Comments by "William Morris" (@williammorris584) on "The Telegraph" channel.

  1. Give that guy a ticket back to Ukraine.
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  2. 8:01 ISW has a somewhat different assessment of Russian activity in the north, most recently in their appreciation of June 22: “Russian forces appear to be intensifying the tempo of their offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast while decreasing the rate of attacks in northern Kharkiv Oblast — consistent with ISW's assessment that Russian offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast are primarily intended to fix and distract Ukrainian forces in order to allow Russian forces to intensify elsewhere in theater.” (ISW, June 22 2024) With respect to the restriction on the use of US munitions, the US apparently would like Ukraine to endure, but not to prevail, in line with the frequent observation that the US wants Ukraine to win in a way that means Russia does not lose. Thus the restrictions to which the client state must adhere, and which change with how Ukraine fares.
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  3.  @frankshailes3205 I see so many of these ad hominems in lieu of substantive responses.
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  4.  @sebastianforbes1 Indeed, but a week late, kilometers short, and multiple directions unmentioned. The AFU are getting steamrolled lately.
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  5. With respect to deep strikes, Russian missile and aviation strikes inside Ukraine continue to be more numerous and deliver heavier ordnance than those made by Ukraine against Russia. As opposed to Russia, there are numerous Ukrainian areas without power and others with rolling blackouts. Ukrainian energy officials state that their electricity production has declined from 55Gw to “less than 20Gw” and call the situation a “catastrophic shortage”. Explosions and the sound of diesel generators have become the soundtrack of Ukraine. But the theme of the podcast today is that Ukraine may have damaged a plane. Nice. Today (Wed June 12), there is video that the Russians knocked out an S300 system that enabled them to then attack Myrhorod airbase in Ukraine and strike at least one aircraft. If that’s verified, will it be a large part of your podcast tomorrow considering that one aircraft has ~ 10x the impact on Ukraine due to the relative size of their air forces? This often isn’t reporting, it’s cheerleading.
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  6. This pod is fighting Ukraine’s war in the information space, and it’s good that someone is doing that. Evenhanded analysis can be found at places like ISW; on YT there are several eg Perun, and occasionally Ward Carrol has Ukraine content.
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  7. Time and numbers are what tells. All the rest is commentary.
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  8. Read Glantz. It was a bit of both, an army with thousands of penal battalions as well as the Fifth Guards Tank Army and skilled predecessors of Spetsnaz. But above all, it was an artillery army, an artillery army with lots and lots of tanks.
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  9. It’s not lies, just truth management: hopium, copium, and man-behind-the-curtium.
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  10. As much as we side with Ukraine, what filters through is that misery is greater and greater, the economy is grinding to a halt, and the Russians continue to drive wedges into locations. As much as the Ukrainians want and use the weaponry provided by the West, it produces a Frankenstein logistical situation with need for training, support, repair, and supply of a multitude of specialized munitions, parts & etc. I just don’t see how Ukraine alone can achieve more than a stalemate. And no NATO nation is going to put combat troops on the ground. For the US, it’s an opportunity for us to grind down an enemy in a proxy war by providing military supplies to Ukraine, but we must be careful nonetheless- China is watching ITS potential opponents in a war over Taiwan deplete their equipment and supplies in what is effectively a proxy war for them, in which China expends absolutely nothing.
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  11. I knew quite a few people who went to J school, and there’s a reason they weren’t STEM majors.
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  12. He’s sacked and exiled for being right.
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  13. Several analysts (Perun and others) believe Russia is building up inventories of their more capable missiles (Kalibr and such) for the winter, while currently expending their increasing supply of low - end drones. It is less clear that they may be preferentially sending the new production T90’s as well as refurbished AFV’s from depots to reconstitute depleted formations. What will these be used upon, and when?
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  14. Some friends started a friendly betting pool on the over/under of a brigade-sized meeting engagement in open country in the next year. There were only bets against; most of these guys were US military officers. Most knowledgeable folks expect a positional slog absent some Russian morale collapse, otherwise there seems little chance of movement warfare in the main theaters. Regime collapse in Russia is a better bet for a near-term favorable outcome for Ukraine. Already footage of Leo 2A4 and A6 losses; don’t know if any are recoverable: https://youtu.be/8qSXAaQc7EI There were people who acted like these things are invulnerable “I Win” buttons. They’re good kit, but still can go boom to any ATGM.
