Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Imperial War Museums"
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'Utter defeat of Empire forces in Asia?' Read about XIV Army and the defeat of the U-Go Offensive.
Then read about the Bengal Famine, but the facts, not the revisionist myth. The Bengal Famine had a number of causes, among which were the number of refugees from Japanese held areas, the inability to import food from those same areas, stockpiling by hoarders and, perhaps worst of all, the Bengal administration, which tried to minimise the crisis. The worst that could be said of Churchill was that he should have known what was taking place, but didn't. After all, in 1943, he had little else to worry about.
You could also add the refusal of FDR to allow the transfer of merchant shipping, by the way. What is without dispute, except by those who choose to blame Churchill for everything since the Black Death, is that once he did find out, he transferred food distribution to the British Indian Army, and had grain convoys diverted from Australia to India.
I appreciate, of course, that revisionists won't accept any of this, as it doesn't suit the agenda. It is, however, factually accurate.
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@nukni4225 So it appears that you lack the integrity to confirm that your first post was entirely false? I rather expected that that would be the way you would respond.
You aren't really worth the time of any honest person, but to correct one or two of your additional falsehoods:
First lie, Churchill was not in any government position when Britain & France declared war, and hadn't been since 1929.
Second lie, he was not a serviceman when imprisoned by the Boers, and was not asked to give any 'word of honour' to anyone.
Third lie, he stole nothing from Garibaldi. Garibaldi died when Churchill was four years old. Churchill admired Garibaldi, as I said earlier.
Fourth lie, that he forged the signature on his own paintings. Perhaps to be fair that isn't so much a lie as merely an infantile comment.
Fifth lie, his speeches were, in the main, recorded after the war, but their texts were recorded at the time in 'Hansard,' often read out on the radio by BBC newsreaders, and usually printed in full within a day or two of them being made in national newspapers throughout the Empire. Nothing was edited or changed.
Fifth lie, he was never called a 'war hero' but he served at the Battle of Omdurman, left the army to become a journalist in 1899, but later commanded a Scots regiment on the Western Front for nine months in WW1. You may not consider serving in the military in wartime gallant, but frankly your opinion is of no merit.
So yes, I do indeed call you a liar.
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@Simon_Nonymous My pleasure. Ernie has always escaped criticism for his actions, which appear to have been based upon his anglophobia rather than any actual alternative strategy. To give some idea of how catastrophic his behaviour was, in November, 1941, 7 merchant ships were lost in convoy, and 6 lost when sailing independently. For December, the figures were 6 & 17.
After Paukenschlag began, and King refused to institute convoys, the losses in convoy from January to June 1942 were 6, 10, 3, 3, 14, and 14, yet the losses of independents, almost all off the East Coast of the US, were, for the same months, 43, 61, 89, 78, 115, and 122.
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@nigeh5326 The technology, in the form of the depth charge, asdic, and HF/DF, already existed. WW2 German boats such as the Type II, VII, & IX, were basically nothing more than developments of late WW1 designs.
Moreover, expansion of the U-boat fleet only really became a serious option after the fall of France. Prior to that, whatever fleet existed was, in effect, trapped in German bases with the only way into the Atlantic the long and dangerous voyage around the north of Scotland, seriously reducing the operational duration of the boats.
In effect, an expansion of the U-boat fleet prior to the war not only warns the British of what to expect, but assumes that in 1938 the Germans already assumed what the strategic situation would be in late 1940.
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@pacificostudios What 'allied shipping in the Mediterranean?' Merchant vessels rarely used it, except for supply runs to Malta, and the threat to Malta had largely dissipated after Pedestal in August, 1942, and Stoneage in November, 1942.
Crete, Sardinia, and Corsica were as relevant as the Channel Islands to the overall prosecution of the war, Crete in particular being, at best, a Pyrrhic victory which effectively destroyed the German paratroop arm, which thereafter was used as a ground force only.
Taking Corsica would have forced Germany to fortify the Provence more than they did.' Why? Certainly to nothing like the extent that the Germans were obliged to occupy Italy, and send their troops there.
An assault on Norway would still have involved moving Allied resources back to Britain from the Mediterranean, and the benefit to the Soviet Union was likely to have been slight. The distances involved, and the crossing of the North Sea, in Autumn & Winter, would increase the hazardous nature of such an operation. Indeed, hitler's fixation on Norway as the Zone of Destiny' resulted in 350,000 being based there at the time of surrender in May, 1945. Why would the Allies attempt such an operation when the same result, that of keeping a large number of German units away from the main battlefront, by means of a deception plan, Operation Fortitude North?
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