Comments by "Big Woody" (@bigwoody4704) on "TIKhistory"
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Beevor's Arnhem is the single most exhaustive and best description and sourced of Operation Market Garden written.Kershaws "It Never Snows in September" covers the German perspective,both basically agree it is the fault of the so called Field Marshall Montgomery failed foreray.Unlike the revision of this host and th rags he quotes. It is written with the benefits of an exhaustive research of the British, American, Dutch and German records, the book provides amazing detail to "The Bridge Too Far" in Arnhem, Nethlerlands. The whole plan suffered from the plain fact that it relied on a single road of attack by the British XXX Corps where going off the road was a near impossibility due to the wet, boggy polders, obvious to anyone who has spent any time in The Netherlands (they rarely use fences in pastures as a dug ditch will quickly fill with water creating a natural barrier). The failure to listen to Dutch military personnel about the geographical defeat of the plan was just another in a string of Montgomery ego led disasters.
The utter evil -- absolutely barbaric and shocking to the conscious -- actions of the Nazi SS, the German commanders in The Netherlands, the Dutch SS and the average German soldier are properly detailed and the Dutch people would rightly demand a fuller accounting of the barbarous actions during those months. The author thoroughly explores the lack of planning by Montgomery and Browning, the willful self delusion of Montgomery borne from an ego that held little regard for the futility and needless death of British and American troops.
Reluctantly and very mistakenly Eisenhower put American Divisions under the command of the British General Montgomery in what turned out to be the greatest loss of any American Airborne Division -- before or since. Montgomery should be a national disgrace to the British, that is clear. Eisenhower began acting as a politician in deferring to Monty's superhuman ego, and abdicated his role as general commanding in a war.
The greatest suffering was then endured by the Dutch people. Epic in its tragedy. A lesson in failed leadership by the British and American commanding generals. A shock and outrage to the conscious in the inhumanity and pure evil of the German army. A story that needs to be retold -- and very well done.
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1st off mantueffel was getting his shit shoved in by Patton's 3rd Army not Monty who wanted to withdaw.And I don't owe you sir an explanation after your rant assholes like little villa were pissing on the honor of dead GIs previously. Hasso had no idea who was doing what on the allied side. Also Monty lost a lot. What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. And then barely.. and poorly.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable
From the Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 469 Montgomery hesitated,suspecting that Runstedt 'had enough combat strength for another attack that could punch through to Liege.Collins thought not. "nobody is going to break through these troops" he told Montgomery"this isn't going to happen. "If the Allies failed to attack closer to the base of the salient,they risked leaving a corridor through which retreating Germans could escape, he told the Field Marshall you're going to push the Germans out of the bag,"Collins added,"just like you did at Falaise
THE ARDENNES:BATTLE OF THE BULGE, by Hugh M. Cole,page 647*CENTER OF MLITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY The failure of the Fifth Panzer Army to close the gap opened by Patton’s troops at Bastogne convinced General Manteuffel that the time had arrived for the German forces in the Ardennes to relinquish all thought of continuing the offensive . Withdrawal in the west and south to a shortened line was more in keeping with the true combat capability of the gravely weakened divisions. At the end of the year Manteuffel had advised pulling back to the line Odeigne–La Roche–St. Hubert. 23 By 2 January Model apparently gave tacit professional agreement to Manteuffel’s views
Oh and whether you admit it or not Monty was a major player at Dunkirk along with Brooke and Gort.Caen - ass kicking,took it in 43 days when he said he'd have it in 1Only took it after 7000 tons of ordinence were shot or dropped from Naval guns(per mile) and Allied BombersFalaise he played politics.Epsom,Goodwood look them up yourself .Market Garden is totally on Monty.
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Watch that video I linked by proffessionals - then you may tackle history
Market Garden is what happens when a moron in the form of Monty is handed command .SHAEF finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 64 mile lane with no room for maneuver and winter closing in is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly.Holes got blasted in this very bad plan from Arnhem all the way down below Valkenswaard Fanboy distortions are ludicrous postmortem to absolve the abrasive egomaniac who in any other army would have been relieved .And if it wasn't for the sorry fact the British Press propped him up beyond his accomplishments & abilities he would have been.Monty won in the desert when he had an embarrassment of Riches.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics
From With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Cassel & Co., 1st edition, copyright 1966 .Page 599 "Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal.
From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, Doubleday & Co., 1st American edition, copyright 1959. From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay.I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."
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Irish Guards there
How about Lt.Col. Vandeluer?
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon .The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over.
Lt Brian Wilson?
