Comments by "doveton sturdee" (@dovetonsturdee7033) on "Knowledgia"
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@berniefynn6623 Simply not correct. Rundstedt gave the order, and Hitler agreed with it. Rundstedt, as a traditional European soldier, regarded an army with it's back to the sea as trapped. The British, with their understanding of combined operations going back over 200 years, viewed the sea as a large highway.
The weather varied. On 27 May, the Luftwaffe carried out 12 major attacks, dropping 15,000 HE and 30,000 incendiary bombs. 28 May was overcast, restricting aircraft operations, 29 was fine in the afternoon. 30 May was a foggy and rainy day, with aircraft unable to operate, 31 was bright and clear from late morning, as was 1 June & 2 June.
Aircraft operations were only seriously restricted on two days.
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I don't know how many times it needs writing, but 'HITLER DIDN'T STOP THE ARMOUR ON THE AA CANAL! Von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group A, however, did, in order to service and rest it before beginning the next stage of the campaign. Rundstedt, like several of his colleagues, feared a repetition of the 'Miracle of the Marne.'
Moreover, as a traditional German commander, he regarded an army backed against the sea as trapped, because he simply did not appreciate the flexibility that Sea Power gave to the allies. Add to that the knowledge that the area around Dunkirk was difficult tank country, and the slower moving German infantry divisions were beginning to arrive, and the decision was a logical one. All this, by the way, is fully documented in the War Diary of Army Group A.
Hitler, of course, knew what the ground around Dunkirk was like from his experiences there in WW1, but more importantly had been assured by Goering that the elimination of the trapped Allied forces was 'A special job for the Luftwaffe.'
As to the absurd idea that Hitler let the BEF escape to encourage the British to come to terms, simply ask yourself this question :- Were the British more likely to sign a peace treaty if:
1). Their entire field army was caged in German PoW camps? or,
2). Their entire field army, together with around 120,000 French troops, had just been lifted to safety?
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They were not 'left abandoned.' Firstly, half of the Division was evacuated, the so-called 'Ark Force.' Secondly, the RN's Portsmouth Command sent a large evacuation fleet to St. Valery, but fog in the Channel prevented the lift attempt, which was re-scheduled for 24 hours later. Thirdly, the commander of IX Corps of French 10th Army, of which 51st Highland Division was a part, chose to surrender before the attempt could be made. Fourthly, the evacuation fleet still managed to pick up just over 2,000 men from Veules.
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The Halt Order was issued by Von Rundstedt, not by Hitler, in order to service the armour and rest the crews before embarking on the second part of the French Campaign. Like many other senior commanders, he was concerned that the French might stage a repeat of the WW1 'Miracle of the Marne.' As a conventionally trained and educated German senior officer, he considered an army surrounded and backed against the sea to be trapped, whereas the British, with centuries of experience of naval power, saw the sea as a wide open highway.
Moreover, as both Von Rundstedt and Hitler knew, the area around Dunkirk was difficult country for armour, and the (horse drawn) German infantry divisions, much better suited to it, were beginning to arrive.
Finally, Goering had told Hitler that the elimination of the surrounded allied forces as, as he put it, 'A special job for the Luftwaffe,' and Hitler believed him.
Consequently, the utter failure of the Luftwaffe to live up to Hermann's boasts, and the evacuation of 336,000 allied troops.
Hitler was giving no-one 'a chance.' He simply made a wrong decision, and totally miscalculated the capabilities of the Royal and Merchant Navies.
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@NitishKumar-jm7ec But Hitler didn't halt the tanks. Von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group A, did. He wished to have them serviced before beginning the second stage of the campaign, and was worried about the danger of a second Miracle of the Marne.
You can add to that the fact that the land around Dunkirk is poor tank country. Moreover, like most German commanders, he viewed a surrounded army backed against the sea as trapped, because he had no real grasp of sea power. The British, with their history of naval superiority, saw the sea not as a trap but as a wide open door. So it proved to be.
Oh, and no, the Luftwaffe didn't arrive too late. They were simply not up to the task given to them.
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@NitishKumar-jm7ec If you seek to be patronising, you have chosen the wrong target, unless you also have a First in Modern History and have your name on several books and articles on the subject of the naval history of WW2.
As someone with access to the British, French, & German archives relating to the period, I don't need to waste time on Wikipedia. I would refer you instead to Lord Gort's Second Despatch, paragraph 39, which confirms the the allied retreat to the Belgian frontier defences took place on 22/23 May. Paragraph 43 confirms that the length of the front held by Franco-British forces on the morning of 26 May was 128 miles, but that the intention was to contract to a perimeter of 58 miles. This decision was made jointly with General Blanchard, who had concluded that the optimistic Weygand Plan was simply unrealistic. Gort, like Blanchard, was aware, or at least suspected, that the Belgian army was about to collapse (Paragraph 45) and on the evening of 26 May gave the responsibility for the establishment of the Dunkirk bridgehead to Lt.-Gen. Adam, commander of 3 Corps. Adam began this task in earnest early on 27 May. On 23 May, by the way, RN warships were still lifting troops from Boulogne, an operation which ended early on 24th.
The Luftwaffe on 25 & 26 May had already attacked Dunkirk's port facilities. Significant evacuations only began on 28 May, although a small number had been lifted on 27 May.
I would recommend the Naval Staff History, 'The Evacuation From Dunkirk - Operation Dynamo, 26 May - 4 June, 1940.' Full of precise details, and bearing out, in their entirety, my comments.
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