Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "TIKhistory"
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The whole plan was assinine,SHAEF knew the deep water port of Antwerp would have been to open to keep the operation supplied.5 tanks made it to The Nijmegan,even if more showed up they would have been blasted with the Reich and Ruhr right there.Cornhole reads Monty coloring books,the nearest port of supply was Cherbourg 499 miles away,but to johnny boy that's brilliance
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely, Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
Let's see.
1)Arnhem because of a crap plan by an amatuer wasn't captured.
2)The rocket sites weren't touched and still operating
3) In the nine days of Market Garden combined losses-airborne and ground forces killed, wounded and missing amounted to more than 17.000.
4)The deep water Port of Antwerp was still closed and needed for massive supplies
5)The Nazi reprisals included the Dutch Honger Winter that starved/froze at least 21,000 of its citizens to death.
6)Monty wasn't there to direct while Student and Model were in fact conducting a clinic on speed and placement of everything available
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This was previously from Achilles Smith and well presented
Just a few points, have you read or referenced the 82nd AB Division Field Order No.11 of 13 September 1944, it explains a lot of detail but it may be complicated for those whom haven't served in an military environment; it explains the mission, the regimental task, tactical study of the terrain, enemy situation in operational area, it has lots of nice grid references and etc. It shows why the Grosebeek Heights was taken; it's key terrain (that's an area you deny to the enemy) and the intelligence estimate provided a fairly accurate assessment of German forces; none of this "1000 tanks" business.
TIK have you read or referenced 1st British AB Corps Operational Instruction No.1 and its mission designated by the Airborne Forces Ground Commander of Operation Market to the 82nd AB Division, it illustrates context.
-Gavin's book 'Airborne Warfare' provides a good account of the operation, here's a nice quote: “At a conference at the headquarters of the British Airborne Corps on September 16 (D1) General Browning directed the CG (Commanding General) of the 82d ‘not to attempt the seizure of the Nijmegen Bridge until all other missions had been successfully accomplished and the Groesbeek,
- Bergendahl high ground was firmly in our hands’This expression of the Corps commander’s evaluation of the separate portions of the mission given the 82d Airborne Division was most helpful since the Divison was to be so widespread”. The book also provides more insight into the rationale behind the planning phase
-There is a follow up quote from Browning: “I personally gave an order to Jim Gavin that, although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges as soon as possible, it was essential that he should capture the Groesbeek Ridge and hold it—for … painfully obvious reasons …. If this ground had been lost to the enemy the operations of the 2nd Army would have been dangerously prejudiced as its advance across the Waal and Neder Rhein would have been immediately outflanked. Even the initial advance of the Guards Armoured Division would have been prejudiced and on them the final outcome of the battle had to depend”, this is from the US official history book; The Siegfried Line.
--From the Captain Westover Letter of July 1945, quote: “For the objective of the 82d Airborne Division, I advise you to check the Operations Order of the British Airborne Corps. I (Gavin) quote the 82d's mission:‘The 82d Airborne Division will seize and hold the bridges at Nijmegen and Grave (with sufficient bridgeheads to pass formations of the Second Army through). The capture and retention of the high ground between Nijmegen and Grosbeek is imperative in order to accomplish the division's task’. This mission, of course, was discussed at great length with the British Airborne Corps Commander. About two weeks prior to receipt of the mission by the 82d Airborne Division, it had been planned that General Urquhart's British Airborne Div's would do the job. They had, therefore, devoted considerable study to intelligence reports and to the terrain. The Nijmegen-Grosbeek high ground was the only high ground in all of the Netherlands. With it in German hands, physical possession of the bridges would be absolutely worthless, since it completely dominated the bridges and all the terrain around it. The understanding was therefore reached with British Corps Headquarters that it would be absolutely imperative that this high ground be seized."
-The "1000 tanks" nonsense is easily dismissed by the Situation of Enemy Forces in Field Order No.11, and the single line from the after action report of the 2Bn/505 is conjuncture, based on rumour and carried out only by one reconnaissance patrol. From the Beevor video, you display confusion and uncertainty over issue but you have displayed this as though Gavin himself was predominated over this rumour.
