Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "The People Profiles"
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Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the years ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties). (20,000 casualties).
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@ronryan7398
‘Really? He won in Sicily? Patton had to come to his rescue.’
Not really…Patton tried to foist a lunatic plan on the allies of landing all around the island. Good sense prevailed and Montgomery’s plan to concentrate resources in one place was a triumphant success. Patton deserted the battlefield to take the unimportant town of Palermo and then had to be coaxed back to the real battle with the offer of being allowed to take Messina.
From a review of BITTER VICTORY The Battle for Sicily, 1943, By Carlo D'Este.
Review written by Walter Lord in the New York Times: 27/11/1988.
‘Montgomery was heading for Messina too, but the German forces still on the island threw up a tough defense line and it was late July before Montgomery worked his way through them and resumed his advance. Fans of the movie ''Patton'' think they know what happened next. Montgomery marched into Messina at the head of his triumphant troops - to find a smirking Patton waiting for him. Mr. D'Este assures us it didn't happen that way. Patton was indeed trying to beat Montgomery to Messina, but Montgomery would not make a race of it. He wanted only to keep the Germans from escaping and realized Patton was in the best position to accomplish that. In fact he urged Patton to use roads assigned to the Eighth Army.’
For your convenience, the link below will take you to this review…
www.nytimes.com/1988/11/27/books/the-finish-line-was-messina.html
The British couldn't get off the beaches at Normandy despite facing the least opposition.
The least opposition was at met by the US forces Utah Beach, were some of the beach exits were totally undefended. The US forces at Omaha Beach were met by the stiffest beach opposition but their problems there were made much worse by poor preparation. The far better prepared British 2nd Army met average opposition at Gold, June and Sword Beaches but were quickly ashore and able to deal with the only major counter attack of the day, in front of Caen by the German 21st Panzer Division.
‘The Americans and Canadians faced stiff opposition and were both on the move before the British.’
Definitely not, Gold, Juno and Sword Beaches quickly joined up the American setback at Omaha Beach left the allies unable to form a whole front for over a week.
‘He didn't take the Scheldt when it was practically undefended and then the Canadians, not the British, had to slug it out for months after.’
The Scheldt was never practically undefended, The German 15th Army was there in force before the 21st Army Group got to that place, particularly the Breskens Pocket. The Scheldt was taken by Canadian, British and Polish forces, under the command of Montgomery.
Arnhem? I guess we don't have to say anymore about Arnhem and his "90% successful operation"
Arnhem freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on Britain, stretched the German forces front by another 50 miles and left the allies well placed to attack the Rhine later in the war.
‘(He was an egomaniacal asshole to boot)’
You met him when?..
When the Americans were trapped in Bastoigne all Monty could do was make excuses why he couldn't relieve them despite being 100 miles closer than Patton was. Get your facts straight. And it's KNOW-nothing not NO-nothing. If you want to celebrate a British general go with Bill Slim.
Montgomery was never tasked with reaching Bastogne. He was tasked with sorting out the American mess in the North and stopping he Germans reaching the Meuse after Bradley and Hodges lost the plot.
Here is a German view of Montgomery’s actions:
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
Hasso von Manteuffel. Commander, 5th Panzer Army.
Re you Arnhem comment, it's any more, not anymore.
‘I wouldn't be too hard on the Americans either. They fought the Germans and beat the Japanese by themselves. (Talk about a two front war)’
Britain also fought the Japanese and fought the Germans for six years, a year of which on their own, with the Germans 20 miles away for four of those years. (A real two front war). As far as who did what in the Second war goes, we rule.
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@nickdanger3802
'Source?'
Try these:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P189/190/191
" May 15th. Went straight from home to St. Paul's School to attend Eisenhower's final run-over plans for cross-Channel operations. The King, P.M., Smuts and all Chiefs of Staff were present. The main impression I gathered was that Eisenhower was no real director of thought, plans, energy or direction. Just a co-ordinator,
a good mixer, a champion of inter-Allied co-operation, and in those respects few can hold the candle to him. But is that enough? Or can we not find all qualities of a commander in one man? May be I am getting too hard to please, but I doubt it."
Monty made excellent speech. Bertie Ramsay in-different and overwhelmed by all his own difficulties. Spaatz read every word. Bert Harris told us how well he might have won the war if it had not been for the handicap imposed by the existence of the two other Services. Leigh-Mallory gave very clear description. Sholto Douglas seemed disappointed at the smallness of his task, and so was I. Then Humfrey Gale and Graham on Administration, followed by Grasset on Civil Controls of France. A useful run-through. The King made a few well-chosen remarks. After lunch he presented the C.B. to Bradley and two other decorations." " Back to War Office and finished up with Monty dining quietly with me. He was in very good form and bearing his reponsibilities well."
