Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Knowledgia"
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@brianmacc1934 Not quite. The Royal Navy certainly began gathering resources from 20 May, in the event of evacuation being necessary, but on 22 May, 1940, the British were intending to support the French 1st Army in any attempt to break out and regain contact with the main French forces. This, the 'Weygand Plan' had initially been ordered by Gamelin, but was cancelled by Weygand, and then belatedly re-ordered, by which time German infantry had caught up with their armoured spearheads. Moreover, the plan was known to General Billotte, commander of 1st Army, but not to Gort, and Billotte himself died in a car crash on 23 May. His successor, Blanchard, took over on the same day, but failed to co-ordinate with his subordinate, Gort, leaving Gort with little or no idea of what he was expected to attempt.
Gort actually made the decision late on 25 May, when he diverted his 5th Division from an attack on Douai to his North-Eastern flank, in order to oppose an attack by Army Group B's 6th Army. The 50th Division was sent in support, and the two divisions fought the successful and largely forgotten Battle of the Ypres-Comines Canal, which held back 6th Army until 28 May. Had Gort let 5th Division join the Weygand attack, the probability is that 6th Army would have made any evacuation at all from Dunkirk impossible.
You might read a detailed explanation in 'The Journal of Army Historical Research,' Vol. 92, Number 372, pages 326 - 336, written by Charles More, or the recent book by the same author, 'The Road to Dunkirk - The BEF and the Battle of the Ypres-Comines Canal, 1940' of 2019.
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@brianmacc1934 Oh, I apologise. I thought you actually knew more about the facts than you do, and thus wasted my time giving you a more detailed reply than you deserved.
The fact is that the pre-war allied planning for a war against Germany basically followed what had happened in WW1, in that the French would initially be responsible for most of the fighting on land, whilst the British would gradually take more responsibility as their land forces were built up by conscription and by the arrival of troops from the Commonwealth & Empire. Whilst this was going on, the Royal Navy (the largest on earth at the time) would re-impose the blockade on Germany which had been so successful in WW1.
The British were not a significant military power on land, but had a small, totally mechanised army of around 13 divisions based in the UK. This force would support the best French forces in the north in support of Belgium, but there was no possibility of this force alone challenging the over 100 divisions deployed by the Germans, as should be obvious even to you.
What 'Dunkirk Fable?' You mean the one where the Royal Navy, ordered to evacuate 40,000 'specialist' troops, successfully evacuated 338,000, of which over 120,000 were French? That fable? The evacuation was, and is, never portrayed in Britain as anything other than a defeat. Even Churchill said that 'wars are not won by evacuations,' but the success of the RN ensured that it was 'merely' a defeat, and not a catastrophe. Similarly, there was no attempt to 'degrade' the French. The British sought to keep France in the fight, and even began landing fresh troops in Cherbourg, until Weygand told them that the French army was no longer able to offer 'organized resistance.'
Oh dear. There I go again. Wasting my time explaining facts to someone who is fairly obviously too prejudiced and too ill-informed to be able to accept them.
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I don't know how many times it needs writing, but 'HITLER DIDN'T STOP THE ARMOUR ON THE AA CANAL! Von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group A, however, did, in order to service and rest it before beginning the next stage of the campaign. Rundstedt, like several of his colleagues, feared a repetition of the 'Miracle of the Marne.'
Moreover, as a traditional German commander, he regarded an army backed against the sea as trapped, because he simply did not appreciate the flexibility that Sea Power gave to the allies. Add to that the knowledge that the area around Dunkirk was difficult tank country, and the slower moving German infantry divisions were beginning to arrive, and the decision was a logical one. All this, by the way, is fully documented in the War Diary of Army Group A.
Hitler, of course, knew what the ground around Dunkirk was like from his experiences there in WW1, but more importantly had been assured by Goering that the elimination of the trapped Allied forces was 'A special job for the Luftwaffe.'
As to the absurd idea that Hitler let the BEF escape to encourage the British to come to terms, simply ask yourself this question :- Were the British more likely to sign a peace treaty if:
1). Their entire field army was caged in German PoW camps? or,
2). Their entire field army, together with around 120,000 French troops, had just been lifted to safety?
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@MrDaiseymay If someone has to have been present in order to comment on anything which happened in history, then that rather causes difficulties for anything prior to around 1950.
That is why people tend to refer to sources from the time, such as the document I referred to earlier, the War Diary of Army Group A, which survived the war and can be examined by anyone interested enough to discover what actually happened.
In point of fact, those who have made the effort would confirm my statement, if asked. Furthermore, I quite enjoy educating the less well informed, even if, like you, they generally get somewhat choleric as a result.
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