Comments by "TheVilla Aston" (@thevillaaston7811) on "The People Profiles"
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@BrianFrancisHeffron-1776
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P282
‘Knowing that his old antagonist of the desert, Rommel, was to be in charge of the defending forces, Montgomery predicted that enemy action would be characterized by constant assaults carried out with any force immediately available from division down to a battalion or even company size. He discounted the possibility that the enemy under Rommel would ever select a naturally strong defensive line and calmly and patiently go about the business of building up the greatest possible amount of force in order to launch one full-out offensive into our beach position. Montgomery’s predictions were fulfilled to the letter.’
P288
‘Montgomery’s tactical handling of the British and Canadians on the Eastward flank and his co-ordination of these operations with those of the Americans to the westward involved the kind of work in which he excelled.
P423
‘Montgomery was always the master in the methodical preparation of forces for a formal, set piece attack. In this case he made the most meticulous preparations because we knew that along the front just north of the Ruhr the enemy had his best remaining troops including portions of the First Paratroop Army.’
Canadian troops in Europe were first, part of British 2nd Army, then when the Canadian First Amy was formed, over half of its strength was made up of British and Polish troops. It then formed part of Montgomery's 21st Army Group. Canadian troops were alongside British troops from D-Day until 1945. My own father saw Canadians in Normandy, the Scheldt and the Reichwald. In the last stages of the war, the Canadian forces were mainly left to mop up in the Netherlands while British forces advance into Germany.
Before you decide to compose an answer to me, ask youself this question: What are the chances that Brian Heffron will know more about this subject than TheVilla Aston?..
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@etangdescygnes
'Montgomery did well at Second El Alamein, but I think his leadership in Normandy, Zeeland, and Market Garden was bad. And yes, Eisenhower must take the ultimate responsibility for Montgomery’s bungling, as the SCAEF!'
What bungling?
For Overlord Montgomery undertook to reach the seine by D+90. He got there by D+78, with 22% fewer than expected casualties and inflicting a defeat as large as Stalingrad on the Germans. All this, with the disruption to the allied build-up caused by the great June storm and him being badgered by glory hungry, know nothing US Generals. Since then, Montgomery's conduct of the Battle has been subject to hair-splitting criticism. If it had been a US commander delivering such a victory, there would have been a library of books, statues, museums, Hollywood films, TV mini-series, and not a day would have gone by without a lecture on the subject, somewhere in America.
As for Zeeland, I take it you mean the Scheldt. That was hundred miles of riverbank and shoreline to clear, with the German in force the Breskens Pocket before the approach of 21st Army Group. That the Germans considered the Scheldt to be highly important is obvious, they were never going to give it up without a major fight.
Maket Garden freed a fifth of the Dutch population, stretched the German front another 60 miles, hindered V2 attacks on Britain and left the allies well plced to assault the Rhine later in the war. The casualties incurred compare wel to allied defeats at Aachen, Metz and the Hurtgen Forest in the same period.
'it has been stated that the obliteration of Caen on Montgomery’s orders, and Operation Goodwood, were mistakes. It has been suggested that it would have been wiser to send infantry units skirting around the eastern edges of Colombelles and Caen in predawn twilight, where they would have been far from the German guns ranged along the Dives, would have found cover, and could have turned westwards to infiltrate Colombelles and Caen in many separate places as the sun rose behind their backs. It would have been the job of the armour and artillery to then similarly skirt along the eastern edge of the built-up areas, to screen the city from German attacks across the plain between the Orne and Dives. Once secured, Caen would have provided a route to hook around the western end of the Borguébus Ridge, and supplies could have been brought from the beaches by both lorries and boats, (along the Orne). Such an operation probably had a much greater chance of success, and would have spared many civilian lives and much destruction of property. There is no reason to think that it would not also have kept the Germans pinned in place.'
Has this come from that charlatan Antony Beevor?
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