-Also you side with Poulussen over the Lindquist misunderstanding and came to your own conclusions, that it's a "cover-up" in your words. Except the Lindquist pre-drop instructions is corroborated by Captain Chester Graham of the 508th; "Prior to the Holland jump I sat in a high-level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen Bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division’s contribution to the success of the operation". Indeed, it was in Field Order No.11 of September 1944 that the 508th was to "Seize, organise and hold key terrain features in area of responsibility and be prepared to seize WAAL River crossing at Nijmegen on instruction of Div Comdr".
The interpretation was flawed with hindsight and the "evidence" was the books from Poulusson and Neillands, which is featured at the start of the Beevor video.I agree Seth 1422 dragged both of these not historians over the coals.Neither were historians and Poulussen couldn't identify an M-1.Pretty damning when you can't recognize one of the most widely dispersed weapons in one of the war's bigger battles
Read Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality, he spells it all out and is the Official historian of the Air Historical for the Royal Air Force, with responsibility for writing documented narratives on RAF operational activity. He has a PhD from King's College in London
William Buckingham,(Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944)with a PhD explains the massive Air effort that Monty barely recognized or considered because he wasn't really a army commander much less a Field Marshall. Like Model for instance who could adapt and change as the circumstances unfolded and changed
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Old Monty at least Japanese Commanders had the common decency to disembowel themselves after a disaster like this.The little villa has his head so far up monty's ass he can tell us what he had for lunch .The RAF didn't want to drop too close to the bridges because of AA guns.
You monkeys in a mango tree swinging from limb to limb slinging feces.Hoping there are some thicko's out there as bent as you
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticized Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write,"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
From Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel. Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
From With Prejudice,by Marshal of the Royal Air Force,Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966,Page 599 " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal."
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-Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare
-The V-2s were still being launched
-The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies
-Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.
-The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease.
-Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich
-Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged
-Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army
-Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success
Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command .SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians. Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly. Your distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been. Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics
The Germans and Americans both logged XXX Corp stopped on 20 September at 1700 hrs(9PM)-That's 3 days and it is a fact Viktor Graebners 9th SS stopped the Paras on the 1st morning - they had Haalf Tracks with mounted Anti-Aircraft guns that shredded some GIs.And APCs with mounted mg42s and some AT guns 75 mms. The 82nd had the most objectives over the largest area. they had the City, the Bridges,and LZ/DZ on the heights. Ist off it was Monty's terrible plan ,then XXX Corp took their time after successful Panzer Faust attacks took out 9 tanks after just 3 miles,stopping the whole column - that made 7 miles
NOTHING was established in the rest of 1944 .So tell me, how come?How come Germans were able to ferry tanks and troops over rivers/canals , under the ever watchfull RAF and Montgomery/Horrocks could NOT do the same ?Not in September, not in October and not in November. Probably because unlike Monty ,Model was an actual Field Marshall
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Outside of your posts being full of shit they were pretty good.And Ryan interviewed perhaps more German and Allied Officers than anybody not at Nuremburg. Monty lied incessantly and belittled damn near everyone he came across - stop acting offended and was given that title to assuage his bruised ego,He faffed everthing from Caen,Falaise,Market Garden
A PHD at King's College who lectured at Sandhurst
From Eisenhower's Armies,by Dr Niall Barr,page 415 After the failure of Market-Garden,Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign.Alan Brooke was present as an observer,noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary,followed by an advance on the Rhine,the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin.After a full and frank discussion in which Admiral Ramsey criticised Montgomery freely,Brooke was moved to write, I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault,instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the 1st place....IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem
A Pulitzer Prize Winner
From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303 Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding a bad mistake on my part
Not only did Brooke,Tedder and Ramsay all point right at Monty,only later did he admit it.Hastings,Hart,Beevor,Bennet,Barnet,Barr,Kershaw,Keegan also back that up
From the Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,page 370 German Generals thought Montgomery was wrong to to demand the main concentration of forces under his command in the north .Like Patton the reasoned the series of canals and great rivers the Maas,The Waal,the Neder Rijn - made it the easiest region for them to defend."With obstacles in the form of water traversing it from east to west" wrote General von Zagen,"the terrain offers good possibilities to hold on to positions".General Eberbach whom the British had captured,was recorded telling other generals in captivity:"the whole of their main effort is wrong.The traditional gateway is through the Saar" The Saar is where Montgomery had demanded that Patton's 3rd Army be halted
Again, None of the objectives were met
-Monty wasn't there to direct while an actual Field Marshall Model and Air Borne General Student were in fact conducting a clinic on effective modern mobile warfare
-The V-2s were still being launched
-The deep sea port of Antwerp was still closed that was needed for supplies
-Over 17,000 crack allied Paras were lost.
