Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Military History Visualized"
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@MoneyIsSilver 'The Royal Navy was already getting picked apart by the Luftwaffe, though, even before Dunkirke.' Really? In the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser. Indeed, the Luftwaffe only managed to put a torpedo bomber into to service in mid 1942. By September 1940, the RN had been 'picked apart' in your words, to the extent that, entering the war with 193 destroyers, there were 'only' some 182 destroyers listed as operational or refitting in the RN Pink List for 16 September.
The Luftwaffe, untrained in anti-shipping techniques, had failed spectacularly at Dunkirk, managing to sink only four of the 41 destroyers which were the backbone of the evacuation fleet, whilst the RN, ordered to evacuate 40,000 specialist troops, brought out 323,000 men.
Actually, whilst the Luftwaffe did have air superiority over the Channel, largely because Fighter Command pilots were ordered to stay over the mainland to maximise their chances of survival, Germany never had the remotest hope of transporting an invasion force across it, given their almost total lack of escort vessels and assault ships.
By the way, whilst U-Boats did achieve a degree of success in the wider Atlantic, this was because RN escorts had been temporarily withdrawn to form the Admiralty's massive anti-invasion forces, and had precisely nothing to do with the Luftwaffe. U-Boats did not operate either in, or through, the Channel, because it was something of a death trap. Three boats were sent to operate there in late 1939. They, and their crews, are still there.
'Churchill - thought the Brits were fucked.' You think so? How was it then that, in August 1940, he was confident enough to send a large troop convoy to North Africa? Look up Operation Apology for further information.
In short, stop believing in myths and buy a proper book on the subject.
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No. The real reason was that the Royal Navy had, and retained, total control of Home Waters, and in particular of the Channel. The Germans did convert around 2,000 barges into rudimentary troop transports. These were to be towed, in pairs and at little more than walking pace, across the Channel by tugs and trawlers.
At the time, the German navy had six operational destroyers and a similar number of large torpedo boats to escort them, with around thirteen operational S Boats. All that the Royal Navy had within five hours steaming of the Channel was around seventy light cruisers and destroyers, supported by some five hundred smaller warships.
'I hear the argument a lot that they didn't have enough landing ships to effectively transport troops.' If that is the only argument you hear against Sealion, then you obviously haven't been listening hard enough!
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@MoneyIsSilver Nonsense. That didn't happen at Dunkirk, it didn't happen in the latter half of 1940, it didn't happen to the East Coast convoys, and it didn''t even happen in the Battle of Crete in May, 1941 where, despite total air supremacy, the axis were unable to land ground troops on the island, and one troop convoy, heading for Maleme, was annihilated.
Air power became crucial later in the war, but not as early as 1940.
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Operation Mercury? That was the one where the Royal Navy prevented any axis reinforcements reaching Crete by sea until the ships were diverted to evacuation duties, wasn't it? The one where one convoy was annihilated, and the second returned to Crete.
Dunkirk? 'Ran them off?' Do you mean when the Royal Navy was ordered to evacuate 40,000 technical specialists, and actually lifted 338,000 troops? When, of 40 RN destroyers involved, four only were lost to air attack? Where, in fact, 235 vessels were lost, of which 142 were small boats simply abandoned at the end of the operation, and 27 were vessels smaller than tugs? Where, of 373 allied warships ranging from MTBs to a cruiser, 39 were lost, 7 of which were to collision or grounding? Simply quoting inaccurate figures out of context merely discredits any argument you may think you have.
As usual for a Sealion fan, you then indulge in all the 'would haves' about the mighty Luftwaffe. In 1940, the Luftwaffe had not been trained in anti-shipping operations, hence the failure (contrary to your view, of course) at Dunkirk. Moreover, the Luftwaffe lacked an operational torpedo bomber until mid 1942. Indeed, in the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than a light cruiser.
Even their own commanders, Wolfram von Richthoven & Oskar Dinort, believed that protecting an invasion force was beyond their capabilities. To put your absurd nonsense about sinking 'half the Home Fleet' into perspective, the RN in September, 1940, had around 70 destroyers and light cruisers in bases within five hours' steaming of Dover, backed up by around five hundred smaller warships. There were a further 40 or so destroyers also in Home Waters. I haven't, of course, mentioned the Home Fleet, as most of it was at Rosyth, guarding against a potential sortie by (actually, non-existent) German heavy ships.