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  15. The Russians struck Ukrainian airbases with aircraft on the ground three time in two days, destroying multiple fixed wing fighters and helicopters. The loss could be as much as a quarter of Ukraines remaining Air Force, but mentioned here? Nah. Likewise an increase in the pace of Russian ground gains in the East - crickets.
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  16. US House Speaker Mike Johnson said yesterday that he would not consider President Biden’s request for additional aid to Ukraine. The French government just fell to a no-confidence vote led by parties opposed to Ukraine aid. Ukraine needs to come up with some cash if they want more stuff.
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  17.  @MrLJT1 That was the estimate of an American general (he actually said 72 hours). The RU MOD never claimed any timetable.
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  18. First line of Joe Barnes’ story from yesterday: “Putin ally’s long-term animosity towards Ukraine saw him veto a €50 billion package of support – and walk away with €10 billion”. So he abstained from the years-long EU membership process, probably to get parliamentary cover on an eventual veto. Then he levered €10 billion for Hungary, and blocked €50 billion for Ukraine. Scholz rightly lauded for a canny maneuver to begin a decade/decades long process, but overall, qui bono here?
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  19.  @Ode-to-Odysseus  Russia’s October advances were the largest in a month for the last couple years. The AFU’s Kursk salient has been reduced by half. Russians pushing northward from Robotyne. Advances in multiple areas of Ukraine’s southeast. Russians have broken into Kupyansk. And there are reports (both Russian and Ukrainian) of Russian reconnaissance troops entering the Chernihiv area unopposed. Difficult to call this ‘barely changed’.
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  20. These attacks make more sense as false flags or unauthorized Ukrainian sympathizers, since they could mobilize Russian resolve or - much worse- provoke Russian escalation.
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  21. Finding a way to produce a Corps/Army sized maneuver battle versus a defense 20-40km in depth, versus an enemy who has escalatory recourse as well as air dominance over their own territory is indeed a bit worrying, but possible if the Russians are sufficiently weakened.
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  22. He certainly saw what every thoughtful observer saw: that Avdiivka was going to be encircled if it was not evacuated. Saying so may have got him the sack.
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  23. We keep enough equipment in hand for contingencies that might affect higher US defense priorities, like increased concerns vis-a-vis China, or a war in the Middle East.
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  24. That was quite a slapdown of Dom; the fastest learning environment in the world is among infantry under fire.
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  25. Syrsky’s statement sounds very much like “Zelensky made me do it to draw the Russians away from central Ukraine and Pokrovsk, but I knew it wouldn’t and it hasn’t, so now we have this salient into Russia to defend”.
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  26. Not at the cost of denial, if it’s accurate. It’s also possible that it is one individual’s impression of a limited area; the old tale of three blind men describing an elephant by touching parts of it comes to mind.
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  27. At last, news about change in control of terrain. Trend unchanged for a few months now: Russians advancing in several areas, both sides digging in wherever there is equilibrium.
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  28.  @Grenadier311 Not unusual.
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  29. For irony.
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  30. He’s a copium dispenser.
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  31. Anyone remember the good old days when it was gonna be over for Russia once the AFU got F-16’s?
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  32. Application of the logic razor would suggest that Russian air losses are related to their increased use. SAM traps are a constant effort; the returns scale with enemy air activity. There is a cost in SAM launchers or radars as well, this is much less visible and more difficult to analyze.
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  33. That man droned on and on about social media posts being sufficient to ban someone’s participation in the Olympics. I can’t imagine anything more feckless, or more silly. During the time that the Warsaw Pact was poised to initiate WWIII and proxy wars were in progress on several continents, members of their military participated in the Olympics.
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  34. They are tactical rather than operational breakthroughs. Cracking a trench line or a defensive position centered on a group of buildings is a breakthrough for a company or battalion. It’s just a matter of scale, war isn’t semantics.