-The Dutch people suffered reprisals from the hunger winter in 22,000 of their citizens died of starvation and disease.
-Many young Dutchmen were sent to work as slave laborers in defense industry in the Reich
-Allies never made Arnhem much less Berlin as your hero bragged
-Monty would not cross the Rhine for 6 more months and that was with the help of Simpson 9th US Army
-Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success
-From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night. As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
-From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.359 as LT Brian Wilson put it the situation at Arnhem remained desperate yet the Guards Armored Division did not move While the Germans used the windfall respite to organize their blocking line.
-From Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation .Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over. Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured.LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair
he more laissez-faire attitude of the chain of command prevailed .Another precious 24 hrs were allowed to slip by while 1st Airborne Division continued to fight for its life.
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From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14 Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.
From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the*Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp.
From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586 Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude."
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https://www.historynet.com/eisenhower-fire-1944-45.htm
Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative"
Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow thrust strategy could succeed – and Monty botched it Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe.
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Burns you really should go to a library - once your ankle monitor gets removed and the restraining order is rescinded.ENJOY
From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.616 July 17,1944 The RAF had dropped a concentration of 7000 tons of bombs to help the ground troops break through the German defense ring.Around evening Air Marshall Tedder had called IKE and and mentioned Monty had stopped his armor from going any farther.IKE was mad as Monty was drawing up his "administrative tail".The Americans got Saint-Lo,taken in fighting from hedgerow to hedgerow and settled in the streets
From My Three Years With Eisenhower,by Capt.Harry C.Butcher,p.617 July 19,1944Monty had a press conference yesterday at which he said that at least 156,000 Germans had been killed or wounded since D-Day. Yet in the big push east & south of Caen only 2,500 prisoners were taken
IKE said yesterday that with 7000 tons of bombs dropped(around Caen) in the most elaborate bombing of enemy front line positions ever accomplished,only 7 miles were gained can we afford 1000 tons of bombs per mile? The air people are completely disgusted with the lack of progress
From My Three Years with EisenHower,By Harry C.Butcher,p.632 - august 4,1944 "At the SHAEF forward War Room last evening,I learned that the Allies had captured some 78,000 Germans,of which the British captured 14,000.The remainder falling into American hands.This information was reported on August 1st.Since which we have captured 4,000 a day"
My Three Years with Eisenhower," by Captain Harry C. Butcher,p. 651
On August 21, 1944, Butcher wrote about the British reaction to the news that an American general, Omar Bradley, was now equal to their own General Montgomery within the Allied command. "I find that British pride, which seems to have been hurt by the relative slowness of advance of the British-Canadian front, as compared to the more newsworthy break-through of the Americans at St. Lo and subsequent end runs, has been hurt even more by the misunderstanding as to Montgomery's command. Some of the London papers have reflected this feeling. Ike has a first class problem on his hands."
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From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p,43-44 the Fact that both US Airborne formations were misused as conventional infantry under British command for a cosiderable amount period after the Failure of MARKET suggests that the concern for US casualties did not figure highly in Montgomery's or Brownings calculations.
