Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "TIKhistory" channel.

  1. Irving Burns your new attempts at slithering about are no more successful than your previous ones. The Guards Armored and 43 Wessex just arrived in Nijmegan,tell them the war is over and all is forgiven.
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  2. you still don't know as davie dables in delusion to prop up the tainted waif bernard
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  3. Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors Hardcover by Peter Harclerode '21st Army Group was one of the formations that received ULTRA intelligence. The Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams, was sufficiently concerned about the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and more particularly that of 9th SS Panzer Division north of Arnhem, that he drew it to the attention of Montgomery on 10 September, after the latter's meetings with Dempsey and Eisenhower on that day. He failed, however, to persuade Montgomery to alter his plans for the airborne landings at Arnhem. Undaunted, Williams tried again two days later with the support of Brigadier General Staff (Operations) in Montgomery's headquarters, who was standing in as Chief of Staff in the absence of Major General Francis de Guingand who was on sick leave. Unfortunately, their warnings fell on deaf ears. Three days later a further attempt was made to warn Montgomery. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith, received a report from SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong, concerning the presence of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in the area to the north and east of Arnhem. Bedell Smith immediately brought this information to the attention of Eisenhower and advised him that a second airborne division should be dropped in the Arnhem area. Eisenhower gave the matter urgent consideration but was wary of ordering any changes to the operational plan at the risk of incurring Montgomery's wrath. He decided that any alteration could only be decided upon by Montgomery himself and accordingly sent Bedell Smith and Strong to HQ 21st Army Group at Brussels. At his meeting alone with Montgomery, Bedell Smith voiced his fears about the presence of German armor in the Arnhem area, but was waved aside; indeed, Montgomery belittled the information and dismissed the idea of any alteration to his plan.' So Montgomery ignored: Chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Bill Williams Eisenhower's Chief of Staff', Major General Walter Bedell Smith SHAEF's Chief of Intelligence, Major General Kenneth Strong
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  4. You've lied once - continuosly Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: "Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine" Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure?p. 201-02. General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks, who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors,"Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."* ULTRA decrypt XL9188 in early September revealed the various units from Normandy had been ordered to western Holland to refit and subsequent intercepts indicated that this included the II SS Panzer Corp. Not until September 15 had SHAEF high command taken note that the corps two divisions the 9th & 10th Panzer seemed to encamped at Arnhem. Montgomery's senior commanders almost to a man voiced skepticism about Market Garden. Beetle-Smith grew anxious enough to alert Eisenhower, who hesitated to intervene in tactical dispositions but authorized Smith to raise the issue with the field marshall. Smith flew to Brussels on Friday,48 hrs before the assault was to begin and suggested strengthening the force to be dropped at Arnhem. "Montgomery ridiculed the idea and laughed me out of his tent" Smith later reported *"he waved my objections airily aside" For 7 miles from the Belgium border to Valkenswaard the XXX Corp drive stopped cold for 12 hrs Um no you misguided monty fanboi, when the Air Marshalls finally found out from IKE they warned Monty - too many flights - too long and not enough daylight. There were SIX HUNDRED more flights than D-Day. This debacle was originally Linnet then Comet then Monty Garden.But he told IKE anyway he get to Berlin and yet never even showed up for the advance on Arnhem Historynet dot com Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative" Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it
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  5. This operation wasted a lot of lives, equipment, resources. It was the last political chance for the English to stay at the big boy table. Bernard uppity little nothing that was an impediment to the war the way you are to History. Couldn't cross the channel for 4 full years w/o the GIs,shameful I'm sure you'd agree Go tell these places the Crown vacated before FDR intervened Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940 Greece, Crete,Hong Kong and Libya in 1941 Tobruk and Dieppe,Singapore in 1942
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  6. He's called a historian gary that has the actuall sorces and has been vetted. Maybe when your hallucinations subside the home for the unfortunates where you reside will remove your ankle monitor and take you to a Library - baby :face-blue-smiling:
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  7. The OP is full of shit,1st off trying to shoehorn a whole column of armor up a 64 mile elevated Lane with no room for manuever is the idea of an idiot and a recipe for disaster.Go visit Monty's statue in Arnhem - oh that's right there isn't one
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  8. AGAIN BURNHOLE Bernard like you had the spine of a gummy bear,neither of you were at Monty Garden. And like Patton neither of you were driven into the channel, shocking I'm sure you'd agree
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  9. Ya he's been knighted and never had to take down any of his boards like a certain host who takes potshots and makes up narratives - like little Villa
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  10. evidently Freddie DeGuingand and many in SHAEF advised against this operation.Way to many holes.The Most senior British officers and IKE knew a deep water port had to be opened at Antwerp.Had Allied troops made Arnhem it would have been dunkirk all over again.And the bridge would have been blown.Crap plan by a small minded man
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  11. Germans did not agree,AGAIN From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north "Like Patton they reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend." With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions" .General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted.