' If I was asked to review the opinion I expressed that evening of Eisenhower, I should, in the light of all later experience, repeat every word of it. A past-master in the handling of allies, entirely impartial and consequently trusted by all. A charming personality and good co-ordinator. But no real commander. I have seen many similar reviews of impending operations, and especially those run by Monty. Ike might have been a showman calling on various actors to perform their various turns, but he was not the commander of the show who controlled and directed all the actors. A very different performance from Monty's show a few days previously.
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD REVISED EDITION NOVEMBER 1950.
VOLUME V CLOSING THE RING
Page 542
On Monday, May 15, three weeks before D-Day, we held a final conference in London at Montgomery’s Headquarters in St. Paul’s School. The King, Field-Marshal Smuts, the British Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders of the expedition, and many of their principal Staff officers were present. On the stage was a map of the Normandy beaches and the immediate hinterland, set at a slope so that the audience could see it clearly, and so constructed that the high officers explaining the plan of operations could walk about and point out the landmarks.
Page 543
Montgomery then took the stage and made an impressive speech. He was followed by several Naval, Army, and Air Commanders, and also by the Principal Administrative Officer, who dwelt upon the elaborate preparations that had been made for the administration of the force when it got ashore.
MONTY
MASTER OF THE BATTLEFIELD 1942-44
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON LONDON 1983
P 588/589
As in April, Monty ran through the tasks of the four armies, as well as those of the commandos and airborne troops. Turning to the wall maps he gave his strategic intentions for 'the development of Operations up to D + 90', outlining again the manner in which the British and Canadians would 'contain the maximum enemy forces facing the eastern flank of the bridgehead' while the American forces, 'once through the difficult bocage country' were to 'thrust rapidly towards Rennes', seal off the Brittany peninsula, and wheel round towards Paris and the Seine, pivoting on the right flank of the British Second Army. As Bradley recalled, 'the British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road toward Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride, this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for while we tramped around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was toward Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
This strategic vision of the Normandy campaign filled the assembled audience with a sense of pride and anticipation, as it had Monty’s own Chief of Intelligence when Monty first laid down his post-D-1 strategy soon after changing the COSSAC plan. As the American
Official Historian noted after an interview with Brigadier Williams in 1947:
Thinks as early as January or February 1944 there is this idea of a swing from the American side towards the Seine. Remembers a map showing line out from Caen running South East and a line up the Cotentin and two lines direct down south of the Cotentin and one down and around the corner and one straight down to cut the neck of the Brittany Peninsula and one straight line down inside the Loire. 'After Cherbourg Peninsula (Monty never said Cotentin) cleaned up we shall be formed up the same way. I [Williams] plotted this on my own map. Felt an immense thrill.'
Monty stepped down. 'It went off superbly, I thought, on that occasion,' his Military Assistant, Colonel Dawnay, later recalled. `Monty was at his best. He was a supremely confident man—it was astonishing how confident he was. '
In a letter of 16.5.44 the American Deputy Theater Commander, General John Lee, wrote [To Montgomery]: 'Your clear and convincing estimate of the situation at St Paul's yesterday would merit in West Point language "a cold max".
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@solomongrundy4905
'You forgot to mention that Monty had 2X the infantry, (all well-trained, excellent morale), 2X the number of tanks, 2X artillery, 3X anti-tank guns, 2X armored cars. Planes were about equal. Now add Monty's virtually limitless resources vs. Rommel's lackthereof, and his lengthy supply lines. Add Ultra Intel, and what would you expect? A five-year-old could command the Allied forces and win.' Your words.
You should take a look at the odds for US victories in Europe, or the Pacific. US commanders also had access to Ultra, and decoded Japanese messages in in the Pacific. Could five-year olds win those battles?
Just yes or no will do.
The Germans had to bring supplies from Italy to North Africa. Britain was bringing supplies around the Cape to Suez.
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@solomongrundy4905
Even some British commanders, including Air Marshal Tedder wanted to see Monty fired, especially after his ineptness during Goodwood. Ike almost did it. Why? Because Monty was a bumbling, egotisical plodder. Still thinking like a WW1 general and that cost LIVES.
