Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "TIKhistory"
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Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation.
-The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Bernard was in reality a plodding, unimaginative,spotlight grabbing little shit
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches
Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."
Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armoured units were stationed there. However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on'
Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594 Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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Cornhole,Your new attempts at slithering about are no more successful than your previous ones .One almost needs a bucket when you post!
So Brooke,Ramsey,Keegan and Tedder are full of shit but you a monty nutthugger are to be believed.LMAO - say that out loud and see how it sounds
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303*Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant,Doubleday & Co,1st American edition, copyright 1959.From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.
From page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
Even John Keegan
The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp.Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.On 10 September he secured Eisenhowers assent to the plan.
Cornhole are you Monty's little Swiss Boy?
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This just keeps getting earier and easier. BTW how is it Monty got driven into the ENGLISH channel,and never got Dunkirked after the GIs arrived? Read Monty's confession
Monty's misadventures - where was he when this debacle started coming apart everywhere almost immediately? Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses at the Belgian border until the Troop support and supply flights went over at 2:30 in the Afternoon?Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like they promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. And why didn't Monty or the Others think to put the bridging equipment up front?17 bridges over 12-13 canals might have come in handy ON TIME don't you think? All 4 Senior British officers and not one thought of this glaring over site - that explains why the RN & RAF was much better led than anything Monty came up with. Try reading what the top officers in the Alliance had to say
Alan Brooke's own words
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely...."
Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary
Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
How about Air Marshall Tedder With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599" Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal
How about Monty's Chief of Staff
Max Hastings, Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
How about IKE's/Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith
Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"
How about IKE's Private Papers?
The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
And of course Admiral Ramsay who knew a deep water port was needed
Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor, page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty, who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later
Try looking up Churchill's biographer Martin Gilbert who took over 20 yrs to finish the 8 volumes on Winston's life Road to Victory, Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion. Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments, the case for him was very weak
Fancy some more little villa?
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Monty won because of an embarrassment of Riches and ULTRA.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable
From Blood,Sweat and Arrogance,by Gordon Corrigan,page 417-18 National myth has it that Monty took over a defeated,demoralized and badly led 8th Army,and by his own abilities and powers of leadership won the great victory of Alamein and then went on to drive the Germans & Italians out of North Africa in a whirlwind campaign that could not have been achieved by anyone else. We know this because Montgomery has told us so,not only by his masterly grasp of public relations at the time but in one of the most self serving memoirs ever foisted on the reading public
The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer - this was monty's baby
When interrogated in 1945, Heinz Guderian the Wehrmacht’s foremost practitioner of Blitzkrieg, stated, “ General Patton conducted a good campaign. From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him on his victory since he acted as I would have done had I been in his place.”General Gunther Blumentritt We regarded general Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive panzer-general of the Allies. . . His operations impressed us enormously probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander. He even improved on Napoleon’s basic tenets
The Rommel Papers,by B.H.Liddell Hart,pages 360-61 "Montgomery risked nothing in any way and bold solutions are completely foreign to him.He would never take the risk of following up boldy and over running us.He could have done it with out any danger to himself.Indeed such a course would have cost him fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action,which he could only obtain at the cost of speed"
Ladislas Farago Patton:Ordeal & Triump(New York:Astor-Honor, Inc., Inc.1964)h,p.505 'If Manstein was Germany's greatest strategist during World War II, Balck has strong claims to be regarded as our finest field commander. He has a superb grasp of tactics and great qualities of leadership' - Major-General von Mellenthin General Balck, commenting on the Lorraine Campaign, said: "Patton was the outstanding tactical genius of World War II. I still consider it a privilege and an unforgettable experience to have had the honor to oppose him" From Patton:A Genius for War,By Carlo D'Este After the War General Fritz Bayerlein commander of Panzer Lehr Division and the Afrika Corp.He assessed the escape of Rommel's Panzers after Alamein "I do not think General Patton would have let us get away so easily" said Bayerlein .Comparing Patton with Guderian and Montgomery with Von Rundstedt
CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything. Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one.
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Correct,This operation was condemned at it's inception it shouldn't have been considered let alone launched. And good men paid the price for Monty and IKE ignoring the red flags
Tim Saunders, The Island: Nijmegen to Arnhem ,Battleground Europe,p. 43 "The terrain that the spearhead of XXX Corps now had to cross, was worse than anything experienced so far. General Horrocks summed up the military qualities of the ground: ‘With its dykes, high embankments carrying the road and deep ditches on either side it was most unsuitable for armoured warfare. It was perfect defensive country in which the anti-tank gun hidden in the orchard was always master of the tank silhouetted against the skyline.’ With the weather deteriorating daily, ground conditions on the Island would get worse."
The Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 365-66 In fact the fundamental concept of Operation Market Garden defied military logic because it made no allowance for anything to go wrong,nor for the enemy's likely reaction .In short the whole operation ignored the old rule that no plan survives 1st contact with the enemy.Montgomery even blamed the weather not the plan,even asserting the plan was 90% successful because they got 9/10ths of the way to Arnhem
Center of Military History
United States Army
The European Theater of Operations
THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
by Charles B. MacDonald
Pages 199-200 Perhaps the real fault of the plan was overambition.Yet all of the handicaps possibly could have been overcome had the British ground column been able to advance' as rapidly as General Horrocks had hoped. Another glaring fault was dependence upon but one road. In any event, the ground troops were delayed for varying amounts of time south of Eindhoven, at the demolished bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon, and at the Waal bridge in Nijmegen. Combined with the kind of resistance the Americans had been experiencing at Metz and Aachen, MARKETGARDEN proved that the Germans in the West might be down but they were not out.
page 439 "Even before the invasion Allied planners had noted that "until after the development of Antwerp, the availability of port capacity will ... limit the forces which can be maintained. Getting Antwerp was one of the main reasons why Eisenhower had strengthened Montgomery's northern thrust."
September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 42 The sad truth was that Market Garden could not be changed or amended into a better concept. It stood as what it was a deeply flawed plan based mainly on hope.Stemming from the faulty premise that a single thrust into Northern Germany could magically spell doom for Hitler. It was a zero defect plan that could succeed only if everything,or at least most things went right
The Second World War by John Keegan p. 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable, since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary
A General's Life,by Omar Bradley and Clay Blair,p.329 On September 14,ULTRA reported that Walter Model commanding Army Group B had established his HQ at Oosterbeek,on the outskirts of Arnhem. An ULTRA report of Sept 16 placed the 9th SS and "probably" the 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Arnhem itself. These reports proved to be absolutely accurate. (ULTRA in the West,p,153,Bennet)
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@akgeronimo501 Model was playing chess and Monty with himself
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them, Monty rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions.He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him
From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 167 It probably would have been difficult for Warren of the 82nd to hold both ends of the Nijmegen Bridge against the combined might of Kampfgruppe Henke,the SS recon.battalion and other reinforcements from the 10th SS panzer Division .In that sense his mission was somewhat unreasonable,it reflected the unrelenting problem the 82nd AB faced in Market Garden namely how it was to hold the Groesbeek heights while at the same time capturing the Nijmegen bridges,especially with only part of the division on the ground.This was the great flaw in the OMG Design and Warren's soldiers paid the price for it.The sad reality was the push for the bridge had failed and was almost preordained to do so.
From September Hope,by John C.McManus,page 331-332 Because the Allied route of advance was so constricted and slender any German counter attack was disruptive,no matter how strong or weak.Truck drivers were spending as much time taking cover in the ditches as driving their vehicles,instead of roaring north to Arnhem,tankers & infantrymen were absorbed into pushing the Germans away from the vital road .As a result of all these problems,ammunition,food and gasoline were running dangerously low for Horrock's frontline units as well as the 82nd AB. The amiable Horrocks realized he was actually fighting 3 distinct battles:one to keep the corridor open,one to hold the Groesbeek Heights and one to make it to Arnhem.Obviously this is too much,and it was a direct result of market garden's overly ambitious nature,not to mention everything had to go right for the operation to succeed
(this snippett right here is just some of the evidence of how far Montgomery was in over his head.)
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 228 Gavin knew he faced a staggering task.He tried to rise to the challenge of a bad plan without complaint and achieved a remarkable success.The 82nd could hardly hold the Groesbeek Heights and take the key bridges at the same time.With the presumption of minimal German opposition - there was no margin of error for the operation.Which was open to the assumption of maximum risk.Most of the tactical objectives were outside,not within the landing areas
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www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them.
Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative"
Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
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This fools errand should never have been considered let alone launched.Way too many moving parts to coordinate.
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.138 Brereton was not in a position to exploit strategic intelligence,and he would also have known that Montgomery had access to ULTRA and never the less decided that Market Garden should proceed. First Allied Airborne depended very heavily on Mongomery's 21st Army Group for their supply of intelligence. 1st Parachute Brigade summary by Capt. W.A. Taylor that appeared on September 13th which pointed out that "the whole Market area was being feverishly prepared for defense" - a statement entirely in accord with Dempsey's diary notes of September 9th & 10th
Brereton and Dempsey along with most of Allied HQ warned the Laggard Monty not to play looses with men's lives.But the creep seeking glory ordered it forward
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.256-257
The crucial link ups between airborne and ground forces was more problematic; they were interlinked and interdependent. So much that the failure to capture of just one objective could lead to the failure of the entire undertaking. Given that no large-scale airborne operation mounted by the Allies or Germans had ever previously secured absolute mission success, there was a strong probability that Market Garden would fail.
