Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "The People Profiles"
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@johnhallett5846
Its a definite no.
The North End of Arnhem Bridge was still allied hands when XXX Corps linked up with the US 2nd Airborne Division on the early morning of the 3rd day, with whole of that day to reach Arnhem Bridge, a 14 mile run. If Nijmegen Bridge and City had been allied hands, XXX Corps would have been there in... three hours?
The Intelligence on German capability was seen by Eisenhower, Brereton, and Bradley was well as Montgomery.
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
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@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-
A reason why we get so many ill-informed comments on here from the US is that Americans have convinced themselves that the USA is good at fighting military campaigns, because of the outcome of the world wars.
The prosaic reality is that in both conflicts, the USA was thousands of miles from any threat to its homeland, it had modest import needs, its allies bore the brunt of the Central Powers and Axis attacks when those enemies were at height of their powers and the USA outnumbered most of its opponents.
Instead of accepting this reality, Americans like to think that this US commander was better than that allied or enemy commander, this US tactic or strategy was better than that allied tactic or strategy, and so on.
That is how we end up with rubbish comments on YouTube that have zero basis in reality, like: 'the Germans feared Patton', 'Eisenhower masterminded D-Day,' 'the Battle of the Bulge could have cost the allies the war', 'the USAAF bombed accurately', and so on and so on.
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'He's a jerk like Wellington! From the moment he has not had the opportunity either to cling to positions previously established by him, that he does not have a balance of power in his favor, these guys are tacticians of operetta! As far as Wellington is concerned, study his "campaigns" from Portugal and Spain and up to Waterloo ... he only clung to positions established by him but without the slightest tactics worthy of the name. When in Montgomery, the only times he was told to "move", he broke his face seriously. As the Americans progressed around him, after the disembarkation, he was blocked for a month in front of Caen and let's not talk about the disastrous operation of Arnhem which ended in a massacre of English soldiers launched in an operation towards which he did not want. take into account movements of SS armored units' Your words.
The vast bulk of German forces in Normandy were ranged in front of British 2nd Army at Caen, including 84% of the German armour, so the US forces could break out.
Market Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, hindered German rocket attacks on London, stretched German defences another fifty miles, and left the allies well placed to attack into Germany in the years ahead. Market Garden’s casualties (17,000), should be compared to allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000 casualties), Metz (45,000 casualties), and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000 casualties).
Learn some history before posting on here.
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@robertgoines1831
What sort of idiot would post this:
-Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare
-The V-2s were still being launched
-The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies
-Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.
-The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease.
-Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich
-Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged
-Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army
-Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success' Probably a teenager from Cleveland, Ohio, USA.
0/10.
Field Marshall Model was there because his headquarters was in Oosterbeek. He soon fucked off when the fighting started, As I would have done. Student was there to command his forces. Army Group Commander Montgomery was at Eindhoven before the end of the battle. Eisenhower was in Ranville in Normandy, Brereton was England.
The 17,000 losses were not entirely made up of Paratroops, and those losses compare with allied failures in the same period at Aachen (20,000), Metz (45,000) and the Hurtgen Forest (55,000).
The Dutch Honger Winter was not caused by Market Garden. It was caused by the Germans, and the German treatment of the Dutch at that time was entirely consistent with German treat of other occupied areas at that time. Market Garden displaced no plan to liberate the bulk of the Netherlands at that time. Further, Market Garden liberated far more people than died in that winter.
Deportation of Dutchmen to Germany as forced labour started long before Market Garden.
Market Garden was not designed to take the allies to Berlin, as one of Montgomery's harshest critics has confirmed:
'Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.'
Arthur Tedder, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue.
None of the allies would cross the Rhine for another six months. US 9th Army was assigned to 21st Army Group because they were where the Germans were providing the stiffest opposition.
The SS Man Prince Bernhard was distrusted by both British and US intelligence, both of whom, rightly showed him the door. Only his Royal status kept him out of prison in the 1970s.
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William Swan
‘Montgomery spent much of his career lecturing military theory’
Montgomery fought with distinction in the First World War, being wounded twice and being awarded the DSO. Montgomery performed with distinction in France in 1940, in trying circumstances, with his superbly trained division closing the gap on the allied left after the Belgian capitulation, and then bringing his division home almost intact. By the time that Bradley, Devers and Eisenhower eventually got into the war, Montgomery had already forgotten more about fighting wars than the three of them collectively were ever going to know.
Operation Goodwood was launched because delays in the US advance to the west, in order to keep German forces away from the US troops. Two thirds of the tanks supposedly knocked out at Goodwood were operational again within days.
