Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "The People Profiles"
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@BrianFrancisHeffron-1776
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
US General Eisenhower
'In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort.'
US General Bradley
`You see from the very start when I was under the command of the Marshal I got clear and definite orders what I had to do. From Bradley and my own people I never get any orders that make it clear to me what I have got to do.
US General Simpson
‘The operations of the American 1st Army had developed into a series of individual holding actions. Montgomery's contribution to restoring the situation was that he turned a series of isolated actions into a coherent battle fought according to a clear and definite plan. It was his refusal to engage in premature and piecemeal counter-attacks which enabled the Americans to gather their reserves and frustrate the German attempts to extend their breakthrough.
The German commander of the 5th Panzer Army, Hasso von Manteuffel.
"Montgomery who we first encountered in 1940 was probably the best tactician of the war if not the best strategist. He made mistakes. Rommel made mistakes as he too was stubborn. Montgomery when he arrived in Africa changed the way the 8th army fought, he was a very good army trainer and was ruthless in his desire to win, he changed the battle into an infantry battle supported by artillery. There has been much talk of using Montgomery to 'tidy up in the 'bulge' we would have done the same thing"
German Generalmajor FW von Mellenthin.
Fancy some more?..
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@richmcintyre1178
Its still a definite no.
At the time each Army Group was getting 7,000 of supplies per day. That is 7,000 tons for 21st Army Group (Montgomery), and 7,000 tons for 12th Army Group (Bradley).
Bradley intially divided his 7,000 tons by sending 5,000 tons to his subordinate Hodges, and 2,000 tons to his subordinate Patton. Before MARKET GARDEN was even conceived, Bradley shifted and additional 1,500 tons per day from Hodges to Patton. He also sent 4 divisions from Hodges to Patton. This arrangement lasted until after MARKET GARDEN had finished. There is no record of supplies being transferred from Patton to 21st Army Group.
An additional 500 tons per day had been flown in by air to help feed the civilian population of Paris. This was sent to 21st Army Group for MARKET GARDEN as the French civilian authorities were able to take over the supply needs of the City.
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@saltmerchant749
Not really...
Part One:
Eisenhower has to take final responsibility as by then, as well as being Supreme Commander, he had appointed himself as allied land forces commander. This with little command experience in battle, and with zero personal combat experience.
Montgomery had no jurisdiction over the Market plan which was under the command of the US General Brereton. Of this, the evidence is clear:
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD. 1954
CHAPTER XXVII. THE LOST OPPORTUNITY
P 588
The Guards, breaking out along one road, met strong opposition nearly all the way to Eindhoven, and yet they drove their armour through these twelve bitterly contested miles in twenty-four hours. When they reached the southern end of the ‘airborne corridor’ on the evening of D plus 1, they were halted for the night by the blown bridge at Zon. This bridge might have been captured intact if the 101st Division had agreed to Montgomery's proposal that it should drop paratroops on either side of the objective, as was done at Grave.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P 265
‘General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in DRAGOON the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision, despite analysis that showed transporting the entire combat force at a deliberate rate could take up to four days.’
Political pressure from Churchill, if such a term can be used, was applied via the War Office - regarding the possibility of what could be done to hinder V2 rocket attacks on London. a quite reasonable request, given the numbr of civilians that were dying.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
P245/246
‘The initial volley had been fired from Holland, and the SS general overseeing PENGUIN had placed his headquarters outside Nijmegen, ‘a Dutch town only ten miles south of Arnhem on the Rhine, a prime objective of Operation MARKET GARDEN. The message from London advising Montgomery of the first rocket attacks also pleaded, “Will you please report most urgently by what date you consider you can rope off the coastal area contained by Antwerp-Utrecht-Rotterdam?”
Obviously no American can possibly relate to this, their homeland was 3,000 miles from any trouble. Not that such a distance stops them from passing judgement on those that were in the real war. As for the Ameicans and Market Garden, the FAAA (First Allied Airborne Army - to save you looking it up), was an American led idea, and US Generals Marshall and Arnold were keen to see it made use of.
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@saltmerchant749
Not really...
Part Two:
Montgomery contended that the plan was 'attended by considerable risks.'
The key decisions that stopped the allies from taking Arnhem, all came from the FAAA:
The distance of the landing zones from the bridges;
No second lift on the first day;
A US soldier deciding to take a complete set of plans, leading to those plans being found by the Germans on his dead body, in a US glider, in a US drop zone within 2 hours of the start of the operation.
The decision not to attempt to take Nijmegen bridge on the first day.
The intelligence was seen by all senior officers, and was inconclusive:
1st Parachute Brigade Intelligence Summary No 1 CLEARLY states that:
"..the area might contain 15,000 enemy troops of which perhaps 8,000 would be concentrated in Arnhem. A reported concentration of 10,000 troops SW of Zwolle on 1st September may represent a battle scarred Panzer Division or two reforming"
Signed W A Taylor, Capt, IO, 1 Parachute Brigade, dated 13th September 1944.
THE GUNS AT LAST LIGHT
THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1944-1945
Rick Atkinson
LITTLE BROWN 2013.
This paperback edition published in 2013.
P260
‘A SHAEF intelligence summary issued September 16 reported that “the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.” German strength facing the 100,000-man XXX Corps directly across the Dutch border was estimated at six infantry battalions backed by twenty armored vehicles and a dozen field guns; scant enemy activity had been detected in the last two days.’
P263
‘Guessing which Germans would be fought proved vexing beyond all other vexations. Radio traffic showed that Model’s Army Group B headquarters had shifted to Oosterbeek, outside Arnhem. Other intelligence suggested that enemy reinforcements of river and canal defenses, but with troops considered “low category”; some improvised Luftwaffe ground units were apparently so rudimentary that they lacked field kitchens. Ultra decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed that various battered units from Normandy had been ordered to Western Holland to refit, and subsequent intercepts indicated that this gaggle included II SS Panzer Corps. Not until September 15 had the SHAEF high command taken note that the corps’ two divisions, the 9th and 10th SS Panzer, seemed to laagered near Arnhem. Together they had suffered nine thousand casualties at Caen, at Falaise, and in the retreat across France; they had also lost much of their armor, including 120 tanks on August 19 alone. But whether the divisions were still eviscerated , where they were headed, or precisely where they were now located remained opaque.’
A lack of air support was due to the weather being good for operations on only four days of the operation.
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