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  12. BRUTE FORCE by John Ellis p.414-16   Montgomery's operation timetable was ambitious to the point of recklessness. Montgomery the man whose main criticism of Eisenhower was his lack of grip,remained remarkably out of touch with day to day operations and incapable of controlling events.He only got as far as Nijmegen and even then never got across the Waal. At no stage during the battle did he visit  XXX Corp HQ and not until 23 September when it was almost over did he visit Dempsey at Second Army HQ.According to Freddie DeGuingand,CoS, Montgomery appeared to let things go their own way   How could anyone suppose that Montgomery and his army would suddenly change his spots and become the sort of force capable of conducting a fast,concentrated,mobile thrust into the heart of Germany. The Army Monty claimed he could lead to Berlin was created by him in his own ponderous and ever cautious image. Lyndon you lump that is also stated in Operation Victory.Go back to your John Cornell account,hard to believe you faffed this one up worse
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  13.  @thevillaaston7811  Go tell your hallucinations to 501 you troubled tart,Sorry if Otto broke your mum's heart
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  14.  @thevillaaston7811  you weren't there and his sources were early on it certainly looked bad.Specially since they had such an easy time with Brooke and Monty. RUNAWAY,must be a Monty thing
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  15.  @thevillaaston7811  He did right from the top as Tedder was his right hand man.But you don't read as hIstory isn't important to you. As bernard and the whole Lucien /Nigel thing ya know plus British "strategic" withdrawals from: -Norway,Netherlands, Belgium and France,Dunkirk in 1940 (338,000,British,Dutch,French Troops in all evacuated) -Greece, Crete & Hong Kong in 1941 (3700 captured in Greece, 12,274 captured in Crete,10,000 captured in Hong Kong) -Tobruk and Singapore in 1942 (28-33,000 captured at Tobruk ,81,000 captured in Singapore) This is well known in historical academia but not by TIK and his hamlet of unhinged halfwits here. Do tell about mum taking Gerry prisoners, that always leaves them in the isle :face-blue-smiling:
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  16. 200,000 were with bernard and brooke during the great skedadle, oh forgot this is TIK's revisionist rag - I meant "Strategic Withdrawal" . The meerkat had 4 yrs to cross w/o the GIs - ya Empire, go ask the Euros
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  17. ya the losers way,The Americans weren't the problem,Monty didn't show up,the Guards armor were well behind schedule and Carrington stopped as the 82nd wanted keep going.What kind of knobs would refer to him as "LORD" - there's your problem. Monty isn't studied at military academies accept as a bad example .The Tanks were late in arriving then stopped,The Germans,GIs and Irish Guards all noted this
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  18.  @arcanondrum6543  great posts, A Bridge too Far was so accurate that Monty didn't appear in it either. It was a horribly disjointed,overly ambtious plan contrived by a damaged little man looking for attention and glory . Monty ignored & discounted the basic logistical reality of not only one road but that the Wehrmacht were falling back upon their own supply and logistical centers. The Germans had lot of practice doing this type of operation coming back from the Eastern Front then going to France. The German Divisions could be quickly reconstituted, refitted, and reinforced with replacement up to full strength in short order. As one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in that area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches accompanying them where armored columns couldn't go The Allies were advancing further and away from their supply centers with long supply lines meaning they were vulnerable to German counterattack or getting bogged down against a German defense in depth with dug in troops in fortifications. The Germans were experts at taking shattered divisions and rebuilding them quickly. SHAEF was right,the Port of ANTWERP should have been opened FIRST The Germans would have had the advantage of interior lines of communications, nearby supply depots, and urban centers to concentrate a counteroffensive against any single attack into northern Germany across the Rhine via Arnhem. A successful attack across the Rhine could only be accomplished from MULTIPLE POINTS simultaneously. This action is exactly what happened in the spring of 1945. IKE's broadfront not monty's debacle of sandwiching a whole armored corp down one elevated lane.The idea you can make one long extended penetration with long extended supply lines into northern Germany, along one axis of advance is IDIOCY . The Wehrmacht still had plenty of infantry divisions, armored division with military resources and capacity to fight in the autumn of 1944. The air transports used for the FAILED Operation Market-Garden should have been used for fuel and ammo deliveries to supplement truck transport for Bradley/Devers advances. The American 82nd and 101st airborne should have been used as regular infantry divisions to spearhead attacks in critical sectors. Most importantly, using the 82nd and 101st for American infantry attacks would have kept them far away from Montgomery which would have been better for everybody.