The Admiralty, of course, had concluded that faster, smaller, vessels with quick firing weapons were better equipped to deal with the Rhine barges towed by tugs which passed for the German invasion fleet, and which the Kriegsmarine estimated would require eleven days, and nights, to land the first nine divisions. Nights, by the way, are when the RN could operate, and when your mighty Luftwaffe couldn't. So, your 'after the Luftwaffe sank half of the home fleet the rest WOULD HAVE withdrawn' is wide of the mark as well.
Ju52? You mean the 220 or so which was all the Luftwaffe had operational in late August, 1940, after they had not replaced their heavy losses in the Low Countries? You must account for further losses during the paratroop dropping stage of the invasion, although possibly not that many as the Germans only had just under 4000 paratroopers available at the time. Supplying the 800 tons per division that was the minimum a German infantry division required when in action would be a further challenge, of course, but not much of one as it presupposes that any of these formations managed to land in the first place, although I assume you will say that they 'would have.'
Resupply by ships during the day? Which ships? The Germans had a small number of coasters which were to be used to tow barges, but few proper supply ships, and where would these supplies be landed from these non-existent ships in any case?
'The Luftwaffe even this early in the war was very effective against ships , especially this close to their bases.' Actually, close to their bases or not, quite the opposite is the case. How else do you explain their failure during 'Dynamo?'
Instead of indulging your wish fulfilment fantasies about what the Luftwaffe 'would have' done, perhaps you might read up about what the Luftwaffe actually did, or more precisely, didn't/couldn't do, in 1940? Then, instead of talking about 'sinking half the Home Fleet' you might read up on precisely how large the Royal Navy in Home Waters was at the time.
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Which 'boats' might they have been? The British had taken almost all the available boats. As one single example, when it became clear that Antwerp was about to fall, the destroyer HMS Brilliant removed 26 merchant ships, 50 tugs, and 600 barges from the port.
Immediately after Dunkirk, the Germans were no more equipped to attempt an invasion than the British army was to oppose one. Moreover, the war in France did not end on 4 June. The rest of France was still unconquered, and the British were still evacuating troops from western ports (over 192,000 of them) until 25 June. The very reason von Rundstedt stopped the tanks on the Aa canal was to have them serviced and repaired to be ready for the second stage of the campaign.
In short, there were no ships or boats available. Why do you think the eventual German plan involved, almost entirely, converted river barges towed by tugs?
Finally, of course, whilst the post-Dunkirk British army was, briefly, in disarray, the Royal Navy was certainly not. Any invading force needed to find a credible way past it, and the Germans never came remotely close to determining one.
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Then explain the fact that, by September, 1940, the Germans had assembled 200 transports, 2100 converted barges, 400 tugs, and over 1100 motor boats in French, Dutch, & Belgian ports. Add to that the nine infantry divisions assembled to form the first wave, supported by a weak parachute division, the eight divisions assembled for the second wave, and the six divisions alloted to the third wave.
Then explain the numbers of planning meetings held during the summer, involving Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Halder, & Raeder.
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@sebclot9478 Actually, I probably am as good, or at least as knowledgeable, as I think I am. Happily, my publishers and readers do rather seem to agree.
1) My reference to Compass and Beda Fomm was simply to educate you concerning what actually happened to the (largely infantry, and badly equipped) Italian army in Libya.
2). The US never assumed convoy escort duties from the British, least of all from 1942. In January, 1942, the US Navy proposed a Mid Ocean Escort Force of 14 Groups. These were to consist of 15 US destroyers, 27 RN/RCN destroyers, and 101 RN/RCN Flower Class corvettes. Initially, there were 5 US Groups, made up of US destroyers and RN/RCN corvettes, 5 British, and 4 Canadian groups.By winter 1942-3, the US had withdrawn from the Allied Mid-Ocean Escort Groups almost entirely. Two US Groups, A1 & A2, were disbanded when their destroyers were re-assigned, and A4 & A5 had their US destroyers replaced by RN ones, at which point they became British Groups B6 & B7. The one remaining US Group, A3, actually consisted of two US coastguard cutters, with RN/RCN Flowers. When the cutters were reassigned, A3 became the Canadian Group C5. Thus, by early 1943, there were 12 Mid Ocean Escort Groups, B1-B7 and C1-C5. US vessels operating in the Atlantic by then were working between the US and the Mediterranean, not in the North Atlantic.
