Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "TIKhistory"
channel.
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
TheVilla Aston scribbled in crayon
What fairytales? Eisenhower made the decision to prioritise Market Garden over the Scheldt.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
You are pathetic - you really are I have produced evidence by British sources and Alan Brooke himself dozens of times then you run away attmepting to convince others of your disturbed views somewhere else.Monty ignored the Scheldt even later blaming the CanadiansALL British Historians and Officers,except D'Este
From Decision in Normandy, by Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex. British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966. ---Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."
From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, copyright 1959 From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact.Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside" -
Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45 Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road,Monty ignored him
The Second World War by John Keegan,page 437 The Plan was the most calamitous flaw in the post Normandy campaign .It was more over barely excusable,since Ultra was supplying Montgomery's HQs from Sept 5 onward with intelligence .As early as Sept 12 Monty's own intelligence reported the Germans intended to hold out along the approaches to Antwerp. Monty - despite every warning and contrary to common military sense - refused to turn his troops back in their tracks to clear the Scheldt Estuary.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration:
General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corp .In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges.
Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and Arnhem
Major General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day.
Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area, the slowness with which it moved up the highway the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude.
Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself, but laid a large proportion of the blame on Eisenhower. ". . . if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area."
There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armored units had moved into the Arnhem area
Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland.
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
2
-
@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- This operation was condemned at it's inception.
How could anyone suppose that Montgomery would suddenly change his spots and become the sort of commander capable of conducting a fast,,concentrated,mobile thrust into the heart of Germany. The Army Monty claimed he could lead to Berlin was created by him in his own ponderous and ever cautious image
Guards Armored crossed the Nijmegen Bridge at 7:10PM the Nite of Sept 20th.Three and a half days after the operation started surprising no one. Horrocks stated the tanks would arrive on time and in force well neither happened. Monty not only mismanaged this he never planned on the Germans fighting back and ignored ULTRA warning about the 9th & 10th Panzers refitting there
Too many flights - too long of flights and not enough daylight. But Bernard promised IKE he get to Berlin and yet never even showed up for the advance on Arnhem. Even the British planners going over Operations Linnet/Comet rightfully stated their concern that the element of surprise would be lost. As the flights starting 50 miles west of London were just over 300 miles total - one way. As soon as the flights reached the coast German units(15th Army I believe) all along the scheldt estuary would radio back about enemy formations approaching so the element of surprise was completely lost. I don't think you know how truly daft this daisy bernard was - you realize he had canaries,bunnies and other sorts of pets traveling with him in that circus wagon of his.
No one ever mentions why really the previous two operations were cancelled - because the British planners thought them fool hardy.Just adding 2 more airborne divisions doesn't make it sound just more problematic. But Monty looking for a head line couldn't help himself .And IKE allowed him and his dimwitted single thrust a long leash to hang himself with it.
Why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur sit on their arses in their tanks at the Belgian border until the Troop & Supply transports flew over at 2:35 in the Afternoon? Did they think they would catch up? If they were charging hard like Horrocks had promised they could have made the bridge at Son before it got blown. The Germans got the britsh supplies and left smart ass notes thanking them. Has that army done a hurried thing ever?
The Armored column made it a whole 7 miles the 1st day as Panzerfaust teams taking out 9 Shermans 3 miles from the start .Bringing the whole column to a halt .This of course wasn't their fault but Monty's pathetic planning.This operation is a prime example of the clownish incompetence of his command. But in Britain that get you the title of Field Marshall
You think Monty could have inconvenienced himself to attend his own operational debacle that after the war he fessed up to? Largest Air Drop in History up until that point and the poof couldn't be bothered? There were cock ups all the way back to the Belgian Border and it didn't involve Gavin or the 82nd.Ya but go ahead and try to blame this abortion on an Americans 55 miles down the road.
And why did Horrocks,Dempsey,Vandeleur leave the bridging equipment in the rear when the Germans blew the bridge over Wilhelmina Canal the 1st day? That might have come in handy don't you think ? While approaching an objective with 17 bridges over 12-13 rivers/canals? All 3 Senior British officers and NOT ONE thought of this glaring over site?
Why were Field Marshall Walter Model & Fallschirmjager General Kurt Student able to ferry tanks and troops over, rivers and canals under the ever watchful RAF at Pannerden, and Horrocks/Montgomery could NOT do the same? Not in September, not in October and not in November
None of the above have a damn thing to do with the 82nd,Gavin or Browning.Monty neither captured the V-2 launch sites, Arnhem or Antwerp during Market Garden. And the reprisals brought on the honger winter - great job
There is a reason TIK doesn't write a book because he'd get filleted with archived history .
2