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,p.309 At the North end of the Bridge,Major Cook's paratroopers had fully expected the Guards Armored Division to push on immediately to Arnhem just 10 miles up the road. Their elation turned to anger as the growing British Force remained immobile
Having paid in blood to secure the Bridges their ire was understandable and it was shared by their regimental commander Colonel Tucker who was overheard in an exchange with an unknown British major in a command post near the Bridge ramp.General Gavins recollection of visiting Tucker in the early morning of the 21st "Tucker was livid.I had never seen him so angry,his 1st question to me was "what the hell are they doing? We have been in this position for over 12 hours and all they seem to be doing is brewing tea."
The puzzlement was shared by British Officer LT Brian Wilson's platoon from the 3rd Irish Guards had been among the 1st to cross the road bridge in the wake of SgT Robinson's troops and after an night of sitting Wilson stopped at Company HQ "as far as I could discover Nijmegen was cleared....the situation at Arnhem remained desperate.Yet Guards Armored did not move"
German Colonel Heinz Harmel's view the British failure to advance rapidly North from Nijmegen Bridge squandered the last chance to reach 1st Para still clinging to the north end of the Arnhem Bridge.Because at that time there was virtually no German troops between the two points.And that remained the case for up to 16 hrs until the Germans were able to fully access the Arnhem Bridge midday on Sept 21st and bring reinforcements south.By halting XXX Corp effectively handed the intiative back to II SS Panzerkorps which used the time to erect an effective defense where none had existed as the Irish Guards discovered when it finally attempted to resume the advance at 13:30 on 21 September.Why the Guards Armored failed to push on remains controversial
Heinz Harmel?
Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by Willam Buckingham,p.358 LT Brian Wilson of the 3rd Irish Guards recalled patrols of US Paratroopers constantly roaming through his location while "for our part" we just sat in our positions all night.
As Heinz Harmel later put it the English stopped for tea the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
LT John Gorman?
Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 LT John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair"
How about Lt.Col.Mackenzie?
ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p 408 on arrival at the Hotle Hartenstein at 23:45 Lt.-Col Mackenzie opted to keep his dsiquiet over Brownings poor grasp of the gravity of the situation and the marked lack of urgency by XXX Corps and the 43rd Wessex to himself
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@street_cheeks you are getting your wires crossed try reading below
Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge, p366 While undoubtedly an American Triumph,the Ardennes Campaign produced a political defeat for the British. And as Churchill recognized there was a much greater consequence. Montgomery would find himself sidelined once across the Rhine on the advance into Germany and all British advice was ignored.The Country's influence was at an end
The German and Allied casualties in the Ardennes fighting from 16 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 were fairly equaled.
--German losses were around 80,000 dead,wounded,missing.
--The Americans suffered 75,482 casualties,with 8,407 KIA.
--The British lost 1,408 wounded of whom 200 were killed.
Monty lied - the GIs actually thru him into a detaining cage look that up on Mark Felton's Board. Rumors ran rampant there was a monty look alike.Smacked the wisp around a tad,served him right for wanting to retreat then claiming vctory
Ardennes 1944:The Battle of the Bulge,p.356 On January 18,determined to mend fences, Churchill made a speech in the House of Commons to emphasize "The United States troops have done almost all of the Fighting and have suffered almost all of the losses....Care must be taken in telling our proud tale not to claim for the British Army an undue share of what is undoubtedly the greatest American battle of the War and will I believe, be regarded as an ever famous American Victory".It was Montgomery's own fault that political considerations and rivalries now dictated allied strategy
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Cornhole Monty's Market Garble changed the game.The brits were out as a player and the Allies couldn't jump over it because Monty already had most of 3 Air Borne divisions wiped out
Page 409 from Ike & Monty ,Generals at War by Norman Gelb "There were many reasons why Montgomery was being effectively downgraded once more .Eisenhower had no doubt any longer that his reputation as a battle-winning commander was greatly inflated.The experience at Caen,Antwerp,Arnhem and delays in following up the Ardennes assault and the excessively thorough build up for the Rhine crossing provided sufficient evidence for that.General Whitely .IKE's British deputy chief of operations,said the feeling at Allied HQs "was that if anything was to be done quickly,don't give it to Monty. Monty was the last person that would be chosen to drive on Berlin - he would have needed 6 months to prepare"
Overlord,by Max Hastings,page 236 Monty announced during the Caen offensive that he was well pleased with the results.He wired Brooke in London "operations a complete success...he told the press his Armies had broken through the German front.Headlines the next day reflected Montgomery's enthusiasm for the battle:"Second Army breaks through...British Army in full cry...Wide corridor through German front...."
From Churchill and Montgomery Myth,by R.W.Thompson,page 170 None of it was true - when it became obvious a few days later,the news papers were scurrying to correct themselves.Montgomery's exaggerations did not surprise experienced British Journalists;he had destroyed the German 90th Division so many times in N.Africa it had become a joke
Page 331 Ike & Monty by Norman Gelb Apparently the Russians shared the doubts others had about Montgomery in Normandy.Their advancing troops were reported to have put up a road sign near Minsk saying - 1,924 kilometers to Caen
Old Monty at least Japanese Commanders had the common decency to disembowel themselves after a disaster like this
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There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration:
General Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corp In this respect, Generalfeldmarschall Model deserves credit for the skill with which he used the sparse resources available to him, particularly given the state Fifteenth Army was in at the time, and for recognising the importance of the Nijmegen bridges.
