Comments by "William Morris" (@williammorris584) on "The Telegraph" channel.

  1. Please also consider an interview with the preeminent historian Stephen Kotkin.
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  2. From an analytical point of view, I’ve been surprised that Russia hasn’t attacked the ports in force before now. It’s always been their best escalatory option with respect to results versus consequences. Apparently they were saving it as a retaliatory move so that it seems less escalatory in context, and the Kerch bridge attack was the opportunity.
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  3. An alternative view is that, at least for some while, Bakhmut has been a mini-Verdun for the Ukrainians. They are disadvantaged by near-encirclement, but fight on for primarily symbolic reasons. The Russians have been leveraging the situation for attrition, and doing so from a favorable logistical position since the defenders’ supply routes are increasingly constrained.
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  4. Meanwhile Pokrovsk is within range of Russian 12cm mortars, to say nothing of all tubed artillery systems. UTL points out a raindrop while ignoring a flood, and Pokrovsk is about to be declared of no strategic importance.
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  5. Ukraine is losing in all of Ukraine, not just on the front. They face an increasingly cold and dark winter in more and more areas without power. Meanwhile, Zelenskyy rearranges the deck chairs.
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  6. Three continuing problems for Ukraine are that they do not have escalatory parity, that the Russians can afford 4:1 attrition, and that both the UKR economy and military are dependent on donations from sovereign actors with other priorities.
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  7. It’s a divisional level attack using Ukraine’s last reserves. Meh.
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  8.  @anthonyhulse1248 The Russians just advanced in two days roughly the depth of the 2023 Ukrainian offensive. On two recent occasions, elements of two AFU brigades have taken a runner to a degree that can’t be disguised. That’s an ebb tide.
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  9. Assuming Ukraine has raised nine brigades of reserves, two to three have already suffered significant attrition without reaching the MLR of the first of multiple Russian defensive belts. It’s early yet, but it looks a reasonable observation that it’s really really difficult to conduct combined arms ops WITHOUT ONE OF THE ARMS ( ie, fixed wing air) especially when it is into dense mine belts covered by the worlds largest artillery park. Another problem is a lack of strategic surprise, since everyone knows the locations that would be the goals of the Ukrainian military, since they are political objectives. This means that the Russians will be dug in at and along every approach to these objectives, pretty much ruling out the hope of reducing losses via maneuver operations. The only relative strategic surprise would be the order in which the objectives are attacked. The one thing that would truly surprise me in this war would be to see a meeting engagement in a major theater. Yet more problems for a longer war are the relative demographic disparity and that Ukraine does not produce any major weapon systems. Russia is both wrong and bad here, and all decent people would prefer for Ukraine to win. But absent regime change in Russia, or a unexpected collapse of its army’s will to fight, this looks like a war that will be settled by an armistice, not a victory. And to your armor pal, Creighton Abrams might rightly be considered a patriarch of the US armor force, but not so far in the past for our MBT to be named the “Abraham”.
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  10. With respect to Ukrainian men in Poland, don’t refugees have Geneva protection against forced repatriation?
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  11. It’s called warfare. My country bombed hell out of everything useful to Germany and Japan including their homes. We sank virtually the entire Japanese merchant marine to starve their industry and people, while we mined all their sea approaches and harbors in order to sink anything that got through. Our British allies used incendiaries on Germany at night that started fire storms that warped metal and caused casualties to be estimated from the quantity of ash in inadequate shelters. We emulated this over Japan after our standard practices returned too-prosaic results. Once we ran out of targets in Europe as low on the priority list as train cars, train stations and trucks, our fighter-bombers strafed things like individual barns and farm equipment. One of our generals as early as 1864 said that war is hell and cannot be mitigated, so he made its effects as severe as possible in his theater in the hopes of shortening its duration.
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  12. In the US, the border disaster has become the defining issue and it is demonstrably the result of Democratic policy over the past few years. Initially, Republicans sought a way to do something about the border, and since there was already some resistance to Ukraine aid, linking the two was seen by the Biden Admin as a path to doing a deal for Ukraine aid. As time has passed, two things have happened. First, resistance to further Ukraine aid has solidified, primarily over the long-term resentment against most members of NATO for consistently failing to meet financial commitments. Second, the border situation has gained in public concern to the point that the Democrats are willing to do anything to cover their tracks on immigration, dropping both the linkages to Ukraine aid and to their formerly ironclad allegiance to a pathway to citizenship for illegals. Now, the Republicans sense the possibility of an absolute legislative win on the border issue, but will do it in a relatively leisurely/cynical fashion, so as to have a winning electoral issue to bash over the Democrats’ heads. Ukraine aid is a distant second place behind the border issue, and public opinion generally is that we’ve done enough and it’s Europe’s turn. Our defense priorities are shifting toward China. Trump’s part in this is that he’s certainly involved, particularly in some Congressional arm-twisting, but mostly he has jumped out in front of the parade to be seen as leading it, and if possible, being its originator.