‘"Operation Market Garden", which was highly out of character for him in its daring and risk in the face of great uncertainties. It was a deeply flawed operation, almost certainly conceived by Montgomery to prove that he had the same flair as Patton.’
What did Montgomery have to prove in regard to Patton? Montgomery was an army group commander in a different army. Paton had pratted himself by hitting Sicilian peasants and some of his own troops. The V2 attacks on Britain alone justified Market Garden.
The Remagen bridge was captured by Hodges, not Patton.
‘it is thanks to Chamberlain that Britain did not become involved in a war before it was capable of defending itself, and was in fact capable when war broke out. I wonder how many people know that immediately after giving his notorious "Peace in our time" speech for the benefit of the Germans, Chamberlain immediately ordered many measures to prepare Britain for war?!’
Hardly, when Chamberlain went the Munich conference, Britain had already, but far too late, begun to rearm. Before Chamberlain went to Munich the service chiefs told him that Britain could not be ready for a general war before 1941. When Chamberlain left office in 1940, there were still one million people unemployed in Britain.
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@solomongrundy4905
'Monty was badly embarrased at Caen because HE BOASTED HE'D TAKE IT IN 24 HOURS.' Your words.
Not really...
Montgomery made no commitment regarding the capture of Caen.
This from an eye witness to Montgomery's briefing to allied leaders at St Paul's School, 15th May, 1944:
OPERATION VICTORY
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DEGUINGAND K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODER AND STOUGHTON LIMITED PUBLISHERS LONDON 1947
P 393
‘Now I am quite certain no promises were made about Caen'
The only promise that Montgomrry made in regard to timings for Normandy was to get the allies to the Seine by D+90. He got them there by D+78.
'He demonstrated his lack of skill there by sending tanks ahead without infantry support. This led to massive tank losses for the Brits.' Your words.
Not really...
Montgomery's tank losses were in line with other senior allied
commanders, Bradley and Devers, compared to the opposition that they faced. When German armoured forces were up agaist allied tank forces, one on one, the Germany generally had the best of it.
'He screwed up at Falaise' Your words.
Not really...
"In halting Patton at Argentan, however, I did not consult Montgomery. The decision to stop Patton was mine alone. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise".
From US Army General, Omar Bradley's A Soldier's Story book. Page 377.
His words.
More to follow...
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@stephenburke5967
Wall to wall rubbish.
The ‘Market’ plan that covered how, when and where the airborne forces were to be landed, and how they fought was the responsibility of the commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, the US General Brereton.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
By Charles B. MacDonald
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
P127
‘The first major planning conference -on Operation MARKET convened in England late on 10 September, only a few hours after General Eisenhower in a meeting with Montgomery at Brussels had given his approval.’
‘Once the ground troops overran the airborne divisions, command was to pass to the 30 British Corps. Responsibility for the complex troop carrier role fell to the commander of the IX Troop Carrier Command, General Williams.’
P132
‘’Naturally anxious that all their strength arrive on D-Day, the division commanders asked that the planes fly more than one mission the first day. They pointed to the importance of bringing all troops into the corridor before the enemy could reinforce his antiaircraft defenses or launch an organized ground assault.’
‘Although it meant taking a chance on enemy reaction and on the weather, General Brereton sided with the troop carrier commanders. He decided on one lift per day.’
As to whether Montgomery had any say in Brereton’s plan, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
‘General Urquhart had warned planners that the dense forests around their landing zones would hamper their communications"which it did dramatically".’ Your words.
Where is this on record?
‘I must add the Dutch underground pleaded with London for weeks prior to Market Garden to blanket bomb the dense forests around Arnhem, Nijmegan and Lent as the Germans had put a corden around the forests with no civilian access therefore no casualties.’
I never heard of it. Where is this on record?
‘The Dutch underground had pinpointed these areas as the hiding areas of the two Panzer divisions that London were informed about but this was ignored.’
All communications purporting to come from the Dutch Underground at that time were routinely disregarded due to the German ‘Enlandspiel’ penetration of the Dutch Underground. Market Garden was no different to any other situation at that time in that regard.
‘it prolonged the war and caused further needless deaths in the theatre of war and infact caused the Russians to advance first into Berlin and the problems that caused in later years with needless deaths and hardship from the segregation of Berlin until the fall of the Wall in November 9th 1989.’ Your words.
How could Market Garden have prolonged the war? It was no bigger than a number of other allied operations at that time, none of which succeeded. If anyone caused the Russians to be in Berlin first, it was Eisenhower, with his broad front policy, which stopped the allied advance, leaving Churchill and Roosevelt with no cards to play at the Yalta Conference, and later, Eisenhower’s unilateral decision to contact Stalin to tell him that Western forces would not attempt to reach Berlin.