3). I did ask you to provide details of convoys which sailed to Britain from the Far East via the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. Where are those details?
4). Have you actually read Mein Kampf? The Soviet Union was, first and last, Hitler's main target. You might perhaps read the reasons for this in 'The Last Days of Adolf Hitler' by Trevor-Roper.
5). Perhaps you might explain how, having marched through Spain, captured Gibraltar, and then withdrawn, what presumably would an isolated German garrison do to maintain itself? Eat the Barbary Apes, perhaps?
6). That is your opinion of Bismarck. The flaws I have described earlier still existed. Bismarck's only advantage over the RN's Nelsons and KGVs was her speed. In a situation where she was obliged to engage, she was outclassed.
7). Do you not remember posting 'The fact that I mentioned ONLY the Bismark by name doesn't mean that it would have been the only German ship to participate in such an operation. I can't believe I actually have to explain that to you.' I merely responded by telling you exactly what naval resources were available to the Germans at the time, as clearly you didn't know for yourself. I chose September, 1940 as even you could look it up without much problem, as the resources available to both sides are well documented. You can choose any month in WW2 to suit yourself, as things hardly got better for the Kriegsmarine, after the punishment it received during the Norwegian campaign. Are you even aware how totally outmatched the German surface fleet was, throughout the war?
8). & 9).Of course the British weren't responding to German provocation, as there was no such major U-Boat construction programme. My contention is that, had there been such a programme, the British would have responded, just as they had to the Kaiser's actual fleet expansion before WW1. By the way, if you think there was a 'scaling back' explain these figures :-
U-Boat Construction by Month :-
1939, Sept. 1, Oct. 0, Nov. 2, Dec 3.
1940, Jan. 1, Feb, 1, March, 2, April, 3, May, 3, June, 3, July, 3, Aug, 5, Sept, 7, Oct, 8, Nov, 9, Dec. 9.
1941, Jan. 11, Feb. 9, March, 11, April, 14, May, 19, June, 15, July, 19, Aug, 19, Sept. 15, Oct. 24, Nov. 24, Dec. 22.
1942, Jan. 15, Feb. 16, Mar, 18, April, 17, May, 20, June, 21, July, 21, Aug. 21, Sept. 19, Oct, 23, Nov. 24, Dec. 23.
1943, Jan, 22, Feb, 21, Mar, 27, April, 18, May, 26, June 25, July, 26, Aug. 21, Sept, 21, Oct. 27. Nov. 25, Dec. 31.
1944, Jan. 20, Feb. 19, Mar. 23, April, 23, May 19, June, 11, July 15, Aug. 15, Sept. 20, Oct. 16, Nov. 22, Dec, 27.
1945, Jan, 37, Feb, 21. Mar. 26.
Where exactly is your imaginary 'scaling back?'
10). Oh, so now Gibraltar is not to be attacked until AFTER North Africa, Suez, and Malta have been conquered? By the way, Suez is in North Africa.
There are many excellent academic studies on the subject of WW2, and in particular of the period leading up to Barbarossa. Have you ever thought of reading one or two, before you wander off into further silliness?
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@sebclot9478 Whether I am arrogant or not is irrelevant. The specialists (usually retired military men, in the most recent case a Rear-Admiral & a Major General) examine my submissions, ask questions if they have them, and only after that are the proofs passed on to the publisher. All I would say is that reviews by academics and military historians have been overwhelmingly position. Clearly, such people lack your enormous breadth of wisdom and understanding. Either that, or my views are credible, and yours are somewhat lacking.
You were the one who brought Suez convoys up, but now you choose to disregard them. Very wise, as there is nothing there to support you.
Of course Hitler's primary enemy was the Soviet Union. Clearly you haven't read Trevor-Roper's analysis of the reasons for the initial preventative attack on France. You should, as it explains how, despite Hitler's contempt for Kaiser Bill's two front war, he subsequently placed Germany into a worse situation from 1941 onwards.