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  13. I was completely stunned to hear an argument that free speech should be limited based on the relative veracity of the speech. If that’s the case, the First Amendment in the US is subject to the judgement of some nebulous entity. The legal tradition in the US has been to vigorously uphold the right to express even the most outlandish speech, and our courts have universally and promptly overturned hate speech statutes. Only direct incitement is actionable here, and there’s a lot of leeway given as to what constitutes direct incitement.
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  14.  @Mimi.the.Capybara  The Russians are constantly reconstituting units and their force is growing, which is why the AFU warns that they are ‘increasingly outnumbered’ and being pushed back everywhere. It’s Ukraine that is in extremis with respect to personnel shortage.
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  15. As tough as it looks in the Senate, Ukraine support is increasingly being delinked from border security in the House, with a growing outright opposition to aid. If there were a 180 degree policy shift to extremely vigorous interception and repatriation at the southern border, that might tantalize the hardliners back to a package linked with Ukraine aid.
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  16. Comments on successful Russian attacks are always accompanied by statements that heavy losses were sustained. Are we to assume that successful Ukrainian attacks had light losses since their losses are very seldom mentioned? And is the relative tolerance of each side to attrition considered in these characterizations? I realize that this podcast is rightly helping to fight for Ukraine in the information space, but I’d kind of like to know what’s actually happening. Attrition has as much to do with Ukrainian success as ground gained. I realize that info about losses is closely held by both sides, but a deeper examination of this would be welcome.
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  17. Another determined effort to avoid talking about the actual battles underway; it’s that ugly for AFU.
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  18. The Russians are using their air forces more and more aggressively, rather than less so. Recently they have been dropping glide FAB bombs on the Kharkiv area, which would not have been attempted just six months ago. This spares the missiles they would have otherwise used for other purposes, such as the near-complete destruction of the electrical generation plants in the northeast of Ukraine. Russian verified losses of multirole aircraft in the last 15 months are roughly equal to the 2023 deliveries of new SU-34 and -34’s alone, and the Russians continue to produce SU-57’s as well. The air war has gone from an equilibrium in which the airspace over the battle area was virtually denied to both sides, to a situation where the Russians have air superiority over much of the combat front.
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  19. There is no serious analyst who sees a scenario in which Ukraine can recover its lost territory using only their own forces. This doesn’t change that assessment. In that context, this attack can be seen as an effort to gain leverage in eventual peace negotiations. With reference to your guest, I now take ISW with a shaker of salt; they long ago transitioned from analysis to cheerleading.
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  20. The Russians switched to saturation attacks some time ago, they appear to be getting larger and at more frequent intervals. Improved Russian SEAD/DEAD has meant the Ukrainians are having to choose between having SAM coverage of their cities or at the front.
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  21. Ukraine appears to be firming up a lodgement on the left bank of the Dniepro, a tactical achievement. This can grow to operational significance if Ukraine can support this logistically. The indirect fire strikes Dom noted early in the news section is probably an attempt to interdict support for the troops on the left bank, or to break up any assembly of reinforcements.
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  22. UALosses has Ukrainian killed listed by name at 42,100. Missing are estimated at 15,000, most probably POW. This is the lowest estimate by any independent and serious analysis.
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  23. I’m so glad I’m not an interviewer, my eyes would have crossed permanently from thirty circuits around the same points.
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  24. The US issue spoken of refers to ~$300M in aid that has been broken out of a US aid package for a separate vote after failing to pass in the House as part of a larger bill.
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  25. Helicopters in the most dense AAW environment on earth? Even attack helos are being taken down at a decent pace despite playing peek-a-boo popup on their side of the FEBA.
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  26. From the last few days, this should be renamed Ukraine: The Whining. All the content amounts to “more, please”, except on the occasions when the “please” is omitted.
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  27. I guess Russia wasn’t out of missiles. Also, did I hear strategic bombers mentioned? Were those Tu-160 or Tu-22M? I couldn’t find out from ISW today.
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  28. A prolonged divergence in outlook between the political and military leadership won’t lead to anything good.
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  29. Their initial classes of nuke boats were noisy as washing machines. They have made great strides since, no doubt aided by some well-known espionage cases.