‘Intelligence told the planners that two Panzer divisions were in the area around Arnhem’
Your words
A SHAEF Intelligence Summary week ending September 4th 1944 stated that the Germans facing British 2nd Army was "no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms".
The 1st Para Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1 CLEARLY states that:
"..the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
Signed W A Taylor, Capt, IO, 1 Parachute Brigade, dated 13th September 1944.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P260
‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
P263
‘Guessing which Germans would be fought proved vexing beyond all other vexations. Radio traffic showed that Model’s Army Group B headquarters had shifted to Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. Other intelligence suggested that enemy reinforcements of river and canal defenses, but with troops considered “low category”; some improvised Luftwaffe ground units were apparently so rudimentary that they lacked field kitchens. Ultra decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed that various battered units from Normandy had been ordered to Western Holland to refit, and subsequent intercepts indicated that this gaggle included II SS Panzer Corps. Not until September 15 had the SHAEF high command taken note that the corps’ two divisions, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer, seemed to laagered near Arnhem. Together they had suffered nine thousand casualties at Caen, at Falaise, and in the retreat across France; they had also lost much of their armor, including 120 tanks on August 19 alone. But whether the divisions were still eviscerated , where they were headed, or precisely where they were now located remained opaque.’
‘Monty knew the weather would hamper supplies’ Your words.
Nope. Market Garden was launched on the basis of a weather report on the afternoon of the 16th September, 1944, which predicted four days of good weather.
‘The road networks approaching their bridge objectives were far to narrow for quick decisive advance and this planning mistake was alone unforgiving of Montgomery.’
But XXX Corps advanced 50 miles in two days (with 12 hours lost due to the Bridge at Son being blown up), arriving at Nijmegen at the start of the third day, only to find that that the US 82nd Airborne Division had failed to capture Nijmegen Bridge.
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@richmcintyre1178
'Monty was not a good strategist. He had the Intel and ignored it. His big moment was more important.'
When did this happen?
He "won" in Africa because the US gave him 500 tanks and the Navy supplied him well beyond what the Germans could match. Just a terrible commander.
They weapon in the desert was the anti-tank gun, not the tank. The British 6 pounder versus the German 8.8cm.
The isituation facing Montgomery in North Africa, the middle of 1942, was far more challenging han a matter of supply. With four divisions against Rommel's six divisions, Montgomery won at Alam el Halfa, and then went on to re-build the Eighth Army, as people who were there later testified:
ARTHUR BRYANT
THE TURN OF THE TIDE
1939-43
COLLINS, ST JAMES’S PLACE, LONDON
1957
P 475
‘without consulting Cairo, he issued immediate orders that, if Rommel attacked, all units should fight on the ground where they and that there should be no withdrawal or surrender. The effect on the Army was electric.’
P 478
‘I was dumfounded by the rapidity with which he had grasped the situation facing him, the ability with which had grasped the essentials, the clarity of his plans , and above all his unbounded self-confidence—a self-confidence with which he inspired all those that he came into contact with.’
WINSTON S CHURCHILL.
THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
CASSELL & CO LTD 1951
P464
‘Everybody said what a change there was since Montgomery had taken command. I could feel the truth of this with joy and comfort.’
GENERALS AT WAR
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS DE GUINGAND
K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.
HODDER AND STOUGHTON 1964
P 188
‘I have always considered that Montgomery’s first two or three days with his Army was one of the most rewarding experiences of my life, and the way in which he put over his personality, right through the Army, was really remarkable. Besides talking to the staff and laying down what he called his ‘military philosophy’, he met all Commanders and their troops and, of course, examined in great detail the ground now held and that over which we would have to fight. I accompanied him during the reconnaissances which resulted in decisions as to the way he proposed to dispose his forces for the defensive battles which we all expected. It would be Rommel’s last desperate to reach the Delta, and failure would remove once and for all the threat to our Middle East Base.’
Here is German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin on Montgomery:
"Montgomery who we first encountered in 1940 was probably the best tactician of the war if not the best strategist. He made mistakes. Rommel made mistakes as he too was stubborn. Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery.'
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@richmcintyre1178
'Patton was paying bonuses to men who scronged enemy supplies' Where is this on record?
Patton did not reveal to Eisenhower and Bradley at that time that one of his corps had captured 110,000 gallons of petrol.
'He still had an army to feed and positions to defend so yes he was still receiving supplies but not the amount needed to attack.' But none of his supplies were being diverted for MARKET GARDEN.
Pattons seems to have been driven by personal ambition, rather than what might be best for the allied cause, based on available evidence:
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN
2013.