Market Garden was founded on flawed suppositions, massaged intelligence, the neglect of past lessons and the acceptance of innumerable risks, which substantially reduced its chances of success even before it was placed in front of Eisenhower. The idea of conducting multiple lift operations against deep and well defended objectives was fundamentally unsound and can only be deemed a blunder of truly staggering proportions. And required repeated daytime airlifts to far inside enemy territory more that 300 miles from Allied Transport bases
1)Monty was a no show - in every army that marched except evidently yours the commander is responsible for what does and does not occur under his watch during his Operation
2) Monty or the guys right under him Horrocks/Dempsey/Vandeleur sat on their arses until 2:30 in the afternoon on the 1st day at the Belgian border waiting for the planes to fly over .Did they some how think they'd catch up? Had they left at day break they would have made the bridge at Son. That the Gerries blew up in the afternoon
3) Of Monty/Horrocks/Dempsey/Vandeleur NOT ONE thought to put the bridging equipment up front. How ignorant of so called veteran officers. Didn't they think going over 17 Bridges and 12-13 rivers/canals that might come in handy at some point in time?
Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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What other rare gems have you two poltroons mined for us today? little villa probably because you only have read to you the crown's comics
♦Hollywood wasn't there when 198,000 Tommies got tossed into the Channel - Monty was.
♦Hollywood didn't make 81,000 Tommies surrender at Singapore,
♦Hollywood didn't sign a deal with The Reich annexing the Czech Republic - Britain did.
♦Hollywood didn't stop Britain from crossing the 30 mile channel after getting driven into it,for 4 full years after Dunkirk.
♦Hollywood never showed up at Market Garden,neither did Monty
♦Hollywood didn't fill ship after ship with tanks,trucks,,halftracks,men,material,munitions, planes,provisions,food,fuel for the duration of the war to prop up the crown.
♦Hollywood didn't promise that Caen would be taken in D+1,Monty did and finally took it 43 days later.
♦Hollywood didn't promise before Market Garden that they'd go to Berlin and didn't even make it to Arnhem,Monty did
♦Hollywood didn't give 16 U.S.Divisions to Monty's 21st Army Group and was practically the last one to cross over the Rhine with them
♦Hollywood didn't make up stories about Montgomery bathing little boys The Full Monty reported them
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Stevie when you are done scribbling in your comic books ask the nurse to read to you
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place.*
Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow"
Monty admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198 Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. "We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively." Here, Montgomery was at the very least being economical with the truth.
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Ah another of Monty's apologists pokes his head out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan.
Seems like Monty forgot that basic fact of Warfare. The commander who underestimates his enemy ( especially when his own intelligence apparatus is ringing alarm bells ) is a fool.The subordinate commanders did not plan the over all operation, Monty did.Stop fetching history from the Cornhole ChroniclesThe dweeb bragged he had all the supplies he was going to get to General Crerar. Here you go from Crerar himself
From A Magnificent Disaster,by David Bennett,page 196 Throughout September Montgomery had been most anxious to open the Channel ports to Allied supply,principally LaHavre,Boulogne and Calais.This he regarded as essential to his strategic plans..But he undertook Market Garden without these ports and with a supply line extending from his rear maintenance area around Bayeux directly to the divisions of second Army. The inadequacy of this arrangement led him to ask for more supplies.When he got them,he rescinded the delay in the launch of Market Garden and to Gen.Harry Crerar he wrote that he had won a "great victory" at SHAEF Montgomery never requested more transport for his divisions .He got all the logistical support he requested with only minor delays.The truth was that the operation was too ambitious .In launching it with a tenuous supply line,no reserve build up of supplies,a shortage of ground transport and both VIII & XII Corps not ready at the start,Montgomery's professionalism had deserted him
Marshall,IKE and SHAEF were done catering to the pathetic Pedo.Patton out performed him standing still - literally.LOOK Here
From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.675 - Sept 24,1944,Monty had been pressing for more supplies to 21st Army Group. IKE informed Monty that he had given preference to the left flank(21st Army) through out the campaign Including the attachments of Air Borne and everything to assure the maintenance.On the other hand all other forces had been fighting with a halter around their necks with respect to supplies. IKE illustrated that for 4 days straight Patton had been receiving serious counter attacks,yet in 7 days without attempting to any real advance 3rd Army captured 9,000 prisoners and knocked out 270 tanks
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-
3
-
3
-
3