Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "TIKhistory"
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Rightfully so these two thought it prudent.Specially when you factor in British Lorrie situation breaking down
Wilmot's "The Struggle For Europe" and on page 524 of the Reprint Society London 1954 edition
By the start of September all the transport reserves of 21st Army Group were on the road. Imports were cut from 16,000 tons per day to 7,000 so that transport companies could be diverted from unloading ships to forward supply. This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) had faulty pistons which rendered them useless. These trucks could have delivered to the Belgian border another 800 tons a day, sufficient to maintain two divisions. By reducing the daily tonnage of First Canadian Army, by bringing in fresh transport companies from England, and by such expedients as welding strips of airfield track on the sides of tank-transporters to convert them for supply carrying, 21st Army Group was able to provide enough supplies to carry Dempsey's two forward corps into Belgium as far as Brussels and Antwerp, but with it's own resources it could go no further.
See "The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group." p.47
So the GI's Red Ball express couldn't keep lugging all that tonnage 483 miles from Cherbourg. Not without assistence from either an open port or the British Lorries pulling their weight rather than in tow
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Little Villa your favorite perv admits it after the war
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public
The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby
When interrogated in 1945, Heinz Guderian the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place.”General Gunther Blumentritt We regarded general Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies. . . His operations impressed us enormously probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets
The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed"
Ladislas Farago Patton:Ordeal & Triump(New York:Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc.1964)h,p.505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him" From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt
CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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@johnburns4017 Brits always fight to last colonial, usually Australians.Old Monty at least Japanese Commanders had the common decency to disembowel themselves after a disaster like OMG.
Try quoting actuall historians and books with page numbers you knob.Puddles are you monty's little swiss boy you keep repeating bullshit and you know it.And here is what Bradley said
From Bradley,A Generals Life,Page 299 Gen Bradley wrote "the news of the German escape from the Falaise Gap was a shattering disappointment - one of my greatest of the war.a golden opportunity had truly been lost.I boiled inside,blaming Monty for the blunder".
From The Second World War by John Keegan,page 399 In 1944 the USA produced 47,000 tanks ,while Germany produced 29,600 tanks and assault guns.Britain in 1944 produced only 5000 tanks.
From September Hope,by John C.McManus,pages 39-40 By September 15,disquieting intelligence about the Arnhem area had come to light.ULTRA AND Dutch intel had detected elements of the 9th& 10 SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem (Monty later admitted he ignored this) They were not far from the planned British drop zones.Intelligence specialist Maj Brian Urquhart as greatly alarmed by the reports.He already thought that Market Garden was at best a bold gamble ,at worst sheer madness.He was adamantly opposed to it.The Intelligence intercepts were correct.The photographs revealed the presence of camouflaged enemy tanks and self propelled guns in the wooded area near Arnhem
"From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
Center of Military History,The United States Army,The Sigrfied Line CampaignPage174
Spearheading the 30 Corps ground column reconnaissance troops of the Guards Armoured Division linked with Colonel Tucker's 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 the morning of D plus 2, 19 September. (See Map IV) Major formations of the British armor were not far behind. From that point priority of objectives within the sector of the 82d Airborne Division shifted unquestionably in the direction of the bridge at Nijmegen. Already at least thirty-three hours behind schedule because of earlier delays south of Eindhoven and at Zon the ground column had to have a way to get across the Waal.
Pages 184-185 First Attempts To Drive on ArnhemCounting from the time of first contact between the British ground column and the 504th Parachute Infantry at Grave at 0820 on D plus 2, 19 September, until the Nijmegen bridge was taken at 1910 on D plus 3, 20 September, a case could be made to show that the ground column was delayed at Nijmegen for almost thirty-five hours Yet this would be to ignore the facts that first arrivals of the ground column represented no more than a forward reconnaissance screen and that several hours elapsed before sizable British units began to arrive. Indeed, almost another twenty-four hours would elapse after capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the British would renew the drive on Arnhem
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
*https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/battle_arnhem_01.shtml
*
At the end of the first day, XXX corps had advanced only seven miles from their start line, and had not reached the first in the sequence of bridges. Meanwhile the Germans were reinforcing, and their tanks were moving into Arnhem ready to take on the lightly armed British paratroopers.
Proof this is a bad plan... the first obstacle each force in this plan had was the very plan itself. XXX Corps stuck going up one road, asking for ambush and serious delays (both occurred)
Retreat to the Reich by Samuel W.Mitcham Jr.,page 244 The US 82nd Airborne was also tied up in heavy fighting in Nijmegen against elements of the 9th SS Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion which was reinforced by I Battalion/22nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment(part of the 10th SS Division). Still the Allies might have won the Battle had the armored advance not been slow .By September 19th they were still miles south of Nijmegen trying to push an entire Corp down a single road.
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Wipe Monty's cack out of your eye sockets you carnival barker .You again have displayed your extraordinary ability not to think .Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command .SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly.Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been.Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics
Fromhistorynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them.
Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it
Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe
BTW babbling Burns it's 80 yrs starting last week that Monty led one of the largest retreats in Military History @ Dunkirk.It's also 75 years ago last week for Victory in Europe.See what a Super Power can do in just 5 yrs.Even correcting all the damage done by the crumbling crown and it's rancid runt got themselves into - You're welcome Johnny Giovanni
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From the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt 'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not. "nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen. "If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, Collins told the Field Marshall "you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise."
CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce. But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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Bernard didn't sort squat in the Ardennes he had to apologize to IKE for suggesting he did,and Churchill addressed this at Parliament. You just keep repeating bullshit hoping someone as bereft as you believes it.Monty's orders were to fall back Harmon and Collins thankfully ignored him.And Monty never showed up to direct at Monty Garden, like a real Field marshall Walter Model.Of course the armored column didn't arrive until 3 days later and the 82nd was left to take on armored cars,halftracks with Mounted mg-42s and 20mm AAguns mounted.
The Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British.Montgomery's disasterous press conference and the clamour of the British Press had stoked a rampant Anglophobia in the USA and especially among Senior American Officers in Europe.And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence.Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled.German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing.The Americans suffered 75,482 casualties,with 8,407 KIA.The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed
The Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,page356 On January 18,determined to mend fences, Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded asan ever famous American Victory" .It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy
http://www.3ad.com/history/wwll/memoirs.pages/marsh.pages/ardennes.campaign.htm
Monty's orders were to withdraw farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action. Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Monty's orders, he gave Harmon the OK." "At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On this day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses."
Lightning Joe Collins did alot of the shoving at the North Shoulder of the Ardennes.Collins found himself on the northern side of the German 'bulge' at the start of their Ardennes offensive. He played a major part in the defeat of the German attack, disengaging on his eastern front and turning south to attack the northern shoulder of the 'bulge', blocking the German transport routes through St. Vith
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt 'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not. "nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen. "If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, Collins told the Field Marshall "you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise."
Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,pages 196-97 Montgomery was the main reason the Americans were stretched in the Ardennes. 16 U.S. divisions were sent north of the Ardennes to compensate for manpower shortages within the 21st Army Group It was similar to Carentan,the Americans were again asked to shoulder the burden of offensive warfare in a sector that had been reserved for his majesty's forces. Or as one American writer recalled Monty was judging 1st Army by the standards of the British 2nd Army,which had barely moved from November 7th to February 8th As a result only 4 U.S.Divisions were strung out in the Ardennes Sector. While in the north Monty accumulated 31 divisions 15 British/Canadians and 16 US.
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page415
Montgomery wrote on December 15th "that Hitler's plight was so dire that he cannot stage major offensive operations"
(Oops,on December 16th the Ardennes offensive began.The twisted twirp wasn't even right for a day.)
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Cleaning latrines no doubt in your case,you have elementary reasoning or perhaps none at all . Monty had 4 full years to cross a 30 mile channel - what was the problem - Hollwood?Ya best let the bigboys get it sorted
♦Hollywood wasn't there when 198,000 Tommies got tossed into the Channel - Monty was.
♦Hollywood didn't make 81,000 Tommies surrender at Singapore
♦Hollywood didn't make 32,000 Tommies surrender at Tobruk
♦Hollywood didn't sign a deal with The Reich annexing the Czech Republic - Britain did.
♦Hollywood didn't stop Britain from crossing the 30 mile channel for 4 full years - after getting driven into it
♦Hollywood never showed up at Market Garden,neither did Monty
♦Hollywood didn't fill ship after ship with tanks,trucks,,halftracks,men,material,munitions, planes,provisions,food,fuel for the duration of the war to prop up the crown.
♦Hollywood didn't promise that Caen would be taken in D+1,Monty did and finally took it 43 days later.
♦Hollywood didn't promise before Market Garden that they'd go to Berlin then couldn't even make it to Arnhem - Monty did
♦Hollywood didn't give 16 U.S.Divisions to Monty's 21st Army Group,IKE did. Then Bernard was practically the last one to cross over the Rhine with them
♦Monty didn't destroy 90% of German Armor Allied Air Corps did.
♦Hollywood didn't make up stories about Bernard bathing little boys Nigel Hamilton reported them in The Full Monty .
♦Hollwood wasn't "evacuated" from:
Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940
Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941
Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942
Want to know who was?
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what author, book and page number??? Monty isn't studied except as a bad example and didn't cross the channel for 4 full years - only with the big boys after the dunkirking. Blumentriit didn't know the GIs were propping up the snogging wanker Bernard for political purposess. IKE should have been removed for basically desrtoying the British Army at Caen
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page407 Churchill had cabled Montgomery "I greatly fear the dwindling of the British Army is a factor in France as it will affect our right to express our opinion upon strategic and other matters"
Intelligence at the Top,by Sir Kenneth Strong Montgomery was letting Bradley's Army lead the way out of Normandy because the Americans could replace their casualties and the British could not .PM Churchill also talked to Eisenhower about the problem the British were having. Churchill called Eisenhower on the telephone and asked him ".....if it was possible Eisenhower to avoid too many British casualties"
Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts, p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse
With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.562-63 Our 3 Armored Divisions, the 11th,7th, and Guards , had been counter attacked from several directions and the advance came to a halt.On 20 July. I spoke to Portal about the Army's failure. We were in agreement regarding Montgomery as the cause
With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586* "Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. *Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. *Eisenhower's efforts covered up Montgomery's lies in Normandy"
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Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool. The subordinate commanders did not plan the over all operation, Monty did.Stop fetching history from the Cornhole Chronicles The dweeb bragged he had all the supplies he was going to get to General Crerar. Here you go from Crerar himself
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions .He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him
Marshall,IKE and SHAEF were done catering to the pathetic Pedo.Patton out performed him standing still - literally.LOOK Here
From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.675 - Sept 24,1944,Monty had been pressing for more supplies to 21st Army Group. IKE informed Monty that he had given preference to the left flank(21st Army) through out the campaign Including the attachments of Air Borne and everything to assure the maintenance.On the other hand all other forces had been fighting with a halter around their necks with respect to supplies. IKE illustrated that for 4 days straight Patton had been receiving serious counter attacks,yet in 7 days without attempting to any real advance 3rd Army captured 9,000 prisoners and knocked out 270 tanks
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