Explain to me why, when Germany was seeking to defeat the largest maritime power on earth, :-
'It doesn’t matter if the German surface fleet was outclassed. Again, raw data with no understanding of what any of it means to the overall picture.'
By 'raw data,' I assume you mean 'facts and figures?' I can well understand from the nature of your argument, such as it is, your urgent need to disregard facts and figures. Explain to me what the raw data does actually mean, if you would be so kind.
'Maybe the British would have responded to U-boat building program. Maybe not. I guess we will never know for sure. And what exactly do you think a scaling back would look like?' No. You explain to me why, when the British had responded strenuously to the Kaiser's naval expansion before WW1, they would simply have ignored a similar U-boat expansion programme in the 1930s?
In short, nothing that you write has any grounding in the real military, and particularly the naval, situation of 1939-1940. As I said, you are wise to ignore facts, as they dismantle your musings even more effectively than I have.
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Small problem here. The Kriegsmarine had no suitable vessels anything like the Landing Ships & Landing Craft that the allies were subsequently to use for their many successful assault landings in Europe & the Pacific. Even to plan a crossing of the Channel, they were reduced to using converted Rhine barges towed by tugs, trawlers or coasters. Moreover, aside from having no suitable transports, the Kriegsmarine was also lacking in surface warships. By September, 1940, they had been reduced, in terms of operational warships, to one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, seven destroyers, seven torpedo boats (similar in size to British escort destroyers), and about a dozen fleet minesweepers.
Furthermore, the main British naval bases at the time for the Home Fleet were at Rosyth & Scapa Flow, with a number of modern cruisers and destroyers in the Humber.
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If the British had 'no equipped army left' how did they manage to send a troop convoy (The 'Apology' Convoy) to North Africa to reinforce the Western Desert Force, in August?
In September, 1940, the Germans had, after their losses during the summer, 3500-4000 paratroops, at most.
'Without air cover, the Royal Navy would have not been able to conduct operations in the south.' Why not? The RN had successfully carried out the Dunkirk evacuation, when the Luftwaffe demonstrated how unprepared it was for operations against shipping, and especially against warships. In the whole of the war, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers. In September, 1940, the RN had twice that number within five hours of the Straits, supported by light cruisers and around 500 smaller warships.
As with all Sealion enthusiasts, you place heavy reliance on 'would haves' rather than facts.
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Would you suggest that the Germans in June 1944 had anything like the naval resources available to them that the British had had in September, 1940? Moreover, are you aware of the overwhelming strength of the Allied navies in 1944, and the almost total irrelevance of the tiny German Navy in 1940?
The leadership of the British army in 1940 hardly matters, as the most they were likely to have needed to do would have been to organise the herding up from the beaches of any half-drowned German soldiers who managed to struggle ashore from their barges, give them a warm drink, and send them off to prison camps.
Halifax, by the way, had a brief period of significance in the early days of the Churchill premiership, but declined significantly after the successful Dynamo, Cycle, & Aerial evacuations. He was shunted off to the United States as British Ambassador in December, 1940, by the way.
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How exactly would that have been 'better way to go?' Historically, the axis struggled to maintain the forces they actually had in North Africa, firstly because of the RN & RAF, and secondly because of the lack of harbour facilities.
The Germans did increase U-Boat production, from an average of four per month between Sept 1939 and December, 1940, to an average of around 22 per month thereafter, leading to 37 in January, 1945. Attempts to prefabricate boats, as the US yards did with escort carriers and freighters, came to nothing. The Type XXIs, when the parts arrived at the construction yards, were found to have gaps between sections built at different locations, and the boats required to be more or less re-built from scratch.
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Very few historians would agree with you. Doenitz regarded the calculations of von Holtzendorff, Kaiser Bill's Chief of Naval Staff in 1917, that in order to starve Britain into submission, 600,000 tons of shipping per month needed to be sunk, as still appropriate. After December, 1941, of course, this figure needed to be increased significantly. Between September, 1939 and December, 1941, would you care to estimate how many times this figure was achieved? Actually, none. the average monthly figure for the period was 211718. In four of the months, the tonnage total was below 100,000 and only twice (June & October, 1940) did it exceed (just) 350,000 In point of fact, the Kriegsmarine never came anywhere near to success in WW2. Certainly, not as near as the Kaiser's navy did in 1917.
