Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "TIKhistory"
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From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944:p. 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
From the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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Here you have it Irving Burns - Brooke and Monty admitting it,maybe you should come clean before it's too late.Repeating all of your fabulous fibs won't get you past the pearly gates
Alan Brooks own words
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219"*...*During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
Monty fessing up
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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Monty won because of an embarrassment of Riches and ULTRA.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable
From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public
The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby
When interrogated in 1945, Heinz Guderian the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place.”General Gunther Blumentritt We regarded general Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies. . . His operations impressed us enormously probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets
The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed"
Ladislas Farago Patton:Ordeal & Triump(New York:Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc.1964)h,p.505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him"
From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt
CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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@matso3856 good job Mats - read "It Never Snows in September" Monty owns this.Regardsless of what Cornhole barks
Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command .SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly.His distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been.Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics
British author of Military History, Max Hastings, states the following in his recent book, The SECRET WAR, Spies, Ciphers, and Guerrillas 1939 -1945 referring to Field Marshal Montgomery on page 495 “The little British field-marshal’s neglect of crystal-clear intelligence, and of an important strategic opportunity, became a major cause of the Western Allied failure to break into the heart of Germany in 1944.
The same overconfidence was responsible for the launch of the doomed airborne assault in Holland on 17 September, despite Ultra’s flagging of the presence near the drop zone of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, together with Field-Marshal Walter Model’s headquarters at Oosterbeek. Had ‘victory fever’ not blinded Allied commanders, common sense dictated that even drastically depleted SS panzers posed a mortal threat to lightly armed and mostly inexperienced British airborne units. Ultra on 14-15 September also showed the Germans alert to the danger of an airborne landing in Holland It was obvious that it would be a very hard to drive the British relief force 64 miles up a single Dutch road, with the surrounding countryside impassable for armour, unless the Germans failed to offer resistance.
The decision to launch Operation Market Garden’ against this background was recklessly irresponsible, and the defeat remains a deserved blot on Montgomery’s reputation.
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THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN
By Don R. Marsh
Monty's orders were to withdraw farther west on the 24th to form a defense line and "tidy up the front" without taking any action Our 2nd Armored Division CO, Major General Ernest Harmon disregarded that order and moved to block the advance near the village of Ciney. The Recon scouts sent word that the Germans had stopped near Celles, apparently to allocate the fuel now in short supply." "At 1435 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "We've got the whole damned 2nd Panzer Division in a sack! You've got to give me immediate authority to attack!" Despite Collins disobeying Monty's orders, he gave Harmon the OK. "At 1625 hours Harmon told VII Corps, "The bastards are in the bag!" On this day the German 2nd Panzer Division trapped and unable to maneuver was destroyed. The enemy lost 81 tanks, 7 assault guns, 405 vehicles of all types, plus 74 big guns. An actual account of the enemy killed and captured was not recorded. It ceased as a fighting force. The German 9th Panzer Division desperately attempted to rescue the 2nd Panzer, but was beaten back with severe losses."
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt 'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not, "nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen. "If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, Collins told the Field Marshall "you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise."
Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge, p366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes campaign produced a political defeat for the British. And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence. Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end
The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled.
--German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing.
--The Americans suffered 75,482 casualties,with 8,407 KIA.
--The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed.
Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,p. 356 On January 18,determined to mend fences,Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded asan ever famous American Victory". It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy
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Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool.The subordinate commanders did not plan the over all operation, Monty did.Stop fetching history from the Cornhole ChroniclesThe dweeb bragged he had all the supplies he was going to get to General Crerar .Here you go from Crerar himself
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions .He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him
Marshall,IKE and SHAEF were done catering to the pathetic Pedo.Patton out performed him standing still - literally.LOOK Here
From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.675 - Sept 24,1944,Monty had been pressing for more supplies to 21st Army Group. IKE informed Monty that he had given preference to the left flank(21st Army) through out the campaign Including the attachments of Air Borne and everything to assure the maintenance.On the other hand all other forces had been fighting with a halter around their necks with respect to supplies. IKE illustrated that for 4 days straight Patton had been receiving serious counter attacks,yet in 7 days without attempting to any real advance 3rd Army captured 9,000 prisoners and knocked out 270 tanks
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But Monty puhleeeze,What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. And then barely.. and poorly.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. Balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons. He was a legend in his own mind.
It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September.The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time Unlike Montgomery forced to go back and open the Port of Antwerp when he promised he'd be in Berlin - A step backward, after making a wrong turn, isn't a step in the right direction,you idiot
Szun Zu - The Art of War"the worst mistake for a general is to underestimate its enemy...!"
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Cheers hey mate,hi mate,hitey ho mate.get a room you rubes.Your boys were driven into the channel.IKE and the GIs gave them 4 full years to cross the English Channel.What was the problem?30 miles the GIs came 3500 miles and supplied the failed English Army again,just like the last war.Should have left your goose stepping cousins have you
It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September.The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time Unlike Montgomery forced to go back and open the Port of Antwerp when he promised he'd be in Berlin - A step backward, after making a wrong turn, isn't a step in the right direction
Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable - Corelli Barnett
From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt
The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed"
From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 521 Montgomery was in a position to profit by the bitter experience of his predecessors.While supplies on our side had been cut to a trickle,American and British ships were bringing vast quantities on materials to North Africa.Many times greater than either his predecessors had ever had. His principle was to fight no battle unless he knew for certain that he would win it.Of course that is a method which will only work given material superiority - but that he had. .Command of a mobile battle force was not his strong point British officers made the error off planning operations according to what was strategically desirable,rather than what was tactically attainable
From The Rommel Papers by B.H.Liddell-Hart page 523 Erwin Rommel - "In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience,but it brought rich dividends .Even at the time American Generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the technical handling of their forces Although we had to wait until Patton's Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare The Americans it is fair to say,profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa,thus confirming axiom that education is easier than re-education".
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