What ineptness? GOODWOOD took place due to the delay in the US build up in Normany, and in order to keep the bulk of German armour in front of British Second Army. It was just part of Montgomery's victory in Normandy, which finished 12 days ahead of schedule, with 20% fewer than expected casualties.
Those people who were supoosedly trying to get rid of Montgomery during the Normany campaign shut up like lights being turned off when the size of the victory in Normandy becam e clear.
As for Tedder:
WITH PREJUDICE
The War Memoirs of Marshall of the Royal Air Force
Lord Tedder G.C.B.
CASSELL & COMPANY 1966
P 563
According to the diary of Eisenhower’s aide, Captain Butcher, I told the Supreme Commander on the evening of 19 July that Montgomery had in effect, stopped his armour from going farther. Later, I am reported as saying that he British Chiefs of Staff would ‘support any recommendation that Ike might care to make with respect to Monty for not succeeding in going places with his big three-armoured division push’
I am sure that this record is misleading for although I strongly disapproved of Montgomery’s action, it was quite beyond my powers to speak in the name of the British Chief’s of Staff.’
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@jeffreyhutchins6527
Montgomery made no commitment regarding Caen in his planning for Normandy. The only commtment he made was to be at the Seine by D+90. He got there by D+78. With 22% fewer than expected casualties.
As for the Falaise Gap:
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
Omar Bradley: A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
‘Nevertheless, despite the slaughter in the Falaise Pocket, claimed everywhere, and rightly, as an outstanding victory, one third of the Seventh German Army, many of them without equipment, had managed to escape before the encircling prongs had closed around them. This should not have happened; many reasons have been put forward, but to my mind few Germans would not have escaped if Bradley had not halted Patton’s northerly advance. Montgomery, the master of the tactical battle, realized this only too well; to be quite honest, it was because of their lack of battle experience that he had little confidence in the U.S. Commanders.’
Brian Horrocks: Corps Commander. Page 53.
What have Bradley and Horrocks got in common?.. They were actually there.
As for Percival at Singapore and McAuliffe at Bastogne. Any comparison between the two situations is absurd. Percival was thousands of miles from any help and had no means of knowing what strength the Japanese had. McAuliffe knew that three allied army groups were behind him and that as soon as the weather turned, overwhelming air power would be avaible to help him.
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@solomongrundy4905
Yes. I would need a lot more than just opinion.
The Panzer Army Africa started the Second Battle of El Alamein with 104,000 men (50,000 of them German). The Germans then took all of the Italian motor transport and fled for all they were worth.
The distances involved were huge. Alamein to the First supply port Tobruk was 375 miles. Tobruk to the next supply port, Benghazi was another 305 miles.
Both sides had been twice up and twice back before Alamein. Montgomery did not make the mistakes previously made by both sides. He ended the war in the North African desert.
As for Patton, he deserted the battlefield in Sicily to seek personal glory by taking Palermo, because it was the Island's capital city. The problem was that the real battle was at the other side of the Island:
I was a Brigadier-General, and Artillery Commander of 82nd US Airborne Division. We took the north-west corner of Sicily [from Agrigento] . . . it was a pleasure march, shaking hands with Italians asking, 'How's my brother Joe in Brooklyn?' Nicest war I've ever been in! Monty—he had a different problem—he was up against Germans.
US General Maxwell Taylor.
'I had offered to go on to take Caltanissetta, but Patton wanted to capture Palermo. . . . It is my belief that the glamor of the big city was the chief thing that attracted Gen. Patton.
US General Lucian Truscott.
Patton personally assaulted Italian peasants, and two of his own soldiers, and got himself passed over for army group command in the campaign in North West Europe.
In Normandy, as a single army commander he was not in the battle until it was three parts over, and most of the Germans had been pinned down by British Second Army.
Of the allied break out in Normandy:
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P333
‘All along the front we pressed forward in hot pursuit of the fleeing enemy. In four days the British spearheads, paralleled by equally forceful American advances on their right, covered a distance of 195 miles, one of the many feats of marching by our formations in the great pursuit across France.’
And onwards to Germany...
DEFEAT IN THE WEST
BY MILTON SHULMAN
LONDON
SECKER AND WARBURG 1947
CHAPTER XXIII
THE RETREAT
'THE most spectacular and most significant advance, once the Seine had beencrossed, was made by Second British Army in their break-out from their bridgehead at Vernon. In less than four days their armour dashed about 250 miles to capture Amiens, Arras, Tournai, Brussels, Louvain and Antwerp.'