What is your source for your absurd claim that 'Britain at one point was down to less than a weeks worth of fuel' by the way?
The rest of your post is simply foolish or, at best, ill-informed, as you seem to be unaware of the absolute supremacy of the Royal Navy in Home Waters at the time.
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They were to be towed into the Channel by tugs or trawlers. The towing vessel would be attached to a powered barge, which would have a second, unpowered, barge behind it. These three vessel units were to be grouped in cumbersome box formations, and would proceed at five knots or so. When (if?) they reached their landing beaches, small motor launches would push the unpowered barges onto them.
Whilst this was happening, the Royal Navy had, by mid-late September, 1940, seventy destroyers and light cruisers within five hours of Dover, with around five hundred smaller warships following up in support.
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@sebclot9478 The Italians had possessions in Libya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. Other than Libya, these were cut off entirely from re-supply, and eliminated completely by November, 1941, after the Battle of Gondar, with 230,000 Italian and colonial troops surrendering.
1). The main Italian forces in Libya were annihilated by Operation Compass, ending with the Battle of Beda Fomm on 6-7 February, 1941. That was, of course, why Hitler was obliged to send a small German force to shore up what was left of Italian Libya.
2). The US only even appeared in North Africa in November, 1942. Italian losses during the period to the end of the campaign were 2.1 million tons of merchant shipping, 83 warships, totalling 195,100 tons, and 83 submarines. Of the surface ship losses, 161,000 were sunk by British & Commonwealth forces, and 33,900 by US forces. Would you care to re-assess your opinion of the extent of the American role?
3). The Suez Canal was simply not used by the British to a significant extent in the early part of WW2. Merchant shipping went by the Cape route, which was longer but safer. The axis had significant aerial forces in the Mediterranean area, which made the passage of merchantmen dangerous. Simply read any academic study of the campaign. Better still, tell me the identity of a single British convoy which sailed to Britain through the Suez Canal during that period. Good luck with that!
4). Perhaps, but the fact is that they didn't, and certainly weren't willing to after June, 1941.
5). I have already explained the situation of Spain in 1939-1940. I suggest you read up on the immediate aftermath of the Civil War to educate yourself. Do you seriously think that Germany could invade Spain in order to capture Gibraltar, then simply pack up and go home? Seriously? I always find the entertaining opinions of those who think German resources were inexhaustible quite fascinating.
6). Good luck with using Bismarck in late 1940 or early 1941, as she wasn't even declared operational until May, 1941. In point of fact, Bismarck was very conservative in design. Three major obsolete features being her four main turrets, resulting in excessive length and therefore displacement, her more or less useless 5.9 inch low angle secondary armament, and most important of all her long outdated incremental armour, when other navies had moved to the superior US conceived all or nothing pattern. Still, you can't expect much more of what was essentially an improved Baden, I suppose.
7). You need to explain it to me. In September, 1940, the Germans had only one operational heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, and ten or so operational destroyers or large torpedo boats. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been damaged during the Norwegian campaign, and weren't even operational again until November, 1940. Please tell me which other ships, again?
8).& 9). I actually wrote, 'Build more U-Boats? I assume that, as these are being built, presumably in the pre-war period, you expect the British to sit back, say 'I wonder why the Germans are building U-Boats?' and not expand their own escort production programme?' I know exactly the nature of the German U-Boat programme between 1939 & 1945. As you would have grasped had you actually read the above, I was referring to earlier reference to a 'scaling back' of the U-Boat war, which didn't actually happen by the way. The point you seem unable to grasp here is that U-Boat construction could only be aimed at one target, and the British, dependent on imports for survival, would act accordingly.
10). Sorry, I had rather lost interest by that stage, so fantastical was your post. Please look up the full extent of the shore batteries which existed on Gibraltar at that time, and then read up on Force H and DF13, both based on Gibraltar. In September, 1940, these consisted of one battleship, one battlecruiser, one carrier, and fifteen destroyers. When you have done that, tell me which forces were available across the Straits which could successfully have overcome these defences.
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