Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Military History Visualized"
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The British were not, and never (except for a short period in WW1) have been, a major military power on land. The BEF, though the only fully mechanised army in the world at the time, was tiny, as the other reply has already explained.
The difference between the Soviet Union and Britain should be obvious. If you have any serious intentions of invading an island nation protected by the largest navy in existence, you really need a significant navy of your own to have even a ghost of a chance of succeeding.
Churchill wasn't 'insistent on the United States joining the war' by the way, as he had no authority to insist that the USA do anything. He was, however, quite rightly trying to secure the support of the world's greatest industrial power. Fortunately, President Roosevelt was wise enough to realise that supporting support for the only European democracy still in arms against nazi Germany was in the long term interests of the United States.
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@sebclot9478 The British weren't in South Africa. In 1941, they had substantial forces in NORTH Africa. Moreover, historically, the Italian Navy struggled to maintain supply levels to the smallish axis forces in North Africa, because of the inconvenient presence of the RN & RAF in the Mediterranean, combined with the serious lack of port facilities in the region.
The Suez Canal was of little importance in the first half of WW2, largely because British convoys went round the Cape. Supplies for 8th Army were landed at the southern end of the canal and moved by rail. The Canal itself was used almost entirely by warships sailing to join or to leave the Mediterranean Fleet, although often these used the Mediterranean via Gibraltar, as did Malta supply convoys.
As the Italian navy was, historically, seriously hamstrung by lack of fuel, and rarely, in the case of the heavy ships, risked action, your Gibraltar option is not credible. Moreover, Franco was never in a position to join the Axis, as Spain relied on US food aid to stave off mass starvation, and FDR had already made el Caudillo well aware that the day Spain did join the Axis was the day this aid stopped. Furthermore, have you actually considered the logistics problems facing a German force passing through Spain even to get to Gibraltar? Bismarck was sunk, by the way, in May, 1941, so is irrelevant to the issue, even if one warship built to a semi-obsolete design could make any meaningful contribution to anything.
Build more U-Boats? I assume that, as these are being built, presumably in the pre-war period, you expect the British to sit back, say 'I wonder why the Germans are building U-Boats?' and not expand their own escort production programme?
Sorry, what you propose is far from 'easy.' It is fantasy based on a lack of knowledge.
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There wasn't really much of a Kreigsmarine left after the Norwegian campaign, where RN submarines had achieved considerable success. Gneisenau was torpedoed on 20 June by HMS Clyde, and under repair until November. On her way back to Germany, one of her escorts, the torpedo boat Luchs, was sunk by HMS Swordfish. Deutchland was torpedoed by HMS Spearfish on 11 April, 1940, and under repair until April, 1941. Karlsruhe was sunk by HMS Truant on 9 April, 1940. Before Norway, Leipzig had been damaged by HMS Salmon in December, 1939, and was never fully repaired, and Nurnberg was damaged at the same time, although repaired by August, 1940.
Add to that further losses: Graf Spee, Konigsberg, Blucher, ten destroyers sunk at Narvik, and a further two bombed and sunk by (German) aircraft, and the German naval cupboard was alarmingly bare.
One thing, though. Don't try sending submarines into the Channel. The Germans sent three in late 1939, and they are still there.
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