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  30. Ukraine has inserted a reserve brigade, perhaps their only fresh reserve, to break the encirclement of Avdiivka and extract what they can of the defenders who must choose between surrender or flight across ground swept by Russian artillery and air-delivered ordnance. An appalling military decision presumably made for the sake of the information space. This debacle had been predictable, and predicted by many, for weeks. And with the Europeans disarmed by decades of fecklessness, Ukraine’s main hope is staked on the US House in recess, whose Speaker has no inclination to bring the passed Senate bill to the floor. Unless cutoff positions have been prepared, the Ukrainians have just left their most heavily fortified positions on the whole front to face the Russians in unimproved terrain with battered units, albeit on a shorter line when the Russians have cleared Donetsk as a logistical hub for further operations.
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  31. I hope to see comments Monday on the post-strike satellite imagery. ISW has said: “ISW has not yet observed any visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces damaged or destroyed aircraft or infrastructure at any of the airbases.” Awaiting further reports.
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  32. ISW (professional analysts): Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and made gains in some areas, although Ukrainian forces appear not to have continued significant mechanized assaults south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
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  33. Parades. Anything to avoid talking about whats happening at the front.
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  34. It seems counterintuitive that Russia would blow the dam when “their” side (the left bank) is mostly lower than the other and therefore they would be flooding their most forward defenses. Presumably, they have been preparing in depth as elsewhere, and view their net defensive position as enhanced. In any case, Ukraine continues to suffer from the problem of escalation disparity. Regardless of who this benefits the most, it pushes the possible Russian acts of escalation front and center. Some of the displaced Ukrainians of the left bank who were deprived of homes and living, may begin or reinforce partisan activity against the Russians. It seems like a mixed bag operationally.
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  35. The current balance of forces and logistics would suggest an even worse outcome for a Ukranian spring offensive than last year’s effort.
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  36. By the rationale Francis mentioned, the UK and France should lose their permanent Security Council seats and veto before Russia loses theirs. Otherwise the move is purely motivated by the actions of Russia, rather than the reasons cited.
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  37. One company of tanks, requiring its own logistics and services tail, is better than nothing, but not much. Basically a diplomatic and PR statement. These drips and drops of stuff from a dozen sources are producing a heterogenous collection of logistical headaches, but are useful enough to put up with the problems. I’d really think that what are much more useful are MANPADS and one-use antitank systems.
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  38. Because we’re the only ones the Russians fear.
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  39. It really has become a hopium dispenser.
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  40. Re Dom’s description of Russian Armies: I was unaware that the combat units of numbered Russian combined-arms Armies (eg, 20th Guards Combined Arms Army) were regularly part of corps organizations between them and their Army headquarters. Since early in WWII, Russian Armies have directly commanded a considerably smaller number of divisions or brigades than their western counterparts without intervening corps headquarters. Russian corps do exist, but tend to be separate organizations within military districts not subordinate to Armies, and although they may be attached to Armies like any other formation, I’m not sure this has taken place with any frequency.
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  41. Talks and concession seem inevitable. There is no serious analyst who sees a scenario in which Ukraine can recover its lost territory using only their own forces.
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  42. “Russia is doing it [missiles] because it’s all they CAN do”. This is small comfort to the Ukrainians, since they can do nothing of the same kind in response; what Russia can do of this type of assault is 100% more than they. That’s a silly and insensitive dismissal.
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  43. Look for Russia to explore ways to interdict aid whether by sea, air, or land. There are interesting possibilities, but some have escalatory risk.
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  44. Ukraine did indeed have the advantage and initiative for a good part of last year, but the misguided offensive plan, the Russians’ stubborn defense, and the Russians’ leveraging of their manpower tipped the scales. From there, the Ukranians mistakenly turned appearances into military priorities, and the Russians exploited this repeatedly.
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  45. 6:32 I recall ISW has stated that the Russians have already produced these reserves in the form of new formations equipped with new-production and refurbished equipment.
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  46. Linking Putin with Iran and Hamas is wise, lest this war become a backwater of US geopolitical priorities.
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  47. 8:33 Exactly. It’s more IF than when Ukraine aid gets to a vote in the US House. And even if it does, it may be months away, and party discipline in the House is a different animal than in the Senate. Only part of the resistance is US politics. There is also a strong strain in US public opinion and political circles of resentment for the Europeans coasting on defense for decades while sheltering under the US defense umbrella.
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  48. How does Ukraine take back any meaningful amount of their occupied territory? Their demographics preclude the casualties incumbent on the attacker, to say nothing of the other difficulties. They are not merely dependent on Western materiel, they are going to need other nations’ troops.
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  49. Is every comment that isn’t sunshine and unicorns for Ukraine a bot? I would think that a bot would be determined more by technical means than from the content.
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  50. Dom’s use of “gift” was actually the correct word. Ukraine can’t buy what they need, and their military is nonviable without it. The West provides the materiel, and Ukraine provides the casualties.
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