So there you have it, Patton in France was nothing special.
And onwards:
The Lorraine Campaign:
An Overview,
September-December 1944
by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
February, 1985
THIRD ARMY
'Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered first-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirety of soldiers with stomach ulcers.'
'Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months.'
'Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory? From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war.'
'Finally the Lorraine campaign demonstrated that Logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be. He [Patton] discovered that violating logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter.'
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@patriciapalmer1377
Eisenhower had zero personal combat experience, almost no command experience, he had not even seen a dead body until April 1943. He was a politician in an army uniform.
He presided over a slow campaign in Tunisia. He devised a very poor plan for the invasion of Italy despite warnings from Montgomery that the dispersal of forces would lead to major problems, which it did.
He mainly kept of Montgomery's way in Normandy and as result the allies had all but cleared France by D+87, giving the Germans as big a defeat as Stalingrad.
Eisenhower took over as allied land forces Commander on the 1st September 1944,and the whole allied advance stalled. He was warned:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P520
'The plan which Montgomery presented to Eisenhower at their meeting on August 23rd was bold enough, but it meant halting Patton and confining Third Army to the defensive role of flank protection during the advance of the Second British and First American Armies to the Ruhr. "The American public, said Eisenhower, " would never stand for it; and public opinion wins war."'
The is it is, US poltical considerations dictating Eisenhowers military decisions.
From Alanbrooke's Diary:
ARTHUR BRYANT
TRIUMPH IN THE WEST
1943-46
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON 1959
P263
‘”Arrived Monty’s H.Q. by 2 p.m. [9th August] Had a long talk with him about recent crisis with Eisenhower. Apparently he has succeeded in arriving at a suitable compromise by which First U.S. Army is to move on the right of 21 Army Group and head for area Charleroi, Namur, Liége, just North of the Ardennes. Only unsatisfactory part is that this army is not under Monty’s orders and he can only co-ordinate its actions in relation to 21 Army Group. This may work; it remains to be seen what political pressure is put on Eisenhower to move Americans on separate axis from the British.”’
And more...
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@garyholschuh8811
‘Could you imagine being a German commander going up against a British army commanded by Montgomery?’ Your words.
"Montgomery who we first encountered in 1940 was probably the best tactician of the war”
German General FW von Mellenthin
“Field-Marshal Montgomery was the one general who never suffered a reverse”
"The Americans attacked with zest, and had a keen sense of mobile action, but when they came under heavy artillery fire they usually fell back-even after they had made a successful penetration. By contrast, once the British had got their teeth in, and had been in a position for twenty-four hours, it proved almost impossible to shift them. To counter-attack the British always cost us very heavy losses.
German General Günther Blumentritt.
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough’.
German General Hasso von Manteuffel.
‘All the way from Dunkirk to the Philippines, to North Africa, to the Netherlands’ Your words.
Err…Dunkirk saved 338,000 troops-ultimately leading to Hitler’s defeat. The campaign around that ended in disaster, but Britain only contributed 10% of the troops involved. North Africa, ended in a defeat for the Axis as big as Stalingrad. The Netherlands was liberated.
As for the Philippines…it was an American defeat with no British involvement.
‘the British and Montgomery were just in the way when it came to winning the war in Europa!’ Your words.
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
US General Omar Bradley.
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
US General Dwight D Eisenhower
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St. Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St. Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
”I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
US Major General Robert W. Hasbrouck.
Field Marshal Montgomery arrived the following day. It was my first personal meeting with him, although I had seen him in staff meetings in London before Normandy. He was impressive, a perceptive, quick-minded man, incisive in his judgments. I could understand why he had been so popular with’ the Eighth Army in North Africa. I took a liking to him that has not diminished with the years.
US General James M Gavin.
As for that ‘endless supply of equipment’ . It amounted to 16.5% of Britain’s war needs across the war years.
As for the USA…It was not in the fighting until Germany had lost all of its advantages in technology and being the aggressor against countries that were behind it rearmament, or until the Germans had been stopped from getting war materials from outside of mainland Europe, and it was irretrievable committed in Russia. The USA was three thousand miles from its nearest enemy, suffered zero attacks on its mainland from its enemies. Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers did not have a day of personal combat experience between them. This showed as they presided over bog ups in Tunisia, Italy, Normandy Metz, the Bulge and the Hurtgen Forest. Devers contributed next to nothing to the allied victory.
Ah,ah,ah...Before decide to reply, consider what the chances are that you will know more about this subject than me.
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