Lt General Brereton reported to Washington that Market had been a brilliant success but had been let down by Garden, with which Bradley in part agreed, blaming Montgomery and the slow advance by the British between Nijmegen and Arnhem Major General Urquhart blamed the fact that the drop zones for 1st Airborne were too far from the bridge and rather unfairly, his own actions on the first day.
Lt General Browning's report blamed XXX Corps' underestimation of the strength of the German forces in the area, the slowness with which it moved up the highway the weather, his own communications staff and 2nd Tactical Air Force for failing to provide adequate air support. He also managed to get General Sosabowski dismissed from his command for his increasingly hostile attitude.
Field Marshal Montgomery blamed the slowness of XXX Corps in general and O'Connor in particular. Later, he partially blamed himself, but laid a large proportion of the blame on Eisenhower. ". . . if the operation had been properly backed from its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and administrative resources necessary for the job - it would have succeeded in spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of 2nd SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area."
There is also the matter of allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had moved into the Arnhem area
Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland
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Ah more of Monty's apologists poking their heads out of Monty's backside to explain why Monty was not responsible for the failure of Monty's plan.Allied HQ finally realized giving good troops to Monty was making Russian generals look like humanitarians.Attacking up a 70 mile lane with no room for maneuver during a wet autumn is the idea of an idiot that had no business leading a boy scout assembly.
Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.219 "Montgomery went over my head" Air Marshall Conningham recalled after the war. "Month after month he did that; until he had his failure at Arnhem - then they made him listen. He violated all command channels"
"Monty's water logged summaries tried to hide glaring weaknesses of a hopelessly flawed plan" - Sabastian Ritchie
Alan Brooke's own words
"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke, entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."
Or Bernard himself after the War admitting it
The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, page 303 Even Field Marshall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks, even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway" Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr without Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. He would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
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Monty wasn't a real field Marshall Like Walter Model - who actually showed up and directed
General Montgomery pushed for this debacle and got it .Then doesn't show up to command, as his plan got blasted 3 miles in when Panzerfaust teams took out 9 shermans and continued to collapse on it's self going forward .And things continued to come apart for the next 64 miles .It was a horribly disjointed plan contrived by a damaged little man interested in his own glorification.
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What he won he won with overwhelming superiority in men, materials,ULTRA and air support. And then barely.. and poorly.Not because of maneuver,guile or tactics.Monty had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations. balance,flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.he was vain,rude objectionable - a legend in his own mind
It still took Monty 6 months with the US 9th Army's help to move where he left off at the end of September.The Americans still advanced thru Lorainne,the Hurtgen,The Ardennes and across the Rhine in that time Unlike Montgomery forced to go back and open the Port of Antwerp when he promised he'd be in Berlin - A step backward, after making a wrong turn, isn't a step in the right direction
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You and history have but a fleeting acquaintance Pinhead Monty dawdled and in fact crossed after Bradley/Hodges/Patton/291st Enginneers .Do readers of the comment sections a favor - next time you're pulling numbers and opinions out of your ass,get your head out of there 1st
you need a suppository in your mouth and a history lesson
Page 368,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-1945,By Max Hastings The US Army relished to the utmost the spectacle of Montgomery preparing to "stage" a huge,formal military pageant ,more than 2 days after it's own soldiers had crossed 70 miles to the south. Patton's Army had crossed at night on 22 March - "without the benefit of aerial bombing,ground smoke,artillery preparation and airborne assistance," - all of which 21st Army Group(Montgomery) was employing on a prodigious scale!!
Montgomery in Europe 1943-45,by Richard Lamb pages 360-362 "British 6th Airborne had lost 30% of it's personnel killed and wounded;the Air landing brigade,which came in gliders had lost over 70% of its equipment The Army that needed to keep casualty count low lost over 3,100 men crossing the Rhine north of Wesel The disparity between the number of lives lost at Wesel and the 2 earlier American crossings is striking
Casualty figures for the Rhine River crossings tell a grim story. Hodges 1st US Army got across at Remagen with a casualty count of 31 men Patton's 3rd US Army came across near Oppenheim "with the total loss of 28 men killed and wounded.
Simpson's 9th US Army had to wait and cross with Montgomery;they suffered 491 casualties crossing south of Wesel.The US 17th Airborne Division lost 921 Paratroopers and 350 air crew(all with Montgomery's 21st Army Group)
Then they lost another 841 casualties crossing south The sad fact is Monty rode the GI's coat tails.The only reason IKE went along with anything the he proposed was to give Stalin and the Soviets a look of solidarity
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