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  19. yes thank you I rather liked it myself
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  20. IKE wasn't that dumb to let 2 armies shoehorn down a 2 lane road it's bad enought XXX Corp got blasted attempting it
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  21. .So tell me John Pierre Peate how come?How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals , under the ever watchfull RAF and Montgomery/Horrocks could NOT do the same ?Not in September, not in October and not in November. Probably because unlike Monty ,Model was an actuall Field Marshall Maybe this explains it,
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  22. CONVERSATIONS WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS,Transcribed By Major Gary Wade "Monty was a fine defensive fighter up to a certain point. But Monty's basic trouble was that he was a set-piece fighter, in contrast to George S. Patton. This was epitomized in the crossing of the Rhine.Monty was always waiting, waiting until he got everything in line. He wanted a great deal of artillery,American artillery mostly--American tanks, also. Then, when he got everything all set, he would pounce.But he always waited until he had "tidied up the battlefield"--his expression--which was his excuse for not doing anything Monty was a good general, I've always said, but never a great one. Eisenhower & Montgomery at the Falaise Gap,by William Weidner,page 319 Montgomery's irrational behavior at the Falaise Gap was also influenced by what Canadian General Henry Crerar called ".... the Englishman's traditional belief in the superiority of the Englishman..." The Montgomery Myth,by R.W.Thompson Given British grievous disappointments in the Eastern Mediterranean and the fragile nature of any military alliance,General Montgomery was an extremely poor choice to command an Allied Army Road to Victory,Winston Churchill 1941-45,by Martin Gilbert A British War cabinet memo suggested that the appointment of Monty was from the point of view of it's reception by public opinion.Apparently that clinched the War Cabinet's vote for Montgomery; based strictly on military accomplishments,the case for Monty was very weak From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 365-66In fact the fundamental concept of Operation Market Garden defied military logic because it made no allowance for anything to go wrong,nor for the enemy's likely reaction .In short the whole operation ignored the old rule that no plan survives 1st contact with the enemy Montgomery even blamed the weather not the plan,even asserting the plan was 90% successful because they got 9/10ths of the way to Arnhem General Oberst Student pointed out the strength of the flak batteries were grossly exaggerate .As a result the British lost "surprise",the strongest weapon of airborne troops .At Arnhem Oberstgruppenfuhrer Wilhelm Bittrich who has great respect for Montgomery's generalship up until then changed his opinion after Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a roadsign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen Rub-a-dub-dub Burns in the tub http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/feb/26/books.booksnews Prof Hamilton, who was befriended by the field marshal at age 11 and knew him well for the last 20 years of his life, has no doubt of the nature of Monty's feelings. "These were quasi love affairs. He became really passionately involved with these young men - and then, more and more, boys, who he would call 'my sons'. They were nothing of the kind, of course, but in his own personality he would frame them in this way. "I myself have more than 100 very loving letters from him. My relationship with him wasn't sexual, in the sense that it wasn't acted upon, but I had been through enough years at British boarding schools to know what kind of enormous affection and feeling he had for me. "And I wasn't alone, this was a consistent pattern in Monty's life." One boy was Lucien Treub, Montgomery's "little Swiss friend", who met him at 12, and told Hamilton how the Montgomery would bathe him personally and rub him down so he would not catch cold "I've interviewed him several times and he was quite clear he didn't feel there was any molesting going on, but it's a tricky area," Prof Hamilton said.