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  35. Speaking of drones, is the Sukhoi S-70 already in use?
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  36. Stalingrad, although larger, wasn’t strategically important either. What made it important was the symbolic value placed on it and the forces dedicated to taking/defending it. The same is true of Avdiivka, as it was with Bakhmut.
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  37. Nathanael Greene wasn’t at the Battle of Bunker/Breed’s Hill. He had been serving in the area, but was elsewhere at the time of the battle.
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  38.  @mattsapero1896  That was the last time Ukraine had numerical superiority. Last year, Ukraine was in its best position of the war since 2022 relative to Russia in personnel, equipment and logistics, and their offensive quickly broke down against a deeply entrenched enemy. Now, even with new aid incoming, Ukraine has no prospects for an offensive this summer, and possibly not this year. The Russians apparently have the means and the intention to maintain offensive operations this summer. As great as their dependence for materiel is, what Ukraine needs most of all is something that cannot be bought or sent by the West: more Ukrainians. Look at Ukraine’s 2023 population pyramid; there are virtually no young men. As bad as Russia’s demographic pyramid is, it is better than Ukraine’s, and several times larger. The materiel situation will probably look favorable for Ukraine sometime next year, but when a deeper conscription proves insufficient to recover any meaningful tranche of their territory, Ukraine will be asking for combat troops and aerial support.
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  39. No mention of the pressure on the Ukrainian front from multiple axes? Krynky, Robotyne, northwest from Avdiivka, west from Bakhmut are all being pushed simultaneously, and an attack from the Kupyansk - Liman area looks imminent. Immediate threats seem more important than long term musings.
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  40. Their whole Challenger park is less than 400.
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  41. I’m getting it just fine.
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  42.  @uku4171 I guess we are conscious of being the guarantor of the defense of a lot of allies, including but not not limited to the Europeans.
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  43.  @sebastianforbes1 Yeah, Ukraine occupies much of Russia and has continued to advance relentlessly for the last year. And Russia’s electrical infrastructure is in shambles. Oh, wait, I got that backwards 😄
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  44. Syrsky’s recent statement sounds very much like: “Z made me attack in Kursk to get the Russians to redeploy out of central Ukraine. I told him they wouldn’t, and they didn’t. Now we have this salient to defend in addition to everything else, and it contains our best units”.
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  45. Yes, I mentioned that at length yesterday.
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  46. 5:12 “Expectation of a Russian offensive in the spring”. That’s not good, the current one hasn’t run its course yet. This implies Russian reserves not currently committed in the current attack along the hundred km or so in southeastern Ukraine, or the positional fighting elsewhere. Are the evacuations of population in the Kharkiv area just in areas coming under fire from Russian advances, or is it more general in anticipation that the expected offensive will fall in that area?
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  47. The left (west) ear is being lopped off , while the Russians are also denting in the base of the eastern side. AFU putting in some counterattacks, but otherwise just defending.
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  48. That’s a baffling assertion. Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, all that happened was that the Soviets collapsed, despite having vastly more capable forces than it has now. What’s the geopolitical rationale for an exhausted and vastly weaker Russia being a conventional threat to the West simply from having its border moved back to the frontiers of Poland and Rumania?
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  49. AFU retreating in every area of active combat. What EU nation is going to keep Ukraine stocked with Patriot missiles and real-time satellite intel?
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  50. @ They are retreating in Kursk as well. The result of their Kursk 2.0 offensive was that within a week or so, they held less Russian territory than when it began due to the Russians attacking all around the salient, and it continues to shrink. Refer to any reliable mapper, even the pro-Ukrainian ISW or Deep State, which is basically a part of the AFU. And on every other active part of the front, the Russians are advancing, while the few AFU counterattacks are either deblocking or temporary screens for withdrawals. Despite the losses, Russian force reconstitution outstrips than that of Ukraine. Even the AFU admits this by saying that they are increasingly outnumbered. Ukraine’s demographic pyramid is one of the few that is worse than Russia’s, and on a population base a fourth as large. Ukraine’s critical need is for something no one can give them: more Ukrainian men.
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