones, however, was a matter for the Royal Air Force and not the 1st Airborne Division, and Air Vice Marshal Hollinghurst, the commander of 38 Group, one of the air force formations which was to transport the Division into battle and supply it thereafter, refused to drop paratroopers any closer to Arnhem. His reasoning was that after the troops had been dropped, his aircraft could only begin the return to their bases by banking left, in a northerly direction; to have banked right would have led them into the path of the 82nd Airborne Division's aircraft returning from Nijmegen. If the aircraft approached too close to Arnhem, their return flight path would lead them directly over the top of a very large flak installation on the nearby Deelen Airfield, and to fly over this would result in severe losses which Transport Command could not afford. For this reason, the air force insisted on dropping all of the 1st Airborne Division roughly eight miles from Arnhem."
Pegasus Archive In Depth 3. Recipe for Disaster
http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/frames.htm
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"On 20 September, D+3, he (General Ridgway) was moving through the battlefield near Eindhoven. He was alone but for his jeep, driver, and two aides.
[W]e came up with the advance elements of British armor. There a junior officer stopped me and told me I could go no further because the road in front was swept with small arms fire. So we stopped a minute to watch how good our British comrades would take out this resistance. They had the muzzles of their tank guns pointing down the road toward where the enemy was supposed to be, but not a shot was being fired. It was a demonstration of caution. . . .I had seen it, and dealt with it many times before. . . .I couldn’t order this tank commander to move on down the road. So, after waiting about forty minutes, and seeing no visible effort being made to outflank this resistance. . .we (Author’s note: “we” means Ridgway and his aides) started walking down the ditch along the side of the road. We went a mile and a half, perhaps, with every sense alert, but not a shot was fired at us. . . .We moved on until we found General Max Taylor at the CP of the 101st Division." page 26 OPERATION MARKET GARDEN: CASE STUDY FOR ANALYZING SENIOR LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a500814.pdf
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