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  23. TIK is a revisionist and this plan was cancelled twice for obvious reasons. It was cancelled previously as Operation Linnet and then Comet for good reasons by British Planners. Grabbing 2 more American AB Divisions doesn't eliminate those complications. Too many flights, too long of flights and over 2hrs less daylight than the D-Day drops in June. And that wasn't even factoring in unfavorable weather conditions - that did arise. The planners earlier stated when the massive flight formations hit the coast the German Army well dug-in on Walcheren Island and the shores of the Scheldt estuary would radio back immediately to Wehrmacht Command of their approach losing all element of surprise. Remember OVERLORD 2 months earlier was 30 miles across the channel,maybe another 20-30 miles inland these flights were almost 300 miles ONE WAY from air fields 50 miles west of London up into NE Netherlands around Arnhem. The Dutch Army who wasn't really consulted stated going right up highway 69 was one long choke point surrounded flood plains,polder marshes and drainage ditches - it had been war gamed before the war started. Also thousands of experienced, well-fortified enemy soldiers still had to be dislodged from key positions they inhabited. Fallschirmjäger General Kurt Student had dropped into that exact area in 1940 he was very familiar with the area and perhaps the best tactical commander on any front Absolutely not,the objective was to cross the Rhine,and the Port of Antwerp was needed for that.All else is bullshit to cover for this failure .Monty and Ike own this debacle - not the soldiers. TIK/YOU ignores all of this as it doesn't get Monty or the Britsh off of the Hook
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  24. Bad plan it wasn't even comtemplated long and the British Planners cancelled Linnet/Comet for very good reasons. Chiefly it was restricted to one narrow road surrounded by marshes/flood plains/drainage ditches that waas not suitable for armor . Second was the planners earlier stated when the flight formations approached the coast all element of surprise was lost. The German Army well dug-in on Walcheren Island and the shores of the Scheldt estuary would simply radio back immediately to Wehrmacht Command of their approach giving Flak teams plenty of time to prepare for a very warm receprtion. Everything had to go right that never happens in battle
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  25.  @MagpieOz  He knew all of that just stop - There was a very good reason the British Planners of Comet & Linnet dismissed this idea whole sale. Monty getting 2 US Airborne Divisions doesn't eliminate any of those problems. As the results later proved and admitted by Monty. Brereton or Browning were not aware of ULTRA and the information of not only the mobile flak units but the 9/10 th SS refitting in Arnhem. Brian Urquhart 21st army intel officer was relieved for persistently pointing it out. IKE owns some of the blame for letting Monty have his way with his single thrust and ignoring opening the port of Antwerp that was absolutely needed for any Operation this size. The Red Ball Express couldn't keep lugging supplies/provisions from Cherbour 483 miles away
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  26. Crawl back under your rock you revisionist rube.Monty was propped up fraud and only given consideration because the Crown put the GIs up for a spell to finish what they started
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  27. little villa lamented "you're grasping at straws",no he isn't he's stating a fact - a concept that throws bernard fanbois into fits of fantasy. Who or what was Monty grasping back at his caravan as everyone else fought on as he got scarce?
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  28. Page number and source? and your ample backside isn't one. Had they got off there asses at 1st light instead of moving like monty well after noon there isn't a discussion MONTY GARDEN.
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  29. Mark M - i agree with alot of what you said but Bradley wasn't at the Ardennes.He got his ass stuck in Luxembourg.The bad thing was IKE moved Monty over.Which was a bad Move because Lightning Joe Collins and Earnest Harmon did the commanding and fighting that the weasel attempted to claim as his own.Monty almost got removed,did little said a lot.Forget who it was but I had read a while back someone challenged the asshole to a duel.Marshall was hardly a compromiser very gifted and insightful leader.Unfortunately since the GIs were stationed in England a lot of leeway was given the Brits,politically
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  30. Had nothing to do with politics IKE gave monty preferential treatment @ Caen/Falaise/OMG. It was obvious he was no Field Marshal.Brooke should have called up Slim or reinstated The Auk or O'Connor.Britain had good officers that knob wasn't one of them
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  31. The Auk had just won 1st El Alamein,the army group was on the up swing.Tim Collins,Dr Niall Barr and Corelli Barnett spell this out very well in Desert Generals Docu that puts a spotlight on the Monty Myth.O'Connor got caught because he was out front reconnoitering as ULTRA wasn't fully functional as this was a year and a half before the 2nd battle of El Alamein. He led one of the most brilliant military campaigns of the war. In two months, the XIII Corps/Western Desert Force had advanced over 800 miles, destroyed an entire Italian army of ten divisions, taken 133,000 prisoners, 400 tanks and 1,292 guns at the cost of 500 killed and 1,373 wounded - a remarkable military achievement. This led Adolf Hitler to send the Deutsches Afrikakorps under Erwin Rommel to try and reverse the situation .But in true Churchill form he stuck his nose in where it didn't belong After O'Connor's great victory he removed 50,000 crack/experienced troops from the desert to Greece. That proved