Large scale night landings proved not to be a success and september 17 put Market into a no moon period.Large scale airborne landings were simply not viable in moonless conditions.Both parachutists and glider pilots required a degree of natural illumination in order to judge height ,orientation and degree of descent to avoid landing accidents, with lost/damaged equipment,injuries and probable fatalities
that tended to run counter to those aims Browning who handed over to Brerton that all 17 Bridges had to be sized with thunderclap surprise.And stressed that time constraints meant any arrangements at this stage had to be binding,before imposing a series of conditions and constraints
*From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p46 * the shortage of navigators was so acute that only 4 out of 10 C-47 crews used on the D-Day drop included one,usually flying at the head of the serial.The situation didn't improve by September 1944. the key issue was lack of natural illumination,the 1st airlifts into Normandy involved 900 C-47s and gliders .MARKET envisioned doing the same with around 1,600 flights,with inexperienced and partially trained air crews in the total darkness of a no moon period would have been suicidal.(Williams insistence on a single lift per day and Brereton's acceptance of it may have been less than ideal,but it was the only realistic option in the prevailing circumstances. (Because of a shortage of navigators on longer flights with much shorter days)
From ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p111 This plan got blasted 3 miles in when Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans and continued to collapse on it's self going forward. Viktor Graebner of 9th SS Panzer had 30 armored halftracks,10 - 8 wheeled armored cars and a number of trucks
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Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that.Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation.
-The idea of Monty in charge of an operation filled the Allies with almost unspeakable dread and the Krauts with incredible joy. Bernard was in reality a plodding, unimaginative,spotlight grabbing little shit
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:p.525 Alan Brooke wrote about Monty in his diary "He requires a lot of educating to make him see the whole situation and the war as a whole outside of the 8th Army orbit. A difficult mixture to handle a commander in action and trainer of men,but liable to commit untold errors,due to lack of tact, lack of appreciation of other people's outlook.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.262-63 Brigadier E.T. Williams, Montgomery's Intelligence Chief cautioned the Field Marshall that the Allies "enemy appreciation was very weak" and that no proper study of the ground around Arnhem had been made . A radio decrypt also revealed the enemy expected a XXX Corp thrust toward Nijmegen.
The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,p.270 one terrain study had concluded that cross country movement in the area varies from impracticable to impossible. All canals and rivers present obstacles, accentuated by the thousands of dikes and shallow drainage ditches
*Decision in Normandy,Carlo D'este* from the outset Market Garden was a prescription for trouble that was plagued by mistakes,over sights,false assertions and out right arrogance.It's success hinged on a slender thread attack & its execution would prove disastrously complex.British ground commander Miles Dempsey was sufficiently concerned that he recommended the drop be made near Wessel.Which would enable 1st Army to block a German counter attack.His proposal was never seriously considered or his concerns addressed
Horrocks, A Full Life, p. 205. On 4 September, Montgomery inexplicably halted Horrocks' XXX Corps, the lead element of his Second Army, just seventy miles from the Rhine river. In a military blunder second only to the failure at Antwerp, the Germans were given time to regroup and form defensive lines where none previously existed. Horrocks best describes the frustrations in his memoirs: Had we been able to advance that day we could have smashed through and advanced northward with little or nothing to stop us. we might even have succeeded in bouncing a crossing over the Rhine
Richard Lamb, Montgomery in Europe 1943-1945: Success or Failure? (London: Buchan and Enright, 1983), pp. 201-02 General Pip Roberts was rightfully more critical of Montgomery than Horrocks who as a corps commander accepted much of the blame for the actions of his superiors, "Monty's failure at Antwerp is evidence again that he was not a good General at seizing opportunities."
Sir Francis De Guingand, From Brass Hat to Bowler Hat, p. 16. - Unfortunately I cannot say that I did support Operation MARKET-GARDEN Montgomery's supposed master stroke; but as I was in the hospital in Aldershot I was powerless to dissuade him. I attempted to, on the telephone; for there were too many ifs in the plan and Prince Bernard was warning, from his intelligence network in Bolland, that German armoured units were stationed there. However, to my telephone warnings Montgomery merely replied, 'You are too far away Freddie, and don't know what's going on'
Liddell-Hart, History Second World War, p. 594 Liddell-Hart, although understanding Montgomery's reasoning, believed that the last true hope to end the war in 1944 dissolved with the halting of Patton's tanks on 23 August 1944.
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