PROLOGUE
11
‘Of Patton a comrade noted, “He gives the impression of a man biding his time”. In fact, he had revealed his anxiety in a recent note to his wife. “I fear the war will be over before I get loose, but who can say? Fate and the hand of God still runs most shows.”
Patton was 100 miles from the Rhine at the time of MARKET GARDEN. His armies were facing the Saar, whereas the armies of Dempsey and Hodges were facing the far more important Ruhr.
Montgomery had already offered Eisenhower the chance to halt Crearer and Dempsey, leaving Hodges and Patton to continue the advance, at at meeting on 23rd August:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P512
'It was vitally important that a firm and clear-cut decision should be made at once, for it was long overdue. But Montgomery had no opportunity of discussing the problem with Eisenhower until August 23rd when they met for the first time in a week. Montgomery then put the issue bluntly. " Administratively," he said, " we haven't the resources to maintain both Army Groups at full pressure. The only policy is to halt the right and strike with the left, or halt the left and strike with the right. We must decide on one thrust and put all the maintenance to support that. If we split the maintenance and advance on a broad front, we shall be so weak everywhere that we will have no chance of success." '
Eisenhower did neither, and everyone stopped. Montgomery was proved right.
The Germans agreed with Montgomery:
'German general Gunther Blumentritt on Montgomery from 'The Other Side Of The Hill by B. H. Liddell Hart page 355:
All the German generals to whom I talked were of the opinion that the Allied Supreme Command had missed a great opportunity of ending the war in the autumn of 1944. They agreed with Montgomery's view that this could best have been achieved by concentrating all possible resources on a thrust in the north"'.
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@finallyfriday.
'The US crossed the Rhine In one day at 2 points. Monty took 6 more months planning Plunder and finally crossed the Rhine. And with limited succes even though by now the wars was basically over.'
Not really...
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD 1954
P759
‘Montgomery's preparations for the assault across the Lower Rhine were elaborate. His armies were confronted with the greatest water obstacle in Western Europe (the river at Wesel was twice as wide as at Oppenheim) and their crossing was expected to require, as Eisenhower has said, " the largest and most difficult amphibious operation undertaken since the landings on the coast of Normandy."’
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P423
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
P427
‘The March 24 operation sealed the fate of Germany. Already, of course, we had secured two bridgeheads farther to the south. But in each of these cases surprise and good fortune had favoured us. The northern operation was made in the teeth of the greatest resistance the enemy could provide anywhere along the long river. Moreover, it was launched directly on the edge of the Ruhr and the successful landing on the eastern bank placed strong forces in position to deny the enemy use of significant portions of that great industrial area.’
IKE & MONTY: GENERALS AT WAR
NORMAN GELB
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LIMITED 1994
P406
‘Montgomery wouldn’t hear of it. An early crossing did not fit the plan he had been devising with great thoroughness to meet all contingencies. The resourceful Germans had shown in the Ardennes that they were capable of the unexpected. Bradley, Patton and Hodges might have been willing to gamble and Montgomery was pleased that they had succeeded. But he was not interested in easy victories that might be of limited significance, and he did not believe they fully understood the risks they had taken or the extent of the far greater achievement he was aiming for. Risk-taking was for amateurs. The results of the first day of his massive Rhine-crossing operation demonstrated the value of doing things right – six divisions were firmly across the river at a cost of only 1,200 casualties.
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@johnburns4017
'He not only didn't take Caen which was a day 1 objective and it was wide open for the taking (as was the approach to Antwerp) He putted around and didn't take it in a month. finallyfriday.
Caen never had date attached to it by Montgomery. Far from being undefended, it had the German 21st Panzer Division in front of it - which proceeded to carry out the only major German counter attack of the day, as it drove towards the coast between SWORD and JUNO beaches.
The approaches to Atwerp (The Scheldt) were far from undefended, the fortifications at Flushing were some of the most formidable in Europe, and the Germans were in force on the sothern bank, at the Seaward end of the estuary, in the Breskens Pocket. The idea that the Scheldt was there for the taking is absurd. The Germans were always going to fight fanatically to deny Antwerp to the allies, as evidenced by their V weapons campaign against that city, and that he ogjective of their ardennes offensive was Antwerp.
'While the US took most of France, Monty couldn't get off the beach.' finallyfriday.' finallyfriday.
As we all know, the vast bulk of the German forces in Normandy was rangd against British 2nd Army. The plan was always for the US 1st Army to take Cherbourg, the major port in the region and to swing round trap the German forces between the two armies. It was the slowness of the US build up that caused Montgomery to undertake a series of operations in the Caen in order to keep the Germans tied down.
‘The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them to their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus, while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen, we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans. Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that the enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.’
From Omar Bradley's book A Soldier's Story.
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