disasterous in both places. To take the 6th Australian Division, along with part of 7th Armoured Division and most of the supplies and air support was just too much Monty caused a lot of problems in British command before ever coming in contact with the U.S.Officers. In the desert Air Marshall Conningham and Adml Cunningham strangled the German supply lines in the Mediteranean while keeping the Allies supplied was paramount. Yet the Monty didn't grab airfields or open any ports later - this continued into Italy - Normandy. I'm assuming you watched that Desert generals docu - Montgomery really should have never gotten that gig - he really could not lose after Auchilech and Dorman-Smith lined those mine fields at he ridge of Alam Halfa that helped shored up defense/blocking line by the Qattara Depression to the south which was impassable to mechanized armor at El Alamein creating a choke point.Then The Torch Landings were looming which forced Rommels hand and FDR sending 300 Shermans and 100 self propelled 105 mm Howitzers. Also factor in complete Air Superiority All these things came together at the same time and Monty couldn't help himself - taking credit that wasn't his and later deflecting blame that was - all thru the war really. Conningham & Cunningham wanted to strangle the shit as he basically ignored the Naval and Air Corps tremendous efforts while cleverly crafting his own over the top narrative. As I'm sure you know the allied supply lines were 100 miles away in Alexandria and Rommel's unfortunately for him stretched back into Libya and the port of Tripoli - 1,000 miles away. None of the above advantages were of monty's doing,it was the Allies 2 yrs of toil and he reaped the benefit Also for a while Auchinleck and Dorman-Smith were with out ULTRA as the Gerries had added another wheel to the Enigma.Throwing off Bletchley Park for a few months,becoming operational conveniently in late August '42 - just when Monty was taking command.Monty didn't go on the offensive for 9 weeks - which is precisely what Auchinleck wanted.When Winston found this out he couldn't just turn around and sack Monty - who was one lucky little Tosser
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  32. Sources were left,I'm not repeating what was laid out - pretty straight forward,that confidence was restored read Desert Generals!!! Monty was on the side of Russia/USA. Bradley was right as others pointed out Monty won with advantages that any other competent General would have won/done also.I'll take all the historians i have read words over fanboy revision. Churchill hamstrung himself by sacking The Auk,if you watched the Docu Winnie bit his lip when he found out Monty wasn't moving either.Realizing he pulled the pin too early on Auk & Smith.Later Churchill spouts drivel to cover his cock up by saying there were no victories before monty and no defeats after. Most allied officers knew damn well that wasn't accurate.Hell even Freddie his CoS said Monty had a unique ability to sense what the Germans were up to - something along those lines. The team at Bletchley Park needed a bucket when reading that. Monty made a big mess of things in Normandy faffing up Caen/Falaise/OMG - that is a fact. From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 254 In terms of the Anglo-American divide the Sicilian episode demonstrated that antagonism was not confined to American officers.Montgomery's behavior made enemies of Admiral Cunningham and Air Marshall Tedder as well as their staffs. The much vaunted rivalry between Patton and Montgomery was minor compared to the depths hostility that had developed with the Royal Air Force Tedder told Patton that Monty was "a little fellow of average ability who has had such a build up that he thinks of himself as Napoleon - he is not" That's from a PHD who teaches History at King's College and lectured at Sandhurst
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  33. Alan Brook was a fool shoving allied objectives aside for that of the crowns while using the GIs to do it.and the press made a hero of monty.Beyond his abilities or accomplishments What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. And then barely.. and poorly.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.He was vain,rude objectionable - a legend in his own mind
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  34. Let's review Mr Brooke shall we. Here is a great book by another good British Historian look what the supposed Highest soldier in Britain said and you may note the authors response.BTW the comments were taken from Brooke's own memoirs so I understand why he and Bernard were chums Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts read pages 162-163 About - Marshall "almost impossible to get him to grasp the true concepts of a strategic situation/understanding About - Churchill - "temperamental like a film star" and "peevish like a spoilt child" with "no long term strategic vision...he can never grasp a whole plan About - Lord Gort "brain has lately been compared to that of a glorified boy scout who just fails to see the big picture" About - Eisenhower "literally knew nothing of the requirements of a commander in action" and "had a very,very limited brain from a strategic point of view" About - Secretary Eden "was dangerous,rather obstinate featherhead-and with no strategic sense About - Gen Alexander "had many fine qualities but no very great strategic vision....it was very doubtful whether he was fit to command his Army" About - Adml MountBatten "Quite irresponsible,suffers from the most desperate illogical brain,always producing Red Hearings" There is a pattern emerging - evidently no one on the allied side but Brooke had any grasp of strategy. Just because these accomplished men disagreed with Brooke it didn't follow they were all dunderheads. His diaries are post war fiction,it was he who had not fully grasped tactics and strategy at important stages of the war making process It is clear from his diaries of his subsequent attempt to rewrite history - Andrew Roberts For a guy that got kicked off of the continent he comes across as a rather arrogant,condescending tosser .All hat and no cattle as they say in Texas
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  35. Listen up bub,I provided direct quotes from men who make a living as Historians.And you present your opinions. Britain had good men but Mick and Keith have more cred than these two yapping jackels when all they do is take swipes at allies - in real time
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  36. IKE wasn't out of touch he knew Bernard was no Field Marshall and he let Monty prove it - which he of course did. Monty was probably playing with lucian would you like a link for that? IKE allowed the crown to tag along for one last time just so they could remember what ist felt like
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  37. had 4 yrs to cross a channel after getting run into it 30 measily miles and that was too foreboding for your fauntleroys,real smart of them know we know why you yammer away - Empire,ya sure go tell that to the Poles and the Czechs you left in the lurch
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  38. Monty failed everywhere his bullshit plan to save his reputation.Even Alan brooke said it and Ramsey and Tedder and Bedell-Smith.That's why the Russians acknowledged IKE and not the berk he was along for the ride and nothing more.He lost a lot. What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials, and air support. And then barely.. and poorly.Rommel/Bayerlein noted this also. For instance the Caen offensives that took place in between were an embarrassing and deadly blunder by an incompetent commander - and his poorly-trained, unmotivated troops. Who also suffered the misfortune of being supplied with British arms. Like another poster noticed - But you've got to love the spin: "I was failing miserably over here so that the Americans can win". Sure he was.
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  39. your army was too small,poorly lead,ill equipped & ineffective - kind of like you in a comment sections. Read The Full Monty by Hamilton. I think John Burns is mentioned in it,was Monty a little rough with you in the tub?Was he blowing bubbles when he held your head under?
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  40. this one's barking,You're funny Burns, a dim bulb but funny .The comment sections need a bucket when reading your posts.Did the nurses confiscate your Nudie Magazines again Johnny?Answer that one,maybe Monty took them up to Arnhem with him.Oh that's right he never showed up there
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  41. Sounds like a Monty fan who neither showed up on day one, or day two, or day three etc..Speaking of day 3 that's when XXXCorp tanks finally made the Bridge @ Nijmegem.Both the Germans & GIs chronicled this in journals,dispatches and after battle accounts
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  42. Shut your lying hole even his Boss Alan Brooke and SHAEF blamed him.Get a life you poor trampled leaf
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  43. Cornhole monty wanted to back away sort of like you and Burpsy when your sock account was busted.Monty tried backing out and Collins and Harmon went on the offensive.Said he had to lather little lucian - is that you? More Monty victims Giovanni Pierre created 28 Sept 2013 John Burns created 07 Nov 2013 John Cornell created 13 Nov 2013 TheVilla Aston created 20 Nov 2013
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  44. Yes I have mentioned that it was 70 miles,with modern measuring - GPS - laser. So monty had 6 more miles and still faffed the whole thing
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  45. You girls and your knitting circles,shame for 1,500 miles with every advantage provided Monty let Rommel get away.I'm reading Winston's War hard to believe monty was worse in Italy than Sicily where he got spanked and schooled like you here
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  46. The French/Dutch/Belgians and Gerries saw a lot of the Burns Family behinds during the great skedaddle. Revolting I'm sure you'd agree
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  47. Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation. -The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Bernard was in reality a plodding, unimaginative,spotlight grabbing little shit "Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen. The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches *Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este*​ from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities." Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armoured units were stationed there. However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on' Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594 Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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  48.  @TheGixernutter  Yes and 1st Para got hung out to dry also.This operation was condemned at it's inception. Most officers British and GI were for opening the deep water port of Antwerp - which made perfect sense. In the highly unlikely hood anyone made it over the Arnhem bridge - THEN WHAT? They get blasted or taken prisoner. The Rhine,Reich and the Ruhr are right there with supplies coming in by rail from near by. And where were the Allies going to get supplied if this fool's errand got lucky - OOPS.That's right 499 miles away at the port of Cherbourg. So reality,logistics and battlefield tactics are a thing
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  49.  @TheGixernutter  Monty and IKE own it Monty for hatching it and IKE for giving him the green light
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  50.  @nickdanger3802  exactly beevor is peer reviewed,critically acclaimed and doesn't suscribe to the Cornhole Chronicles or this revisionist rag
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